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Dissertation Abstract 
Jardine, Matheson & Company is a Hong Kong conglomerate that has gone through political 
upheaval, global and regional economic crises, and has survived and transformed itself 
several times in the process. The story of Jardine Matheson is by no means an unmitigated 
success story - management decisions were made on the basis of imperfect information 
and sometimes they proved wrong, with long-term negative impact on the firm. But the story 
of Jardine Matheson is about organizational learning, about the management of capabilities 
in an uncertain environment, about the limitation of risk via organizational routines and 
cooperative external relationships - based on superior expertise in risk management. 
This dissertation is an analysis/history of strategic management at Jardine, Matheson & 
Company, using Resource-based theory as the principal interpretive framework. 
Two periods in the firm's history are examined: the development of its early capabilities 
(1810 to 1906) and the expansion and growth of the firm by acquisition from 1961-1996. 
From their beginning in the commissions business, William Jardine and James Matheson 
developed a reputation for sound financial management that furthered their trading 
relationships and supported their firm's expansion from agency house to managing agent to 
investment house from 1832-1885. 
Through the mid twentieth century, trading firms like Jardine, Matheson provided a single 
source for shipping, insuring, warehousing, marketing and selling goods produced in Europe 
and the US to Asian markets. All trade with the Pacific went through brokers like Jardine, 
Matheson. Jardine, Matheson had the relationships and the reputation; it was the biggest 
and best known of the trading companies. 
Jardine's acquisition strategy of the period 1961-1971 reveals a firm leveraging its distinctive 
capabilities in new Pacific markets; vertically integrating along the lines of its capabilities, 
horizontally integrating to build new capabilities for future growth in 1972-1977 and 
reevaluating its acquisitions and divesting non-performing assets in 1978-1979. The 
Hongkong Land stock swap of the early 1980s - and the firm's consequent high debt 
position - led to critical rethinking of strategic management at Jardine Matheson and a re-
focusing on its historic capabilities by 1984-1989. 
Today, long-term, dense networks of relationships and informal financial credits enable 
Jardine, Matheson to lead the conglomerate sector and enterprising local firms in 
transportation, insurance, hotels and financial services. The firm's entry into branded 
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franchise businesses is an acknowledgment of the value of relationships and reputation 
(both Jardine's and that of the international franchise) to replication and, hence, to continued 
growth. 
The ability of the firm's managers to extend their geographic or functional knowledge to new 
opportunities - and the firm's commitment to cross-training managers - has been essential 
to reputation, innovation and architecture, the sources of added value and basis for strategic 
management at Jardine, Matheson. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction - What Can A Hong Kong 
Conglomerate Teach Us About Uncertainty, 
Relationships and Capabilities? 
Introduction 
Volatility, government policy shifts, chance - unpredictable elements in the life of any 
business - are familiar to the major Asian conglomerates. Some, like Swire Pacific, 
Hutchison Whampoa, Wheelock and Jardine, Matheson & Company, are the descendants 
of the old agency houses and share the opprobrium of a colonial, or worse, opium past. 
In Hong Kong and on the mainland, new business enterprises have emerged or new 
configurations led by Chinese businessmen - like Cheung Kong's Li Kashing - that are 
challenging the old houses for investor dollars because they afford leading edge 
development prospects without the corporate center, asset baggage, and history. 
Jardine, Matheson & Company is the oldest of the firms and the focus of this study. From 
1832 and for a hundred years, the firm's business was risk-broking for buyers and sellers of 
goods from/to Europe and Asia - and based entirely on commissions. The firm extracted 
commissions - as much as 45 cents on every dollar - for services that included sales, 
returns, cost and freight, guarantees of bills, ship's disbursement, insurance, arranging 
insurance, chartering ships, receiving inbound freight, obtaining outbound freight, setting 
insurance losses, negotiating bills of exchange, arbitration of debts, debt settlement, 
managing estates, executors of estates and transshipping goods. Jardine, Matheson could 
charge a commission on sixteen separate "agency" services because the business was very 
risky and the participants in the business - not knowledgeable enough themselves and 
lacking the clout of a big operator like Jardine, Matheson - preferred to have that risk 
managed by a firm with market knowledge, reputation, influence and strong financial 
management skills. 
Today, Jardine Matheson is a multinational company with a range of activities 
encompassing financial services, supermarkets, consumer marketing, engineering and 
construction, motor trading, property and hotels. Jardine's insurance, motors, supermarket 
and hotel businesses are market leaders across Asia. 
Chapter 1: Section 1: Jardine, Matheson & Company as A Study Subject introduces the 
concepts of collaboration, capabilities, learning and inter-firm networks as important to a 
study of strategic management. 
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Chapter 1: Section 2: Dissertation Aim, Key Questions and Rationale identifies the 
purpose of the dissertation, the questions it examines, and the rationale for the selection of 
questions to be addressed in each chapter. 
Chapter 1: Section 3: Dissertation Structure identifies the purpose of each chapter and 
the content of major subheadings in each chapter. 
II 
Chapter 1: Section 1: Jardine, Matheson & Company as A 
Study Subject 
Jardine, Matheson & Company is an example of success and survival in a highly uncertain 
social and political environment. Any search for characteristics and practices responsible 
for success must include collaboration, capabilities, learning and interdependent multi-firm 
networks. 
Because their business lines, customers or markets have evolved in different directions 
depending on their capabilities, Jardine, Matheson competes with other Hong Kong firms 
like Swire and Hutchison and CITlC, among others, for investment capital, coalition 
participation and influence in the region, but these firms are more often collaborators than 
competitors within the ASEAN. 
Since the 1960s, the accelerated globalization of economic activities and global competition, 
have made it impossible for firms like these to rely on their own resources to survive the 
tyranny of global competition. They must pull together other firms, both competitors and 
collaborators, to help them ride out unpredictable storms in the global economy, share 
knowledge and reduce business risk. This has taken the form of external corporate 
networks based on both equity and non-equity arrangements. 
Indeed, Jardine Matheson's diversification in the mid1970s into very different products and 
services leveraged the company's existing capabilities in finance, insurance, trading and 
shipping, marketing and distribution to create internal and external corporate networks 
representing different stages of the same production chain - as well as different production 
chains altogether. Jardine Matheson's managers experienced new learning, a source of 
immediate or potential competitive advantage, and applicable to future growth. 
Not at all a new phenomenon, the concept of intra- and inter-firm networks to reduce risk 
began as early as the 19th century with the Canton Insurance company, headed in alternate 
years by Jardine, Matheson and by Dent & Company, that set insurance rates for shippers; 
the Shipping Conferences, established by John Samuel Swire, to which Butterfield and 
Swire and Jardine Matheson (among others) were parties, which established guaranteed 
routes and rates for shippers, and the British and Chinese Corporation headed by Jardine 
Matheson and Butterfield and Swire to raise and manage Chinese railroad funds. 
Relationships and network building are embedded in the social and economic relations of 
ASEAN firms, where culture, cooperation and trust are essential to business operations 
under uncertainty. In fact, it is the quality and distinctiveness of these intra-firm and inter-firm 
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contracts and relationships that create competitive advantage for the firm within its market. 
according to a Resource-based interpretation of the growth of firms. 
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Chapter 1: Section 2: Dissertation Aim. Key Questions and 
Rationale 
The primary aim of this dissertation is to analyze the strategic management of Jardine, 
Matheson & Company, using Resource-based theory as the principal interpretive 
framework, although Harvard and Chicago School views are also considered. The 
dissertation covers two periods, the development of Jardine, Matheson's network of 
relationships and capabilities from 1810 to 1906, and the transnational expansion of Jardine, 
Matheson's businesses and markets from 1961 to the present. 
The unique contribution of this dissertation is in its attempt to operationalize the Resource-
based view, applying that view to the broad historical sweep of the development of one 
major company to help explain that firm's sustainability and the consistency of its strategic 
practices, policies and management. 
In a Resource-based interpretation, a firm's strategic choices are aimed at developing and 
applying profitably its distinctive capabilities. Resources and services are chosen for 
development and growth in response to internal and external factors. Failure is inevitable 
and can be attributed to a misunderstanding by the firm of its own capabilities or the 
capabilities needed in a new market. Of particular interest is the firm's role in creating 
markets or market institutions, that is to say the development of routines for the functioning 
of the various markets the firm was helping to develop. In a Resource-based interpretation, 
the founders and managers of the firm develop an internal and external architecture to learn, 
collaborate and reduce risk. Initiative is primary and encouraged; only reasonable routines 
are established to curb opportunism. Finally, raising funds, when necessary, is part of the 
managerial or entrepreneurial task. 
Hence, the interpretation of strategic management in Jardine, Matheson & Company 
requires answers some critical questions: 
• How and why did Jardine, Matheson's founders and managers develop particular 
resources and services? (Question 1) 
• What internal (including the firm and its agents) and external (including government, 
social policy, competition, new entrants, buyers and suppliers) factors were 
responsible for their choices? (Question 2) 
• The firm's choices met with some notable successes - and some notable failures. 
How are the firm's failures explained? (Question 3) 
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• At the firm's origin - and again after WWII and the Korean War - there were as yet 
no markets in Asia, in the sense of market institutions. What role did the firm play in 
the development of markets? (Question 4) 
• What was the organizational structure of the firm, including both internal and 
external, that allowed for consistent business routines and promoted organizational 
learning? (Question 5) 
• How did Jardine, Matheson promote managerial initiative while curbing 
opportunism? (Question 6) 
• How did Jardine, Matheson raise funds for growth? (Question 7) 
But the study of strategic management in Jardine, Matheson is more than a series of 
responses to probing questions. The study provides both context for and systematic 
analysis of firm decision-making. Senior executives of Jardine, Matheson were unusually 
explicit about the reasons for what they were trying to do, both in the early period as 
evidenced in the Jardine, Matheson Archives, and in the later period, in the Annual Reports, 
interviews and investment records. 
The early Jardine, Matheson & Company was the direct descendant of the first private 
trading company with a history and experience in the Far East that spanned 200 years. The 
firm was the inheritor of administrative routines and a network of trading relationships that 
grew out of the very special business, social and political environment in China during the 
early nineteenth century. The opportunity - as well as the uncertainty - of the China trade 
made profitable a range of services to businesses and individuals that protected their 
investments and shipments, while Jardine, Matheson & Company absorbed the risk. The 
firm was in a position to do this so long as it did not invest in the commodities in which it 
traded or which it insured. Fundamental to Jardine, Matheson's success and the reputation 
it built for financial probity was the fundamental strategic decision to eschew speculation and 
to concentrate on building up a pattern of relationships within and outside the business 
which would foster the flow of information, the knowledge with which to interpret it, the ability 
to influence others and the reputation to attract and retain trading partners. 
Resource and services choices (Question 1) the internal and external factors responsible for 
those choices (Question 2), the development of routines for the functioning of the various 
markets which Jardine, Matheson was helping to develop (Question 4), and managerial 
fundraising for new opportunities (Question 7) are issues for the development of any firm, 
and are part of the discussion of the early history of Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1810 to 
1906 which absorbs Chapter 4. 
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While the early history occupies only one chapter of this dissertation, the decisions made by 
the early firm frame the resource and services choices made by Jardine, Matheson & 
Company after WWII, after the near destruction of the firm and its assets, and the 
imprisonment or exile of many of the firm's managers. There was little left after the war -
beyond the ambition of the Keswicks to rebuild in an uncertain environment they believed 
they knew far better than the Europeans and Americans who saw advantage in marketing 
their products in China. The pace of growth, the sometimes-speculative decision-making, 
made some degree of failure inevitable. Just as inevitable, given the firm's inexperience 
with strategic failure, was a trial and error approach to climbing out of failure. Part of the 
firm's escalating fear of failure was the level of debt financing incurred to fund growth. 
Like the previous chapter, Chapter 5 is an overview chapter that covers the post WWII 
period to 1996. The Chapter examines the firm's resource and services choices made in 
each of four sub-periods from 1961-1996 (Question 1). It is impossible to separate these 
choices from the firm's perception of productive opportunity; hence, in telling the story of 
Jardine, Matheson's emergence from WWII and aggressive acquisitions and divestiture 
strategy, attention is also paid to the environmental conditions in which the firm assessed 
opportunity and made choices. Chapter 5 also deals with the firm's first significant 
experience of failure (Question 3). The mechanisms used by the firm to raise funds for 
continued growth (Question 7) are also explored. 
The extraordinary range of product/market choices made by Jardine, Matheson during the 
period covered in Chapter 5 might be explained by a loss of focus with painful 
consequences, leading to a re-examination and re-focusing of the company along the lines 
of its historic capabilities. While the final outcome was indeed a re-focusing, the internal and 
external factors responsible for the firm's choices defend their logic, consistency, insight into 
industrial development, and real productive opportunity for extending historical capabilities 
and relationships into new business areas. Hence, Chapter 6 is an in-depth analysis of the 
firm's investments, its acquisitions and divestitures from 1972 to 1996 to understand the 
industry (external) and skills (internal) factors responsible for Jardine. Matheson's resource 
and services choices (Question 2). 
The firm's ability to grow depended on the capability and experience of its managers -
including the ability to foster the flow of information, the knowledge with which to interpret it, 
the ability to influence others and the reputation to attract and retain trading partners. 
Hence, Chapter 7 is dedicated to the organizational structure of the firm, including both 
internal and external organizations, that allowed for consistent business routines and 
promoted organizational learning (Question 5). The chapter deals with organizational 
learning from the 
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viewpoint of management processes, including the training of high potential management; 
the involvement of the firm's senior managers on the boards of influential external bodies, 
and the surfacing, review and approval of new investment ideas. The chapter also covers 
the management processes that protected the Company from ill-considered or opportunistic 
projects sponsored by departments or by associated or subsidiary firms (Question 6). 
To support a Resource-based interpretation of resource/services choices based on 
capabilities, the management of uncertainty, the development of external insight and 
continued organizational learning, Chapter 8 looks at the history of strategic management at 
Jardine, at four breakpoints - 1832, 1885,1977 and 1996. The breakpoint is a snapshot of 
the company at a point in time when a new business model was in play: in 1832, the 
"agency house" was the operative model; in 1885, the freestanding investment house; in 
1977 international commodities trading and investment in 1996, international brand building. 
Chapter 8 addresses the organizational learning component of Question 5 as revealed in 
firm decision-making. 
Chapter 9 provides a broad overview of the questions and answers, comparing alternative 
Resource-based, Harvard and Chicago school interpretations. 
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Chapter 1: Section 3: Dissertation Structure 
The dissertation is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 is a critical account of Resource-based theory as a framework for interpreting 
business strategy. 
Chapter 2: Section 1: Comparison of Harvard, Chicago and Resource-based 
Theories of the Firm introduces three strands of firm theory, the first two are Harvard 
and Chicago school industrial organization economics, still deeply rooted in neo-
classical firm theory, and the third is Resource-based theory. The section summarizes 
and analyzes Resource-based theory in terms of its similarities to and differences from 
these 10 related theories. 
Chapter 2: Section 2: Edith Penrose and The (Resource-based) Theory of the 
Growth of the Firm drives deeper into the concepts of Resource-based theory 
articulated by Edith Penrose. 
Chapter 2: Section 3: Edith Penrose, Her Influencers and Influences - Big Ideas 
for Economics and Strategic Management focuses on the major ideas and themes, 
drawn from economics and strategic management that will be investigated in this 
dissertation. 
Chapter 3 deals with the methodology used in this dissertation: the primary sources used, 
how the business facts were gathered, analyzed and presented, and the findings interpreted 
in light of the theory literature. 
Chapter 3: Section 1: Key Questions and Hypotheses identifies some significant 
questions important to understanding strategic management in Jardine Matheson and 
proposes a set of hypotheses valuable to evaluating alternative Resource-based, 
Harvard or Chicago school interpretations. 
Chapter 3: Section 2: Four Tests of Validity and Reliability examines the kinds and 
use of information sources to establish the quality of the research design. 
Chapter 4 takes a case study approach to the early years of Jardine, Matheson & 
Company, beginning with the progenitors of the firm, the early private trade, from 1810 to 
the firm's establishment as a public liability company in 1906. The chapter deals with the 
early resources and services choices made by the firm (Question 1), based on the internal 
and 
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external factors, including the very special business, social and political environment into 
which Jardine and Matheson entered (Question 2), the development of markets (Question 4) 
and the firm's establishment of mechanisms to raise funds for investments (Question 7). 
Chapter 4: Section 1: Resource/Service Choices and Origins of Market Institutions 
looks at the services required of private traders and the establishment of market 
institutions in a commercial atmosphere of high risk and volatile political conditions. 
Chapter 4: Section 2: Internal and External Factors Responsible for 
Resource/Services Choices looks at the establishment and communication of decision 
rules that allowed the firm to build and protect its reputation for sound financial 
management and network of trading relationships. The section also deals with the firm's 
evolving relationship with government. 
Chapter 4: Section 3: Fundralsing for Growth: From Joint Stock to Free-standing 
Investment House looks at Jardine, Matheson's changing role as investor with partners 
in the development of China and the ASEAN. 
Chapter 4: Section 4: Jardine, Matheson's Resource/ Services Choices, 
Contributing Factors, Development of Market Institutions and Fundraislng 
Mechanisms: A Resource-based Interpretation summarizes key research findings for 
the early period in light of four of the seven questions posed by this dissertation. 
Chapter 5 extends the case study approach to the firm's period of international growth and 
expansion, debt and recovery, from 1961-1996. The chapter sheds light on senior 
management's understanding of the firm's capabilities and perceived ability to reshape 
these to address new opportunities. Simon Keswick's asset sales of the mid 1980s provides 
evidence that the use of Resource-based theory to interpret a firm's record is not tied to any 
notion of necessary success for a 'correctly-based' strategy - provided there is some 
evidence, other than outcomes, from which to infer the reasons and expectations which led 
to action. 
This Chapter looks at the firm's resource and services choices (Question 1) over four sub-
periods, 1961-1971; 1972-1977; and 1978-1983; 1984-1996. The firm's first experience 
with failure (Question 3) is dealt with, as are mechanisms used by the firm to raise funds for 
growth (Question 7). 
Chapter 5: Section 1: Resource/Services Choices and Contributing Factors to 
1961 establishes the 20th century political and economic context for Jardine, 
Matheson's resource/services choices, including the decision to go public in 1961. 
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Chapter 5: Section 2: Building on Historic Capabilities: Stepping Stones Period, 
1961 -1971 describes the firm's resource and services choices during the first of 
Jardine, Matheson's growth periods, including cautious expansion into new geographic 
markets and extensive investment in the economic development of Hong Kong. 
Chapter 5: Section 3: Speculating in Commodities and Manufactures: Exploit and 
Develop Period, 1972 -1977 describes the resource and services choices made by 
during Jardine, Matheson's aggressive international expansion into new and unrelated 
businesses, including manufacturing and natural resources. 
Chapter 5: Section 4: Rationalizing Commodities and Manufactures: Harvest and 
Divest Period, 1978 -1983 describes the resource and services choices made during 
an equally intense period of divestiture activity, during which Jardine, Matheson 
rationalized both businesses and markets in response to internal and environmental 
factors. 
Chapter 5: Section 5: Experience of Failure: Focus on Distinctive Capabilities 
Period, 1984 -1996 describes a period of reduced acquisition activity during which the 
firm concentrated on core businesses and new competencies in retail and services. 
The firm's choices met with notable failures. The section deals with Jardine's 
experience and explanation of failure. 
Chapter 5: Section 6: Fundraising for Investment describes the self-financed growth 
of the "Stepping Stones" period and the increasingly leveraged growth of the "Exploit 
and Develop" period. 
Chapter 5: Section 7: Choices, Failure and Investment: Interpretation of Jardine, 
Matheson's Growth Strategy Using Resource-based Theory compares the proposed 
Resource-based interpretation of Jardine, Matheson's choice of resources and services 
based on capabilities with the alternative explanations of the Harvard and Chicago 
school. 
Chapter 6 offers an analysis of the "industrial logic" of Jardine, Matheson & Company 
acquisition and divestiture strategies. The Chapter deals with the internal and external 
factors responsible for the firm's resource and services choices (Question 2). 
Chapter 6: Section 1: External Factors - Jardine, Matheson's Acquisitions and 
Divestitures by Industry analyzes acquisitions and divestments by industry group and 
major category over each of the strategic sub-periods. 
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Chapter 6: Section 2: Internal Factors - Skills Required by Acquired Firms 
identifies and compares the skills required by the firm's manufacturing, resource and 
services acquisitions with those required by Jardine, Matheson's core businesses. 
Chapter 6: Section 3: Geographic Spread of Jardine, Matheson's Acquisitions and 
Divestitures analyzes the entry and exit strategies of the firm. 
Chapter 6: Section 4: Comparison of Jardine, Matheson's Acquisitions with Those 
of Other International Firms During the Same Periods looks at trends and patterns of 
acquisition activity across industries and geographies for the same period. 
Chapter 6: Section 5: Could Jardine, Matheson Leverage Its Distinctive 
Capabilities More Effectively By Building An External Organization? The section 
examines the advantages to Jardine, Matheson of its "external organization," that is, its 
network of equity and trade relationships, versus market transactions. 
Chapter 6: Section 6: The Internal and External Factors Responsible for Jardine, 
Matheson's Resourcel Services Choices: A Resource-based Interpretation. The 
Resource-based view is compared with Harvard and Chicago interpretations. 
Chapter 7 examines organizational structure, knowledge sharing and the training and 
development of Jardine, Matheson's human resources to accommodate and accelerate 
growth while managing uncertainty. Sections 1 and 2 deal with the internal organization of 
the firm. Section 4 deals with the external organization, and Section 5 compares Jardine, 
Matheson & Company's external organization with that of the Japanese general trading 
company. The Chapter deals with the creation of an external organization, in which 
participants become dependent on the technical and communications architecture set by 
upstream participants (Question 5). Chapter 7: Section 3 also deals with the firm's methods 
for enhancing managerial initiative while curbing opportunism (Question 6). 
Chapter 7: Section 1: Interpersonal Networks tracks some 200 of Jardine, 
Matheson's managers from 1972 to 1996 to determine how managers contribute to the 
intra- and inter-firm network. 
Chapter 7: Section 2: Internal and External Relationships: Parent and Subsidiary 
Firms - Affillatlonal Ties discusses resource dispersion and networks at Jardine. 
Matheson. 
Chapter 7: Section 3: Encouraging Initiative While Curbing Opportunism discusses 
the role of boards in decision-making at Jardine, Matheson. 
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Chapter 7: Section 4: External Relationships - Impact on Influence and 
Reputation discusses the information gathering, influence and decision making roles 
played by Jardine, Matheson executives on the boards of government, bank and 
social/political clubs. 
Chapter 7: Section 5: Internal and External Organization and Growth discusses the 
roles of organization (Question 5) and managerial initiative (Question 6) in firm strategic 
management, and compares a Resource-based interpretation with altemative Harvard 
and Chicago school views. 
Drawing on the seven questions and their responses, including both the business facts 
presented in the preceding chapters as well as additional detail from my case study 
research, Chapter 8 audits Jardine, Matheson's and strategic management and 
organizational learning overfour breakpoints, 1832, 1885, 1977, 1996. 
Chapter 8: Section 1: Strategic Audit ofthe Environment and the Industry 1832-
1996 identifies Jardine, Matheson's principal external relationships with suppliers, 
customers and competitors, and how those relationships have changed over time. 
Chapter 8: Section 2: Strategic Audit of the Firm, Jardine, Matheson & Company. 
1832-1996 considers how Jardine, Matheson's capabilities have been deployed in the 
firm's chosen markets, how appropriable are their returns, and how the firm's 
capabilities have changed over time to meet evolving business needs. 
Chapter 8: Section 3: Implications for Learning and Innovation considers the 
change in value and use of resources and capabilities over Jardine, Matheson's history. 
Chapter 9 summarizes the findings of this research, re-examines the applicability of a 
Resource-based - versus monopoly (Harvard) or ownership (Chicago) - interpretation of 
strategic management in Jardine, Matheson, examines the contribution of this study to the 
strategic management literature and suggests directions for further research. 
Chapter 9: Section 1: Summary of Research Findings recaps the major findings of 
Chapters 4 through 8. 
Chapter 9: Section 2: The Applicability of A Resource-based Interpretation of 
Strategic Management In Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1832-1996 re-examines 
the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 and summarizes the case for a Resource-based 
interpretation. Alternate Harvard and Chicago school hypotheses are critiqued. 
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Chapter 9: Section 3: Contribution of this Study to the Strategic Management 
Literature and Directions for Future Research. 
Chapter 9 recaps the major findings of Chapters 5 through 8; looks at the comparative 
usefulness of Resource-based theory and the Harvard and Chicago School views to 
interpret strategic management in Jardine Matheson. The Chapter offers suggestions for 
further research into Jardine, Matheson & Company and the strategic management 
literature. 
Each chapter begins with an introduction, including chapter contents and structure. Each 
chapter contains three or more subsections that are clearly identified. Within each 
subsection are italicized subheadings. 
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Chapter 2: A Critical Account of Resource-based 
Theory as a Framework for Interpreting Business 
Strategy 
Introduction 
Many researchers and practitioners have sought to interpret business strategy, looking for 
the reasons behind the development and growth of firms - or looking to predict future 
behavior (or future growth) from an analysis of past action and performance. The focus of 
firm theory has shifted from the firm as a production function (neoclassical school) to the 
firm as monopolist (Harvard School, Bain 10), to the firm as a contributor to social welfare 
(Chicago School), to the firm as an innovator (Resource-based theory). 
These schools of theory differ with respect to the relative importance of the roles they assign 
firm and industry. Is it the firm (Chicago and Resource-based views) or industry structure 
(Harvard School) that exerts most significant impact on firm strategy and growth? And if it is 
the firm, is it ownership and efficiency (Chicago School) or distinctive capabilities resident in 
the firm (Resource-based theory) that create efficiencies and new profitable opportunities? 
Both Harvard and Chicago schools assume perfect knowledge, at least of all relevant 
probabilities. Firms therefore can create strategy for sustainable advantage. By contrast, 
the Resource-based view assumes firms will do their best to plan for different outcomes in 
the midst of uncertainty and will attempt to minimize risk. 
Chapter 2: Section 1: Comparison of Harvard, Chicago and Resource-based Theories 
of the Firm introduces three strands of firm theory, the first two are Harvard and Chicago 
school industrial organization economics, still deeply rooted in neo-classical firm theory, and 
the third is Resource-based theory. The section summarizes and analyzes Resource-based 
theory in terms of its similarities to and differences from these 10 related theories. 
Chapter 2: Section 2: Edith Penrose and The (Resource-based) Theory of the Growth 
of the Firm drives deeper into the concepts of Resource-based theory articulated by Edith 
Penrose. 
Chapter 2: Section 3: Edith Penrose, Her Influencers and Influences - Big Ideas for 
Economics and Strategic Management focuses on the major ideas and themes, drawn 
from economics and strategic management that will be investigated in this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: Section 1: Comparison of Harvard. Chicago and 
Resource-based Theories of the Firm 
When is a firm not a firm? In neoclassical theory, the firm was a black box,1 which costlessly 
made optimal decisions in response to price signals in the marketplace. 
The neoclassical firm was a specifiable production function, teaming two inputs, labor and 
capital, and operating on the following assumptions: (a) that the "right" input mix can be 
ascertained via a cost curve; (b) the marginal contribution of each input is easily calculable; 
(c) all parties have perfect and complete information; and (d) resources are mobile and 
divisible and flow unimpeded to the highest value use.2 
The historical basis of the model was an undeveloped agrarian economy with standardized 
products, numerous firms in markets, each firm with a small share and unable by its action 
alone to exert significant influence over price, no barriers to entry, and output carried to the 
point where each seller's marginal cost equaled the going market price. 3 
The theory of perfect competition gave way to modeling the firm as a mechanism to restrain 
output through monopoly or collusion. The focus of this model was the large firm, because 
large firms controlled substantial proportions of industry output and were believed to have 
the greatest opportunity and incentive to engage in monopolistic or collusive practices.4 
In the Harvard School's standard industrial organization (10) model, firms want to restrain 
output so that market price will be driven up. The successful firm's profit is the difference 
between an artificially high market price and its costs. Competition for monopoly control is 
the firm's motivation. The main limitation on size and scope in the standard model is 
governmental intervention. 
Even vertical integration is seen as a method of extending monopoly power to downstream 
industries. Acquiring own source of raw material is seen to free a firm from another's control 
over price. And advertising or product differentiation are viewed as ways to erect barriers 
and increase monopoly power.5 
Edith Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (Oxford: Blackwell. 1959). p. xiii 
2 
Frank H. Knight. Risk Uncertainty and Profit (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co .• 1921). p. 320 
3 E.M. Singer. Antitrust Economics and Legal Analysis (Columbus. OH: Grid Publishing. 1981). p. 2. 
4 
L.W. Weiss. "The Concentration-profits Relationship and Antitrust: in H. Goldschmid. H.M. Mann & J.F. Weston. 
ed. Industrial Concentration: The New Learning (Boston: Little. Brown. 1975). p. 184. 
5 W. S. Comanor. "Vertical Mergers. Market Power and the Antitrust Laws," Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 
57. p. 259-62. See also W.S. Comanor and TA Wilson. Advertising and Market power (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 1974). 
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While the perfect competition model predicts no persistent performance differences among 
firms, standard 10 predicts persistent, above normal returns based on efficiency differences 
among firms or the ability of firms in an industry to restrict new entrants. 
Joe Sain's 1950s era studies to defend his "structure-conduct-performance" hypothesis 
analyzed data from the middle of the Depression era, supporting the belief that control and 
deterrence of competition by firms with market power were the central economic forces in 
the economy, instead of firms competing over making at lower cost a product consumers 
preferred.6 
Michael Porter's "Five Forces" model is based on Sain's structure-conduct-performance 
hypothesis in which industry structure - e.g. numbers of sellers and buyers, product 
differentiation, barriers to entry, degree of fixed versus variable costs, and vertical 
integration - determines firm conduct - e.g. pricing and advertising - which in turn 
determines economic performance. 7 Underpinning Porter's framework are three sources of 
external constraints that affect the ability of inputs to generate rents - demand, public policy 
and competitor action. Like Sain 10, Porter's model looks to the firm to deploy its resources 
to deter competition, to co-opt it through collusion or to destroy it through below cost 
predatory pricing.8 
The Chicago response to counter the Bain 10 view - as well as the public policy initiatives 
resulting from that view - gained its momentum from an effort to understand the economic 
rationale and impact of social welfare practices on business.9 The Chicago tradition 
questioned the power of government intervention to increase welfare, arguing that the 
"social costs" of government-imposed divestiture for reasons of size or concentration 
outweighed the benefits. The Chicago tradition viewed many practices that the Harvard 
school considered monopolistic or collusive as simply the outcome of firms trying to 
maximize productive efficiency.1o 
The scholars of the Chicago tradition reconfirmed through renewed application of price 
theory the efficacy of market mechanisms in achieving welfare-enhancing ends. The 
Chicago tradition also applies central concepts of neoclassical price theory - profit 
6 J.S. Bain, "Worl<able Competition in Oligopoly: Theoretical Considerations and Some Empirical Evidence," 
American Economic Review. Vol. 40, pp. 35-47; also, J.S. Bain, "Economies of Scale, Concentration and the 
7 Conditions of Entry in Twenty Manufacturing-Industries. American Economic Review, Vol. 44, pp. 15-39. 
8 Michael E. Porter, Competltiye Strategy (New Vorl<: Free Press, 1980). 
Idem, also Michael E. Porter, Competitive Adyantage (New Vorl<: Free Press, 1985). 
9 
G.J. Stigler, "A Theory of Oligopoly" in G.J. Stigler, The Organization of Indystrv (Homewood: Irwin, 1968), p. 38. 
10 H. Demsetz. "Industry Structure, Marl<et Rivalry and Public Policy," Joymal of Law and Economics. Vol. 16. pp. 
1-9; H. Demsetz, The Market Concantratlon Doctrine (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, Hoover 
Policy Studies, 1973). 
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maximizing behavior and competition. A central assumption within the Chicago tradition is 
that of costly information. 
The Chicago school offered efficiency-based explanations for a number of practices that 
Bain saw as monopolistic, for example vertical integration, related by the Chicago school to 
the efficiency with which suppliers can or cannot supply a firm over the various stages of a 
product life cycle. 11 In the Chicago view firm size and scope are determined by efficiency. If 
a firm can make efficiency gains, it will grow. If not, it will shrink as competitors erode the 
firm's source of advantage. 
Important to the Chicago perspective is the paramount role of entry of new competitors in 
imposing an efficiency imperative on incumbent firms and determining long run earnings 
potential. To deter competition, it is necessary to erect legal and impenetrable barriers to 
entry through ownership of assets or vertical integration. 12 
Information, locked in assets, is another and perhaps the most fundamental barrier to 
entry,13 according to the Chicago tradition. Information costs constitute hurdles to all who 
would have entered the industry. Complete knowledge about products and firms would 
make brand loyalty useless from both consumer and seller viewpoints. In the presence of 
such costs, competitors are deterred from entry, and consumers will find it useful to rely on 
the firm's experience and reputation, on its history, or on the fact that the firm has made 
sizeable investments to this industry.14 
By contrast with the Harvard and Chicago models which assume firms' perfect knowledge, 
much like neo-classical theory, the Resource-based view is fundamentally a process theory, 
embodying learning and also the decay of static advantages, though a concept of 
equilibrium may be useful to explain the persistence of strategic principles through a 
sequence of actions. 
As in the Bain 10 and Chicago school model theories described above, the firm's ultimate 
objective in a Resource-based approach is above normal returns, but obtaining such returns 
is tied to the distinctiveness of the firm's product, and the distinctiveness of the product to 
the distinctiveness of its inputs or resources. Articulated by Edith Penrose in 1959, "The 
core of the theory of the growth of the firm can be very simply stated. We start with the 
function of the firm and from this derive the appropriate definition of the firm. The economic 
function of 
11 G.J. Stigler, "The Economics of Information," in G.J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry (Homewood: Irwin, 
1968). 
12 G.H. Stigler, "The Division of Labor is limited by the Extent of the Market," in The Organization and I~ 
13 (Homewood: Irwin, 1968). 
H. Demsetz, "Barriers to Entry," American Economic Review, Vol. 72, p. 52. 
14 H. Demsetz, "Barriers to Entry," idem, p. 50. 
27 
a firm is that of acquiring and organizing human and other resources in order profitably to 
supply goods and services to the market.,,15 
In a Resource-based view, the critical problem faced by the firm is how to maintain the 
distinctiveness of its product. Like the Chicago School (and unlike the Harvard School) the 
Resource-based view sees abnormal returns resulting primarily from the acumen or luck of 
the firm in acquiring, combining and deploying resources and relationships more quickly or 
more effectively than other firms in the industry and in the environment which the firm finds 
itself. 16 
Unlike the Chicago School, in the Resource-based view the acquisition of resources and 
operational efficiency are not enough. Edith Penrose distinguished between resources and 
services precisely in order to produce an analysis in which the relevant uses of resources 
were problematic; resources themselves are created partly by a continuous process in the 
course of business, and partly by deliberate action guided by some conception - a scenario 
rather than a forecast - of what might be achieved.17 
Since the necessary conditions for Resource-based theory are highly imperfect knowledge 
and cognitive limitations, any intendedly comprehensive strategy must include more than 
the development and application of capabilities; it requires the management of uncertainty, 
which is a question both of productive and marketing capabilities and of governance. 
A summary comparison of the Resource-based view with the neoclassical, Harvard (Bain 
10) and Chicago School models reveals these similarities and dissimilarities. 
• The neoclassical school presumes perfect knowledge - so do the Harvard and Chicago 
Schools. On the contrary, the Resource-based view presumes that the firm operates in 
an uncertain world. 
• Perfect knowledge assumes that successful strategy can be deduced. The Harvard and 
Chicago Schools operate on this basis, hence failure can be avoided. In the Resource-
based view, uncertainty makes it impossible to deduce successful strategy. Strategy is 
fallible, extra-logical. 
• Neoclassical theory views the firm as a combiner of physical inputs with predictable 
physical output and with perfect knowledge of market demand. The Resource-based 
view operates under no production algorithm. The identification and combination of 
15 Edith Penrose, ibid, p.lx 
16 The basic Resource-based view articulated R.P. Rumelt, Strategy. Structure and Economic Performance 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 567; B. Wemerfelt, "A Resource-based view of the Firm," 
Strategic Management Journal Vol. 5, pp. 173; J.B. Barney, -Strategic Factor Markets: Expectations, Luck and 
Business Strategy," Management Science, Vol. 32, pp. 1231-41. 
17 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. 55. 
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• resources is problematic. Resource availability may be unpredictable. Both the inputs 
and the output of the firm may be intangible, the by-products of teams of resources, 
whose causal connections are ambiguous. Discerning appropriate inputs is ultimately a 
matter of entrepreneurial vision and intuition. 
• According to the Harvard School, a firm's environment poses critical constraints on 
strategy. These constraints may be other firms (competition or monopoly) or 
government. While accepting the possibility of environmental constraints (and arguing 
the firm's ability to adapt to constraints and shape its own environment), the Resource-
based view holds that restraints through monopolistic or collusive action - or investment 
in entry barriers - are not primary sources of above normal rents. It is the firm - not the 
industry - that is the unit of analysis. The internal organization of the firm is a critical 
variable. Firm behavior may be at least as much a matter of managerial choice as the 
foregone conclusion of industry structure. 
• According to the Chicago School, firms are production and distribution efficiency 
seekers hence firms make acquisitions to obtain scale economies. The size and scope 
of the firm reflect the extent to which production and distribution efficiencies are 
achieved. On the contrary, in the Resource-based view, efficiency seeking goes far 
beyond current production, extending also to new products, new routines, and new 
relationships. 
• Both the Harvard and Chicago Schools view persistent abnormal rents as possible. So 
does Resource-based theory, but knowledge, innovation and other intangibles are as 
important to the Resource-based firm as the attainment of rents - and equally a source 
of growth. 
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Chapter 2: Section 2: Edith Penrose and The (Resource-
based) Theory of the Growth of the Firm 
The previous section suggested three alternative interpretations for the existence and 
activities of firms, the Harvard school, Chicago school and Resource-based view. This 
section focuses on the contributions of Edith Penrose to the Resource-based view, to 
industrial organization and to economics. 
In her 1959 Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Edith Penrose defines and describes a firm 
not as monopolist but as innovator, as the coordinator of the capabilities of its managers, 
who recombine resources - and learn from mistakes time and again - to provide distinctive 
and creative products and services that are valuable to the firm's markets. Indeed, the 
firm's managers are responsible for the growth of the firm and for whatever limits there may 
be to the rate of growth. 18 For her understanding of the firm as a dynamic human 
organization, Penrose is indebted to Alfred Marshall who saw in economics "a study of 
mankind in the ordinary business of life. For the business by which a person earns his 
livelihood generally fills his thoughts during by far the greater part of those hours in which 
his mind is at its best; during them his character is being formed by the way in which he 
uses his faculties in his work, by the thoughts and feelings which it suggests, and by his 
relations to his associates in work, his employers or his employees.,,19 
The key contributions of Penrose's thought include: 
• A definition of the firm as a collection of productive resources the disposal of which 
between different uses and over time is determined by administrative decisions.2o 
• A definition of resources that includes physical and human resources which in turn 
consist of a bundle of potential services and can, for the most part, be defined 
independently of their use.21 
• A definition of firm governance as an administrative framework within which resources 
are bound together and whose boundaries are determined by administrative 
coordination or authoritative communication (including term contracts, leases and patent 
license agreements, which may provide controls that are as effective as "administrative 
coordination,,}.22 
18 Edith Penrose, Ibid. pp. 43-64. 
19 Alfred Marshall, principles of Economics (Macmillan, 1949), Book I, p. 1. 
20 Edith Penrose, Ibid., p. 24 
21 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. xl. 
22 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. 189-91. 
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• A dynamic process theory of the continuous but limited growth of the firm based on 
entrepreneurial vision or 'image.' In order to focus attention on the crucial role of a 
firm's inherited resources, the environment is treated ... as an 'image' in the 
entrepreneur's mind of the possibilities and restrictions with which he is confronted, for it 
is, after all, such an 'image' which in fact determines a man's behavior; whether 
experience confirms expectations is another story?3 
• A perspective on the limits to firm growth rate and size, the former limited by the growth 
of knowledge within it, but the latter by the extent to which administrative effectiveness 
can continue to reach its expanding boundaries.24 
• A view of the importance of managers to firm growth and hence to profits. "Profits 
... (are) a necessary condition of expansion." Growth, therefore, was a chief reason for 
the interest of managers in profits.25 
• An understanding of the importance of inherited managerial capability to the successful 
expansion of the firm through acquisition. The availability of inherited managers with 
such experience limits the amount of expansion that can be planned or undertaken in 
any period of time. Such managers, by definition, cannot be acquired from the market 
but are a necessary input in expansion.26 
• A recognition that even growth by acquisition and merger does not escape the 
constraints imposed by the necessity of using inputs from existing managerial resources 
to maintain the coherence of the organization.27 
• A necessary connection between the growth of the firm and the increasing experience 
and knowledge of management. The growing experience of management, its 
knowledge of the other resources of the firm and of the potential for using them in 
different ways, create incentives for further expansion as the firm searches for ways of 
using the services of its own resources more profitably.28 
• A necessary connection between the completion of an increment of growth and the 
availability of the managerial services devoted to it for further expansion. 29 
• A theory of the diversification of the firm, based on the assumption that the firm can 
23 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. 5. 
24 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. xvII. 
25 Edith Penrose, Ibid., p. xii 26 
Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. 49. 
27 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. xii. 
28 Edith Penrose, Ibid. pp. 78-79. 
29 Edith Penrose, ibid. p. 200. 
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manipulate the environment to serve its own purposes. Penrose observed that: "The set 
of opportunities for investment and growth that its entrepreneurs and managers perceive 
is different for evety firm and depends on its specific collection of human and other 
resources. ,,30 
• An assumption that in the theory of the growth of firms "histoty matters" - growth is 
essentially an evolutionary process and based on the cumulative growth of collective 
knowledge, in the context of a purposive firm.,,31 
Penrose's firm exists in an uncertain world - where managers make fallible conjectures, 
and, knowing that they may not have complete information, must make the best decisions 
they can. She is indebted to Frank Knight for her understanding of uncertainty.32 
Of uncertainty, Penrose says: 
• Uncertainty resulting from the feeling that one has too little information leads to a lack of 
confidence in the soundness of the judgments that lie behind any given plan of action. 33 
• One of the most important tasks of a firm in an uncertain world will be that of obtaining 
as much information as is practical about the possible course of future events. 
• To obtain information requires an input of resources, and to evaluate the information 
requires the services of existing management. 
• Uncertainty will limit expansion only to the extent that managerial resources are limited. 
• Each new activity undertaken by the firm requires an increased input of managerial 
services, to obtain sufficient information, but to develop sufficiently well-worked out 
plans to reduce risk. 
• Practically all of the various ways of reducing risk have the same effect on the demand 
of managerial services as do the ways of reducing uncertainty. The greater the risk or 
uncertainty, the greater the managerial task. Hence the expansion plans of a firm are 
necessarily restricted by the capacity of management. 
Edith Penrose makes a strong case for enterprise - or entrepreneurial ambition, but risk and 
uncertainty attend every managerial decision:34 
30 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. 73. 
31 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. 2. 
32 Frank H. Knight, Risk. Uncertainty and Profit. Ibid. p. 77. 
33 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. 59. 
34 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. 33,36.37. 
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• Enterprise and attitude toward risk are, in this context, opposite sides of the sane coin, 
for enterprise includes the willingness to take riskS ... to search for ways of avoiding risk 
and still expand. 
• Firms can, for examples diversify their activities to spread risk, or protect themselves by 
backward or forward integration; or they can adopt short-run flexible programs easily 
changed when conditions change; or they may, as a means of limiting their own liability, 
set up subsidiaries able to borrow money on their own account to make on some of the 
more speculative activities. 
• Entrepreneurial judgment involves more than imagination, good sense, self-confidence 
and other personal qualities. It is closely related to the organization of information 
gathering and consulting facilities within a firm - and it leads into the whole question of 
the effects of risk and uncertainty on, and the role of expectations in, the growth of firms. 
• Although the "objective" productive opportunity of a firm is limited by what the firm is 
able to accomplish, the subjective productive opportunity is a question of what it thinks it 
can accomplish. 
• Expectations, and not objective facts, are the immediate determinants of firm behavior. 
The receding managerial limit, the evolutionary growth of knowledge, the importance of 
enterprise and entrepreneurial vision, the respective importance of the firm and the 
environment, the possibility of failure and the persistence of uncertainty and risk, and the 
collective action of firms to reduce risk and uncertainty - as Penrose acknowledged in her 
introduction to the 1995 re-issue of her Theory of the Growth of the Firm - are issues that 
have been important both to economics and to strategic management since Adam Smith. 
These issues are dealt with in Section 3. 
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Chapter 2: Section 3: Edith Penrose. Her Influencers and 
Influences - Big Ideas for Economics and Strategic 
Management 
The receding managerial limit, the evolutionary growth of knowledge, the importance of 
enterprise and entrepreneurial vision, the respective importance of the firm and the 
environment, the possibility of failure and the persistence of uncertainty and risk, and the 
collective action of firms to reduce uncertainty and risk - each of these "big ideas" deals with 
an issue of significance for firm behavior. These issues are: the basis of strategic choice; 
the internal and external factors leading to resource and service choices; the explanation of 
failure; the role of the firm as an innovator, creating markets; the firm's architecture - its 
internal and external relationships and organizational learning; the promotion of managerial 
initiative and reduction or perception of opportunism; and fundraising for new projects or 
growth opportunities. 
Basis of Resource/Service Choice 
Capabilities are the basis of deliberate strategic product/market choice in the Resource-
based view. The idea can be traced to Adam Smith's belief that economic progress was 
fundamentally the result of the division of labor, which resulted in progressive improvements 
in skill, dexterity, judgment and productive capabilities of all kinds as well as increased 
specialization.35 This idea is the basis of Penrose's Theorv of the Growth of the Firm, 
although Penrose spoke of "resources" and "services·. 
G.B. Richardson, inspired by Penrose, replaced her "resources" and "services" terminology 
with capabilities and produced an analytical framework to explain which activities are likely 
to be collected within a single organization, which coordinated by market transactions and 
which coordinated by businesses otherwise independent.36 
In the strategic management literature, Birger Wernerfelt, who coined the term "Resource-
based view, argued that firm selects its strategy to generate rents based on its resource 
capabilities and a dynamic fit with environmental opportunities provided by customers, 
competitors, technology, etc.37 The view is shared by Rumelt,38 by Montgomery and 
35 Brian J. Loasby, '"Edith T. Penrose's Place in the Filiation of Economic Ideas," Economla. No. 29-8 (1999). 
p. 104 
36 George B. Richardson. "The Organization of Industry," Economic Journal. Vol. 82, pp. 883-96. 
37 Birger Wemerfelt, "A Resource-based View of the Firm," StrategiC Management Joymal Vol. 5. No.6 (1984). p. 
172. 
38 Richard P. Rumelt. "Toward A Strategic Theory of the Firm." Comoetitive StrategiC Management (Englewood 
Cliffs. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1984). p. 557. 
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Wernerfelt,39 and by Castanias and Helfat who, like Penrose, include managerial expertise 
among rent generating resources.40 
Replacing the word "capability" with core competence, strategic management theorists 
Prahalad and Hamel argue that the resource accumulation process may help cultivate a 
firm's core competencies, defined as "bundle of skills and technologies that enables a 
company to provide a particular benefit to customers and provide a catalyst to further 
resource accumulation. 
The firm must constantly reinvest to maintain and expand existing capabilities to inhibit 
imitation. Alfred Chandler emphasizes creation, maintenance and expansion of resources 
and organizational capabilities as keys to competitive advantage. Such capabilities provide 
the profits that in large part finance the continuing growth of the enterprise. Highly product-
specific and process-specific, these organizational capabilities affect and often determine 
the direction and pace of small numbers of first-movers and challengers, as well as of the 
industries and national economies in which they operate.41 
In fact, Chandler provides a wealth of evidence in support of the Penrosean notion that 
resources and organizational capabilities provide an internal dynamic for the growth of the 
firm. 
Just as an important theme in Penrose is the interrelatedness of resources and mental 
models as two sources of firm heterogeneity, Chandler42 illustrates how resources and 
mental models of managers interact. Some firms' managers are uniquely positioned to 
create a significant organizational breakthrough (e.g., multidivisional form). The 
accumulation of resources and the need for change demanded new mental models for 
coping with unprecedented diversification. The accumulation of resources creates a base 
for organizational learning, 
Internal and External Factors Responsible for the Firm's Resource and Services 
Choices 
In a Resource-based interpretation, a firm's choice of resources and services for 
development and growth would be explained by the business, social and political 
39 Cyntha A. Montgomery and Birger Wernerfelt, "Diversification, Ricardian Rents and Tobin's q," Rand Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 19 (1988) pp. 624. 
40 Richard P. Castanias and Constanca E. Helfat, "Managerial Resourcas and Rents,· Journal of Management, 
Vol. 17, No.1 (1991); pp.155-171. 
41 Alfred D. Chandler. Scale and Scope (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1990), p. 496. 
42 Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope, Ibid., p. 189. 
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environment of the firm as well as by the firm's concentration on building up a pattern of 
relationships both inside and outside the business. These relationships would foster the 
flow of information, the knowledge with which to interpret it, the ability to influence others 
and the reputation to attract and retain trading partners. 
While Penrose acknowledges the firm's conjectural ability to shape its "image" of the 
environment,43 she adds: ''There can be no question that for any particular firm the 
environment 'determines' its opportunities, for it must take its resources as given ... and 
must look to the opportunities it can find for using them for the source of its power to grow. 
Whether we should treat the resources of the firm or its environment as the more important 
factor explaining growth, depends on the question we ask: if we want to explain why some 
firms see the environment differently, why some grow and some do not. .. or why the 
environment is different for every firm, we must take the 'resources' approach; if we want to 
explain why a particular firm or group of firms with specified resources grows in the way it 
does, we must examine the opportunities for the use of those resources.,,44 
Alfred Marshall provides insights into how a firm might simultaneously build a pattern of 
relationships and shape its environment by coordinating its activities with other firms through 
an "external organization, "that is to say "a network of social, technical and commercial 
arrangements that link a business with its customers, suppliers and rivals; such networks 
take a long time to put in place.45 
In discussing the nature of production in 'The Principles' Marshall differentiated the benefits 
of production accruing to the individual large firm - internal economies of scale - and those 
accruing to the industry as a whole - external economies. "We may divide the economies 
arising from an increase in the scale of production of any kind of goods, into two classes -
firstly, those dependent on the general development of the industry; and, secondly, those 
dependent on the resources of the individual houses of business engaged in it, on their 
organization and the efficiency of their management. We may call the former external 
economies, and the latter internal economies . ..46 
As Loasby notes, into Marshall's discussion of external economies is introduced the notion 
of localization (which) cuts across his distinction between the organization of businesses in 
the same trade and the organization of various trades relative to one another, being 
concerned 
43 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. 215. The word "image" derives from Kenneth Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University of Michigan Press, 2956). 
44 Edith Penrose, Ibid. p. 217. 45 
Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (london: Macmillan Press, 1920; Brian J. Loasby, "Marshall's 
Economics of Progress," Journal of Economic Studies. Vol. 13, Number 5, p. 10. 
46 A. Marshall, Ibid. p. 266. 
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sometimes with relations between similar firms and sometimes with firms whose activities 
are complimentary.47 Thus "localization", along with specialization - which means the 
production process can be broken up into smaller stages thereby allowing small specialized 
firms to fulfill a part of the total production process48 - are ways in which small firms can 
accrue external economies of scale and thus overcome the disadvantages which arise due 
to their size. According to Marshall, external economies .. "can often be secured by the 
concentration of many small businesses of a similar character in particular localities: or as is 
commonly said, by the localization of industry.,,49 
In effect, this localization of industry can be an alternative to a larger size for the individual 
enterprise. As Marshall notes: "For instance in cotton spinning, and calico weaving, a 
comparatively small factory will hold its own and give constant employment to the best 
known machines for every process: so that a larger factory is only several parallel smaller 
factories under one roof; and indeed some cotton spinners, when enlarging their works, 
think it best to add a weaving department. "so 
This localization of industry, coupled with the already identified specialization, gave rise to 
the notion of industrial districts, discussed in further detail in Section 6. Marshall comments: 
"The largest industries, and especially those that need massive plant, are located 
increasingly in industrial districts,"51 but small firms providing inputs and specialist finishing 
can also reap advantages in terms of external economies from being located in industrial 
districts: - "in large measure dispensed with the necessity of any complex arrangements in 
each individual business, since the external economies, which even a small business thus 
obtained, were generally far more important to it than those which the largest business in 
the world could obtain by its own efforts ... 52 
In addition to external economies arising out of production, Marshall identified benefits 
arising out of agglomerations, such as skilled labor, capital and infrastructure. "Meanwhile 
the trading functions of the city developed. Warehouses for the products of the district took 
the place of factories; shops for the accommodation of the district were enlarged; and banks 
and mercantile houses of all kinds became prominent. .53 
Marshall refers to an intangible "industrial atmosphere" which he describes thus: "When an 
47 Brian J. Loasby, 'Firms, mar1<ets and the principle of continuity.' in National Systems of Innovation (London: 
Pinter. 1992) 1990, p. 112. 
48 A. Marshall, Principles, Ibid. p. 284. 
49 A. Marshall, Principles Ibid., p. 266. 
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A. Marshall, Industry and Trade, p 300. 53 
A. Marshall, Industry and Trade, p. 285. 
37 
industry has thus chosen a locality for itself, it is likely to stay there long: so great are the 
advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from neighborhood to one 
another. The mysteries of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air, and 
children learn many of them unconsciously.,,54 The establishment of an industrial 
atmosphere takes on the appearance of an extended or external organization where skills 
are being constantly developed and interchanged, ideas are exchanged and innovation 
occurs within the district. In such an atmosphere, "if one man starts a new idea, it is taken 
up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and thus it becomes a source of 
further ideas."55 
Marshall's "industrial atmosphere" leads to a long-term commitment of an industry to a 
particular district, like Marshall's examples of the cutlery trade Sheffield and Solingen "which 
yield gratis to the manufacturers of cutlery great advantages, that are not easily to be had 
elsewhere: and an atmosphere cannot be moved."56 Once industrial districts become 
established they are relatively stable productive systems "an established center of 
specialized skill, unless dominated by a guild or trade-union of an exceptionally obstructive 
character, is generally in a position to turn to account quickly any new departure affecting its 
work; and if the change comes gradually, there is no particular time at which strong 
incitement is offered to open up the industry elsewhere."57 
Yet they are also dynamic systems, the dynamism being created by the constant interaction 
of the actors involved. Merchants not only purchase goods but also "discuss with the 
manufacturer himself any suggestions which may occur to them for modifications in detail, to 
suit their individual judgments, or to meet the special tastes ... " etc. 
Marshall's external organization, "industrial district" and "industrial atmosphere" are rich 
sources of information about the collaborative pursuit of knowledge by firms. While Penrose 
did not have much to say about external networks, she did advance that the spread of inter-
firm networking has been stimulated by the growth of global businesses the scale of 
operation of which is largely independent of national boundaries, especially in technological 
fields. Strategic alliances are formed between firms in related areas around the world. 
Formal relations among such firms are necessary and rational, and may advance the 
competitive power of each of them. Penrose used the network as an example of 
administrative coordination. Penrose herself credits D'Cruz and Rugman for their definition 
of a network as a "governance structure for organizing exchange through cooperative, non-
54 A. Marshall, prjnclples, p. 281. 
55 A. Marshall, prjnciples, p. 271. 56 
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equity relationships among firms and non-business institutions,,58 and Gomes-Casseres,59 
for a definition of a network as "groups of companies joined together in a larger overarching 
relationship ... each company fulfilling a specific role within the group." 
Explanation of Failure 
In the Resource-based view, failure can be attributed to the firm's misunderstanding of its 
own capabilities or the capabilities required in a new market. Brian Loasby's interpretation 
of "Penrose's most significant analytical innovation ... the distinction between resources and 
inputs into production, which she called productive services," inserts fallible conjecture into 
the firm's understanding of its capabilities, its environment and its opportunities.so There is 
no absolute logic that can be brought to bear to exempt the firm from failures of 
understanding. All firms exist in an uncertain world, so actual conditions in the world itself-
not only the understanding of those conditions - can impact the success or failure of 
strategy. Loasby compares Penrose with Marshall, citing Marshall's line that "constructive 
speculation is inherent in nearly every business decision:" "Any firm may fail ... and all firms 
experience failure."sl 
The concept of failure owes much to Adam Smith's "account of the growth of knowledge 
through the invention and application of fallible connecting principles. Thus learning may 
lead to foresight or oversight. .. A theory of economic development that respects both human 
abilities and the historical record must rest on conjecture and exposure to refutation rather 
than rational expectations."s2 
Failure is one of the outcomes of uncertainty. Elaborating on the uncertainty that underlies 
business decisions, Frank Knight writes: "The business man himself not merely forms the 
best estimate he can of the outcome of his actions but he is likely to estimate the probability 
that his estimate is correct.,,63 In a world of change and uncertainty, "The essence of the 
situation is action according to opinion, of greater or less foundation and value, neither 
entire ignorance nor complete and perfect information, but partial knowledge.54 Using the 
example 
58 J. R. D'Cruz and A. Rugman, "Business Network Theory and the Canadian Industry," Intemational BUSiness 
~, Vol. 3, Number 4, p. 276. 
59 B. Gomes-Casseres, "Group versus Group: How Alliance Networks Compete." Harvard Business Review, July-
August 1994, p. 4. 
60 
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61 Brian J. Loasby, Ibid. p.11. 62 
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63 Political Economy, Vol. 18 (1999), p. 38. 
Frank H. Knight. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. Ibid. p. 230. 
54 Idem, p. 188. 
39 
of the insurance industry, Knight comments on the principle of eliminating uncertainty by 
dealing with groups of cases rather than individual cases: 
"The possibility of thus reducing uncertainty by transforming it into a measurable risk 
through grouping constitutes a strong incentive to extend the scale of operations of 
a business establishment. .. Insofar as a single business man, by borrowing capital 
or otherwise, can extend the scope of his exercise of judgment over a greater 
number of decisions or estimates, there is a greater probability that bad guesses will 
be offset by good ones and that a degree of constancy and dependability in the total 
results will be achieved.,,65 Indeed, says Knight, "It must be emphasized that this 
type of organization actually reduces risks, and does not merely transfer them from 
one party to another (corporations).66 
Role of Firms In Creating Markets 
In a Resource-based view, the firm's development of market institutions will encourage the 
development of the capability for buyers and sellers to be in such free interaction that the 
prices of the same goods will tend to equality easily and quickly. 
Mark Casson offers a picture of the initial obstacles to trade without market institutions: no 
contract between buyer and seller, no knowledge of reciprocal wants, no agreement over 
price, the need to exchange custody of goods, no confidence that goods correspond to 
specification and no confidence about restitution in case of default. As Loasbl7 notes, it is 
to the advantage of the entrepreneur to invest in the creation of a system of conventions and 
rules that cost him more in the short term so that he can reduce transaction costs in the 
longer term. "In developing its own organization and its particular market, each business 
draws on the institutions of the society within which it operates, and then develops, through 
a mixture of deliberate decisions and the consequences of day-to-day interactions, rules and 
conventions which serve to coordinate its activities and to align them with the activities of its 
suppliers and customers."68 
65 Frank H. Knight, Risk. Uncertainty and Profit, Ibid. p. 254. 
66 Idem, p. 254. 
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The Architecture of the Firm and Organizational Learning. 
In a Resource-based view, the firm creates an 'architecture' or 'administrative framework' for 
learning and collaboration. This framework includes both interorganizationallinkages and 
internal processes for learning, the development of capabilities, the exploitation of 
productive opportunities, and the development of consistent routines important for 
trustworthiness, consistent patterns of behavior and effective forms of governance. 
The ideas central to the 'architecture' of the firm derive from Adam Smith and Alfred 
Marshall. Reinterpreted by Penrose in The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, the division of 
labor both within and between firms, leads to the development of skills and the perception of 
possibilities, while firms within a similar line of business will develop somewhat different 
skills and perceptions. Firms are learning organizations, continually changing their 
organization to align their increasing knowledge with their productive opportunity.69 
Marshall again adds greater depth to his exploration of firm behavior. As explained in 
Section 2 above, the continual interaction of buyers, sellers and producers resulted in a 
Marshallian "industrial atmosphere" and localization in an "industrial district." Marshall 
coined the term "constructive cooperation" to identify one of the factors which gave industrial 
districts a competitive edge: Constructive cooperation enables even "moderate sized" 
businesses to compete with much larger competitors "provided these qualities are united 
with a frank willingness to learn from others; and to cooperate genially with others in matters 
in which unfettered association has large opportunities.,,70 The economies which accrue to 
medium sized businesses, enabling them to compete with larger competitors, arise out of 
the evolution of new organizations which are directly the result of the development of 
constructive cooperation, arising itself out of the constant interaction within the industrial 
districts. Marshall cites such examples as The British Pottery Manufacturers' Association' 
which had among its purposes "To deal with the quality, supply, purchase, and control of 
raw materials and stores, where desirable, in the interests of the members; to deal with all 
questions relative to cost and conditions of transport; to consider means of facilitating the 
extension of export trade; to bring about closer cooperation with the technical arts, and 
designs sections of the pottery schools; to promote general propaganda, and to undertake 
advertising in connection with the industry; to consider the best means of encouraging and 
utilizing improvements, inventions, and patents for the general good and advancement of 
the industry; to deal with all matters connected with more economical production, including 
costing; to watch national and local legislation affecting the industry. Experts are to be 
69 Brian J. Loasby, "The Significance of Penrose's Theory", Ibid. p.38. 70 
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appointed, and assistance given to members in overcoming the technical difficulties which 
constantly arise in so complex an industry; and the Federation has power to purchase, work, 
and exploit any patents, secret processes, or other improvements in the general interests of 
the members. ,,71 
The constant interaction of the actors within Marshall's industrial districts, leading to 
innovation and the sharing of skilled personnel and machinery relies on the development of 
trusting relationships and close community relations. 
The trust, which underlies the "constructive cooperation", develops through relationships 
which evolve through interaction within markets, as the following citation makes clear. 
"Everyone buys, and nearly every producer sells, to some extent in a 'general' market, in 
which he is on about the same footing with others around him. But nearly everyone has 
also some 'particular' markets; that is, some people or groups of people with whom he is in 
somewhat close touch: mutual knowledge and trust lead him to approach them, and them to 
approach him, in preference to strangers.,,72 
Encouraging Initiative While Curbing Opportunism 
Unique to the Resource-based view, opportunism is often an opportunity to extend the firm's 
interorganizational linkages to include a new but familiar business partner with known and 
consistent business behaviors. The idea derives from Marshall's concept of the external 
organization, the network of social, technical and commercial arrangements that link a 
business with its customers, suppliers and rivals. 
In her 1995 edition of The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Penrose cites the work of Oliver 
Williamson,73 who describes and lends support to the evolution and growth of the 
multidivisional form, in which strategiC decisions are concentrated in a general office at the 
top of a large enterprise, served by an "elite" staff whose function is to examine strategic 
options and exercise a general supervision over operating subsidiaries. Williamson's 
analysis rests on the appraisal of transaction costs. He demonstrates the way in which firms 
can expand their managerial capacity and the type of organization required. 
The key issue is incentive-compatibility: the distribution of knowledge may provide 
opportunities for individuals to gain by concealing or misrepresenting their private 
information, while reducing overall efficiency. However, restoring efficiency allows for gains 
71 A. Marshall, Industry and Trade, p.604. 
72 A. Marshall, Industry and Trade, p. 182. 
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all round, and so 'farsighted contracting' permits the design of incentive structures which 
ensure disclosure of private information, if necessary by putting the owner of this private 
information in charge. 
Penrose also cites Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal's74 "managerial theory of the 
firm." In their model, the creation of a high degree of trust, extensive socialization of 
personnel to the values of the firm, personal psychological incentives to excel in meeting 
targets, and effective networks of relationships throughout the firm are heavily relied on to 
maintain administrative cohesion. 
Michael Jensen argues that the cost of transferring information makes it necessary to 
decentralize some decision rights in organizations. This decentralization in turn requires 
organizations to solve the control problem that results when self-interested persons do not 
behave as perfect agents. Jensen argues that three critical systems are necessary: (1) a 
system for allocating decision rights among agents in the firm, (2) a system for measuring 
and evaluating performance in the firm, and (3) a system for rewarding and punishing 
individuals for their performance. These concepts offer a major competitive advantage for 
organizations.75 
Fundraising for Investment 
In a Resource-based view, raising funds for acquisitions/investment, when necessary, is 
part of the managerial or entrepreneurial task. This task might be accomplished through an 
'external organization' in which the raising of funds is relatively easy - or through intrafirm 
boards that review and approve fundraising projects to safeguard against opportunism and 
to consider the potential project in light of its larger effect on businesses currently managed 
by the company. 
74 Christopher Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, "Beyond the M Form: Towards A Managerial Theory of the Firm: 
Strategic Management Journal, (Winter 1993). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology and Sources 
Introduction 
The primary aim of this dissertation is to analyze the strategic management of Jardine, 
Matheson & Company using Resource-based theory as the principal interpretive framework. 
The dissertation covers two periods: the development of Jardine, Matheson's core 
capabilities from 1810 to 1906 and the international expansion of Jardine, Matheson's 
businesses and markets from 1961 to the present. 
The types of research questions asked by this study - "how and why" questions 
predominantly about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no 
control- suggest that an explanatory case study approach be used.76 The "case" is the 
applicability of Resource-based theory to the interpretation of strategic management in 
Jardine, Matheson. 
The unit of analysis in this case study is the strategic management of a single firm. 
Comparison with firms operating in the same markets, in similar businesses, making similar 
decisions over the time period covered in this study, are frequently used in this dissertation 
to provide a larger view. 
The research design involved these six steps: 
• Identifying a set of questions key to the research; 
• On the basis of these questions, framing hypotheses that support a Resource-
based interpretation or suggest an alternative interpretation; 
• Analyzing the hypotheses to structure an approach to the research; 
• Using hypotheses to gather relevant data and summarizing it into findings; 
• Synthesizing the results of the data gathering to create case study databases; 
• Using the case study databases to structure data analysis and composition. 
The chapter and its discussion of methodology and sources is structured as follows: 
Chapter 3: Sectlon1: Key Questions and Hypotheses identifies some Significant 
questions important to understanding strategic management in Jardine Matheson and 
76 
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proposes a set of hypotheses valuable to evaluating alternative Resource-based. Harvard or 
Chicago school interpretations. 
Chapter 3: Section 2: Four Tests of Validity and Reliability examines the kinds and use 
of information sources to establish the quality of the research design. 
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Chapter 3: Section 1: Key Questions and Hypotheses 
As stated in Chapter 1, this study attempts to answer some significant questions about 
strategic management at Jardine, Matheson & Company. The questions are: 
• How and why did Jardine, Matheson's founders and managers develop particular 
resources and services? (Question 1) 
• What internal (including the firm and its agents) and external (including government, 
social policy, competition, new entrants, buyers and suppliers) factors were responsible 
for their choices? (Question 2) 
• The firm's choices met with some notable successes - and some notable failures. How 
are the firm's failures explained? (Question 3) 
• At the firm's origin - and again after WWII and the Korean War - there were as yet no 
markets in Asia, in the sense of market institutions. What role did the firm play in the 
development of markets? (Question 4) 
• What was the organizational structure of the firm, including both internal and external, 
that allowed for consistent business routines and promoted organizational learning? 
(Question 5) 
• How did Jardine, Matheson promote managerial initiative while curbing opportunism? 
(Question 6) 
• How did Jardine, Matheson raise funds for growth? (Question 7) 
Each of these questions deals with an issue of significance for firm behavior: the basis of 
strategic choice; internal and external factors leading to resource and service choices; 
failures; role of the firm as an innovator, creating markets; the firm's architecture - its 
internal and external relationships and organizational learning; the promotion of managerial 
initiative and reduction or perception of opportunism; and fundraising for new projects or 
growth opportunities. 
The answer to each question was framed as a hypothesis, articulating what would be true if 
Resource-based theory were a proper explanation of strategic management at Jardine 
Matheson. For each Resource-based hypothesis, a corresponding Harvard or Chicago 
school explanation was offered. The hypotheses were then grouped into issue "buckets." 
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Basis of Resource/Service Choice (Question 1) 
Hypothesis 1 (RBV): Jardine, Matheson's founders and subsequent senior managers 
made strategic choices aimed at developing and applying profitably their distinctive 
capabilities. 
Hypothesis 1a (Harvard): Jardine, Matheson's founders and subsequent senior managers 
made strategic choices aimed at achieving competitive advantage through the creation of 
monopoly positions in their chosen markets by erecting entry barriers and eliminating 
existing competitors. 
Hypothesis 1b (Chicago): Jardine, Matheson's founders and subsequent senior managers 
made strategic choices aimed at reducing the cost of production through vertical integration. 
Internal and External Factors Responsible for the Firm's Resource and Services 
Choices (Question 2) 
Hypothesis 2 (RBV): Jardine, Matheson's choice of resources and services for 
development and growth derive from the very special business, social and political 
environment into which Jardine, Matheson entered, and the firm's concentration on building 
up a pattern of relationships within and outside the business which would foster the flow of 
information, the knowledge with which to interpret it, the ability to influence others and the 
reputation to attract and retain trading partners. 
Hypothesis 2a (Harvard): The specific advantages of Hong Kong and the cluster of 
expatriate competitors clustered there - and the demand they sought to satisfy - had more 
influence on Jardine, Matheson's resource and service portfolio than the firm's explicit 
management choices. 
Hypothesis 2b (Chicago): Jardine Matheson's choice of resources and services was 
based on ownership opportunity - enhanced by the British rule of law in Hong Kong which 
enabled and protected private ownership. 
Explanation of Failure (Question 3) 
Hypothesis 3 (RBV): Jardine, Matheson's strategic choices were based on the 
development of distinctive capabilities. When the firm's strategy failed, that failure can be 
attributed to a misunderstanding, either of their own capabilities were or as to what 
capabilities were needed in a new market. 
Hypothesis 3a (Harvard): Jardine, Matheson's strategic choices were based on the pursuit 
of monopoly positions. Where the firm's strategy failed, failure can be attributed to changes 
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in industry structure that could have been predicted - and avoided by investment in entry 
barriers, signaling and pricing strategy. 
Hypothesis 3b(Chicago): Jardine, Matheson's strategic choices were based on the pursuit 
of ownership advantages. Where the firm's strategy failed, the firm was trapped into short 
term, higher cost contracts that did not provide the cost and time efficiencies possible 
through direct ownership. 
Role of Jardine, Matheson in Creating Marlcets (Question 4) 
Hypothesis 4 (RBV): There are only rudimentary market institutions. Jardine, Matheson's 
communication (through reports, a weekly newspaper, etc.) of internal routines to customers 
and business associates will encourage the development of the capability for buyers and 
sellers to be in such free interaction that the prices of the same goods will tend toward 
equality easily and quickly. 
Hypothesis 4a (Harvard): There is already a market, if fragmented, in which Jardine, 
Matheson is the major player. The firm's goal is to get all of the market for itself by signaling 
strategy, erecting entry barriers, encouraging competitors to leave - or buying them out. 
Hypothesis 4b (Chicago): There is already a market, if fragmented, and there is a set price 
for the object that Jardine, Matheson sells. It is the firm's business to produce as cheaply as 
possible. Creating a market means increasing demand and sale of already existing 
products by being more efficient and reducing prices to increase total sales and profits. 
Jardine, Matheson can do that through large scale ownership. 
The Architecture of the Firm and Organizational Learning (Question 5) 
Hypothesis 5 (RBV): Jardine, Matheson's founders and subsequent managers developed 
an "architecture" or "administrative framework" for learning and collaboration. This 
framework included interorganizationallinkages for risk reduction and learning important for 
developing capabilities, trustworthiness, consistent patterns of behavior and effective forms 
of governance. It was part of interorganizational succession planning that managers could 
be moved from one geographical area to another, one function to another, with enhanced 
effectiveness and without disruption of the business. 
Hypothesis Sa (Harvard): Firm architecture is a response to industry structure, which has a 
strong influence in determining the competitive rules of the game as well as the strategies 
potentially available to the firm. It's about competition. Learning is based on a rigorous 
48 
analysis of the market, the industry and the strengths and weaknesses of competitors. 
Hypothesis 5b (Chicago): Firm architecture is a way of increasing efficiencies and rents 
through ownership or long-term contracts that keep transaction costs low. Firm architecture 
promotes and encourages organizational learning - specifically knowing how to resolve 
minor problems arising from contracts, for example, and what the rules are for effective 
contract administration. A further example, learning also takes place in the production area 
where it is accomplished through on the job training or more formal training and education. 
Encouraging Initiative While Curbing Opportunism (Question 6) 
Hypothesis 6 (RBV): Unique to the Resource-based view, opportunism is often an 
opportunity to extend the firm's interorganizationallinkages to include a new but familiar 
business partner with known and consistent business behaviors. 
Hypothesis 6a (Harvard): Initiative is rewarded and opportunism curbed by managerial 
bonuses based on over-achievement of results. 
Hypothesis 6b (Chicago): Similar to the Harvard school, recognizing that agents are effort 
averse, owner-managers must have paid higher bonuses or provided better benefits to 
attract and retain the best managers to grow its business. The point of view is based on the 
quid pro quo nature of contracts. 
Fundraising for Investment (Question 7) 
Hypothesis 7 (RBV): Raising funds, when necessary, is part of the managerial or 
entrepreneurial task. This task might be accomplished through an "external organization" in 
which the raising of funds is relatively easy - or through intrafirm firm boards that review and 
approve fund raising projects to safeguard against opportunism and to consider the potential 
project in light of its larger effect on businesses currently managed by the holding company. 
Hypothesis 7a (Harvard): In the Harvard view, there are internal routines for analyzing the 
market, competitors, and new entrants as well as the needs of buyers and sellers. New 
projects would be put through a rigorous competitive analysis. 
Hypothesis 7b (Chicago): In the Chicago view, there are internal routines for fundraising 
for projects. Managerial initiative and opportunism are handled through rigorous cost/benefit 
analysis, the establishment of hurdle rates and bonuses are based on project returns. 
The data collected were matched to the key questions and hypotheses and plotted on a 
data matrix, described in the internal validity section below. 
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Chapter 3: Section 2: Four Tests of Validity and Reliability 
This dissertation follows Robert Yin's77 criteria for judging the quality of research designs, 
including four tests of validity - construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability. 
Construct Validity requires the use of multiple sources of evidence and the establishment 
of a chain of evidence during the data collection phase of case study research. Sources of 
evidence used in this study are archival records, documentation, physical artifacts and 
interviews. 
Archival records are a principal source for the history of the firm, and the development of the 
firm's early competencies discussed in Chapter 4, was the Jardine, Matheson & Company 
Archives, housed at Cambridge University Library. They occupy some 1000 square feet of 
shelf space and provide a complete record of the firm through 1906. From the Jardine 
records, it was possible to identify how the firm adapted itself to the special conditions of 
trade with China and emerging Asian markets, to outline the firm's development as an 
agency house, its commission business in trade and the service of trade, and its business 
as merchant investor, against a broad economic, social and political background. 
The Jardine, Matheson archives predate the formal constitution of Jardine, Matheson as a 
partnership by some 22 years, since the firm's founding partners were both employed by 
Magniac & Company. The early correspondence provides insight into the practices, agent 
and supplier relationships, markets and products which James Matheson and William 
Jardine inherited and built. 
The format of the correspondence is volumes of bound letters, boxes of unbound letters and 
microfiche. The correspondence is organized chronologically, by manager (Taipan), by 
geographic area and by market. A plan of the organization of the Archives is available to 
researchers who have secured the firm's permission to access the records. The fragility of 
the correspondence, worm-eaten and mildewed from storage in the back rooms of a Hong 
Kong warehouse or go down before its arrival at Cambridge University, is partially 
responsible for Jardine, Matheson's interdiction against photocopying. A second reason 
shared with me by the Manuscripts Librarian was the firm's desire to maintain a single 
repository of original correspondence at Cambridge - not duplicate sets of photocopies in 
libraries around the world. 
77 Robert K. Yin, ibid. p. 32. 
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The correspondence is handwritten, much of it in a large, loopy, florid style popular during 
the early to mid 1880s. Some of the originals are badly faded and are available only on 
microfilm. 
The letters fall into two main groups, general correspondence and private letters. General 
correspondence includes letters reporting receipt of an order or advising of a delivery - or, 
alternatively, circumstances delaying a delivery. These are largely unsigned letters or 
letters bearing the "house" name. Of the more than 180,000 letters only some 4000 are 
private letters. 
The private letter books of James Matheson, William Jardine and their successors provide 
rich detail on the way information was shared among correspondents and agents; the 
thinking of the founders about their business; the training of agents and office staff and the 
disciplining of agents; the meaning of social and political events and the response the firm 
should make to these events, the opening of markets and the status of investments in 
business and technology. 
These are signed letters to and from major suppliers and agents. I read all of the private 
letters, copying large passages or whole letters into lined copy books in No.2 pencil per the 
regulations of the Cambridge University Library Manuscripts room, creating a record for 
myself that was nearly as fragile and frequently as indecipherable as the original 
manuscripts themselves! 
I chose to copy letters and passages that illuminated a situation requiring interpretation and 
a decision to act, why it was taken, how it was implemented and with what result. Hence, 
my record is biased toward management thinking. A sampling of the letters is given in 
Appendix A: Jardine Matheson Archives, Management Issues 1810-1906, at the end of 
this dissertation. 
A second source of information on the early firm is The Canton Register, the first English 
language newspaper in China, founded by James Matheson in 1827. Originally intended as 
a monthly, the paper's subscribers pushed for a weekly newspaper, and within a few months 
of start-up, The Canton Register became a weekly. Its pages were filled with recent 
legislation, custom, ship arrivals and departures, advertisements of new businesses and 
ships for sale, and local and worldwide news of interest to the trading community and their 
families. Twice monthly, there was a update on prices in the marketplace called "The Price 
Current." 
The Canton Register was published until 1846. The full newspaper record - some fifteen 
hundred pages of text - was obtained on microfilm from the U.S. Library of Congress. 
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The Jardine, Matheson Archive and the Canton Register provided the firm and industry data 
that inform Chapter 4. 
The availability of monographs based on archival records of the Rio Tinto Company, Finlay 
& Company, Harrison & Crosfield, Butterfield & Swire, the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 
among others, permits a broader view of Jardine, Matheson & Company, its industry, its 
investments and its network of relationships. 
Documentation and physical artifacts are used extensively in Chapter 5 to consider the 
growth of Jardine, Matheson & Company from 1961 to 1996. The chapter draws on the 
firm's Annual Reports, including the consolidated financials, the summary balance sheet and 
profit and loss statements of the major subsidiaries, the Chairman's letter and the Annual 
Report Essay, group structure diagrams and the principal subsidiary and associated 
company charts, where and when these were provided. 
As a Company registered in Hong Kong and, after 1984 registered in Bermuda, Jardine, 
Matheson & Company was under no obligation to make its Annual Reports available to the 
general public. While the U.S. Library of Congress, British Library, Harvard University and 
the New York Public Library had discrete volumes covering a few of the 35 years, the 
complete record was made available to me at Matheson & Company in London. 
For the sake of comparison, selected Annual Reports of peer firms like Swire Pacific, First 
Pacific, CITIC Pacific, Wheelock & Company and Hutchison Whampoa were obtained from 
several research sources. 
Because of changes in accounting practice, most notably the move to equity accounting, the 
presentation of financial data in the Annual Report has undergone significant change. In 
1981 it became necessary to summarize the balance sheet and profit and loss data for 
major subsidiaries in order to explain the impact on the consolidated balance sheet of the 
losses attributable to those businesses. 
As Jardine, Matheson & Company began to grow, its internal and external organization are 
depicted in the Annual Report, including acquisitions of 20% or more of associated and 
subsidiary companies, their business lines and the geographies in which they operate. 
• The charts that accompany Chapter 5 make use of all of the quantitative data to plot the 
management ratios relevant to operating performance, corporate liquidity and corporate 
value. The financial data are also used to value the firm under different scenarios and 
to chart Added Value; 
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• Acquisitions and restructurings during the study were charted to reveal the relative 
growth of the firm's business lines across geography and the duration of investments. 
See Chapter 6; 
• Changes in governance and structure were tracked. See Chapters 5 and 7. 
Interviews and discussions were used to gain insight into firm decisions from 1970 to 1996. 
My advisor and guide to the history of Jardine, Matheson & Company post-1961 was 
Jeremy Brown, formerly managing director of the firm, under senior managing director, 
David Newbigging. Brown was a steward of the firm during its period of greatest and 
broadest expansion. Currently, Jeremy Brown is a director of Matheson & Company in 
London. I had three meetings with him during the research period and exchanged letters. 
Mr. Brown provided me WITH access to the Jardine, Matheson Archives at Cambridge 
University and allowed me to review the complete Annual Reports of the firm at the offices of 
Matheson & Company in London. 
During the third of my meetings with Jeremy Brown, I asked him the series of questions that 
Chris Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal had asked some nine companies in research 
supporting Nitin Nohria and Sumantra Ghoshal's 1997 The Differentiated Network, 
Organizing Multinational Corporations for Value Creation, discussed in Chapter 7. 
To interpret the acquisition and investment environment, as well as accounting practices of 
the 1970s and 1980s, I relied on Paul Albert, senior investment counsellor with Prudential 
Securities Far East, who lived and worked with the small but influential circle of Hong Kong's 
corporate and government leaders that included the Governor, Jardine, Matheson, The 
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank and Hong Kong Telephone. 
Mark Nichols, research librarian, Cambridge University Library, shared with me the recently 
finished catalogue of the Jardine, Matheson Archive, from which I was able to develop a 
comprehensive view of the incoming and outgoing correspondence by market. 
Internal Validity is established during the data analysis stage of case study research, 
during which the data collected are logically linked to the hypotheses, and criteria 
established for interpreting the findings. For the Jardine, Matheson case, we looked for 
corroborative evidence for the Resource-based view (Hypotheses 1-7) or alternative 
plausible hypotheses 1a-7a (Harvard view) or hypotheses 1b-7b (Chicago School). We 
plotted the evidence for each hypothesis on a data matrix. 
The data matrix tracks hypotheses, data, sources and methods on a single X-V grid. Listed 
along the Y-axis are the hypotheses and related questions that help target the data needed. 
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Along the X-axis are the sources that might be able to support the hypotheses or answer 
questions. The crosscheck column is used to ensure verification . The template appears 
below. 
Data Matrix 
ISSUE: 
PAGE_ Of 
--
DATE: HYPOTHESIS: 
SOI"RCES: CROSS-CHECK: 
YES NO 
DATA NEEDS finn Principal Jardlnt Induotry Comparative 
Interview Matheson Expert RHtarch 
Archive Inttrviow 
01 X X YES 
02 X NO 
03 X X X YES 
Reliability and replicability are also built into the case design. The letters that inform 
Chapter 4 are available in the Jardine, Matheson Archive; a sample of the letters is included 
as Appendix A. Jardine, Matheson's investments and acquisitions - including lines of 
businesses, primary SIC code, country of origin , ownership percentage - are captured in a 
150 page database. A truncated version of this database is attached as Appendix B. 
The previously mentioned data matrix provides the opportunity to verify the logic and 
conclusions of this dissertation and to replicate the instrument in other studies. 
The search for objective criteria for interpreting the findings led to John KaY's78 strategic 
audits of the firm and the industry. These very structured , detailed analytical tools result in a 
multidimensional and revealing characterization of changes in the external or industry 
environment and the ability of the firm to accommodate , adapt or change to succeed in the 
78 
John Kay. Foundations of COroorate Success (Oxford : Oxford University Press. 1994). pp. 283-320. 
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new environment. The audits pose a series of questions suitable for the creation of "table 
shells" for arrays of data that provide insights into: 
• changes in the use and value of Jardine, Matheson's resources from one 
period to the next. For example Jardine's change in strategy from ship-owning to 
shipping services, with the sell-off of costly to maintain physical assets and new 
focus on services; 
• the capabilities or organizational routines that have been the source of 
competitive advantage to the firm. The core competencies of the firm, developed 
during the early period were identified and compared with their use or extension 
during the later period; 
• the internal and external organization of the firm - how relationships 
developed and changed from the early to later period. Changes and use of 
management resources, organizational form and govemance as well as 
relationships with buyers and suppliers were charted and analyzed; 
• the firm's response or adaptation to its environment, including the major 
strategic groups, industry and market trends, regulatory environment, market 
served, value chain, consumer demand, was identified and compared from one 
period to the next. 
External Validity is always problematic when a single case is studied, nevertheless a level 
of generalizability is achieved through the comparison of Jardine, Matheson and Company 
with other Hong Kong firms of the early and later periods, as well as with 3887 multinational 
firms whose acquisitions and divestitures were studied by Khemani in 1991 79. Similarity or 
complementarity of acquisitions was analyzed using the standard industrial classification 
(SIC) code, which categorizes establishments into industries (2-digit codes) and industrial 
groups (4-digit codes) on the basis of raw materials, production processes, and end uses. 
The SIC analysis of acquisitions over the period 1972-74, 1975-1977, 1983-1984, 1988-
1989 permits a comparison of Jardine, Matheson's acquisition strategy with that of the 
multinational firms studied by Khemani, who also used SIC analysis to interpret acquisitions 
and divestitures over the same period. 
79 RK "W 
. hemanl In averman, Leonard. ed. Corporate Globalization through Mergers and Acquisitions. (Canada: 
University of Calgary Press. 1991). 
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The skills required by Jardine, Matheson and Company's acquisitions are compared with the 
skills of multinational firms studied by Moshe Farjoun.80 Again using SIC codes, and based 
on the United States Department of Labor Office of Employment Statistics (OES), each 
industry or line of business is viewed as a combination of occupational skills or bodies of 
knowledge required to produce a product or services. Consequently, the relatedness of 
different industries is determined by similarity in skill combinations. Jardine, Matheson's 
original and acquired businesses were grouped into 2-digit and 4-digit SIC codes and OES 
industry and occupational data were used to identify the skills required by each of these 
businesses. The analysis allowed Jardine, Matheson's acquisition strategy to be compared 
with that of the manufacturing firms studied by Farjoun. 
80 
Moshe Fa~oun, "The Independent and Joint Effects of the Skill and Physical Basis of Relatedness in 
Diversification," Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, No.7 (July 1, 1998), pp. 611-630. 
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Chapter 4: Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1810· 
1906: Resource and Services Choices, Contributing 
Factors, the Development of Market Institutions and 
Fundraising for Investment 
Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 1. Section 2. the early Jardine. Matheson & Company was the inheritor 
of administrative routines and a network of trading relationships that grew out of the very 
special business. social and political environment in China during the early nineteenth 
century. The opportunity - as well as the uncertainty - of the China trade made profitable a 
range of services to businesses and individuals that protected their investments and 
shipments. while Jardine. Matheson & Company absorbed the risk. The firm was in a 
position to do this so long as it did not invest in the commodities in which it traded or which it 
insured. Fundamental to Jardine. Matheson's success and the relationship it built for 
financial probity was the fundamental strategic decision to eschew speculation and to 
concentrate on building up a pattern of relationships within and outside the business which 
would foster the flow of information. the knowledge with which to interpret it. the ability to 
influence others and the reputation to attract and retain trading partners. 
Chapter 4 deals with the early history of Jardine. Matheson & Company. In telling that story. 
the chapter includes the firm's early resource and services choices. the internal and external 
factors responsible for those choices. the development of routines for the functioning of the 
various markets which Jardine. Matheson was helping to develop. and managerial 
fundraising for new opportunities. particularly in the late 1800s. 
The early history of Jardine. Matheson & Company is known from letters sent to and from 
the firm to suppliers and agents. some 183.000 letters. as well as account books. ledgers. 
telegrams and memoranda. The letters are an underlying resource of this firm. because all 
firm activity - including management. discipline. market information and training as well as 
order fulfillment - was based on written correspondence. copies of which were faithfully and 
more or less carefully preserved. The collection includes 31.000 from the period 1810-1850. 
and 142.000 from 1850-1906. During the period 1810-1850.22% of the letters were to 
China; 35% to India. 16% to London or Great Britain. 24% to the East Indies. 9% to Macao. 
and 4% to other locations. Over the whole period. from 1810-1906.40% of the letters were 
addressed to Hong Kong/China. 17% to London/Great Britain and 15% to India. Some 
3.114 letters were Signed by the partners. See Chart 1: Frequency and Distribution of 
Letters, 1810-1906. at the end of the chapter. 
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The tradition of management letters, as well as their maintenance for future use, began with 
the British East India Company, as early as 1600, and in China as early as 1723, as shown 
by the records in the British Museum. The letters in the Jardine, Matheson collection start 
from 1810. They are the letters of the firm's progenitors who developed and maintained a 
seamless correspondence with suppliers and agents that was unbroken by the death or 
removal of one partner and his replacement by another. This continuity and stability was 
important to the reputation as well as to the architecture of Jardine, Matheson & Company. 
Chart 2: Categorization of Correspondence, below, shows how the subjects covered in 
the private letters were categorized for study and interpretation. 
Chart 2: Categorization of Correspondence 
THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE INDUSTRY 
Role of managers in the Firm Capital resources 
Training of agents and office staff Knowledge resources 
Disciplining of agents, staff Physical resources 
Structure of the partnership Correspondents 
Market knowledge Kinds of products 
How market knowledge was shared Kinds of services 
Relationship with correspondents Location, number of markets 
Relationship with Chinese business class Investment in technology development 
Relationship with and participation in Investment in new businesses 
government Competitors 
Participation in industry organizations Demand Conditions 
The chapter is divided into four sections: 
Chapter 4: Section 1: Resource/Services Choices and Origins of Market Institutions 
looks at the services required of private traders and the establishment of market institutions 
in a commercial atmosphere of high risk and volatile political conditions. 
Chapter 4: Section 2: Internal and External Factors Responsible for 
Resource/Services Choices looks at the establishment and communication of decision 
rules that allowed the firm to build and protect its reputation for sound financial management 
and network of trading relationships. The section also deals with the firm's evolving 
relationship with government. 
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Chapter 4: Section 3: Fundraising for Growth: From Joint Stock to Free-standing 
Investment House looks at Jardine, Matheson's changing role as investor with partners in 
the development of China and the ASEAN. 
Chapter 4: Section 4: Jardine, Matheson's Resource/Services Choices, Contributing 
Factors, Development of Market Institutions and Fundraising Mechanisms: A 
Resource-based Interpretation summarizes key research findings for the early period in 
light of four of the seven questions posed by this dissertation. (For consistency, the order 
and numbering of the questions remains constant throughout the document). 
• How and why did Jardine, Matheson's founders and managers choose to develop 
particular resources and services? (Question 1) 
• What internal (including the firm and its agents) and external (including government, 
social policy, competition, new entrants, buyers and suppliers) factors were responsible 
for their choices? (Question 2) 
• What role did Jardine, Matheson play in the creation of market institutions? (Question 4) 
• What mechanisms did the firm put in place to raise funds for investment? (Question 7) 
Section 4 also compares the proposed Resource-based interpretation of Jardine, 
Matheson's strategic decisions, based on capabilities and the management of uncertainty, 
with the monopoly and ownership/efficiency explanations suggested by the Harvard and 
Chicago school views respectively. 
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Chapter 4: Section 1: Resource/Service Choices; 
Origins of Market Institutions 
The origins of Jardine, Matheson & Company's early resource and service choices and 
incipient market institutions - established to create a stable environment in which trade could 
flourish -lie deep in the late 18th century. The East India Company was then the dominant 
player in the China trade. Piracy and storms at sea threatened the security of shipments, 
and conditions in China prohibited merchants from moving beyond a narrow trading sector. 
The East India Company was banker, broker and insurer - minting its own money, insuring 
shipments, and maintaining a militia for the protection of the merchant community. When 
the East India Company lost the monopoly on trade, banking, financing and insuring 
functions, which had protected and facilitated trade, were left to be carried on by the 
emerging private trade. 
Early resource/services choices and the development of market institutions were 
necessitated by the gap left by the East India Company, and these are nearly impossible to 
separate from the trading environment. 
The Origins of the Private Trade: Early Market Institutions 
Through 1842, the East India Company, by virtue of a Royal Charter, held the monopoly of 
the trade between Great Britain, India and the Far East. From China the company imported 
tea to meet the increasing consumption in Europe. Trade with the Chinese was difficult. 
The foreign traders were limited to a small plot of land, Canton, on the banks of the Pearl 
River. They were permitted to deal only with Chinese merchants who were officially 
sanctioned by the government. These Chinese merchants were known as "cohongs." The 
Manchu government believed that China already possessed everything in abundance and 
had no need for the products of "foreign barbarians," as government documents referred to 
the European traders. 
China's self-sufficiency couldn't have happened at a worse time for British manufacture. 
Large-scale, low-cost British manufactures, especially cotton, created a domestic surplus 
that had to be sold abroad, even at a loss to maintain the volume of output. Even offered at 
a loss, the Chinese were not buying. 
Unable to make money selling manufactured goods to the Chinese, private traders 
associated with the East India Company began smuggling opium into China aboard ships 
chartered in Calcutta. All of the opium was in fact produced in India under the direction of 
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the East India Company, but was not distributed by the Company. Such a sale would have 
risked the East India Company's charter for the legitimate business with China. Instead, 
private merchants licensed by the East India Company, like Jardine, Matheson & Company 
and its progenitors conducted the trade. 
Jardine, Matheson & Company and peer companies exchanged the silver proceeds they 
would receive for opium for bills drawn on the chartered company in London and India, thus 
completing a triangular transaction and eliminating the need to ship large quantities of coin 
from Europe to China.81 
Like Palmer's and Dent and Forbes, among others, Jardine, Matheson became a house of 
agency with many other associated private merchants in Canton.82 While the agency 
house was primarily a trading firm, like the East India Company, the firm also acted as 
banker, bill-broker, ship owner, freighter, insurance agent and purveyor, maintaining 
commercial and financial connections with its branch houses or agents all over the world. 
The partners within an agency house had often begun their professional lives with the East 
India Company. For example, William Jardine, born in 1784 in Dumfriesshire, Scotland, a 
student of medicine at Edinburgh University, went to work for the British East India Company 
as a ship's surgeon. He met and became a partner of Magniac & Company, a trading firm in 
Canton, China. Magniac & Company was descended in an unbroken line from the first 
trading firm permitted by the British East India Company to trade privately and enjoyed an 
extensive list of "correspondents" for supply and distribution. A few months later he was 
joined by James Matheson, son of a Scottish baronet, who had for several years served as 
Danish consul in China. 
General merchants and commission merchants like the early Jardine, Matheson were in 
direct and daily contact with world suppliers in London, Liverpool, Glasgow, Calcutta, Straits, 
and indeed China (although through the intermediation of the CO-hong). The demand for 
raw materials and foodstuffs for use in Asia as well as for export was increasing so rapidly -
and money was so available - that investors deposited money directly with the agency 
houses for a fixed rate of interest. 
Unlike the East India Company, agency houses were not joint stock companies. They were 
personal partnerships, preferred to individual ownership because, in the event of death, the 
firm would not come to an end. In 1831, when his nephew Hugh was about to become a 
partner in Calcutta with Charles Lyall, James Matheson wrote on the merits of a partnership. 
81 
82 Account of sales, charges and net proceeds of opium. Hong Kong, May 18, 1846. JM A8/77n. 
Letter from Fergusson & Co. to Charles Magnlac & Co. In Canton. Calcutta, April 14, 1825. Jardine Matheson 
Archives 86/5/164, Cambridge University Library. Hereinafter, the Jardine Matheson Archives will be identified 
asJM. 
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The arrangement, he said, allows "greater confidence resulting from not having to rely on a 
single life will induce your friends to greater business."83 The partnership, based on the 
principal-agent concept in English Common Law, was loose and individual partners were 
allowed to have separate dealings on their own account, also known as "speculation." 
When James Matheson set up his. nephew in Calcutta in 1831 it was "on the express 
understanding that the house is one of mere agency, and that above all you must abstain 
from speculating in that most treacherous of articles, indigo, which has entailed ruin to so 
many, while a fortunate few have made money by it."84 For a young house "pure 
commission business" was best, because "income comes to you without asking in the snug 
way of the China business.,,85 
The agent charged commission on every kind of service provided to his principal. On March 
1, 1825, rates were established by a Meeting of the Canton Agents and confirmed in 
November 1831.86 
Commissions Charged by Agents 
(1) On sale of opium, cotton. cochineal. Quicksilver and precious stones; and of ships house 
(2) On sale or purchase of all other goods 
(3) On retums (including cost and freight) in goods 
cost and freight of Treasure or Bills 
(4) On the sale. purchase or shipment of Bullion 
(5) Guarantee of bills. bonds or other engagements 
(6) Ship's disbursement 
(7) Effecting insurance 
(8) Chartering ships for other parties 
(9) Receiving inward freight 
(10) Obtaining outward freight 
(11) Settling insurance losses 
(12) Negotiating bills of exchange 
loans on respondentia 
(13) Debts. where a process at law or arbitration is necessary 
Debts if recovered 
(14) Managing estates of others 
(15) Acting as Executors for estate of persons deceased 
(16) Transshipping goods 
Source. Hosea B. Morse. Chromc/es of the East India Company Trading to Chma. III. Yale. 1926-29. 
83 Letter from James Matheson to Hugh Matheson. November 7. 1832. JM. C5/1. 
84 Letter from James Matheson to Hugh Matheson. November 4. 1982. JM, C5/1. 
85 Letter from James Matheson to Hugh Matheson, May 9, 1832. JM, CS/1. 
88 ILB. JM. September 10. 1828. 
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The Commission system set a precedent for the emergence of the agency house as an 
investment group, using these deposits and some limited trading profit to invest in indigo 
factories, sugar plantations, ships, agricultural and building speculations, docks, and loans 
to other mercantile houses, at reduced risk and for potential wealth. 
As a result of the pure commission basis of their business, the partners required little 
working capital , since they operated on the capital of the shippers. Speculation in opium or 
indigo would have involved borrowing from the Hong merchants on strict terms of 1-1/2% 
interest a month. The partnership document of Yrisarri & Co. stated: "The attention of the 
partners (X. Yrisarri and J. Matheson) is to be primarily devoted to Agency, not, however, 
excluding safe speculation on the spot, but adventures to other places are to be considered 
rather as an exception to their line of business than as properly belonging to it. Profits are to 
go to a joint account, from which it shall be allowed to neither to withdraw for his separate 
purposes more than $5,000 per annum, leaving the remainder to accumulate until the 
termination of the partnership , when it shall be equally divided ." See Chart 3: Evolution of 
the Private Trade, below. 
Chart 3: Evolution of the Private Trade 
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When a partner withdrew, the house was not dissolved, although its name was changed. 
Other partners were admitted who enjoyed the established credit, the relationships and 
routines, and the financial resources of the house. Credit, relationships, routines and 
financial resources were passed along seamlessly from Cox and Beale to Magniac and 
Beale to Magniac & Company. When Jardine, Matheson & Company came into being on 
July 1, 1832, it was an amalgam of three successful interests - Jardine, Magniac and 
Matheson - with an extensive clientele ranging from Europe to Australia and Latin America, 
a substantial opening balance and some fifty regular correspondents in Bombay and almost 
as many in Calcutta.8? 
Need for Credit Led to Banking Capability and Market Institutions 
From the beginning of the private trade, banking operations were carried on by the Canton 
agency houses. Since there were no European banks in China, the merchants had to be 
financiers. The granting of credits was indispensable to the distant commercial transactions 
of the China trade. Advances were granted at 1 % per month and in the form, not of cash, 
but of accepting Bills of Exchange drawn on themselves or on their London agents. 
Exchange banking evolved directly from the China trade because it was dependent on 
remittance and subject to currency variations. A deposit and loan business was developed, 
owing to the nature of the money market at Canton, which allowed for an extremely high rate 
of interest. The Hong merchants were the principal borrowers. They were charged 1-1/2% 
a month and up to 40% per annum.88 "Nabobs" and Captains of Indiamen sent their private 
fortunes made in India to the merchants of Canton, and kept the money on deposit until they 
returned to England or died. To a Mr. Robertson who left $3000 in the hands of Reid, Beale 
& Co., the firm wrote: "We pay 10% per annum interest on deposits and beg you to inform 
us if interest is to be remitted annually or to accumulate here."89 
In addition to deposit banking, the Canton agency houses engaged in a variety of financial 
operations arising from the need to remit funds continuously from China to India and 
England to balance the trade, including: 
• high-interest, short-term loans called "respondentia" bonds," granted to shippers in 
Canton to help them purchase an export cargo and charter a vessel. The money was to 
be repaid in India within a fixed number of days after landing the cargo, which was 
security for the loan; 
87 JM C1/1-4. C2/1-S. 
88 Hosea B. Morse. Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China. III. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 1926-9). 
89 JM April 28. 1801 
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• the purchase of "[British East India] Company Certificates" in exchange for payment in 
London at a rate of exchange fixed by the Court of Directors. The private merchants 
paid a high premium for these certificates, which were available in limited amounts and 
were fully paid out at 12 months and half at 6 months. 
• payment in Chinese silver ingots - profitable because they were 15% purer than silver 
dollars which were smuggled out of Macao or Lintin. 
• remittance of funds through American traders, because American traders had always 
been obliged to bring large quantities of cash to Canton with which to purchase teas and 
silks. 
For example, Magniac & Company would pay its India suppliers with drafts on Magniac's 
London agents, guaranteed by bills of lading for American cotton and other goods received 
from American agents in exchange for teas and silks. During the remittance crisis of 1826-
27 Magniac & Co. wrote: "we have taken up a considerable amount of the Bank of U.S. Bills 
on Baring Bros. & Co., London." By 1830 half of the value carried by U.S. vessels to China 
consisted of Bills on London. Bills of John Jacob Astor, Stephen Girard of Philadelphia or 
those drawn under letter of credit from Baring Bros. were always negotiable in Canton. 
Building Distinctive Capability: Jardine, Matheson's Reputation for Financial Probity 
A regular supply of American Bills on London changed the remittance situation. In a circular 
letter of 1831 to Bombay firms, Jardine, Matheson said "It is generally in our power to remit 
funds to England on more advantageous terms than can be effected in Bombay." Jamsetjee 
Jeejeebhoy and Sons, the largest trade constituent of Jardine, Matheson & Company, 
remitted to London through China about £150,000 a year. American drafts in London gave 
the private trade financial independence from the East India Company. 
The practice of resorting to American Bills on London lessened Jardine, Matheson & 
Company's exposure during what became known as the Calcutta credit crisis for 1829-34. 
The story of Jardine, Matheson's relative escape from the credit crisis is an example of the 
power and use of information as a resource. All of the other Agency Houses suffered losses 
or failed, including Palmer & Co., Alexander & Co., Mackintosh & Co., Colvin & Co., Fairlie & 
Co., London & Calcutta, Richard Mackintosh & Co., London, among others. Dent & 
Company was unprepared for the failure of Palmers in 1830. According to James 
Matheson, the origin of the bitter feud between Dents and Jardine, Matheson & Company 
lay in Jardine; Matheson's withholding of the correspondence, brought from Calcutta in a 
Jardine clipper, of the news of the failure of Palmers. 
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In 1832 James Matheson wrote about Jardine, Matheson's financial policy to his nephew 
Hugh. "Of the bills which we endorse, those on Baring Brothers & Co. are always drawn 
under credits either from themselves or their attorney at New York, Mr. T.W. Ward, who has 
authority for the purpose. Other bills are drawn under credits from a known capitalist John 
Jacob Astor of New York, who owns lands almost equal to a principality in the United States. 
Bills on Gledstone, Drysdale & Co. are either drawn under credits from them or on the 
security of bills of lading for goods .... Mr. Thomas Weeding on whom we draw is a merchant 
possessed of at least a lack of pounds sterling. Thomas Wyatt on whom we also pass bills 
is a still greater capitalist 'tho only an oilman. Then there are Messrs. Spode and Copeland, 
Chinaware men of solid wealth and you may have seen some of our bills on them also. On 
the whole, we feel that we are now committing ourselves with people of far greater solidity 
than those whose bills are vaunted forth at 7/10 -1/2 at Calcutta. And if any disappointment 
should occur to us, divided as our risk is among various parties, it cannot but prove 
comparatively insignificant.. .. It may probably prove a useful preparation on future 
occasions of sending you bills with our endorsement to state who the drawers are, and the 
nature of the security on which we rely authorizing you at the same time to assure parties 
taking them that Fairlie Bonham & Co. will be prepared to take them in case of need for our 
honor. But as I have said before it is not likely that we shall trouble you with anything 'til we 
hear that credit is reestablished in the mercantile establishments at Calcutta .... Tell me how 
the bills of the United States bank are valued at your place, whether they would sell equally 
well with those of the first Calcutta houses. They ought in fact to sell as well as the 
Company's. The security to my mind is better."90 
In 1835, Hollingworth Magniac established with John Abel Smith, M.P. and Oswald Smith, 
the firm of Magniac Smith & Co., of 3 Lombard Street. William Jardine, who claimed to be 
"fully aware of the wealth, respectability and high character of the parties," agreed to make 
them London agents with this reservation: "At no time shall it be expedient that we should 
give up the option of carrying on transactions with other London houses to a certain extent, 
however, giving a larger share of business to whatever house may act as our principal 
agents. The principal advantage we look to from our house connection is the certainty of 
our Bills being protected to whatever extent we may have occasion to draw in the course of 
anyone season, without reference to immediately available assets to meet them." 91 
When William Jardine went home from China in 1839, he became a partner in the Lombard 
Street firm, which became known as Magniac Jardine & Co. when he bought out the Smith 
family. In 1848, James Matheson reorganized the firm as Matheson & Co. 
90 Letter from James Matheson, April 25, 1832. JM, C5/1. 
91 Letter from James Matheson to William Jardine, February 9,1835, JM, C5/3. 
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On the strength of its reputation and relationships, Jardine, Matheson & Co. was thus able 
to build a banking business, which on the withdrawal of the East India Company's Finance 
Committee from Canton in 1839. handled most of the lucrative exchange transactions 
arising from the China trade . Following the conclusion of the war and the cession of Hong 
Kong to Britain, Jardine. Matheson & Company began to finance shipments, open credit and 
offer general merchant banking facilities . See Chart 4: Evolution of Financial Services, 
below. 
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So attractive were the proceeds of the banking business that Jardine. Matheson had 
therefore a vested interest in opposing the formation of the competitive Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation in 1865. In 1895. William and James J. Keswick of Jardine. 
Matheson & Company. with Robert Jackson of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation. formed the British and Chinese Corporation, which made financial 
arrangements for successive governments of China and. before 1911 , constructed major 
railway lines in east central China . 
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Building Market Institutions to Insure Rich Cargo Against High Risk: 
In addition to banking another major aspect of the agency business which sprang from the 
China trade was marine insurance. Insurance was indispensable in a trade of rich cargo and 
high risk. In 1801 there was no public insurance office of any kind in Canton, but several 
individuals would combine in temporary associations to underwrite a ship and its cargo up to 
$12,000. In 1805 the Canton Insurance Society was founded. This institution lasted thirty 
years and was managed alternately, every five years, by the Davidson-Dent house and that 
of the Beale-Magniac-Jardine firm. The concern consisted of a number of shares, usually 
60, which were held by the managing agents in Canton and their friends in Calcutta and 
Bombay. These shares were much sought after since there was no limit to the responsibility 
of each shareholder, no cash deposit was exacted and the profits yielded a dividend of from 
$3,000-$4,000 a share. The main inducement to become a shareholder was the prestige 
and respectability it conferred. In 1832 Jardine, Matheson & Company as Managers of the 
10th Canton Insurance Company, bestowed the Calcutta agency on their protege, Lyall 
Matheson & Company. 
The competition in "risks" was due to the fact that the principal agency houses in Calcutta 
and Bombay each had an insurance office of its own, likewise a co-partnership of 
commercial "friends" and their connections in the other centers. Fairlie & Co. were 
managers of the Calcutta Insurance Society, with Magniac & Co. as its Canton agent. 
Palmers ran the rival Canton Insurance Company, with Dents as its Canton agents. Forbes 
controlled the Bombay Insurance Company, Remington the Bombay Insurance Society. 
James Matheson brought with him to Canton in 1819 the agency for Mackintosh's Hope 
Insurance Company and Dents' Phoenix, which he took with him upon entering the firms of 
Yrisarri and Magniac. The insurance companies belonged to the various agency houses. 
One might call them insurance subsidiaries, from which the agency houses derived 
dividends on shares, surplus of premiums over losses and a regular commission of 1/2% for 
every insurance affected. 
A list published in The Canton Register of February 1829 shows Magniac & Co. as agents of 
six Insurance companies, including the 8th Canton Insurance Company, and Dent & Co. as 
agents of four. In 1829 Jardine started a private underwriting account "J.M. and Friends," 
with the firm holding 20 of the 36 shares, with each share worth $1,000 per annum. As the 
volume of the China trade increased, the insurance revenue increased. In 1835, when the 
10th Canton office came to a close, Dent decided to end the "ancient custom of alternate 
management" and set up its own China Insurance Company, leaving Canton in the hands of 
Jardine, Matheson & Company. The Canton Insurance Company laid the foundation for 
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Jardine, Matheson's large interest in many forms of insurance services ,92 and the increased 
cash flow from insurance services enabled the firm invest in new businesses - particularly in 
shipping. 
Building Dominance In Shipping: Jardine, Matheson as Owner, Investor and Innovator 
In the early days of the China trade, the Canton agency houses acted as resident agents, 
also known as Supercargoes, for country ships owned in India, receiving from the owners a 
commission, as described in the section on Commissions. The development of the opium 
trade forced the Canton agent to become a ship owner. It became necessary to have a 
special fleet of clippers, receiving ships, coastal vessels, and tenders. These ships would 
often be the joint property of the Canton agent and the agent's principal India constituent 
who supplied the opium. Jardine, Matheson gave its captains an interest in the clippers and 
a reduction of demurrage charges on their receiving vessels. The shipping business grew 
up around the larger Canton agency houses, which had grown rich from its banking and 
insurance businesses. Jardine, Matheson & Company was able to build a considerable 
private fleet, the beginnings of its dominant position in the carrying trade of the China seas. 
One of the first acts of the new firm was to order the brig Fairy from a shipyard in Liverpool, 
England. From this and earlier smaller beginnings the firm's shipping interests grew and 
became a principal activity in the Group's transportation services. The founders were quick 
to take over a large part of the tea trade, which was available after the East India Company's 
monopoly ended. Tea and silk were the major trading activities until later in the century.93 
Jardine, Matheson & Company also established agency services (as the configuration of 
insurance, banking, and representation services was called) for other ship owners, including 
those of American clippers.94 
The firm's shipping business was inseparable from trading. For the firm's London agents -
Magniac Smith, Magniac Jardine and later Matheson & Company - canvassing for ship 
consignments was important to maximizing capacity on incoming and outgoing ships. This 
led to close relationships with ship owners and extended to outward cargoes such as coal 
with the introduction of steamships in the Far East. 
92 Letter from James Matheson to Hugh Matheson, February 21, 1832, JM C/1; Insurance policy taken out by Joao 
Antonio Barretto, Chairman of the Club Lusitano. with the Hongkong Fire Insurance Company, Limited, Hong 
Kong, January 2,1974. JM A8/96. 
93 Table of tea purchases. Foochow, June 30, 1865. JM A8/129; "Account of Cocoons purchased up Country for 
Account of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson & Company and sent fresh to Pootung for an experiment per steamer 
94 Faust,' Shanghai, August 12, 1865, JM A8/8/4. 
Maggie Keswick, ed., The Thistle and the Jade (London: Octopus Books, 1982), p. 138·139. 
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Investment in technology for rapid transport and communication was important to 
competitive advantage in tea sales. The first British tea clipper, the Stornoway was built for 
the firm. Several such ships would ply between China and England, each carrying about 
million pound weight of tea for sale at the London tea auctions. By 1840, the Baltimore 
model Clipper Ship excelled the field in speed. 
James Matheson was impressed with the possibilities of steam navigation and chartered the 
steamer Forbes in Calcutta to tow the brig Jamesina to China. The next steamship venture, 
the Jardine, was built in 1835 and was inspired by the need for better communication between 
Canton and Lintin. Jardine, Matheson's steamships, built on the River Clyde, replaced clippers 
in 1855 on a regular monthly schedule from Calcutta to China. 
Jardine, Matheson was also an investor in the shipping interests of other firms. The firm 
invested in Russell & Company's shipping operations on the Yangtze River in 1860 and in 
the China Coast Steam Navigation Company in 1872. The China Coast Company was the 
precursor to the Indo China Steam Navigation Company, formed in London in 1881, which 
brought together all the ships and operations on the Yangtze, after Russell & Company was 
sold to the China Merchants. From an initial 12 ships, the Indo China Steam Navigation 
Company expanded its ships to 20 at 100,000 tons by 1905 and expanded its river service 
to include Hankow, Ichang and Chungking, when politically and commercially practical. 
The tonnage of vessels entered and cleared at offices under Chinese control from 1864-
1912 indicate that the coasting trade represented 75% and foreign trade 25% of total 
shipping volume. British ships represented 50% ofthe total through 1912, when Japanese 
and Chinese ships began to carry a combined total of 40%. The bulk of the coasting trade 
was in the hands of the Indo-China Steamship Company (Jardine, Matheson's subsidiary) 
and the China Navigation Co. Chart 5, below,looks at the number of ships, the tonnage 
and relative market share of shipping company competitors operating on the Yangtze from 
1903 through 1911. (Entries under competitor columns are from left: number of ships, 
tonnage, market share, based on percent of total Yangtze River trade). 
Chart 5: Market Share of Major Shipping Companies, 1870·1911 
Year China Indo-Chlna Nisshin Kisen China Total 
Navigation Steamship Merchants 
(Butterfield & (Jardine, 
Swire) Matheson) 
1903 4-6.757 (23.8) 5-7.236 (25.5) 5-6.727 (23.7) 6-7688(27.1 ) 20-28408 (100) 
1911 I 9-9863 (17.9) 6-10648(19.3) 12-25678 (46.6) 7-8864 (16.1) 34-55053 (100) 
.. Source. William D. Wray. Mltsyblshl and the NYK 1870-1914. Busmess Strategy In the Jaoanese ShlRpma Industry. Haryard 
University. 1984. 
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Competition (and collaboration) with the Japanese began in 1900. The Japanese goal was 
to link China ports with Mitsubishi's transoceanic lines, integrating the Japanese firm's 
business operations with those of European traders, and reducing Russia 's threat to be the 
first to connect Europe and East Asia by rail. The building of railways in China by Western 
firms and the inevitable development of China 's natural resources similarly threatened 
Japan. See Chart 6: Evolution of the Shipping Business, below. 
Chart 6: Evolution of the Shipping Business 
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Incipient Market Institutions Evolve and Institutionalize: The Treaty Port System 
Three wars with China over opium and colonial interests from 1842-1898 laid the foundation 
for the treaty-port system within which commercial , navigational, residential , judicial and 
industrial rights were secured for British and American merchants in China . The treaty port 
system identified some 15 ports that were to be kept open for foreign trade and required that 
taxes and duties be systematized . The system provided encouragement and protection for 
trade and lasted until 1941 . A similar system in Japan lasted from 1858 to 1894. The 
system in Siam lasted until 1926. 
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The treaty port system offered traders a freedom from monopoly, a wider field of activity 
than the previously limited single trading zone (for example, Canton), a systematized 
taxation of goods and shipping, of direct access through British officials to local authorities 
and of extraterritoriality, the provision of differences between British and local judicial 
conceptions and practices. 
The system of taxation, guaranteed by the Treaty of Nanking, provided for a 5% import and 
export tariff and arranged that imports after payment of import duties might be conveyed to 
the interior free of all further charges except transit dues. The Treaty of Tientsin provided 
that transit dues might be compounded by paying a single charge of 21,12% on the value of 
goods in return for certificate known as a transit pass, exempting goods from all further 
inland charges whatsoever. From 1842 to 1928, the Treaty Port system made the entry of 
foreign goods into China, the manufacture of goods by foreigners in China, and the export of 
Chinese goods abroad was fiscally easy as possible. 
As a consequence of extra-territoriality, the British -like American, Japanese, French and 
other foreign traders resident in China - were for a long time entirely immune from direct 
taxation, except in the form of a land tax, by the Chinese govemment. This was largely a 
characteristic of the treaty port system until World War II. 
Most-favored-nation treatment - one of the most important parts of the treaty port system -
threw open China's inland waters to navigation. The Chefoo Convention of 1876 provided 
that the term "inland" should apply as much to places on the seacoasts and river shores as 
to places in the interior not open to foreign trade. The Mackay Treaty of 1902 laid down that 
a steamer duly registered for inland water navigation might ply between open ports, or from 
one open port or ports, to places inland and back to such port or ports, landing or shipping 
passengers, or cargo, at any recognized place of trade en route.95 Under these rules, 
British merchants also had the right to lease warehouses and jetties on inland waters, to 
employ Chinese agents at them and visit them from time to time. Yangtze Trade 
Regulations, issued in the same year as the first set of inland waters regulations, allowed 
vessels not specially registered under the latter to ply between - as well as land and ship 
passengers and goods at - the open ports on the river but not elsewhere. Vessels 
specifically registered for inland water traffic, however, made the excluded places, usable. 
In 1905 the West River was also thrown open to steam navigation. Treaties made in 1928 
and 1930 in respect of the tariff placed tonnage dues entirely under Chinese jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, at the outbreak of World War II, they remained as they had been fixed by the 
Treaty of Tientsin, $.65/ton.96 
95 E.M. Gull, British Economic Interests in the Ear East. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), p. 31. 
96 E.M. Gull, ibid., p. 32. 
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The treaty port system was a strategic asset to the private trade. By definition, a strategic 
asset is a source of competitive advantage which is derived from factors external to the firm 
rather than from the firm's distinctive capabilities. The treaty port system created a level 
playing field in which all firms had the same opening advantage, but firms that could 
accumulate and retain more revenue through their distinctive capabilities had greater 
sustainable advantage. 
From 1842 through 1914, Shanghai and Hong Kong among the Treaty Ports, were the chief 
centers of economic activity for tea, silk and manufactures, see Chart 7 below. The Treaty 
Ports of Tientsin, Hankow and Canton were distant followers. 
Chart 7: Economic Activity of Shanghai and Hong Kong, 1840·1914 
Chief Imports, Average 1899·1903 1904·1908 1909·1913 
Annual Value £ £ £ 
rea 712.560 74,759 712,368 
Raw silk 391.958 354,490 359,494 
Silk, knubs and waste 338,705 322,772 442,332 
Hemp 235,592 21,416 12,520 
Plaiting of straw 231,266 188,799 168,465 
Manufactures of skins and 230,159 188,680 58,646 
furs 
Bristles 176,806 218,638 269,152 
Furs 133,705 154,896 58,646 
Hides. raw 49,618 46,412 . 
Soya beans .. 
- 717.562 
Wool. camel's and sheep's 16.050 202.158 237,536 
.. Source. Annual Statement of the Trade of the Umted Kingdom In E.M. Gull. Bntish Economic Interests In the Far East. Institute of 
Pacific Relations. 1943. 
The British Empire (including Great Britain and Hong Kong) was the purchaser on average 
of 28% of China's exports during the period 1880·1913. The combined share of China's 
import trade represented by India, Singapore, the Straits, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa and Canada was 26% in 1880 and averaged 10% from 1890-1913. 
During the period 1854·1903, the bulk of Britain's imports from China came directly from 
Chinese ports. Only a relatively small portion came through Hong Kong. On the other 
hand, until 1889, nearly half of Britain's exports passed into China from Hong Kong. After 
1889, this proportion changed. Hong Kong's percentage share of China's total exports 
averaged 31.5% from 1880-1913. 
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Chart 8 depicts the development of Hong Kong as an entrepot for Britain's trade with China. 
Chart 8: Hong Kong As Entrepot, 1890-1913 
Average Annual Value 1890·3 1894·1903 1904·13 
Thousands £ Thousands £ Thousands £ 
Imports from China 4,505 2,784 4,011 
Imports from Hong Kong 1,012 726 580 
Exports to China 5,956 6,066 11,131 
Exports to Hong Kong 2,095 2,419 3,594 
Source. Statlsllcs of the United Kingdom S Customs and Excise Department 10 E.M. Gull. BnUSh Econo/Plc Interests In the Far Wi, 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943. 
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Chapter 4: Section 2: Internal and External Factors 
Responsible for Resource/Services Choices 
Without the government backing the East India Company had enjoyed (as well as the ability 
to mint money and raise a militia), private firms with a reputation for financial probity enjoyed 
a major source of advantage over less cautious peers and would-be competitors in trading, 
banking, maritime insurance and shipping. Reputation and retention of trading relationships 
depended on sound financial management and the ability of the firm's founders to 
communicate decision criteria and build trust at a distance. Later, reputation would be an 
important advantage in the firm's evolving relationship with government, as lender, investor 
and joint venture partner. 
As previously mentioned, letter writing was the principal means of setting rules, sharing 
market information and building relationships with suppliers and agents, communicating 
strategy to partners, training and disciplining agents, organizing industry support and 
communicating with and influencing government. The correspondence is rich and some 
flavor of the content of the letters is given in Appendix A: Jardine Matheson Archives, 
Management Issues 1810-1906, at the end of this dissertation. 
Avoid Speculation: A Simple Decision Rule for Managing Uncertainty 
The advantage Jardine, Matheson enjoyed in the marketplace depended on its reputation -
and that reputation depended on the quality of the firm's financial decisions. With 
competitors seesawing from stability to near bankruptcy, Jardine, Matheson offered a safe 
haven to customers and suppliers who banked, borrowed, insured and shipped with the firm. 
It was important to Jardine's reputation and to the firm's own stability that associated agents 
and staff follow closely the firm's prohibition against speculation on their own account, 
particularly speculation in commodities and especially speculation in indigo. As James 
Matheson explained to Charles Thomas, who was urging on Matheson a coffee investment: 
"While you speculate in the face of a high exchange and at your own risk, your neighbors do 
so at the risk of their constituents and often for the sake of effecting sales at anything likely 
to pay an indifferent exchange. Hence, it generally happens that those who are first in the 
market on these occasions, whether from priority of information or superior discernment in 
foreseeing a use, make handsome profits, while those who follow experience a very 
different fate. It is not, however, on account of these views that we feel an insuperable 
objection to incur the risk of such speculation. They are foreign to the line of our business, 
and we have 
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neither the time nor inclination for acquiring the requisite information to give us a fair chance 
of avoiding the most serious errors.,,97 
Inculcating sound financial management in its agents was the most pressing management 
issue faced by Jardine, Matheson & Company in the firm's early years. Advances and 
speculation were the most common concerns. James Matheson chides the firm's Bombay 
agent De Vitre & Company: 
Excuse my mentioning to you that it would be some satisfaction to me if you could 
manage to square up your account with us about once a year, if not putting you to 
much inconvenience. Your balance would thus be really what it ought to be, say, a 
series of temporary advances in anticipation of your remittances and not a 
permanent loan forming a part of your trading capital.98 
The firm of E. de Otadui, a Portuguese agent working in Manila, and his American partner, 
John Shillaber, was reprimanded sharply for "the injudiciousness of the speculative views, 
which you have allowed yourselves to be led away by, as much to the injury of your friends. 
You will probably accuse your bad fortune, but if this has been the case during a large 
portion of your life, is it not high time, at length to avoid exposing yourself to a choice which 
has proved so uniformly ruinous?"99 
Again to Otadui, "Sincerely desirous as we are of the prosperity of your house, and of 
contributing to it by every means in our power, it is a service of great regret to us that our 
wishes should to all appearance have been hitherto thwarted in this respect. And we are 
anxious that a better system should, if possible, be adopted to insure you enjoying the full 
advantage of the extensive agency business which you have the means of commanding. I 
have written strongly to Mr. Shillaber my opinion of the injudicious magnitude and seemingly 
wild character of his speculative views."1oo 
Speculation led to the request for advances and loans, anathema to the firm. In a letter of 
May 1, 1838 to John Purvis in London, James Matheson wrote: ·We must confess however 
it is with some reluctance we agree to this, experiences here show that such advances in 
place of benefiting the receivers are too apt to accumulate with a still larger debt. It will be a 
source of much satisfaction to us, should you care prove to be an exception to the general 
rule.,,101 
97 
98 James Matheson to Charles Thomas, Singapore Sept. 30, 1832, JMA C4/2. 
99 Letter from James Matheson to De Vitre & Co., July 24, 1832., JM 4/1. 
100 Letter from James Matheson to John Shilaber, Manila, April 26, 1838. JM C5/3. 
101 Letter from James Matheson to E. de Otadui, April 30, 1838. JM C5/3. 
Letter from James Matheson to John Purvis, May 1, 1838. JM C5/3. 
76 
James Matheson sent James Adam Smith to Manila to oversee the finances of Otadui & Co. 
But the young man's correspondence reveals him to have fallen into the same financial 
practices as the firm's partners. James Matheson therefore admonishes: 
The state of the Government and your own treasury as pointed out in your own 
letter of 7 August is very annoying and disappointing and I could not have believed 
that you would have been so helpless as to have no local response within reach to 
provide for this temporary emergency - seeing that you had such excellent security 
to give for an advance and were besides authorized to pass your bill on us. This 
unlooked for state of affairs subjects us to the inconvenience and loss of sending 
you large treasure remittance per Good Success, and we cannot bear even the 
remote chance of our operations in your quarter being hampered or impeded for 
want of funds. I enter into all these explanations in the hope that a better 
understanding between us for the future may prevent such a contretemps as we are 
now suffering from. 102 
Referring to James Adam Smith's unsuccessful attempts to reconcile Otadui's accounts, 
which appear seriously short, Matheson writes: 
This surely needed explanation from you or from Shillaber to relieve him from the 
grave imputation, which it involves. It would seem to me as it now stands to be 
another instance of money taken from us without our knowledge or consent, and 
they seem to hint surprise at our wishing to charge interest on it - Does it never 
occur to Otadui or Shillaber to ask themselves what particular merit they should 
have in our eyes that they should expect us to make the vast sacrifices for them of 
every kind which we are doing? Our whole intercourse with them has been but a 
string of sacrifices, one after another without any return. 
How Jardine, Matheson Built A Reputation for Regular and Candid Information with 
Buyers and Suppliers 
A network of correspondents in East Asia, Europe, South America and Africa, including the 
commanders of Jardine, Matheson's vessels, supplied information to the early firm, some of 
which was communicated to a larger audience via The Canton Register from 1827-1846, 
and some withheld for Jardine, Matheson's own benefit. Beginning in 1848 through 1870, 
the commander of each Jardine vessel submitted a formal monthly report, which was 
compiled and sent to "friends" on the firm's "opium list." It followed a set form, and normally 
began 
102 Letter from James Matheson to James Adam Smith, May 7. 1838. JM C5/3. 
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with general remarks, sometimes commenting cautiously about political events in China, 
and then described current markets for each type of opium, quoted average prices, 
estimated current stocks in China, and gave current exchange rates for India and London. 
The government-controlled Bengal monopoly provided reports and memoranda on crops 
and possible yields in the Benares and Behar agencies, but Jardine, Matheson & Company 
depended on Jeejeebhoy and others for their knowledge of the Malwa crop and Bombay 
market trends to prepare instructions for commanders on the coast. Jardine, Skinner in 
Calcutta also informed Jardine, Matheson about the monthly auctions, watched market 
trends and forwarded the official reports of the government opium agencies. 
After 1846, the collective communications of the Hong Kong head office with Jardine 
commanders were formalized. Each month instructions were sent from Hong Kong to the 
Commanders of Jardine, Matheson & Company vessels, Southern and Eastern Stations, 
which included all receiving ships on the coast, ranging from 14 in 1846 to 10 in 1851 and 
thereafter. Instructions gave a general picture of the Hong Kong market before issuing 
orders on sales. For a view of the content of such correspondence, see the Coast Letter 
Book, Hong Kong to Commanders, May 29, 1851: "The almost simultaneous arrival of (four) 
vessels from the fifth and sixth Calcutta sales has caused, for the moment, a panic among 
the dealers and prices which had previously been well supported at our last quotations have 
given way. After a time, however, the market will probably rally somewhat, but for the 
present, you will continue to take full share of sales at current rates." 
How Jardine, Matheson Built and Trained An Increasing Cadre of Agents 
Unlike the East India Company that frequently engaged the well-educated sons of the well-
to-do in roles for which they might be ill-suited in order to jump-start a career, the private 
traders could not afford the lUXUry of a mistake. James Matheson was articulate about his 
expectations: "I am not in favor of young men being brought forward on the stage of life 
without ample previous training. In regard to your plan of making him our "safe and 
confidential agent" in Glasgow, I should think some years must elapse before he can be 
qualified for such an office. 103 
His assessment of the talents of a friend's young protege was caustic: "He is so incorrigibly 
vain as not to be in the least aware of his shallowness of intellect. Thus he has neither the 
same chance of improvement which a more modest man would have nor the same facility of 
making up for his deficiencies by resorting to the advice or assistance of a friend.,,104 
103 Letter of James Matheson to William Mathieson, Glasgow, January 17,1831. JM C4/1. 
104 letter of James Matheson March 18, 1832, JM C4/1. 
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When he perceived the goal to be worthwhile, Matheson was a detail-oriented teacher: 
Perceiving that it would be acceptable to your firm to have a portion of the Agency of 
our intimate friends Messrs. Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy Sons & Co., Bombay, we have 
for some time been desirous of bringing them into correspondence with you. Their 
London business consists chiefly of the remittance to Bombay of funds arising from 
their consignments to us which are by us forwarded to Messrs. Forbes, Forbes & 
Co., who have hitherto acted as their friends. The usual routine has been, that on 
receipt of their consignments to us, we write to Messrs. Forbes, Forbes & Co. 
engaging to remit to them in the course of the season such sums as we may be 
instructed on receiving our engagements. Messrs. F. F. & Co. agree to advance a 
certain portion of the same and the remainder as soon as our bills or produce reach 
their hands. Last year in consideration of the difficulty of making remittances from 
hence they relaxed from this rule and came under advance for more than a third, but 
they are too fond of making remarks tending to overrate the value of their services 
and are apt to be captious in reminding our friends that sometimes our letters of 
Engagement, sometimes our remittances (when bills happen to be scarce here) are 
late in reaching, all which our friends remark in a late letter is very unpleasant to 
them. We have taken advantage of this to reply that you will fumish advances 
without unduly burying our operations here, so as to give time for our picking up bills 
and produce at the most advantageous periods of their being procurable within the 
range of the season and as a commencement we have sent them a letter of credit 
on you for £20 to £3,000. It will rest with you (if they adopt our plan) to encourage a 
continuance and extension of this business or the contrary. They have for many 
years carried on a well managed and lucrative business through our predecessors 
and us, which has latterly exceeded a million of dollars per annum of which about 
£150,000 per annum pass through the hands of their London agents. They also 
consign on a limited scale 
How Jardine, Matheson Developed and Evolved Its Relationship with the Government in 
China 
While the East India Company had acted on the authority of the Crown as an arm of the 
government with a militia of its own, the private trade in China found itself with no authority 
and no protection. The object of its on again, off again relationship with government, 
whether Parliamentary or Ching dynasty, was trade. The relationship went through three 
phases during the period covered in this chapter: the first, a campaign to engage all British 
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traders and suppliers in China and India to support the British government's intervention in 
trade whether by guns or diplomacy; the second, a campaign to engage all foreign traders in 
pursuit of the establishment of free trade at negotiated Treaty Ports; the third, a campaign to 
provide loans to the Chinese government for armaments and infrastructure, often involving 
the collaboration of peer companies and competitors. 
At the outset, as the East India Company became less effective and private traders 
increasingly on their own, an appeal was made to Parliament for diplomacy or guns, 
whatever would have the desired return. 
James Matheson campaigned for government protection of the right of free trade where a 
precedent of such trade had been established. In 1828 he delivered an address to 
Parliament, which was subsequently published by Smith, Elder in 1831. James Matheson's 
Present Position and Prospects of the British Trade with China was directed to the House of 
Commons where its purpose was to argue "establishing a direct and frequent 
communication between the two governments (Great Britain and Peking). No particular act 
or appearance of favor or concession need to expected from the Chinese Government.,,105 
The treatise quotes extensively from natural law theorists and lawyers like Grotius, 
Pufendorf and Emmerich de Vattel to bolster the argument for the application of the law of 
nature to trade as well as to nations. 
Upon joining Magniac & Company, James Matheson solicited the Bombay and Canton 
merchants to sign a Petition to Parliament, supporting his treatise. In a letter to Jamsetjee 
Jejeebhoy, which is typical of many of the period, he argued: 
As you must feel interested in whatever tends to the improvement of our commercial 
relations with China, I take this opportunity of enclosing a copy of a Petition calling 
the attention of the House of Commons to the subject signed by every British 
subject here, out of the Company's employ, except Mr. L. Dent and Capt. Glover. 
Much good has already been done by the energetic measures adopted. 106 
The firm's relationship with Lord Palmerston, British Foreign Secretary. was very strong and 
the partners persuaded Lord Palmerston to send warships to China to arrange for 
reparations to be made for the 20.000 chests of opium worth $9 million. which had been 
seized by the Chinese authorities. The hostilities that ensued became known as the First 
Opium War. The Chinese lost and were forced to sign a treaty in 1842 awarding the British 
traders $6 million in reparations. The treaty opened the ports of Canton. Amoy. Foochow. 
105 
'06 James Matheson, Prosoects of the British Trade with China, (London: Smith Elder, 1831). 
Letter of James Matheson to Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, January 31, 1831. JM C4/1. 
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Ningpo and Shanghai and ceded the island of Hong Kong to Britain. The second phase of 
the relationship with government had begun. 
Jardine Matheson purchased the first plot of land sold in Hong Kong and moved its offices 
there. The colony's first governor, Sir Henry Pottinger, endorsed the opium trade and later 
won the support of Parliament, which viewed the opium trade as a method to reduce the 
British trade deficit with China. After continued hostilities, a Second Opium War broke out in 
1860. As victors, the British won virtually unrestricted commercial rights to conduct 
business in China - but so did the other trading nations, France, Germany, and the United 
States among others. 
The firm was substantively involved in the pre and post Opium War discussions and the 
establishment of the treaty port system, described in the previous section, which established 
a system of customs duties at the ports. The treaty port system replaced the old tribute 
system by which gifts and respect were paid to the Imperial throne for the privilege of 
conducting trade. The firm developed and maintained close relations with both Chinese and 
British leaders, attempting to find the right, timely, mutually beneficial instrument of 
influence. 
After many years of seeking Parliamentary assistance on behalf of the merchants of Canton 
(and after many years of making minor loans at interest to officials and Chinese merchants), 
Jardine, Matheson was involved in the first sizable loan to the Imperial government - a loan 
guaranteed by the customs revenue in April 1867 - for China's campaign against the 
Moslem rebels. The uprising was known as the Taiping Rebellion. The loan at 15% was in 
the amount of £400,000, with Jardine, Matheson being asked for £200,000. 
Peking did not authorize further provincial loans until 1874 when money was needed again 
to finance military operations. The firm declined the whole amount of £600,000 but offered 
£150,000, if customs security were again provided. Assurance was then given that permits 
would be issued by the customs at Shanghai, Canton and Chinkiang, that they would be 
endorsed by the governors general and governors, and that the full amount would be 
returned within three years, with annual interest set at 10.5%. The firm was satisfied with 
this business as an investment. 
The conclusion of the Taiping Rebellion and the opening of the Yangtze River, the third 
phase, raised Jardine, Matheson & Company's confidence in a Chinese government-
directed program of economic development for China. This confidence is illustrated in the 
record of meetings between members of the firm and Li Hung-Chang, leader of the Imperial 
army against the rebels. Nevertheless, the participation of foreigners in China's external 
trade, as owners or agents in the exchange of goods, was still restricted at all open ports, 
except 
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Shanghai and Hong Kong. Hence, the auxiliary services of trade were vital to the prosperity 
of foreigners in China. Jardine, Matheson & Company reacted to these developments by an 
increased emphasis on the servicing of trade, facilitation of government loans and industrial 
projects, and the pursuit of cooperation and joint investment with the emerging Chinese 
merchant community. 
From 1885, James Keswick saw Li Hung-Chang several times to discuss site development. 
Li had plans to construct a railroad to link Shansi with Tientsin. In Keswick's view "It would 
be the best means by which we could become the pioneer company of railways on a large 
scale in China .• 107 
Through the summer and autumn of 1886, much of Jardine, Matheson's Shanghai and 
Tientsin correspondence deals with proposed contracts for armaments, railways, railway 
materials, telegraph equipment, loans, Port Arthur fortifications and Formosa. Until 
conservative pressures forced Liu Ming-ch'uan's removal as governor of Formosa, his 
orders for railway materials and arms were almost entirely channeled through the agency of 
Jardine, Matheson. 
During the 1880s firms like Jardine, Matheson were very willing to work with the Chinese 
Officials, who would accept foreign help in the building of communications to begin the 
transformation of the old economy. A new policy had become explicit by 1875. By lending 
money for administrative and essentially non-productive purposes, the firm expected to 
place itself with Li Hung-chang and a few others, as the agent through whom the Chinese 
government might initiate and supply its further projects. Jardine's partners interpreted 
China's early self-strengthening efforts - both the arsenals and the steamships - as 
harbingers of industrialization and future economic development so vast in terms of required 
communications and manufacturing equipment that it would dwarf all previous industrial 
programs. For the Western agent ·on the ground," experienced and favored by Chinese 
officials, it was expected that such a program would provide excellent profits. 
Jardine, Matheson's willingness at this stage to serve, rather than oppose, the bureaucracy 
reached its high point in the decade before the Sino-Japanese war, although the great surge 
of industrial and financial enterprise, regarded as imminent each year, had not resulted in 
many concrete projects before 1885. Jardine hoped for a China developing commercially 
and industrially along Japanese lines, with overall direction in government hands while 
Western firms acted as suppliers of capital, materials and skills. Jardine's F.B. Johnson's 
107 
Letter from James Keswick to J. Bell-Irving, July 18, 1887, JM, C4119 
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advocated "keeping ourselves to the front in any communications on fiscal arrangements or 
enterprises taking place between Chinese authorities and foreigners.,,108 During this period, 
the firm was primarily interested in railway contracts, often with partners like Butterfield & 
Swire, for financing and supplying of material. Loans, however large and profitable, were 
regarded as a means of obtaining leverage with officials responsible for the award of railway 
contracts. Loans offered for general engineering work - particularly the repair of the Yellow 
River flood control system, the fortification of Port Arthur, and the provision of materials for 
all engineering work - were second only to railway contracts. The sale of armaments 
followed all these larger activities. 
The geographic centers of the firm's activities with Chinese officials during the 1 BBO's and 
1B90's were Shanghai, Tientsin and Peking. In the eighties, the firm's office at Tientsin 
began to coordinate all the firm's business on behalf of the Chinese government, directing 
negotiations at Peking and maintaining daily contact with Li Hung-Chang's office. 
While Jardine, Matheson continued to make government loans in the 1 BBOs and 1890s, in 
the century's closing decades, what was different was the emergence of definite aims for the 
use of capital. Having reverted to the stricter practices of an agency house, operating on 
commission and no longer investing large amounts of their own capital in exports, members 
of the firm were free to emphasize their distinctive capabilities as managers and brokers of 
finance, banking and insurance services. 
And it was in the spirit of optimism and perceived future value that Jardine, Matheson & 
Company amalgamated its river and coastal shipping interests and floated the resulting 
limited liability company, The Indo-China Steam Navigation Company, on the London Stock 
Exchange in 1881.109 Sir Paul Chater formed the Hongkong Land Company in joint partnership with 
James Keswick in 1888.110 
108 
Letter from F.B. Johnson to W. Paterson, January 20, 1883, JM, Unbound Correspondence, HK-Sh. B2/12. 109 . 
110 Jardine, Matheson & Company 1981 Annual Report, p. 8. 
Jardine, Matheson & Company 1981 Annual Report., p. 8. 
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Chapter 4: Section 3: Fundraising for Growth: From Joint 
Stock to Free-standing Investment House 
The three major functions derived from trading, elsewhere described as agency services --
namely, banking, shipping and insurance - dominated the Hong Kong investment market 
and reflected the commercial character of the Treaty Port system. From the 1870's forward, 
Jardine, Matheson and its competitors partnered made substantial investments in joint-stock 
enterprises in the service of trade. Chart 9 details Jardine, Matheson's investments as of 
April 1885. 
Chart 9: Jardine, Matheson & Company - Investments in the Service of Trade and 
Manufacturing 
Taels (Ounces of Sliver, Chinese) 
Hunt's Wharf Property 213,846 
Jardine's Piers and Godowns 331,000 
Canton Insurance Office 36,000 
Hong Kong Fire Insurance Company 44.100 
Hong Kong and Whampoa Dock Company 81,568 
Hong Kong. Canton and Macao SS Company 36.672 
Indo-China Steam Navigation Company 817,560 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank 463,968 
China Sugar Refining 109.858 
Luzon Sugar Refining 119,850 
Source. JM ArchiveS. Account Books. 1885 
The China Mail reports Jardine, Matheson's commission business at £150,000 as of 1884. 
Jardine's assets at the time are found in the 1885 accounts, a total of £2.5 million and half 
in the name of Robert Jardine. According to Lefevour, "A rough calculation would indicate 
that more than half of the firm's total capital was invested in steamships, Treaty Port real 
estate, banking, insurance and produce business. The range of its business, and this 
substantial capital, placed (the firm's) members most favorably in their campaign to serve as 
catalysts in China's commercial and industrial development.-'" 
Funded with the retained earnings of trading profits, Jardine, Matheson & Company opened 
111 
Edward Le Fevour. Western Enterprise in Late Ching China. (Cambridge. Massachusetts; Harvard University 
Press. 1968). p. 175 
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Ewo Silk Filature in 1895 and Ewo Cotton Spinning and Weaving Company, Ltd. in 1897 to 
meet the incipient Japanese competition and internalize the supply chain. By 1914, Jardine, 
Matheson were managers of two other mills, the King Yik and the Yantzepoo, their spindles 
totaling 153,320 with 1900 looms. 
After a period of opposition, Jardine, Matheson joined the Board of Directors and the 
London Advisory Council of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in 1877 (and has remained 
on the Bank board ever since). Among Jardine, Matheson's early reservations about 
membership on the bank board, was the bank's direct access to member firm finances. 
Butterfield & Swire and Sassoon, among others, sat on the board. The advantage of 
membership was access to investment and shared financing opportunities not only in China 
and Hong Kong but also in the bank's branch markets. 
Early in 1898 the British and Chinese Corporation was created jointly by the Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation and Jardine, Matheson & Company to construct railways in 
the Yangtze Valley; the provinces south of the Yangtze; the province of Shansi with 
connection to the Peking-Hankow line at a point south of Chengting and a connecting line to 
the Yangtze Valley, crossing the Huangho Valley. The immediate purpose of railway 
construction was to link the port to the interior for product inflow and outflow. There was 
intense competition with and eventual collaboration by German, American and French 
interests in the construction of railways. A list of railway projects follows as Chart 10. 
Chart 10: Jardine, Matheson & Company and The Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank 
Investments In China Railroads 
Shanghai-Woosung £100,000 (Jardine, Matheson) 
Taku-Tientsin £50,000 (Jardine, Matheson) 
Canton-Hankow £10,000,000 (Investor: Jardine, Matheson) 
Shanhaikuan-Newchwang £2,300,000 (British and Chinese Corporation (Jardine, Matheson 
and the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank) 
Shanghai-Nanking £3,250,000 (British and Chinese Corporation as above) 
Canton-Kowloon £1,500.000 (British and Chinese Corporation as above) 
Tientsin-Pukow £7,400,000 (British and Chinese Corporation with Deutsche 
Asiatische Bank) 
Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo £1,500,000 (British and Chinese Corporation) 
The combined contribution of Jardine, Matheson and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank -
operating as the British and Chinese Corporation - to railway development was £26 million. 
The issue of railway investment arises again in a discussion of the firm's relationship with 
government. 
85 
Beyond China - Opportunity for Exploration in Japan and Southeast Asia 
As much as Jardine, Matheson had grown from trader to investor - and as large as the firm 
was at that time - the opportunity for still greater growth lay ahead - not just in China but in 
Japan and in Southeast Asia. 
There was dramatic development of natural resources throughout Asia from the 1860s 
through 1914, made more opportune to nominally British, Asia-based investors and their 
investment groups in London because of the relationship between Britain and countries 
under treaty or protection. These countries included the Crown Colony of the Straits 
Settlements (comprising Singapore, Penang, Malacca, Province Wellesley and the 
Dindings); the Four Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri, Sembilan and Pahang; and the 
Five Federated States of Johore, Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah and Perlis, which were under 
treaty obligations to follow the advice of British advisors in all matters other than those of 
religion or custom. 
The tin "industry" is an example of an early geographic cluster. Tin was mined in the five 
Federated States and smelted in Malaya. Tin smelting was Malaya's only important industry 
and was located in Singapore. Singapore refined not only the tin of Malaya, but also tin from 
Siam, Indo-China, Burma, Australia, China, Central and South Africa. 
Railways, necessary for transporting tin from the mining center of Larut to Singapore's Port 
Weld - eight miles distant on a deep-water inlet of the Larut River - were constructed in 
1884. In the same year a railway, twenty-two miles long was built from Kuala Lumpur to 
Klang. In 1895, a railway was completed from the port of Teluk Anson to Ipoh. The west 
Coast Railway was completed and Singapore was linked with Bangkok through Kedah there 
were 1909 miles of road and 805 of railways by 1914. 
During this period Burma was administered by a Lieutenant Governor appOinted by the 
Government of India, part of the British Empire and under Treaty regulations. Burma's total 
rice output was 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 tons a year, most of it going to countries within the 
British Empire. 
Boring for oil in Burma began in 1887, but results were negligible till two years later. By 
1904 production had reached a total of 118Yz million gallons. In 1913 it totaled 277Yz 
gallons. Exports scarcely totaled 2 Yz million gallons in 1910-11; by 1913-14 it had reached 
22 million gallons. Sarawak in North Borneo began petroleum production in 1910, when the 
first well was sunk. 
To transport the oil, railways were built to link Rangoon to Prome in 1877; Rangoon to 
Mandalay in 1889, and a branch line from Thazi to Myingyan in November 1899, and so on. 
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In Siam and the Netherlands East Indies, while there were no official treaties that promoted 
trade and development, but contribution was made by entrepreneurial capital. 
Trade with Japan during this period involved the exportation of raw materials - raw cotton 
from India; rubber, iron ore, tin and spices from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, 
Siam, Indo-China, Burma and Borneo - largely through Singapore, which had become a 
great entrepot for Western Pacific trade - as well as wool from Australia and timber and pulp 
from Canada. Of the value of Japan's export trade, 8.5% derived from India, the Straits, 
Australia, South Africa and Canada and 5.1 % from Great Britain. Like China and the 
markets described above, Japan needed foreign capital. The first foreign loan, which was 
for railway construction, was floated in London in 1870 and secured on Customs duties and 
railway earnings. 
Chart 11 looks at imports/exports across Asia from 1860 to 1914 
Chart 11: Asian Imports, Exports. 1860-1914 
To and from '68 '00 "14 
Millions Millions Millions Millions Millions Millions 
Export Import Export Import Export Import 
China -Taels 103 39 115 182 238 458 
India -Rupees 4.7 1.4 776 616.5 1,267.4 990 
Japan- Yen 16.6 ('73) 18 191.3 355 515 503.4 
Malaya- 20.6 16.6 152.4 170 161 194.5 
Straits Dollars 
Philippines-
-
- 5.9 4.3 70 64.2 
US Dollars 
Indonesia-
- 83.1 - 154.8 415 276.7 
Guilders 
. . Source. B.R. Mitchell, InternatIOnal Hlstoneal Statistics, Afnca and ASia, (New Yorl<. New Yorl< University Press. 1982) . 
Because the cash contribution necessary to fund massive infrastructure or mining projects 
was beyond the means of a single firm. collaboration was a survival technique. Chart 12. 
on the next page. identifies some of Asia's early private investors. including a number of 
Jardine. Matheson's competitors and the spread of their business interests. 
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Chart 12: Jardine, Matheson & Company and Competitors in East Asia 
Competitor Location Business Partner Group Capital 
Capital 
Palmer & Co. Calcutta Banking, Indigo Mills, 0.4 (1830) 5.0 (1830) 
1781 Shipping, Sugar Mills 
Binney & Co. Madras Coffee plantations, 0.12 (1906) 
1799 Cotton mills, Sugar, 
Woolen Mills 
Ogilvy, Gillanders Calcutta Copper mines, Diamond .75 (1906)1 
1824 mines, Gold mines, Jute 
Jardine, Matheson Canton Banking, Shipping, .2 (1906) 1.72 (1891) 
1832 Insurance, Cotton, 
Mines, Railways 
E.D. Sassoon & co. Bombay Banking, Breweries, 1.25-1.50 6.-7 (1920) 
1833 Cotton Mills, Shipping, (1909) 
Tramways 
Bonstead & Co. Singapore Banking, Petroleum, .3-.5 (1908) 
1831 Rubber, Tea estates 
Finlay & Co. Bombay Banking, Cotton Mills, 1.0 (1909) 4.36 (1898) 
1862 Shipping, Tea estates 
Guthrie & Co. Singapore Banking, oil palm .45 (1912) 
1821 plantations, rubber 
estates 
Jardine, Skinner Calcutta Indigo mills, jute mills, 1.46 (1914) 
1840 paper mills, sugar mills, 
tea estates 
Mackinnon, Calcutta Jute mills, Shipping, Tea .2 (1901) 3.2 (1909) 
Mackenzie 1847 
Wallace Bros. Bombay Banking, cotton mills, 0.8 (1901) 3.2 (1909) 
1847 rubber estates 
Ralli Bros. Calcutta Banking, cotton mills 4.2 (1902) 
1851 
Henderson Singapore Gold mines, jute mills, 0.5 (1908) 0.3 (1913) 
1856 paper mills, rubber 
estates 
Butterfield & Swire Shanghai Banking, harbors and .75 (1896) 4.15 (1900) 
1867 docks petroleum, 
shipping, railways 
M. Samuel & Co. Yokohama Banking, petroleum, 1.29 (1903) 3.0 (1,903) 
1878 shipping 
Harrison & Crosfield Malaya Tea estates, tobacco .2(1901) 
plantation 
. .. . Source. S.O, Chapman, Bntlsh-based Investment Groups before 1914, Economic History ReView, 2nd sar., XXXVIII (1985) . 
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Jardine, Matheson's Early Foreign Direct Investment 
In the years after 1870. Jardine. Matheson & Company placed more emphasis on Japan 
and began to explore new business opportunities in Southeast Asia. A report on tin mines 
at Selangor. Malaya was requested in April 1884. in order to ascertain their investment 
value. There is also mention of a Matheson & Company report on Yangtze copper ore that 
"is worth prospecting and securing and we should endeavor to be in safe manner connected 
with it.112 
The Parkes Papers reveal Jardine. Matheson was considering a suggestion that a company 
be formed to build a railway from Inchon (Chemulpo) to Seoul. In 1883. the firm already had 
an exclusive mining concession in Northwest Korea. an agency had opened in Seoul to 
supervise exploration of the concession and the firm had a contract to carry tribute rice on a 
Jardine steamer from the southern ports to Seoul. Jardine. Matheson was active in mining 
ventures in the region but lost interest in the Korean mining venture because: "Even if we 
should eventually find a mine with gold in paying quantity we should have to expend a large 
capital and to contend with all the difficulties raised by obstructive officials and a very inept 
people."113 
Jardine. Matheson began selling small amounts of Russian oil. carried via Suez. at 
Shanghai in the early 1870's. By 1880. imports had risen to 250.000 gallons. A new 
concentration process at Shanghai allowed the oil to be sold at a price that put it within the 
reach of millions, and imports rose as a result to 839,000 gallons by 1884. Jardine. 
Matheson began to import American oil in 1881 and handled smaller consignments of 
Sumatran oil from 1883. In the mid 1880's the firm was anticipating growing demand and 
had imported as much as 380,000 gallons/annum on joint account with a Shanghai 
businessman, whose hold on the kerosene market in China was unchallenged in the 1880's 
and 1890's. Jardine, Matheson also acted as agent for American Tidewater Company. a 
Standard Oil associate, through whom the firm placed most orders. In 1893. Jardine offered 
to become agents for both Standard Oil and Tidewater throughout Asia in return for 
assuming managing agency of Standard's new Sumatra concessions. Despite intense 
negotiations and Jardine's readiness. the bid failed. 
Companies like Jardine. Matheson (or Matheson & Company. its investment arm) made 
substantial direct foreign investments in Asian development. Direct foreign investment is 
defined as investment abroad for business purposes with the investors intending to control 
112 
113 UC. HK·Sh .• to W. Paterson. April 17. 1884. JM. 
PLB, Sh·HK, to W. Keswick. May 28.1884. JM. 
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and run the business abroad. John Dunning suggests that some 30% of British overseas 
investments before World War I were direct investments (rather than bank loans or portfolio 
investments where the investor had an arm's length relationship with the recipient.) 114 
Michael Edelstein 115 estimates that the private trade made some 35% of net foreign 
investment. Chart 13 shows the dramatic increase in foreign investment beginning in 1861 
and continuing into the 20th century. 
Chart 13: Total Net Foreign Investment and GOP, 1831-1910 
Decade Net Foreign Investment (Millions £JAnnum) Rate NFl/GOP 
1831-40 4.5 1.2 
1841-050 6.5 1.4 
1851-60 20 3.3 
1861-70 37.2 3.7 
1871-80 52.2 4.1 
1881-90 74.9 5.5 
1891-1900 49.8 3 
1901-10 97.5 4.7 
Source. Michael Edelstein, Overseas Investment In the Age of High Impenallsm, Columbia University Press. 1982. 
Jardine, Matheson - through Matheson & Company, its investment house - had invested 
£7,514,790 in Hong Kong and China, not including railway loans of £26 million, and actively 
sought other investment opportunities in Europe, the United States and Latin America. Mira 
Wilkens116 describes Matheson & Company as an example of a "free standing company," 
the purpose of which was to obtain capital by bringing together profitable or potentially 
profitable operations overseas with British investors seeking financial opportunities superior 
to those at home." Like other "freestanding companies," Matheson & Company would have 
provided stock or investment promotion and legal services, but even more importantly, the 
existence of a British company traded on British markets, with securities denominated in 
sterling, encouraged the investment of British individuals and financial intermediaries. 
114 J.H. Dunning, ·Changes in the Level and Structure of International Production: the Last One Hundred Years," 
The Growth of International Business, Mark Casson, ed (London: G. Allen & Unwin,1983). 
115 Michael Edelstein, Overseas Inyestment in the Age of High Imperialism (Columbia University Press: New York, 
1982). 
116 Mira Wilkens, "The Free-standing Company, 1870-1914: An Important Type of British Foreign Direct 
Investment,' Economic History Review, 2nd ser., XLI No.2 (1988), p. 272. 
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Matheson & Company connected the overseas project to potential investors. The skill 
acquired in doing this for one venture enabled the promoter to repeat it many times, and 
develop a reputation for experience and access to resources. 
For example, Hugh Matheson, the senior partner of Matheson & Company, who had taken 
part in other investment promotions, was sought by German merchant Heinrich Doetsch to 
raise investment capital for trading and mining interests in southern Spain. Doetsch needed 
financiers "with appropriate experience and resources in the promotion of a new venture, to 
purchase, modernize and operate the mines." Matheson formed a syndicate to raise money 
to buy the mine from the government of Spain, after which the Rio Tinto Company was 
floated on the British market. Respectable financiers and a Member of Parliament were put 
on the board. Doetsch received a cash commission of £80,000. Matheson & Company 
would act as commercial agents for RioT into throughout the world and receive a 
commission on sales and purchases. The Rio Tinto mines were ceded in perpetuity to the 
syndicate for £3,680,000, of which Deutsche National Bank owned 56%; Matheson 24% and 
railway construction firm Clark Punchard and Company 20% and were entitled to proceeds. 
The investment was not intended to be arms-length, but ongoing and supportive of the 
interests and business requirements of the investors. 
Harvey's 1981 117 study of the Rio Tinto Mining Company identifies investment in new mining 
ventures - gold in the Transvaal, for example - rather than forward or backward integration 
as the motive behind Matheson's decision-making. 
At Hugh Matheson's death in 1898, the role of Chairman was taken over by John Keswick, 
former Jardine, Matheson Taipan and, in 1898, director of Matheson & Company. This 
appointment underlined the continuing executive level involvement of Matheson & Company 
in the operation and development of Rio Tinto. Rio Tinto built Matheson & Company's 
reputation in mining and exposed Matheson & Company to other mining opportunities. 
117 Charles Harvey, Historv ofthe Rio Tinto Mining Company (Cornwall, UK: Allison Hodge, 1981), p. 188. 
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The following diagram shows Matheson & Company's investments through 1914. 
How Jardine Matheson Raised Investment Capital 
I 
MINING (R,o T,nlo1873 . 
Transvatl ExploratIon Co 1884 : 
MATHESON & COMPANY 
London 
I 
I 
MountaIn Copper Co . 1899 .Panuco Copper Co 1899;Caucasus Copper Co 1904) 
FIN ANCIALIINSURANCE (Canlon Insurance Off,ce 1836 : HK Fire Insurance Co 1868 . Ewo Bank . Shangha, 1863· 
7 ;PekmQ 1870· Chinese government loan contractor) 
MERCHANTS (ShanghaI SIlk FIlature 1870 : Ewo Spinning Co Shanghai 1895 : Jardine Spinning and Weaving Co 
1897) 
S HIPPING (China Coast Sleam N aviga tIon 1872; Indo-China Steam Na vig allon 1881) 
RAILWAY BUILDING ShanghaI Woosung Railway 1874-6 ; ChIna Railway Co 1887 ; British & Chinese Corporallon 
with Hongkong and Shanghai Bank 1896) 
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Chapter 4: Section 3: Jardine. Matheson's Resource I 
Services Choices. Contributing Factors. Development 
of Market Institutions and Fundraising Mechanisms: A 
Resource-based Interpretation 
Returning to the four questions posed in this Chapter, do the research findings support a 
Resource-based interpretation? Each question and response is examined from a 
Resource-based perspective. Attention is paid to alternative Harvard and Chicago school 
interpretations. 
The Basis for Jardine, Matheson's Early Resource and Services Choices (Question 1) 
A Resource-based response to Question 1 would argue that the firm made strategic 
choices, because of need or perceived opportunity, based on distinctive capabilities, rather 
than to achieve a monopoly position (Harvard School) or ownership advantage (Chicago 
School). The resource and services choices made by Jardine, Matheson were necessitated 
by the trade, the distance, the risk, and the cultural divide between Chinese and Indian and 
private English participants, as well as the piratical practices that prevailed on the high seas 
and coastal waters. Chapter 4: Section 1 looked the demand for security among private 
traders and their clientele, in the midst of high risk and political volatility endemic to trade 
and particularly to the burgeoning private trade. Trading credits loans and insurance on 
every facet of the trade reduced risk for buyers and sellers; hence financial management, 
insurance, banking, shipping and trading became the cluster of capabilities known as 
"agency services." 
The security of buyers and sellers depended largely on the financial probity of the agency 
house, a factor that was intangible, hence ascertainable largely through reputation. The 
pursuit of security was an overweening concern of Jardine, Matheson and Company, 
exemplified in the firm's abjuring speculation at all costs and disciplining agents who 
speculated on their own account and jeopardized the reputation of the firm. The Jardine 
Matheson archives are full of letters to agents remonstrating against speculation and 
recommending they adhere to a commission business only. When a house was operating 
on commission, the goods were not paid for until the house had received payment from its 
customers. Since no security was required, in effect, merchants gained credit for as much 
as two years. Letters of credit, operating Similarly to endorsed checks and drafts, otherwise 
known as bills of exchange, acted partly as the machinery of remittance but also as sources 
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of credit in their own right. The commercial letter of credit issued by the merchant's bank 
authorized the seller of goods or produce to draw upon the bank under certain stated terms. 
Jardine, Matheson itself offered credit facilities both to its agents and to suppliers, making 
substantial returns from interest on credit transactions. Indeed, before the Honking & 
Shanghai Bank in 1865, Jardine and its agency house competitors were the principal 
bankers in East Asia. As noted earlier in the chapter, depositors could rely on returns of 6% 
or more, and interest rate charges on short-term loans improved working capital. 
Realizing how business continuity depended on reputation, Jardine, Matheson jealously 
guarded its financial reputation and the reputation of firms on which it depended. Recall 
James Matheson and William Garden's concern that their bills be drawn against American 
banks and also their pursuit of information about the reputation of British and American 
banking houses. 
Security also depended on a network of inter-firm relationships and shared routines. Cutting 
across trading, shipping and financial services, the second of Garden's distinctive 
capabilities was its network of relationships or relational contracts, both internal and 
external. These relationships included the house, associated shippers, distributors, 
customers and suppliers. Such relationships were essential to the total supply and demand 
chain that extended from manufactured goods and commodities through a network of value-
added steps including financing, insurance, sales contracts and transportation links until it 
reached the ultimate consumer. John Kay 118 calls the series of relational contracts we have 
described the firm's "architecture." Its value lies in the capacity of organizations, which 
establish it to create organizational knowledge and routines, to respond flexibly to changing 
circumstances and to achieve easy and open exchanges of information. 
When Jardine, Matheson expanded its upstream activities to include cotton and silk milling 
(as owner of mills in China and Japan) and mining (through Rio Tint and other ventures), the 
firm was well on its way to becoming early supply chain experts. This expertise including 
planning and execution functions, risk assessment, demand planning, distribution planning, 
transportation planning and production planning. Each function required collaboration with 
supply chain partners to plan and optimize the supply chain. 
We know that Jardine, Matheson was performing those planning functions from the letters, 
which speak of Matheson & Company's chartering activities to keep the firm's ships full on 
inbound and outbound journeys. 
118 
John Kay, ibid., p. 63. 
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Internal and External Factors Responsible for Jardine, Matheson's Resource and 
Services Choices (Question 2) 
A Resource-based response to Question 2 would argue that Jardine, Matheson's choice of 
resources and services for development and growth derive from the very special business, 
social and political environment into which Jardine and Matheson entered, and the firm's 
concentration on building up a pattern of relationships within and outside the business which 
would foster the flow of information, the knowledge with which to interpret it, the ability to 
influence others and the reputation to attract and retain trading partners. On the other hand, 
a Harvard school interpretation would find the environment of Canton/Hong Kong more 
influential than any choices made by the firm itself. A Chicago school interpretation would 
place ownership and British rule of law at the center of strategic decisions. 
There can be little doubt that the environment rewarded financial probity, but the 
environment was not conducive to the achievement of a monopoly position. The private 
trade was young; early traders were in the business precisely because they could participate 
while owning nothing for low working capital. There were opportunities for everyone, as 
Jardine, Matheson's founders explained in their letters. 
The more prosperous trading firms sought to own their own ships. Given the capital-
intensive nature of the shipping industry (the investment in ships, in warehouses at point of 
embarkation and disembarkation, security and ground transportation), it was a costly 
endeavor to expand market penetration. Not surprisingly, forging substantive strategic 
partnerships or alliances was attractive to Jardine, Matheson because it allowed the firm to 
accomplish market expansion with less risk and cost, gain a national, regional or global 
presence in the market and to co-opt the routes and market presence of partners to 
complement one's own market coverage. Jardine, Matheson & Company joined John 
Samuel Swire's Shipping Conference which, even to the present, sets shipping routes and 
discourages participants from engaging in a competitive fight to the finish. 
Jardine, Matheson's range and flexibility increased dramatically when partnerships were 
created that linked Hong Kong and Calcutta, Hong Kong and Singapore, Hong Kong and 
London. As noted above, relationships with American and British manufacturers increased 
the firm's access to capital and investments. The political risks of war and blockade became 
more manageable because cargoes could be diverted to other ports, like Manila in the case 
of James Matheson and the opium blockade. Even when the Chinese government forced 
British traders out of Canton, Jardine, Matheson & Company continued its trade using 
competitive American firms as intermediaries. 
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The captains or supercargoes of foreign merchant ships were useful partners, strengthening 
shipping interests, increasing international contracts and introducing into the firm associates 
who knew another aspect of the import-export trade. 
During the early period, collaboration with competitors was also means of survival in the 
insurance business. Jardine, Matheson and Dent & Company shared management 
responsibility for the Canton Insurance Company and pooled their resources to manage the 
risks of piracy, storms at sea, spoilage among other potential hazards to which they and 
their customers were exposed. 
The Treaty Port system had an extraordinary effect on trade and development in Asia, 
making trade more predictable, opening new markets to trade and development, and 
exposing trading firms like Jardine, Matheson to opportunities for investment that required a 
whole new way of doing business, through a "free-standing" investment house associated 
with the trading company - the London firm of Matheson & Company associated with 
Jardine, Matheson & Company in Hong Kong. 
Jardine, Matheson's Role in the Development of Market Institutions (Question 4) 
A Resource-based interpretation of the early period would acknowledge the existence of 
only rudimentary market institutions and the importance of firms in creating such institutions. 
A Harvard interpretation would argue that there was already a market, if fragmented, and 
that Jardine, Matheson would have used its advantage to get all of the market for itself by 
signaling strategy, erecting entry barriers, encouraging competitors to leave - or buying 
them out. But that was not at all the case in the early period. Private traders were more 
often collaborators in the development of market institutions - setting and agreeing to 
interest rate commissions on agency services, pooling resources for paying insurance 
claims and establishing shipping routes. 
A Chicago school interpretation would argue that creating a market means increasing 
demand and sale of already existing products by being more efficient and reducing price to 
increase total sales and profits. During the early period Jardine, Matheson & Company, 
Dent & Company and others in the private trade committed themselves to live by a set of 
rates for agency services. The price of the commodities they traded was communicated in 
"The Price Current," a bi-monthly insert in The Canton Register. 
A Resource-based interpretation makes far better sense of the challenge and opportunity 
private firms shared operating in the shadow of the East India Company. In the early period, 
private traders were more often collaborators in the development of market institutions -
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setting and agreeing to interest rate commissions on agency services, pooling resources for 
paying insurance claims and establishing shipping routes. 
As explained in earlier in this Chapter, during the early period Jardine, Matheson & 
Company, Dent & Company and peer firms in the private trade committed themselves to live 
by a set of rates for agency services. Jardine, Matheson & Company used the weekly 
Canton Register to communicate its insurance rates and commodity prices (and those of 
peer and competitive firms) so that buyers and sellers in the market were in such free 
interaction that the prices of the same goods tended to equality easily and quickly. 
From 1810 to 1906, Jardine, Matheson & Company generated some 200,000 letters to its 
constituents and agents, framing business arrangements, making payment and insurance 
promises and disciplining agents. 
Jardine, Matheson sought to build its reputation on financial wisdom and a network of 
relationships that its constituents could rely upon. The firm had to absorb the trading risk of 
its constituents by basing its own bills on trustworthy financiers in Britain and the United 
States. Essential to financial wisdom was the firm's avoidance of speculation, which had 
brought down many agency houses. 
The personal efforts of William Jardine and James Matheson to secure the trade resulted in 
the ceding of Hong Kong to Britain, and the creation of the Treaty Port system, which 
provided for the first time a level of regularity to trade and predictability to the costs of trade 
with China, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa and Japan that lasted until WWII. 
The creation of Matheson & Company, a freestanding investment house, provided shared 
benefits and limited risks among institutional and private investors, using Jardine, 
Matheson's superior market knowledge to identify new prospects for funding. The outcome 
for Jardine, Matheson & Company was indeed enhanced wealth, but competitors (like 
Butterfield & Swire) were welcome. Jardine Matheson & Company and Butterfield & Swire 
were collaborators on railway and other projects, with government as a public partner, well 
into the twentieth century. 
How Jardine, Matheson Raised Funds for New Investments (Question 7) 
A Resource-based response to Question 7 would argue that raising funds, when necessary, 
is part of the managerial or entrepreneurial task. This task might be accomplished through 
an "external organization" in which the raising of funds is relatively easy - or through 
intrafirm boards that review and approve fundraising projects to safeguard against 
opportunism and to consider the potential project in light of its larger effect on businesses 
currently managed by 
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the holding company. A Harvard school interpretation would emphasize a rigorous 
competitive analysis of fundraising projects to support fundraising efforts. A Chicago school 
interpretation would similarly emphasize a rigorous cost/benefit analysis to defend new 
ownership schemes. 
For the early trading firm with low working capital, the notion of locking up the firm's own 
resources as the sole owner or sole investor was short-sighted at best. Bringing investor 
capital into the firm limited risk for the trading firm and potential investors, while supplying 
the venture with enough capital to grow.119 
The creation of Matheson & Company, a freestanding investment house, provided shared 
benefits and limited risks among institutional and private investors, using the trading 
company's superior market knowledge and reputation to identify new prospects for funding. 
The outcome for Jardine, Matheson & Company was indeed enhanced wealth, but 
competitors (like Butterfield & Swire) were welcome. 
Opportunity enough for all at the cost of one's reputation defines the atmosphere of trade 
and investment in the 19th century. It was a life for which the cash-poor but entrepreneurial 
private traders were well suited, if they continued to base their business dealings on what 
they knew. Speculation was the unmaking of firms like Palmers, Dent and Russell that had 
been market leaders. Jardine, Matheson survived because the firm was more successful 
than peer firms in limiting the speculative activities of its agents - a testament to the 
administrative control the firm exerted predominantly through its management letters and 
selection of agents were. 
The firm's strategic choices were indeed made on the basis of capabilities that were valued 
by the market during this period - financial probity, sound jUdgment, information sharing, 
recognizing that customers and suppliers alike depended on frequent communication to 
asses the soundness of their own business judgments. On these strengths Jardine, 
Matheson built a reputation and attracted trading partners. Consider again: 
• The firm's growing reputation for sound finance and information saw Jardine, Matheson 
through credit crises when competitors like Dent & Company, Palmer & Company went 
bankrupt. By end of the first period, Jardine, Matheson and Butterfield & Swire were the 
leading shipping firms, although the Japanese were beginning to compete with them for 
the Yangtze. Through the establishment of the shipping conferences, Jardine, 
Matheson and Butterfield & Swire virtually controlled the shipping industry in the Pacific. 
Jardine, 
119 
Harvey's history of the Rio Tinto mines describes the fundraising activities of Matheson & Company as well as 
the promoter role played by Hugh Matheson. 
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• Matheson added to its reputation - and to its information access - by becoming a 
business partner and later member of the board of the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. 
• The firm's internal and external organization, consisting of a network of 
correspondents, grew from some 50 in 1810 to 150 by 1832 throughout Bombay, 
Calcutta and Madras. The network also included the captains of Jardine's ships, the 
firm's suppliers and peer companies like Dent and Butterfield & Swire. 
• The firm's innovation included its communications routines the management letters as 
well as the publication of the first English language newspaper in Canton; the 
commissioning of faster sailing vessels for faster exchange of letters between Jardine's 
correspondents and to meet the increasing demand for tea, and the creation of a 
freestanding investment house to turn the trading company's superior knowledge of 
development opportunities for investment opportunities for institutional and private 
investors. Another form of innovation, flexible strategies enabled the firm to make timely 
business decisions, even if these would change the nature of the business - like the 
move out of opium when Sassoon & Company began to offer production credits. 
These capabilities were developed as a response to the particular circumstances of the 
market Jardine, Matheson sought to enter. Together they contributed to the establishment 
of market institutions that made trading relationships more dependable before the advent of 
the treaty ports. 
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Chapter 4 Chart 
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Chart 1 Frequency and Disposition of Correspondence, 1801·1906 
MARKET GENERAL l'RI)lUE S'Il'l'LEMENTA L MARKET S'IBTOTAL 
Africa 1825-1881 185 1813-1836 8 193 
America 1821-1898 5176 5176 
Amoy 1833-1901 4298 1845-1872 104 4402 
AUltralia 1824-1859 1056 1837-1882 31 47 5961 
1860-1898 4827 
Bombay 1822-1833 3200 1827-1872 283 31 16674 
1834-1881 13160 
Calcutta 1818-1893 8540 1815-1867 390 20 8950 
Canton 1815-1848 1678 1846-1859 1155 218 
1849-1904 12706 1805-1872 2492 18249 
Chefoo 1842-1901 810 1865-1885 9 819 
Chlnchaw 1833-1863 600 600 
Chlnhal 1853-1871 14 14 
Chluklang 1863-1901 1146 1868-1870 9 1155 
Chuenpee 1840 8 1835-1841 5 13 
Chu .. n 1840-1860 24 1837-1843 63 87 
Coalt 1825-1893 935 291 1226 
Ea,t India 1821-1898 11133 1813-1882 188 33 11354 
Europe 1820-1855 800 1828-1882 7 148 6975 
1856-1891 6020 
Foochow & River 1846-1881 4083 4083 
Formo .. 1885-1881 209 209 
Hank_ 1861-1901 1948 1948 
Holh_ 1876-1881 49 49 
Honam 1858-1869 352 352 
Hong Kong 1833-1905 14309 1829-1886 1090 404 15803 
Great Britain 1822-1891 8130 1829-1873 171 62 8363 
India 1819-1898 1601 1813-1869 85 
1820-1867 69 1755 
Ichang 1883 
Japan 1859-1892 3661 1859-1887 196 21 3878 
Kahlng 1869 
1876.1878 2 3 
Kapalngmum 1830-1891 24 1831-1837 15 39 
Klennlng 1861-1864 3 1865-1868 7 10 
Klenyang 1863-1864 3 3 
Kluklang 1861-1886 1266 1865-1872 23 1289 
Korea 1883-1884 190 190 
KOWloon 1837-1900 9 9 
Kumllngmun 1835-1856 1355 1835-1852 34 1389 
L1ntln 1823-1853 120 1824-1838 51 171 
London 1814-1898 20751 1812-1882 203 63 21017 
Lookong 1847-1854 74 74 
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Chart 1 Frequency and Disposition of Correspondence, 1801-1906 
MARKEl GENERAL PR'VATE 5"DD
' 
ENEMY.' MARKET S"BtOTAI 
Mad,.s 1823-1881 2153 1838-1850 11 2164 
Macao 1823-1849 2660 1813-1872 665 50 11638 
1850-1891 8263 
NalTlCNl 1844-1860 27 27 
Newclulng 1861-1901 470 470 
Nlngpo 1844-1883 1052 1052 
Pagoda Island 1855-1858 3 
Pakhol 1877-1880 52 52 
Pekin 1860-1901 29 29 
Plngtu 1886 
Port Aurthur 1886-1901 3 
Shanghai 1824-1891 10805 1848-1688 1411 15 12231 
Shungwan 1861 
Sulchlng 1857-1863 4 
Suyaada 1869 
Suykut 1861 
Sw.tow 1853-1880 2910 2910 
Taltau 1851-1856 5 
Taku 1860-1871 5 5 
Tlentaln 1860-1901 1166 1166 
Toonkoo 1839-1840 109 109 
Talnga.n 1864-1901 3 
Tamaul 1860-1898 941 941 
Tungalulw 1861 
Twatulla 1872.1879 2 2 
Wal-hal_1 1859 4 
Wanchow 1877-1878 2 
WIuImpoa 1825-1885 1253 1253 
Wooaung 1854-1871 646 646 
Wuhu 1883-1884 121 121 
Other 1813-1900 5690 5690 
TOTAL 171239 8981 1112 183018 
Hong Kong/China 40% Source: Jardine. Malheson Archives. Cambridge University 
LondoniGraat Britain 17% 
India 1S% 
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Chapter 5: Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1961-
1996: Resource/Services Choices, Explanation with 
Failure and Fundraising for Investment 
Introduction 
Chapter 5 deals with the history of Jardine, Matheson and its strategic management, in the 
20th century, after the near destruction of the firm and its assets, and the imprisonment and 
death of many of the firm's managers in WWII. There was little left after the war - beyond 
the ambition of the Keswicks to rebuild in an uncertain environment they believed they knew 
far better than the Europeans and Americans who saw advantage in marketing their 
products in China. 
As noted in Chapter 1, Section 2, the chapter contributes to the architecture of the current 
study by providing an analytical history of Jardine, Matheson from 1961 to 1996, a period of 
intense acquisition and divestiture activity. Like the preceding chapter in its treatment of the 
early history, it uses firm history to answer questions about the firm's resource and services 
choices, the experience of failure, the raiSing of funds for project investment - and the 
continued development of market institutions to make trading and investment conditions 
more reliable. The questions are: 
• How and why did Jardine, Matheson's founders and managers choose to develop 
particular resources and services? (Question 1) 
• The firm's choices met with some notable successes - and some notable failures. How 
are the firm's failures explained? (Question 3) 
• How did Jardine, Matheson's managers raise funds to finance investment? (Question 7) 
Sections 2 through 5 deal with the resource and services choices (Question 1) during four 
periods of acquisition and divestiture. Section 5 deals with the firm's experience and 
explanation of failure (Question 3) - and its impact on strategic management. Section 6 
deals with the fundraising mechanisms employed by the firm (Question 7). Section 7 uses 
the questions to frame a Resource-based interpretation of strategic management in Jardine, 
Matheson. The section also touches base with the Harvard and Chicago school views. The 
complete Chapter outline follows: 
Chapter 5: Section 1: Resource/Services Choices and Contributing Factors to 1961 
establishes the 20th century political and economic context for Jardine, Matheson's 
resource/services choices, including the decision to go public in 1961. 
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Chapter 5: Section 2: Building on Historic Capabilities: Stepping Stones Period, 1961-
1971 describes the firm's resource and services choices during the first of Jardine, 
Matheson's growth periods, including cautious expansion into new geographic markets and 
extensive investment in the economic development of Hong Kong. 
Chapter 5: Section 3: Speculating in Commodities and Manufactures: Exploit and 
Develop Period, 1972-1977 describes the resource and services choices made during 
Jardine, Matheson's aggressive international expansion into new and unrelated businesses, 
including manufacturing and natural resources. 
Chapter 5: Section 4: Rationalizing Commodities and Manufactures: Harvest and 
Divest Period, 1978-1983 describes the resource and services choices made during an 
equally intense period of divestiture activity, during which Jardine, Matheson rationalized 
both businesses and markets in response to internal and environmental factors. 
Chapter 5: Section 5: Explanation of Failure: Focus on Distinctive Capabilities Period, 
1984-1996 describes a period of reduced acquisition activity during which the firm 
concentrated on core businesses and new competencies in retail and services. The section 
deals with Jardine's experience and explanation of failure. 
Chapter 5: Section 6: Fundraising for Investment describes the self-financed growth of 
the "Stepping Stones· period and the increasingly leveraged growth of the "Exploit and 
Develop" period. 
Chapter 5: Section 7: Choices, Failure and Investment: Interpretation of Jardine, 
Matheson's Growth Strategy Using Resource-based Theory compares the proposed 
Resource-based interpretation of Jardine, Matheson's choice of resources and services 
based on capabilities with the alternative explanations of the Harvard and Chicago school. 
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Chapter 5: Section 1: Resource/Services Choices and 
Contributing Factors to 1961 
Well into the twentieth century, foreign trade continued to give Jardine, Matheson a role in 
the national agenda of China and its trading partners in the Pacific. Jardine's bread and 
butter business was importing into the Far East hundreds of lines of British, Canadian and 
American consumer and capital goods, everything and anything from packages of Ovaltine 
to Westinghouse transformers. Jardine, Matheson acted as principal, consultant or agent in 
trading with the Chinese. As an agent for British and Australian companies, it sold to the 
Chinese livestock, wool, cotton, hides, aircraft, rolling mills, machine tools and complete 
chemical plants. As a principal, Jardine bought and resold commodities such as soy beans, 
broad beans, vegetable oils, hog bristles and furs, as well as tea, rice, gold and 
diamonds.120 
But day-to-day business in the China trade was volatile and dangerous: 
• In the summer of 1937 Japanese forces attacked China in an attempt to expand 
Japanese commercial and strategic interests to the Asian mainland. A number of 
Jardine, Matheson's management were captured and imprisoned. The company's 
textile factories were looted and the Chinese staff was dispersed. 
• In December 1941, Japanese forces invaded British colonies in Asia, including Hong 
Kong. Jardine, Matheson officials in the colony were again imprisoned. Jardine Taipan 
John Keswick, who had managed to escape to Ceylon, returned to Hong Kong after the 
War to rebuild the small airline, textile mills, wharves, brewery and cold storage facilities 
which were all that remained of the firm's physical assets. 
• In 1949, Communist forces seized control of the mainland after four years of civil war. 
Jardine, Matheson attempted to build a relationship with the Communist regime. 
• By 1950, new government policies increased taxes, restricted currency exchanges and 
banned layoffs. Jardine's Ewo Brewery in Shanghai was forced to reduce its prices by 
17%, and to remain open at a $4 million annual loss. Companies based in Hong Kong 
were bound to observe a British trade embargo against China because of the Korean 
War. 
120 
Allen T Demaree, "The Old China Hands Who Know How 10 Live wilh the New Asia," ~ (November 
1971), p. 133. 
105 
• Compelled to close its operations in China. Jardine. Matheson entered into negotiations 
with the Communist government and. in 1954. wrote off $20 million in losses. While 
little of the physical assets remained. the skills of Jardine. Matheson's managers were 
intact - although removed to Matheson & Company. London. 
• With trade inside China closed. Jardine. Matheson continued to trade with China from its 
London base. although such trade was limited. 
To survive and grow in the midst of adversity in China and uncertainty in Hong Kong. the 
firm investigated new Asian markets. both for itself as principal. and for the British. Canadian 
and Americans firms for whom the firm acted as agent. And to do so it needed an infusion 
of cash. 
Jardine. Matheson & Company was 129 years old when it went public in 1961. abandoning 
the partnership system under which the firm had been administered since 1832. The listing 
of the company's stock on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange marked the beginning of a 
search for expansion and diversification fueled by investor capital, which was cheaper than 
bank loans during the period. 
The firm was not alone in its pursuit of other Asian markets at this time. World trade had 
begun to exceed the growth of world production during the mid-1950s. and by the early 
1960s firms sought to grow by direct foreign investment 121 : 
• in the developing countries of Japan. Korea. Taiwan. Singapore and Malaysia across a 
wide range of industries; 
• by exploiting knowledge and expertise gained in one country's markets In other 
countries at low cost. and 
• by offsetting the unavoidable extra costs of doing business in foreign nations. 
This chapter tracks the growth of Jardine. Matheson from 1961 through 1996. as principal. 
agent, consultant and multinational, continuing to work in a loose federation of associates 
and subsidiaries, and growing by diversification. 
121 Edward Chen, "Economic Restructuring and Intrustrial Development In the Asia Pacific: Competition or 
Complementarity?," Business & the ComtemDorv Wodd (Spring, 1993), p. 68. 
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Chapter 5: Section 2: Building on Historic Capabilities: 
Stepping Stones Period, 1961·1971 
The 1961 stock prospectus described Jardine, Matheson as a firm "which participates widely 
in the commerce and industry of the Far East, in the merchanting of imports and exports, the 
distribution and servicing of engineering products, the shipping industry, air transport 
business, insurance, investment management, agency business and general merchant 
adventure." 122 
The new public company was family owned - the family of James Keswick had bought out 
the remaining shares of the Jardine family and had arranged the public offering with three 
London banks. Until 1973, the firm did not report "turnover" or revenue in its official 
statements, arguing that the firm's operations were too diverse to supply such figures. The 
net operating profit in 1961 was HK$9,207,OOO, reflecting the sale of investments sufficient 
to fund the reorganization of the capital of the company. The firm was organized along 
geographic lines and consisted of a head office and a few wholly owned subsidiaries. 
All of the departments and the subsidiaries reported into the Hong Kong head office. The 
departments included: the Imports and Exports Departments, Jardine Engineering 
Corporation, Airways and Insurance Departments, Shipping Department, Jardine Dyeing & 
Finishing Company, Matheson & Company Ltd (with investment, shipping and chartering 
sections) in London, and the China Trading Department (closely allied to Matheson & 
Company Ltd.). 
In addition, Jardine, Matheson possessed several wholly owned subsidiaries, including 
Jardine, Matheson & Co., Japan, Ltd.; Jardine, Matheson & Company Ltd. - Taiwan, and 
Jardine Waugh Ltd. - Malaysia (expansion of an investment initiated in 1954). 
While the Company's trade with China was relatively small, the men who ran Jardine's 
China Trading Department saw China as a market with vast long-term potential. The five 
executives in the China Trading Department - all Chinese - combed the mainland press, 
reading between the lines for subtle hints of change in China's purchasing priorities. As 
Chinese, they had more freedom than Westerners to move around the mainland. They also 
had personal contacts in China's seven state trading corporations, and they had intimate 
knowledge of the protocol, tactics, and taboos of the China trade. 
When Jardines' traders bought a commodity from China, they simply placed an order via 
cable to Peking. On major deals they accompanied clients on trade missions to Peking or 
122 
Jardine. Matheson & Company Stock Prospectus 1961. 
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Shanghai. They attended the month-long trade fairs in Canton in the spring and fall, where 
the People's Republic conducted as much as half of its trade with the outside world. 
Chart 14, Stepping Stones, 1961-1971, at the end of this chapter, depicts the firm's 
cautious expansion into new geographic markets with existing capabilities - trading, finance, 
shipping and insurance services - and extensive investment in unrelated industries in Hong 
Kong and Australia. 
The word "cautious" is used because Jardine, Matheson and other investors made their 
plans with an eye toward the turnover in 1997 of lands adjacent to Hong Kong that had been 
leased to the British. Since Hong Kong was dependent on these lands for water and 
industrial space, many Hong Kong residents expected that the Colony would be taken over 
by the Communists. The Cultural Revolution did not assuage their fear. Jardine's caution 
played itself out in two ways: (1) acquirers like Jardine, Matheson & Company sought to 
recoup their investments in 3-5 years,123 (2) acquirers sought to spread their risk by 
expanding across the Pacific rim. 
Along with caution, there was optimism that Hong Kong would be a financial leader and 
world light-industrial center. The economy was booming. Corporate income tax was 15%, 
among the lowest in the world, with no tax levied on dividends, capital gains or income 
generated outside the colony. The currency was among the strongest in Asia and was 
maintained by a colonial policy of virtually uninterrupted budget surpluses. 
Further, the influx of skilled Chinese workers into Hong Kong from the Mainland, the rising 
standards of living of the people in the territories (i.e., the New Territories that lie along the 
border of Kowloon and China) and the accompanying commercial and industrial expansion 
afforded reason to believe that the Hong Kong home market offered growth opportunities in 
every area of the economy. Broader trade with Asia depended on the trading requirements 
of the more prosperous European and North American countries. 
Cautiously stepping from market to market, Jardine, Matheson moved into Australia in 1964, 
establishing a holding company with interests in importing and exporting, aviation, real 
estate, textiles, sugar manufacturing, shipping and timber. The firm had very long-term 
contacts in Australia and interests - some of them dating back to the nineteenth century - in 
Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand, Laos, Taiwan and the Cook and Fiji Islands. 
The firm used the holding company construct as an anchor for the eventual creation of 
economic hubs like Hong Kong, located in deepwater ports, such as Australia, Japan, South 
123 
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Africa and Singapore and the Pacific Coast of the United for shipping, commodities trading, 
finance and insurance. 
Among key investments during the period: 
• Jardine Waugh Ltd. was merged with Guthries, and its trading interests in Singapore, 
Malaysia and Brunei were rationalized. The new firm, Guthrie Waugh Berhad, was 
moved to Hong Kong to avoid double taxation on dividends paid out of Thailand profits. 
• Matheson & Company acquired Turnbull Gibson & Co., Ltd., a freight and insurance 
broker located in Zambia. 
• Jardine, Matheson & Company (Australia) Pty. Ltd. acquired 50% of a vehicle deck 
container ship, the "Matthew Flinders," owned jointly with H.C. Sleigh Ltd. 
• The firm re-acquired the Indo-China Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. The shipping firm had 
been founded by Jardine, Matheson in the nineteenth century and was subsequently 
sold to the Chinese. 
• In 1970, Jardine, Matheson initiated a new investment management and financial 
services joint venture with Robert Fleming & Co., London. The new firm was called 
Jardine, Fleming & Co., Ltd. 
• In 1970 the firm launched its first venture in the United States in San Francisco, 
planning to build it into a holding company along Australian lines. 
• In Hong Kong, the firm acquired a new wholly owned subsidiary, the Empire Finance 
Co., Ltd., a brokerage firm that traded in Hong Kong and Japanese stocks. The firm's 
Japanese subsidiary improved with "liberalization of the entry of foreign business and 
imports into Japan. It would seem to be in Japan's long-term interests to move faster 
towards the ultimate goal of complete freedom for the entry of overseas capital nOw that 
its foreign currency position is so strong and the country is becoming an exporter of 
capital.,,124 
• Jardine, Matheson and the Hongkong Land Company entered into agreement to 
develop hotel and apartment projects at East Point. 
• In Hong Kong, Jardine, Matheson & Company took on new insurance subsidiaries like 
the Lombard Insurance Company (descendant of the 10th Canton Insurance Company), 
and new acquisitions -like Chinese International Underwriters, Ltd. in the hull 
insurance-
124 . 
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broking field and Hong Kong Security Ltd. in the field of security services. The firm initiated 
a new marketing partnership with Alfred Dunhill Ltd. 
Financial Analysis 
At the end of the period. consolidated trading profit before taxes was HK$72 million, an 
increase of 500% since the firm went public in 1961. Fixed assets, mainly ships and 
property. had increased from HK$39 million in 1961 to HK$139 million in 1971. Investments 
in subsidiary and associated companies increased from HK$27.8 million in 1961 to HK$292 
million in 1971. See Chart 15 Summary Financial Data, 1961-1969; compare with Chart 
17 Summary Financial Data, 1970-1979. end of chapter. Return on equity increased from 
8.51% in 1961 to 18.83% in 1971. Return on total assets increased from 7.82% in 1961 to 
16.12% in 1969. and began a slow decline to 15.05% in 1970 and 13.31% in 1971 - a 
decline which became increasingly evident during the 1970s as assets mounted. See Chart 
15.1 Key Management Ratios, 1961-1971. below. 
Chart 15.1 Key Management Ratios, 1961-1971 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
ROE 8.51% 7.60% 10.23% 10.49% 11.03% 11.51% 12.27% 15.01% 18.73% 17.76% 18.83% 
ROTA 7.82% 7.00% 9.47% 7.89% 7.84% 8.97% 9.65% 12.41% 16.12% 15.05% 13.31% 
Added 39.07% 35.24% 43.08% 45.92% 45.18% 45.81% 41.28% 45.84% 47.14% 
Value 
The sale of stock - some 12 million shares in 1970 and 1971. and the sale of Hong Kong 
property for redevelopment during the decade created a net capital surplus that went directly 
to reserves to finance new growth. Added value. the ratio of retained earnings or transfers 
to reserves over trading profit began the decade at 39% and ended at 47.14%. No turnover 
data were available until 1972; hence the use of trading profit for added value calculations. 
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Chapter 5: Section 3: Speculating in Commodities and 
Manufactures: Exploit and Develop Period, 1972-1977 
From 1972-1977, the firm pursued two paths toward growth. The first was a continuation of 
its Stepping Stones approach into new markets. The second, concurrent and radical 
approach, was expansion into 46 markets with product offerings that spanned 152 individual 
lines of business. 
One might call period Exploit and Develop. based roughly on Birger Wernerfelt's typology 
in which the growth of the firm involves a balance between the exploitation of existing 
resources and the development of new ones. See Chart 16 Exploit and Develop. 1972· 
1977 at the end of this chapter. 
Looking at the firm's investment decisions during this period, we can hypothesize a hybrid 
growth strategy that executives at Jardine, Matheson could summarize as follows: 
• We will continue to invest heavily in our home market, Hong Kong; 
• We will continue to expand the market reach of our related businesses - trading 
shipping, finance, insurance, where physical resources and skills are shared; 
• We will invest in unrelated businesses where we can't lose and maybe we'll win. 
Investment prospects with easy exit (high current ratio gives the firm the ability to 
convert its accounts receivable into cash or borrow to repay current creditors) and high 
returns on equity (high profit margin, low cost labor); 
• We will exploit our managerial skills (approximately 10% of total employees) in finance, 
management, marketing, engineering, supply chain/logistics, industry specialists to 
simplify and replicate the work effort of unskilled or blue collar labor common across our 
businesses (some 90% of employees); 
• We will consider that we have succeeded if we achieve 25% return on investment within 
three years (If yes, exploit, develop, raise ownership percentage, create subsidiary, 
create holding company for further acquisitions; if not, sell and commit net surplus 
capital to reserves). 
Beginning in 1972, Jardine, Matheson experimented with stock sales and long-term debt to 
finance the acquisition or investment in firms whose products and services were related and 
complementary to Jardine, Matheson's existing products and services, for example, real 
estate in London's financial district and in Hawaii - and to access additional investment 
capital for growth. 
III 
In that year, Jardine, Matheson made the largest acquisition in its history - the London real 
estate company, Reunion Properties Company, Ltd., reported to be the biggest landlord in 
London's financial district, for HK$133 million - the first time issuing new stock that found 
ready buyers among institutional investors. Before the year was out, the Reunion deal was 
followed by a HK$55 million takeover bid for Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., an old Hawaii 
trading company with sugar cane and real estate holdings. This was Jardine, Matheson's 
first major acquisition in the United States and, again, it was made possible by issuing new 
stock. For the first time since the Communists seized its vast Shanghai holdings after 1949, 
Jardine, Matheson held greater assets outside Hong Kong than it held in the Crown Colony. 
As importantly, the availability of cheap labor and raw materials, coupled with increasing 
although limited GOP, justified the firm's diversification into unrelated producUservices in the 
emerging markets of Asia (Thailand, Korea,) and Africa (South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Lesotho) and its investment of low cost capital into high risk, high potential positions in forest 
products, sugar and oil exploration. Jardine's Chairman Henry Keswick saw a bright future 
for raw materials and natural resources in these new markets: "Jardine, Matheson & 
Company are now well involved - either through subsidiaries, joint ventures or associates -
in the production of wood products, rubber, palm oil and sugar. We also intend to 
participate in the rapidly expanding oil industry in South East Asia through services and 
exploration." 125 
Among key investments: 
• In Thailand, Fedders (Thailand) Ltd. was formed, which was a joint venture with Thai 
interests and Theo. Davies & Co., Ltd. of Hawaii to manufacture room air conditioners. 
• Jardine, Matheson & Company (Japan) initiated a forest products jOint venture with Mac 
Millan Bloedel, Ltd. of Vancouver. The new company was named MacMillan Jardine 
(Japan, Ltd.). 
• In Malaysia, a plywood and block board plant was planned in Pahang by Mentega 
Forest Products, Sdn. Bhd. in which MacMillan Jardine had an interest. 
• Jardine, Matheson & Company acquired a substantial minority holding (40%) in Hunts 
Holdings Ltd., a small holding in Southern Pacific Properties that was developing a 
tourist resort at Deuba in Fiji, as well as a shareholding in the Cook Islands Trading 
Corporation. 
125 . 
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• Jardine, Matheson & Company's United States development program was underway 
with four initial investments in real estate, building materials, tourist services and 
computer components. 
By the end of 1972, net operating profit was HK$18.5 million up 60% over the previous year. 
The compound growth rate in adjusted earnings per stock unit was now 27% per annum. 
Stockholders equity was HK$114.6 million, and increased to HK$290 million in 1973. The 
announcement of a cease-fire agreement in Vietnam improved the political climate 
throughout the Far East and raised investor confidence in Asia as a place to do business. 
The firm continued to grow its shipping, financial services and insurance operations by 
initiating jOint venture arrangements with other overseas and Hong Kong partners who had 
leading positions and expertise in their own sub-sector of finance - be it deposit and foreign 
exchange-broking, hire purchase finance, stock-broking, or bullion dealing; as well as 
insurance - including life, marine, fire insurance, or reinsurance; and transportation -
including containerization, freight forwarding, and other shipping agency services. 
• Jardine's wholly owned subsidiary, the Indo-China Steamship Navigation Company, 
acquired minority interests in Wah Kwong Shipping & Investment Co. (Hongkong) Ltd. 
and Grand Marine Holdings Ltd, two leading Hong Kong public shipping companies with 
nearly one million tons of deadweight tonnage afloat. 
• The Lombard Insurance Co., Ltd. acquired South Australian Insurance Holdings Ltd. in 
Australia. 
• The Hongkong and Far Eastern Investment Company, Ltd. issued new shares in 
exchange for certain of Jardine, Matheson & Company's long-term investments and 
changed its name to Jardine Securities Ltd., holding investments in many large public 
companies. Jardine Securities Ltd. was added to the list of finance and investment 
companies that now included the Empire Finance Company, with interests in smaller 
well-managed Hong Kong companies that it brought to the market, and Jardine Fleming, 
now a leading merchant bank offering investment management, underwriting and 
corporate finance services with offices in Tokyo, Singapore and Sydney. 
Jardine, Matheson & Company's real estate developments continued with the 1000-room 
Excelsior Hotel and its adjacent shopping center in Hong Kong, now fully operational; the 
construction of the May Tower apartment and the Hong Kong World Trade Center, 
underway and planned for completion in 1974 and 1975 respectively. 
The organization - as well as the capital structure - of the firm was beginning to change 
from a purely geographic to a functional alignment. The Hong Kong Head Office, first 
referred to 
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as "the parent company" in 1972, was changing from an operating company to an active 
holding company, with a strong focus on better balance sheet management of the parent 
and of the principal operating subsidiaries and associates of the firm. 
While the Hong Kong office continued its long-standing departmental activities, four 
departments had been spun off as public companies with subsidiaries and associates of 
their own: 
• Jardine Industries Ltd. (trading, manufacturing and real estate); 
• The Indo-China Steam Navigation Company, Ltd. (shipping); 
• The Lombard Insurance Company Ltd. (insurance); 
• Jardine Securities Ltd., an associated company (investment). 
By mid 1973 the net assets of Jardine, Matheson & Company, Pty. Ltd. were HK $170 
million and those of Matheson & Company Ltd. approximately HK$350 million, representing 
the parent company's equity and loan funds. The firm continued to increase its overseas 
assets. 
• The firm reorganized Jardine Waugh & Company, changing its name to Jardine, 
Matheson & Company (South East Asia) Ltd. and reorganizing its capital structure to 
enlarge the equity base of the company for future expansion in a geographic area that 
had great potential. Chairman Henry Keswick explained, "Our immediate objective is to 
consolidate our position as a major international trading, services and financial group 
with headquarters in Hong Kong and operating throughout the Pacific region and in the 
United Kingdom."126 
• In the U.S.A., Jardine undertook a joint venture with Grosvenor International (Hawaii) 
Ltd. for real estate development in Hawaii under the name Grosvenor Jardine Inc. In 
1972 three projects were underway. 
Management expertise was critical to the continued growth of the firm, Henry Keswick 
acknowledged, "Over the years we have had a consistent policy of recruiting annually an 
intake of young graduates and other professionally qualified speCialists of all nationalities. 
This policy stands us in good stead today as we have developed an experienced 
management team in depth that will continue to provide a strong base for the Company's 
future expansion.,,127 Commenting on the appointment of three new directors of the 
company, Keswick was pleased to say that the average age of executive directors of the 
Company was 37 years. 
126 
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Henry Keswick called 1973 "one of the most challenging years in Jardine's recent history -
starting in a period of intense boom conditions in Hong Kong and ending in an international 
energy and inflation crisis.,,128 The geographic spread of assets and earnings during 1973 
had changed significantly from 1972 as the company moved to increase its business 
activities in South East Asia, Australasia, Europe and North America. 
Regions Net Assets HK$ Net Assets HK$ Net Earnings % Net Earnings % 
1973 1972 1973 1972 
Hong Kong 734 512 55 82 
N.E. Asia 27 13 10 7 
S.E. Asia 167 18 13 3 
Australasia 100 76 4 4 
N. America 145b 7 5 -
Europe 536 32 13 4 
TOTAL 1709 658 100 100 
Loans 251 85 
ADJ.TOTAL 1458 573 
Having invested so heavily in world markets, Jardine, Matheson & Company would bear the 
impact of the energy crisis of 1973 and worldwide monetary uncertainties as both supplier 
and customer. 
Development and expansion of Jardine's portfoliO of businesses, geographic spread, use 
and source of funds were analyzed in the 1974 Annual Report for the first time. The firm 
had grown very large, very fast. "Such is the diversity of Jardine, Matheson & Company's 
business that large movements are likely to occur between the categories from year to year. 
Nevertheless, the Board's policy is to balance the activities and areas so that there is no 
undue reliance on anyone area or activity on a continuing basis." 
In 1974, Jardine, Matheson & Company's capital expenditures totaled HK$370 million. 
Investments had been made in ships, existing property ventures, and acquisition of minority 
interests in subsidiary companies in the oil servicing industries. These investments had 
been funded largely from internal resources and term finance. The major portion of Jardine, 
128 . 
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Matheson & Company's total fixed assets were in property and dry cargo ships. In the next 
three years, some HK$122 million would be invested in modernizing the sugar plantations 
and sugar mills of Theo. Davies & Company, the firm's acquisition in Hawaii. 
For the first time in its public record keeping, the firm introduced an historical account of its 
development and strategy in 1974. The link with the past is reflected in the opening 
paragraph of the Annual Report: "Jardine, Matheson & Company played a major role in the 
founding of Hong Kong and in its subsequent emergence as a major trading, financial and 
manufacturing center in South-East Asia." The firm's business activities are described as a 
"wide range of interests" that "stem largely from an historic ability to deal with any business 
situation that arose." The organizational development of the firm, which employed 21,000 
people in 12 Asian and Pacific countries as well as the United States, is described as 
follows: "Now there are specific divisions, departments, subsidiaries and associates which 
can provide almost any type of commercial service throughout Asia and the Pacific. The 
earlier traditions are thus maintained in today's diverse international corporation."129 Jardine 
Matheson's widespread interests were identified as: "trading and light industry; service 
activities including shipping, air transport, insurance and security; financial services, 
including merchant banking, money, commodity- and stock-broking; property; and natural 
resources." 
1975 was another year of continued capital expenditures, including the acquisition of all the 
issued capital of Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd, a leading Hong Kong construction and civil 
engineering group with substantial commercial property holdings; the successful cash and 
share offer for 75% of Zung Fu Company Ltd., a firm with widespread automotive, 
engineering, trading and aviation interests in Hong Kong and Australia; and the acquisition 
for HK$175 million of 53% of Rennies Consolidated Holdings Ltd., a firm operating in eight 
South African countries in shipping, transportation, trading and light industry, hotels and 
tourism. 
In his statement to stockholders, new Chairman David Newbigging articulated the firm's 
business development and expansion strategy: "We intend to continue the policy of 
developing our existing interests and of seeking new activities in fields compatible with 
them. As our business grows, both functionally and geographically, the demands on 
management and staff at all levels increase. Constant attention will be paid to this with a 
view toward assuring that management in depth is available for any new projects we 
undertake."130 The firm more than doubled its employees from 21,000 in 1974 to 46,000 in 
1975. 
129 
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Exceptionally high world sugar prices increased Jardine, Matheson & Company's returns 
from its sugar interests, but sounded an alarm bell. Considerable effort was spent in 1975 
on achieving a more even spread of activities to insulate the firm against major short term 
variances - whether high or low - in the more volatile elements of their business, particularly 
commodity prices. 
To provide additional financial strength and flexibility, the firm issued HK$500 million in 7.5% 
Convertible Subordinated Unsecured Loan Stock due 1990, with the intention of refinancing 
on improved terms its short and medium term debt and providing more working capital for 
continued growth and investment. 131 
• Jardine, Matheson consolidated its ship-owning and marine insurance in Hong Kong in 
1976, acquiring for cash all the outstanding shares of two previously publicly quoted 
subsidiaries, the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company (Hong Kong Ltd.) at a cost of 
HK$30 million and Lombard Insurance Company Ltd. at a cost of HK$17 million. 
• The firm made another striking geographical move in 1976 with its first major investment 
in the Middle East, a significant minority shareholding in Transportation and Trading 
Company (TTl), a company affiliated with the Olayan Saudi Holding Company, which 
operated through subsidiaries and associates. principally in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
TTl was involved in the distribution and marketing of construction and engineering 
equipment. vehicles and machinery. food products. transportation and contracting. 132 At 
the close of 1976 an agreement was reached with Diamond M. Drilling Company of 
Houston. Texas to manage the drillship in which Jardine, Matheson & Company had a 
substantial minority shareholding through International Petroleum Ltd .• now operating in 
the Far East. 
• In the same year in Hong Kong. Jardine. Matheson & Company went into partnership 
with Barclays Bank International Ltd. as Jardine Barclays Ltd. to acquire Union 
Dominion Trust Ltd. This company provided consumer finance services through two 
local joint ventures - United Merchants Finance Ltd. in Hong Kong and Jardine Manila 
Finance Inc .• the Philippines. 
In his statement to stockholders. David Newbigging. who was Chairman of Jardine. 
Matheson during 1975-1980. articulated the firm's business development and expansion 
strategy: "We intend to continue the policy of developing our existing interests and seeking 
131 J ref 132 a ~ne, Matheson & Company, 1975 Annual Report, Chairman's Letter, p. 14. 
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new activities in fields compatible with them. As our business grows, both functionally and 
geographically, the demands on management and staff at all levels increase. Constant 
attention will be paid to this with a view toward assuring that management in depth is 
available for any new projects we undertake.,,133 
During this period a total of 437 acquisitions were made for a total investment of HK$8253 
millions in finance, transportation, trade and service, manufacturing and natural resources. 
Through investments and acquisitions, Jardine Matheson was now represented in 46 
markets. Indeed, such aggressive expansion required what David Newbigging called 
"management in depth." 
In a 1975 interview, David Newbigging painted a picture of organizational life and culture in 
the mid 1970s 
Jardine, Matheson had 13 directors, one of whom was Chinese, and 140 managers, all 
expatriates, recruited from Oxford and Cambridge, on a three-year contract with the firm. A 
consequence of the imprisonment of Jardine's managers during World War II and casualties 
during the war and the Korean conflict, the Company's "old guard" had been replaced by a 
cadre of very young graduates, who reported to managers only slightly older, and were 
responsible for very large profit centers. Newbigging commented, "We drop them in at the 
deep end. We say, 'okay, you think you are good, now prove it'."134 
Jardine's departments and subsidiaries were run as profit centers. Tight financial control 
and reporting systems ensured that no profit center could fall behind even for one month 
and pass unnoticed. Each was submitted to the discipline of forecasting three years in 
advance on a monthly basis. Henry Keswick pushed through strict cash control and 
reporting measures: "If I want to know the overheads of our air conditioning plant in 
Thailand, I can find it straight away. Every month we produce group results. I can see how 
a profit center has done, compared with budget, and the financial people highlight what has 
gone wrong. Every month we update our forecast for the year. And every quarter."135 
The firm's management structure was informal. There were no organization charts, only a 
single-sheet list of directors' responsibilities on which the directors were listed not by name 
but by initial with instructions to "liaise with". 
Executive directors assembled by 9 a.m. every workday - and Jardine's 30 associate 
directors met weekly - for a meeting known as "prayers," to tell each other what they had 
133 . 
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done the previous day, or the previous week. Once a month, everyone who headed a profit 
center in Hong Kong - 10 directors, 50 department heads - came together for their version 
of the "prayers" meeting. 
The branch offices kept in touch with headquarters through regular weekly telephone calls in 
which the head of the profit center in, say Singapore, would speak to the director in Hong 
Kong, to whom he reported. 
David Newbigging noted in an interview that Jardine, Matheson's interests could have been 
rationalized, that if the firm had existed in London it might have been divisionalized. In 
Newbigging's view entrepreneurship depended both on responsibility and on incentive. He 
said, "There are benefits in having many companies, particularly if you have joint ventures. 
And if you want to bring in an expert and give him a slice of the action, the only way to do it 
is to have a separate company.,,136 
Commenting on the firm's diversification strategy, Chairman Henry Keswick said, "There is 
industrial logic in what we do. We never buy a business just as a financial exercise. We 
never strip assets. We only expand into areas where we can inject our own methods.',137 
Acquisitions and investments had to have board approval - and followed a standard process 
for assessing the current financial health/operating effectiveness of the target firm. First 
Jardine, Matheson would send in a team to look at prospects. Members might include an 
operational director, finance director and legal and taxmen. With smaller acquisition 
prospects, the examination of the books might be left to an accountant and a management 
representative. 
Financial Analysis 
By 1977, turnover (reported as of 1973, previously called consolidated trading profit) was 
HK$4419 million, reflecting the contribution of subsidiary and associated companies. Fixed 
assets continued to rise from HK$310 million in 1972 to HK$2551 million in 1977. 
Investments in subsidiary and associated companies increased from HK$418 million in 1972 
to HK$1392 million in 1977. See Chart 17 Summary Financial Data, 1970-1979, end of 
chapter and Chart 17.1 Key Management Ratios, 1970-1979, on the next page. Return on 
equity was 16.06% in 1972 and 15.33% in 1977. Return on total assets was 13.40% in 
1972 and 10.89% in 1977. Retained earnings over turnover - or Added Value - continued 
to deCline from 6% in 1973 to 5% in 1977, reflective of high growth, high expenses in the 
face of amounting assets. The ratio of debt to equity, which was 40% in 1972, increased to 
53.8% in 1977. Sales margins declined from 14.5% at the beginning of the period to 10.8% 
136 lb' Id., p. 34. 
137 lb' Id., p.34. 
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in 1977. Working capital to sales declined from 10.8% at the beginning of the period to 7% 
in 1977. 
Chart 17.1 Key Management Ratios, 1970-1979 
ROE 
ROTA 
Added Value 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
17.76% 18.83% 16.06% 9.40% 11.70% 13.30% 15.19% 15.33% 14.51% 15.28% 
15.05% 13.31% 13.40% 7.91% 18.54% 9.97% 10.39% 10.89% 11.33% 11.84% 
0.06 0.058 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.054 0.055 
Had Jardine, Matheson continued to pursue its horizontal and vertical acquisition program, 
what would have been the firm's value in 1985 and what risk would banks have been willing 
to take for further unrelated diversification? Model 1 values the firm as if the Exploit and 
Develop scenario, using the modeling methodology of Ciaran Walsh, 138 specifically, the 
following concepts: 
• Horizon Period: The number of years for which current strategies will continue to add 
value to the company. The number is usually 6 to 10 years. Our model uses 6 years. 
• Forecasts: For each of the years in the horizon period, operating and investment cash 
flows are forecasted, based on known operating and investment cash flows. In Model 1 , 
a linear regression of actual cash flows from 1970-1979 was used to produce a growth 
rate that assumed the same broad "Exploit and Develop" acquisition strategy for the 
next six years. 
• Cash Flow to the Firm: Profit available for appropriation or eamings before interest and 
tax [(EBIT) (1-tax rate) + depreciation] minus capital expenditures, minus change in 
working capital. Where it appears, the change in assets is due to cash conversion, not 
to write-ofts. 
• Discount Rate: Each year is discounted back to the present using a discount factor 
based on the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). The WACC is estimated at 
10%. 
138 C. laran Walsh. Key Financjal Ratios, (London: Financial Times Press, 1990). 
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• Terminal Value: The final year's cash flow is capitalized using the long-term cost of 
capital (net operating profit after taxes X 10). This gives the terminal value at the end of 
the horizon period. 
• Total Enterprise Value: The terminal value is discounted back to the present again, 
using the WACC; cash flows are added, including the terminal value, to produce the 
total enterprise value. 
• Added Value: Liabilities are subtracted from the total enterprise value to derive 
accumulated added value. In the context of cash flow analysis, added value is what the 
banks would be willing to lend for unrelated diversification. 
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Model 1 - Continuation of Exploit and Develop Acquisition 
Strategy 
Actual Historic Cash Flows 1970 -1979 (US Millions) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Profit 46 58 92 137 215 265 259 367 432 495 
Available 
+/- Fixed 64 114 717 49 1,030 346 -201 -554 -86 
Assets 
+/-Net 39 -29 236 110 393 -80 -44 314 45 
Working 
Capital 
Net Cash 
-45 7 -816 56 -1,158 -7 612 672 536 
Flow 
Projected Cash Flows 1980-1985 (US Millions) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Projected Cash Flow 577 695 814 932 1,051 1,169 
Discounted at 10% 525 574 612 636 652 660 
WACC 
Total Present Value '80-'85 3,659 
+Present Value of 6,600 
Terminal Value 
Entity Value- Funds 10,259 -
Total Liabilities Employed 5136 
Accumulated 5,123 
Added Value 
Note. Added value here IS what the bank might be willing to lend for unrelated diversification. 
Actual Cash Flows 1980-1985 (US Millions) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Profit Available 525 723 708 139 80 157 
+/- Fixed Assets 154 437 684 -801 205 -1035 
+/-Net Workina Capital 
-269 729 -254 47 -640 -462 
Net Cash Flow 640 -443 278 893 515 1654 
Actual cash flows for 1980-1985 fell below those projected for 1981-1984, a consequence of 
high assets to sales, itself a consequence of Jardine, Matheson's very aggressive 
acquisition program. 
To meet its cash flow projections and avoid raiding reserves, the firm might have reduced its 
growth to a level it could safely absorb by increasing retained profits (for example, through 
additional asset sales) or by reducing internal costs, specifically the cost of sales, which is 
captured in its assets to sales ratio - or by instituting a combination strategy to wipe out the 
cash deficit and restore a balance between profits, assets and growth. This balance is what 
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Ciaran Walsh calls "growth equilibrium," defined as the rate of growth that a company can 
sustain from its operating cash flow. The concept of "growth equilibrium" enables 
management to manipulate three cash flow drivers - the relation of assets to sales, retained 
earnings to sales and growth in sales. The self-funding rate of growth for a company is 
calculated by expressing retained earnings as a percentage of owner's funds. When the 
growth equilibrium (GE) = 1, cash flow is not in deficit and is positive when GE = 1 + x. 
Taking 1977 as an example, assets to sales are 706/4419 = .159. Each $1 sales requires 
.159 to carry it. Looking at the relationship of retained earnings to sales for the same year 
gives 129/4419 = .029. Each extra $1 sales generates .029 of retained earnings which goes 
into balance sheet funds. But each extra $1 sales requires .159. Therefore, $1.30 of sales 
in any year are required to fund $1 sales the following year. This ratio of $1 extra sales for 
every $1.30 existing sales, means the company should decrease current assets or increase 
owners funds by 130%. 
Setting GE=1, then decreasing assets, increasing owners funds or both would have 
improved Jardine, Matheson's cash flows as follows: 
Growth Rate Sustainable by Cash Flows - Sensitivity Analysis (US MIllions) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Current Assets 796 1,525 1,271 1.318 678 216 
Sales 7,467 9.266 11.240 10.644 8.881 10.497 
Owners Funds 5,235 6.600 6.288 5.261 4.224 4.774 
Retained 815 633 -177 -113 834 -310 
Current 15.5 9.5 -2.8 -2.1 19.7 -6.4 
Growth Is 
Asset cost of ea. $1 sale 0.106 0.164 0.113 0.123 0.076 0.02 
Retained earnings 0.109 0.068 -0.015 -0.01 0.093 -0.029 
generated bv $1 sale 
Sales this year required .97 2.41 -7.53 -12.3 0.817 -.689 
to fund $1 sales next 
year 
Rate of growth that can 103% 41.4% N/A N/A 122% N/A 
be funded from retained 
earninas 
. .. 
AcqUISItions and divestitures affect year-te-year figures . 
In fact, Jardine, Matheson made significant divestitures between 1978 and 1979, including 
its investments in shipping and overseas properties that were unprofitable, as well as its 
interests in several subsidiaries. The firm expected that these asset sales would be 
sufficient to increase working capital and cash flows (200% increase by 1985). The growth 
rate was anticipated to be approximately 14% from 1980 to 1985, close to the actual Heng 
Seng Index (HSI) earnings growth rate of 16%. However, the Hong Kong Land stock swap 
put additional demands on Jardine, Matheson's cash flow and debt coverage. See the end 
of Chapter 5, Section 4: Harvest and Divest for further analysis and cash flow projections. 
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Chapter 5: Section 4: Rationalizing Commodities and 
Manufactures: Harvest and Divest Period. 1978·1983 
From 1978-1983, the firm began to rationalize products and markets, building a more 
focused portfolio that could be replicated in each market. 
This period was characterized by two waves of divestitures. The first, from 1978-79 and the 
second wave, 1981-1983. The interpretation of this period, which we'll call Harvest and 
Divest, is based on the diversification and divestiture research of Hoskisson, Johnson and 
Moesel and D.O. Bergh and G.F, Holbein,139 which relates divestiture to deliberate, 
voluntary resource reallocation and strategy choices. 
Hoskisson et al. describes a phenomenon they call "strategic divestiture," the reshuffling of 
asset portfolios through divestiture and voluntary restructuring linked to strategy formulation. 
What sets the Hoskisson research apart is its finding that strategic decisions - more than 
performance and weak governance - are the primary cause of high levels of divestment 
intensity. 
A voluntary restructuring program aided by input from McKinsey and Company 
accompanied the first wave of Jardine, Matheson's divestitures during 1978-79. The second 
wave of divestitures was initiated to get the company out of high debt, caused by its stock 
swap with the Hongkong Land Company. Chart 18: Harvest and Divest, 1978·1983, at the 
end of this chapter, presents the scope of Jardine, Matheson's divestments during the 
period 1978-1983. 
With fixed assets and returns on invested capital more or less static, and the firm's debt to 
equity ratio at 54.8%, it is not surprising that Jardine, Matheson & Company turned to 
management consultant McKinsey & Company in 1978 to restructure the firm. The result 
was to place more of the day-to-day business with the operating companies and the 
activities of the Chairman and his team of senior managers on planning and policy issues 
and overall firm strategy, which included exploration of growth opportunities in China. 
Through its investments in commodities, the firm's earnings had become subject to 
widespread political, economic and monetary uncertainty. After a meteoric rise to over 60 
US cents per pound, the world price of sugar fell to 15 US cents in six months, taking the 
139 
Donald D. Bergh and Gordon F. Holbein, "Assessment and Redirection of Longltudenal Analysis: Demonstretion 
with A Study of the Diversification and Divestiture Relationship,' Strategic Management Joymal. Vol. 18, No.7, 
p. 561: Robert E. Hosklsson, Richard A. Johnson, Douglas D. Moesel, "Corporate Divestiture Intensity In 
Restructuring Firms: Effects of Governance, Strategy and Performance,' Academy of Management Joyrnal. Vol. 
37, No.5 (1994), p. 1208. 
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profits of Jardine, Matheson & Company's Hawaii and Philippines operations with it. A 
sharp deterioration in the South African economy dealt a similar blow to Rennies. The 
OPEC oil shock and near collapse of Indonesia's state oil company sent troubling ripple 
effects through the economies of Hong Kong and South East Asia. 
David Newbigging wrote, "During the year (1978) we conducted an in-depth review of a 
number of our investments in associated companies ... where we have held the investment 
for several years without receiving dividends. Following this review we have now made 
provisions totaling HK $90 million for certain of these investments, ,,140 including: 
• In Hong Kong, Jardine Industries Ltd. 's shareholdings in three companies in three 
consumer electronics manufacturing companies were sold, taking Jardine Industries out 
of the manufacture and sale of consumer electronics. 
• In 1979, the firm disposed of HK$201 million in investments, including Promet 
Engineering Pte. Ltd. and Toft Bros. Industries Ltd. and their subsidiaries, shipbuilders. 
• With a depression in local property markets, Jardine, Matheson & Company sold 
Reunion Properties as well as its shareholding in Singapore Land Ltd. and its interests 
in the Gotanda office building in Tokyo, and the Excelsior Hotel and Shopping Center 
complex in Hong Kong. 
The emergence of China from the anarchic Cultural Revolution to the more stable era of the 
Four Modernizations appeared about to open China's untapped consumer market. Indeed, 
Jardine. Matheson expanded its China Trading Division to support and benefit from the 
government's modernization program, which included the expansion of foreign trade, among 
its Four Modernizations. Jardine's Beijing office became the focal point of the effort. A 
second office was added in Guangzhou (Canton) to deal with traditional export and import 
activities as well as jOint-venture industrial investments and compensation trading. Jardine, 
Matheson and its joint-venture partner A.G. Schindler. with the China Construction 
Machinery Corporation, established the China Schindler Elevator Co. Ltd. in March 1980 to 
manufacture and distribute lifts and escalators for sale within China as well as for export. 
The "modernization" of China encouraged many businesses to seek representation in Hong 
Kong as a way into China. Overseas Chinese seeking secure investments and business 
developers created additional demand for Hong Kong property. As a result. the last years of 
the 1970's had seen an unprecedented property boom in Hong Kong. Rents for top-quality 
offices in the Central District rose from some HK$6 per square foot in 1975 to nearly HK$30 
in 1980. and the price of a lUXUry flat from HK$1.5 million to HK$8 million. 
140 
Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1978 Annual Report, Chairman's Letter, p. 16. 
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The Hongkong Land Company held a unique portfolio of top quality office and residential 
property, and was very active in property development. Its other main interests included the 
Mandarin Oriental group of deluxe hotels and the Dairy Farm food distribution group with 
major supermarket chains in Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore. 
When Hongkong Land signed a cooperative agreement with its rival, Cheung Kong Holdings 
Ltd., which had been raiding property companies in Hong Kong, Jardine, Matheson - then 
owning 26% of Hongkong Land - sprang into action to avoid what it anticipated to be a 
takeover bid. 
In the late summer and early autumn of 1980, Jardine increased its holdings in Hongkong 
Land to 32%, financing the purchase by property sales, and the sale of a large block of 
shares and warrants in the Hongkong & Kowloon Wharf & Godown Company Ltd. 
On the morning of November 3, amid intense speculation and press comment, and following 
the expenditure of HK$2.2 billion in the stock market that day, Jardine, Matheson & 
Company announced that the firm now owned 40% of Hongkong Land. 
Commenting on his firm's purchase of 659.1 million shares in the property company, 
Jardine, Matheson Chairman David Newbigging tried to put a positive spin on the firm's debt 
position: "An investment on this scale would not have been possible but for the sound 
financial basis on which Jardine, Matheson & Company had been built up over several 
years. Our policy of reducing the ratio of debt to equity during the latter part of the 1970's 
enabled us to borrow the substantial funds needed for these stock market purchases on 
favorable terms. Although these borrowings have resulted in the debt/equity ratio rising to a 
level of .87: 1, we believe that this will not inhibit our future expansion and that the continued 
growth of the group overall, coupled with the expected earnings and cash flow from our 
investment in Hongkong Land, will more than compensate for this temporary effect."141 
Concurrently, Hongkong Land was also increasing its holdings in Jardine, Matheson & 
Company and, following a series of corporate moves and acquisitions through the stock 
market, Hongkong Land announced that it owned approximately 40% of Jardine, Matheson 
& Company, making Hongkong Land the firm's single largest shareholder. Compounding 
what amounted to a mutual hostage-taking situation, Jardine invited two of Hongkong Land's 
senior directors to join the board of Jardine, Matheson & Company, namely Trevor Bedford, 
Managing Director of Hongkong Land, and George Ho, Deputy Chairman and Managing 
Director of Hongkong Commercial Broadcasting Company Ltd. and a director of Hongkong 
141 
Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1980 Annual Report, Chairman's Letter, p. 16. 
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Land. Their appointments paralleled the appointments of two Jardine, Matheson & 
Company directors to the board of Hongkong Land, David McLeod and R.C. Kwok.142 
The year saw a significant increase in investments of HK$5,030 million and of additions (and 
fewer disposals) to fixed assets of HK$316 million, funded by cash generated from 
operations of HK$1,17S million, increases in term debt of HK$ 2,996 million and the issue of 
shares totaling HK$753 million. Total term debt rose to HK$3,921 million by December 31, 
1980, with 2/3 of that largely in medium term debt. 
• Investments included the purchase of Glanvill Enthoven & Co. Ltd, a long-
established firm of Lloyd's insurance brokers based in London. Jardine 
acquired the whole of the outstanding capital of that company - and then 
amalgamated its existing insurance-broking interests with those of Glanvills. 
• The firm initiated a five-year oil exploration program with two major US 
companies and was awarded, through Matheson Petroleum, an exploration and 
production lease in the United Kingdom sector of the North Sea. 
Despite borrowings and interest costs associated with Hongkong Land, Jardine Chairman 
David Newbigging tried to remain optimistic: "We will continue to reduce indebtedness by 
improving cash flow from operations and disposing of businesses which are either not 
closely related to our main activities or are producing an unsatisfactory return. However, we 
do not consider it necessary to dispose of good quality assets and investments solely to 
reduce the level of debt. Our 1981 results demonstrate that the current level of interest cost 
is well within the group's capacity."143 
With a substantial drop in property trading profits, 1982 proved a very bad year for 
Hongkong Land. Local property markets declined. Several of Hongkong Land's joint 
ventures in Hong Kong with other partners met with serious difficulties because of the 
depressed state of the property market and the failure of partners to meet their 
commitments. Hongkong Land conducted a thorough review of all its joint ventures and 
decided to make substantial extraordinary provisions where either the project in its current 
form was not viable or its partners unable to meet their obligations. Due to Jardine, 
Matheson & Company's new equity accounting procedures, these provisions now showed 
up on Jardine, Matheson & Company's accounts where they had a negative effect on 
results. 
They did not, however, show up on Hongkong Land's accounts. Hongkong Land's decision 
to account for their shareholding in Jardine, Matheson & Company on the basis of dividends 
142 . 143 Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1980 Annual Report, Chairman's Letter, p. 16. 
Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1981 Annual Report, Chairman's Letter, p. 16. 
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received, and not on an equity basis, had consequential effects on Jardine, Matheson & 
Company's own accounts. Chairman Simon Keswick reported, "We believe, given the level 
of our shareholding and board representation, that Jardine, Matheson & Company should 
continue to equity account the results of Hongkong Land (including any dividend received 
from Jardine, Matheson & Company) and therefore will no longer make any allowance for 
the cross-holding effect of Hongkong Land's shareholding in Jardine, Matheson & Company. 
We have also absorbed direct to reserves our proportion of the reduction in Hongkong 
Land's property revaluation surplus on December 31, 1983. The net effect has been to 
reduce the carrying value of our investment to HK$5.88 per Hongkong Land share 
compared with its underlying net asset value of HK$6.41 per share at December 31, 
1983.,,144 
During 1983 Jardine Matheson disposed of surplus assets to raise cash, extended regional 
joint ventures to breathe new life into two businesses - Lombard Insurance and the Indo 
China Steamship Company - that needed access to specialist skills and further capital to 
expand, and trimmed overheads. 
• In February 1983, Jardine reached agreement with The Continental Corporation 
to develop jointly their insurance underwriting interests in the Asia Pacific 
region. This amounted to the Lombard Insurance Company, formerly a wholly 
owned subsidiary, being owned 60% by Continental and 40% by Jardine, 
Matheson & Company. 
• The Indo-China Steamship Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Jardine, 
Matheson, was sold. 
• Jardine, Matheson's sale of its 53% stake in Rennies Consolidated Holding for 
HK$1,272 millions generated a surplus over book value of HK $760 million. 
• Negotiations for the sale of Jardine, Matheson & Company's Hawaiian sugar 
interests continued throughout 1983. 
By the end of December 1983, Jardine had reduced its debt to equity ratio from .81 to .75. 
But the moves made during 1983 were insufficient to solve Jardine, Matheson & Company's 
problems - low working capital to sales, high assets to sales - low profitability in the face of 
high debt and interest expenses. The firm announced its intention to put more effort into 
developing several of its functional businesses to the point where they could stand-alone. 
Insurance brokerage was already in this position. Following its acquisition of Bache 
Insurance Brokers Inc, now renamed Jardine Insurance Brokers Inc., Jardine had become a 
major international insurance-broking business in most of the countries in which it operated. 
144 . 
Jardine. Matheson & Company, 1983 Annual Report, Chairman's Letter, p. 16. 
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Now, the firm intended to develop its freight forwarding and shipping agency interests along 
similar lines. 
In January 1984 Jardine Fleming & Company Ltd. arranged on behalf of Hongkong Land a 
needed HK$4,000 million eight-year syndicated bank loan, secured mainly against 
properties in Hong Kong's Central District. This loan replaced some of Hongkong Land's 
short term borrowings and meant that all of its current borrowing requirements for its Hong 
Kong Telephone, Hongkong Electric and Exchange Square real estate purchases could be 
met by medium to long term financing. 
Jardine, Matheson & Company would take further steps in 1984 to manage its balance 
sheet, making more provisions against property and shipping. While Jardine, Matheson & 
Company's ship management and shipping agency businesses would continue to be 
developed, the firm "should progressively withdraw from its ship owning activities, including 
those related to offshore oil servicing."145 
Financial Analysis 
The asset sales of the late 1970s were, in fact, followed by asset acquisitions in 1980-1981, 
notably in real estate, as Jardine, Matheson built up extensive holdings in Hongkong Land at 
a time when the cost of funds was high. The firm's debt to equity ratio was .87:1.00 in 1981. 
By 1984, total debt was more than two times equity. Return on assets in 1984 declined 50% 
from peak 1981 levels. This reflects the firm's high debt and low income levels and points to 
an unrealistic dividend payout policy in the face of rising debt and reduced earnings. Return 
on equity dropped from a high of 11 % in 1982 to 1.89% in 1984. This reflects the firm's high 
debt and low income levels. The firm's current ratio was low throughout the period, 
approximately 1.18 in 1984 dropping from a high of 1.29 in 1981. A low current ratio meant 
that Jardine, Matheson could make an easy exit from investments. 
Net cash flows during the period were far lower than expected, but not in deficit, despite net 
sales growing 20% a year and the relationship of cost of goods sold to sales at 93.5%. See 
Chart 17 Summary Flnanclals, 1970-1979 and Chart 19, Summary Financial Data, 1980-
1989, end of chapter and embedded Chart 19.1, on the next page. 
145 . 
Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1984 Annual Report, Chairman's Statement, p. 16. 
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Chart 19.1, Key Management Ratios, 1978·1985 
ROE 
ROTA 
Added Value 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
14.51% 15.25% 10.02% 10.63% 11.26% 2.64% 1.89% 3.29% 
11.33% 11.84% 8.88% 9.65% 9.65% 5.65% 4.66% 6.71% 
5.4% 5.5% 11% 6.8% 0 0 0 2.9% 
If Jardine. Matheson had not reorganized in 1985. what would its enterprise value have 
been in 1990? Using 1985 as the starting year. Model 2. on the next page. allows us to see 
the impact. if any. on cash flow of Jardine. Matheson's asset sales and stricter cash 
management. 
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Model 2 - Harvest and Divest, Without Reorganization 
Projected Cash Flows 1986-1990 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Projected Cash Flow 946 1,024 1,102 1,180 1,259 
Discounted at 10% WACC 860 846 827 806 781 
Total Present Value 1986-1990 4,120 
+Present Value of Terminal Value 7,817 
Entity Value 11,937 
-Total Liabilities (Funds Employed) 8,426 
Added Value 3,511 
Net cash flows were far lower than expected, but not in deficit, despite net sales growing 
20% a year and the relationship of cost of goods sold to sales at 93.5%. The debt/equity 
ratio was reduced dramatically from an average 66% in the early 1980's to 10% in the last 
four years of the decade and ROE from a low of 1.89 in 1984 to 14% in 1989. Beginning 
with the reorganization of 1985, Jardine, Matheson had begun to increase owner's funds. 
The five-year average in 1989 was 21.89% (versus - 0.13% over the five years beginning 
1982-1987). 
Actual Cash Flows 1986-1989 
1986 1987 1988 1989 
Profit Available 479 785 1.113 1.577 
+/- Fixed Assets 
-222 351 262 329 
+/- Net Working Capital 758 -5 -580 ·239 
Net Cash Flow 
-57 439 1,431 1.487 
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Chapter 5: Section 5: Experience of Failure: Focus on 
Distinctive Capabilities Period. 1984-1996 
The acquisition by Jardine, Matheson & Company of 40% of Hongkong Land Company and 
vice versa had long-range management consequences for both companies. Jardine and 
Hong Kong Land had made their acquisitions near the peak of Hong Kong's land boom. 
The subsequent collapse in the property market and soaring interest rates became the 
single largest burden on Jardine. When earnings plunged and debt soared, local 
entrepreneurs like Li Ka'shing and Y.K. Pao began to view Jardine, Matheson (and 
Hongkong Land) as takeover targets. Jardine had to sell valuable - and profitable - assets 
to survive. A major reorganization plan was deployed with changes amounting to the 
dismantling of Hongkong Land and the creation of a complex web of mutually owned 
corporations, fortifying the firm's defenses against future takeovers and strengthening the 
firm's governance in innovative ways. 
The Hongkong Land affair was the firm's first, truly major and unanticipated taste of failure. 
The chagrin is evident in Simon Keswick's assessment of the actions necessary to secure 
the company, for, indeed, Keswick believed that Jardine, Matheson's survival as a family-
owned firm was at risk. 
In the 1984 Annual Report, Simon Keswick reflected on the rise and fall of Hong Kong 
property market and Jardine, Matheson & Company's relationship with Hong Kong Land. 
This is the strategy in Keswick's own words: 
Our first corrective moves in both companies were to cut dividends and to cancel or 
defer a" unnecessary capital expenditure, confining ourselves to those projects for 
which we had entered into firm commitments, together with a few others which 
passed stringent tests for return on capital. Simultaneously, we streamlined 
management and set about re-defining our business objectives and strategy. 
At Jardine, Matheson & Company, we instituted a major program of reduction of 
overheads and tightened our worldwide cash management. Next, we analyzed our 
major activities to determine which were to be regarded as core businesses, with 
growth potential and the ability to prosper on a stand-alone basis with decentralized 
management. Those that failed to pass this test were earmarked for possible 
disposal. 
While we were taking these actions at Jardine, Matheson & Company, Hongkong 
Land, as has been documented in its reports to its shareholders, was taking similar 
132 
strong measures to extricate itself from joint ventures, to restructure its debt and to 
concentrate on its own three core activities - property, food and hotels. 
In addition to winding up or disposing of those projects and businesses for which we 
saw no promising future, both companies used favorable market conditions to raise 
capital or to sell certain assets, such as Atlas House in london and Hongkong 
land's shareholdings in Hong Kong Telephone and Hongkong Electric, where the 
investments, although of high quality, were not integral to our operations. We also 
introduced partners to some of Jardine, Matheson & Company's businesses where 
we considered that the specialized expertise of our partners, as well as their capital, 
would be of value. 146 
From 1984-1996, business interests were reduced and new governance schemes 
introduced to protect information and closely monitor expenses and investments. Growth 
continued, but far less visibly, through related diversification strategies pursued by 
subsidiary and associated companies. The firm continues on this track through 2000. 
In 1985, Hongkong land's residential real estate portfolio was sold to Australian investors 
and in 1986, Hongkong Land's Dairy Farm food subsidiary and Mardarin Oriental hotel chain 
were spun off as separate companies. Hongkong land's remaining interest in Jardine, 
Matheson was contributed to a new investment company, Hongkong Investors Ltd. The 
new company was merged with Jardine Securities Ltd. to form Jardine Strategic Holdings 
Ltd. Jardine Strategic, with net assets of more than HK$ 5.5 billion, was the single largest 
shareholder in Jardine Matheson, Hongkong Land, Dairy Farm and the Mandarin Oriental 
hotel chain. Like Jardine, Matheson Holdings, Jardine Strategic was incorporated in 
Bermuda. At its founding in 1986, Jardine Strategic had a 25% stake in Jardine, Matheson; 
15% stake in Hongkong Land; 27% stake in Dairy Farm and 35% in Mandarin Oriental. 
Unlike Hong Kong-based investment concerns, Jardine, Matheson had the right to 
repurchase its own shares - and did so repeatedly through 1996. Chart 20: Governance 
and Structure, 1981-1996, at the end of the chapter. 
Simon Keswick removed David Newbigging as taipan. Keswick cleaned house of 40 other 
executives at Jardine, Matheson responsible for lines of business that had been 
discontinued with the asset sales of the late 1970s. 
The capital base of a number of Jardine, Matheson's affiliated companies was enlarged, 
including the placement of 30 million new shares with Jardine Strategic for HK$600 million. 
146 
Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1984 Annual Report, p.17. 
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Jardine Strategic raised $US200 million in the Euromarket, and Dairy Farm placed new 
shares valued at HK$454 million with Jardine Strategic. The purpose of these issues was to 
take advantage of favorable market conditions to build group equity to finance acquisitions 
and expansion without excessive borrowing. 147 
Jardine, Matheson entered a joint venture with Moet Hennnessy SA and United Distillers 
Group of Guiness Pic for the distribution of an expanded range of brands on long-term 
contracts in Japan, Hong Kong and North East Asia. The firm also expanded its franchise 
interests through the acquisition of additional fast food and convenience store franchises in 
Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. In the United Kingdom, Dairy Farm 
acquired 25% of Kwik Save Group, Pic, a leading discount supermarket operator. 
Compared with 1986's consolidated net eamings of HK$4 79 million, Jardine, Matheson 
recorded eamings of HK$784 million in 1987 - a 64% increase. Net extraordinary profit of 
HK$278 million in 1987 - compared with HK$52 million in 1986 - arose mainly from three 
items: the Company's share of Hongkong Land's property and land bank sales and profits 
arising from bUSiness restructuring within Jardine, Matheson, less a provision against the 
Company's investment in Jardine Strategic. 
In 1988, Jardine, Matheson continued to strengthen its shareholding in major affiliates - a 
policy and program, according to Simon Keswick, "that enabled the firm to increase its share 
of current profits and the future growth of businesses which we know well and for which we 
see promising prospects. "148 
In 1989 Jardine Strategic increased its share of Dairy Farm from 27% to 41%, permitting 
Dairy Farm to acquire from Jardine, Matheson & Company the firm's 7-Eleven franchises in 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia for a consideration of HK$450 million to be satisfied 
mainly by the issue of 67.1 million new Dairy Farm shares. 
In terms of managerial structure, the most significant event of 1989 was the formation of 
Jardine, Pacific, which grouped together all of Jardine, Matheson's Asia Pacific businesses 
into a region-wide trading and services operation. By 1990, Jardine Pacific had created jOint 
ventures in life assurance, air conditioning and security and increased its investment in 
restaurant franchises in Australia and Taiwan. 
Jardine, Matheson's motor vehicle operations in Hong Kong, China, Australia and the United 
Kingdom were amalgamated to form Jardine International Motor Holdings Limited. Jardine 
Insurance Brokers continued to enlarge its network of acquisitions in the United States, 
147 
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Australia and Singapore, while Jardine Fleming consolidated its position as one of the 
leading investment and merchant banking houses in Asia Pacific. 
Dairy Farm completed two new strategic acquisitions in 1990, buying major supermarket 
chains in Spain and New Zealand. In March 1993, Eurodollar convertible preference shares 
were issued to raise some US$200 million for Dairy Farm and US $350 million for Jardine 
Strategic. Dairy Farm intended to deploy the proceeds of its issue to fund its expansion 
program, including a joint venture with Nestle to manufacture dairy products in Hong Kong 
and China, and the acquisition of the Cold Storage retail chain in Singapore. Jardine 
Strategic's issue would provide funds for its portion of Dairy Farm and its refinancing of the 
company's investment in Cycle & Carriage to a level of 16%.149 
On July 1, 1994, the Bermuda Takeover Code, which provided statutory takeovers 
protection for the Company's shareholders equivalent to London's City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers, came into force. The law formalized the protection Jardine, Matheson & 
Company had required in undertaking its move to Bermuda in 1984. 
In 1994, Jardine, Matheson & Company's secondary listing on the Hong Kong stock 
exchange was withdrawn and Asian time zone trading in the Company's securities began to 
take place mainly on the Singapore Stock Exchange. The Company's primary listing on the 
London Stock Exchange and its other secondary listings were not affected. l50 
In 1995, the firm articulated this vision of its businesses, partnerships, focus, management 
and value: 
The Jardine, Matheson Group comprises eight main businesses, each of which has 
its own individual strategy while benefiting from Jardine, Matheson & Company's 
support as a shareholder with long-standing experience of the Asia-Pacific 
Region ... Partnership: The Group has a policy of cultivating partnerships with major 
international corporations so as to combine the advantages of market knowledge 
and industry expertise. The Group also makes strategic investments in growth 
companies that offer the prospect of cooperation with one or more of Jardine, 
Matheson & Company's businesses ... Asia-Pacific Focus: Based on its existing 
strengths in Asia, Jardine, Matheson & Company's strategy is to build its business 
into market leaders more widely throughout the Asia-Pacific Region, where some 
85% of the Group's profits originates ... Management: To achieve its objectives, the 
Group recruits, trains and develops managers, drawn both from Asia and from the 
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rest of the world. who combine international business skills with a cultural affinity 
with the region ... Creating long-term value: The Group takes a long-term view of 
business and aims to strike a balance between mature cash-producing activities 
and investments in new developments. The maintenance of financial strength 
through prudent financing is fundamental to the Group's philosophy. 
By 1996. Jardine. Matheson & Company had 60.000 employees in Hong Kong - 200.000 
overall in its subsidiary undertakings and associates. With interests in 30 countries. Jardine. 
Matheson & Company derived 80% of its profit from the Asia-Pacific Region. The firm's 
business lines included: 
• Jardine Pacific .. the group's Asia-Pacific trading and services business. Its activities 
fall into five industry groupings: Marketing & Distribution. Engineering & 
Construction. Aviation & Shipping Services. Property Services and Financial 
Services. The firm provides 26% of the Group's profits and is 100% owned by 
Jardine. Matheson & Company. Jardine Pacific accounts for 16% of the Parent's 
equity. 
• Jardine International Motors .. a Hong Kong Listed company engaged in the sale and 
service of quality motor vehicles. with an emphasis on Mercedes-Benz. It has 
operations in Asia. Europe and the United States. The firm provides 14% of the 
Group's profits and is 75% owned by Jardine. Matheson & Company. Jardine 
International Motors accounts for 8% of the Parent's equity. 
• Jardine. Fleming. a joint venture with Robert Fleming of London. is a leading 
financial services group in Asia Pacific. It undertakes investment management. 
securities broking. corporate finance. capital markets and banking. This joint 
venture provides 15% of the Group's profits and is 50% owned by Jardine 
Matheson. Jardine. Fleming accounts for 7% of the Parent's equity. 
• Jardine Lloyd Thompson. a listed international specialist insurance broker. The 
recently merged company combines specialist skills in the London insurance market 
with an international network. especially in the Asia-Pacific Region. The firm 
provides 1 % of the Group's profits. Jardine Lloyd Thompson accounts for 1 % of the 
Parent's equity. 
• Dairy Farm .. a listed international food retailer with supermarket and other interests 
across Asia. in Australasia and in Europe. It has joint venture interests in 
restaurants through Maxim's in Hong Kong and in manufacturing through Nestle 
Dairy Farm. The firm provides 10% of the Group's profits and is 52% owned by 
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Jardine, Matheson & Company. Dairy Farm accounts for 9% of the Parent's equity. 
• Hongkong Land ... a major listed property group, with some 5 million square feet of 
prime commercial property in the heart of Hong Kong. The group is focusing on 
high quality property and infrastructure investments in Asia. The firm provides 21 % 
of the Group's profits and is 32% owned by Jardine Strategic. Hongkong Land 
accounts for 46% of the Parent's equity. 
• Mandarin Oriental manages a group of lUXUry hotels principally in the Asia Pacific 
region. The listed company holds equity in most of its hotels, which include 
Mandarin Oriental, Hong Kong and The Oriental, Bangkok. The firm provides 5% of 
the Group's profits and is 51 % owned by Jardine Strategic. Mandarin Oriental 
accounts for 9% of the Parent's equity. 
• Cycle & Carriage a leading Singapore-listed company with two core business areas: 
motor vehicles, with operations in Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, 
Thailand and Vietnam; and property investment and development in Singapore and 
Malaysia. The firm provides 5% of the Group's profits and is 23% owned by Jardine 
Strategic. Cycle & Carriage accounts for 4% of the Parent's equity. 
In 1996,64% of Jardine, Matheson's profit came from Hong Kong and China; 14% from the 
greater Asia Pacific area, 6% from Europe and 16% from North America for a total of 
SUS356 million. Jardine, Matheson & Company drew 60% of its equity from Hong Kong and 
China, 22% from the rest of Asia Pacific, 8% from Europe and 10% from North America and 
liquid funds, for a total of US $4,096 million. 
South East Asia remained a focus, as highlighted by the acquisition of a 23% interest in 
Cycle and Carriage in Singapore and more recent investments in EON Berhad in Malaysia 
(9% shareholding acquired in June 1995) and Tata Industries in India (20% shareholding 
acquired in March 1996). 
By 1996 all eight of Jardine's core companies - Jardine Pacific, Jardine International 
Motors, Jardine Fleming, Jardine Lloyd Thompson, Dairy Farm, Mandarin Oriental Hotel, 
Cycle and Carr and HongKong Land were pursuing expansion abroad. Hongkong Land with 
nearly half the prime real estate in Hong Kong's Central District was pursuing investments in 
Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam as well as China. Jardine, Pacific was investing in toll roads 
in Indonesia, water treatment plants in China, and drugstores in Singapore 
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Financial Analysis 
The Hongkong Land stock swap had significant repercussions on firm governance that 
continued through the end of the study period . For Simon Keswick, the disclosure of 
information by Hongkong Land to a Jardine competitor had resulted in Jardine, Matheson -
as well as the Land Company - being potential takeover targets by Hutchison's Li Ka 'shing 
and ship owner Y.K. Pao. Further, Hongkong Land's financials followed an accounting code 
different from Jardine's, allowing Jardine to account for Hongkong Land 's exposure but the 
Land Company to look unscathed. 
Going forward , Keswick looked to unique governance structures to manage risk. In 1986, a 
new structure was introduced linking the subsidiaries to Jardine Strategic and Jardine, 
Matheson & Company by ownership percentage. The embedded Chart 21: Ownership 
Structure of Jardine, Matheson & Company 1992 is illustrative. Here, a new holding 
company, Jardine Strategic, manages businesses, which formerly belonged to Hongkong 
Land (as well as some of the newer ventures, not mentioned here). Jardine, Matheson 
Holdings manages the older portfolio, consisting of Jardine Pacific, Jardine Insurance 
Brokers, Jardine Fleming, Jardine Strategic and other interests . From a qualitative 
viewpoint, Jardine Strategic imposes a layer of management between higher risk 
bUSinesses and Jardine, Matheson Holdings. Management theorists and equity analysts 
might view Jardine Strategic as a cost center, draining resources from the Jardine Group -
as indefensible as corporate services are to value-minded management. 
Chart 21: Ownership Structure of Jardine, Matheson & Company 1992 
Jardine 
Matheson 
Ltd. 
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35% 
But Jardine, Matheson & Company's managers are astute financiers and look for risk 
reduction and incremental profit from Jardine, Strategic, as the following analysis indicates. 
Using 1992 as an average year (in terms of ownership percentage), the embedded chart 
shows that Jardine StrategiC is worth more to Jardine, Matheson Holdings than the 
individual companies it manages, contributing 100% of the profits expected but at less risk. 
The role of Jardine StrategiC - indeed the role of any of the firm's holding companies in 
governing Jardine, Matheson's widespread interests - is an example of organizational 
innovation. 
In a unique way a holding company can become a vehicle for creating more value for 
Jardine, Matheson and for its subsidiaries than would be created by market mediation or 
internalization. Critical is the ability of the subsidiary to raise shareholder capital in excess 
of Jardine, StrategiC'S ownership percentage. 
The embedded Chart 22, below, uses after-tax operating profit for each of Jardine, 
Matheson's subsidiaries from 1986 to 1996 to calculate the variability of annual results. 
Jardine Strategic's profits are calculated over the same period. With less variability, Jardine 
Strategic contributes 100% of profit while taking only 86% of the risk. 
Chart 22: Is Jardine Strategic Worth More than Its Pieces? 
(US MIllions based on After-tax Operating Profit) 
Year Jardine JIB Jardine Dairy Hongkong 
Pacific Fleming Farm Land 
1986 10 9.6 26 37.5 111 
1987 43.75 10 48 58 123.5 
1988 72.5 12 46 100 154 
1989 87.5 15.66 67 125.2 194 
1990 98 19.5 73 150.2 267 
1991 100 35.5 83 147 277.5 
1992 107 31.5 80 303 301 
1993 109 32 200 189 517.5 
1994 126 38 208 224 371 
1995 145 34.5 123 187 262.5 
1996 93.5 26.5 82.1 105 649.4 
N 11 11 11 11 11 
M 90.2 24.06 94.1 147.8 293.4 
SO 37.41 10.96 59.7 76.1 166.2 
SOIM 0.41 0.45 0.64 0.52 0.57 
.41/.4736 86% of 100% of 
= average profits 
variation taking 
only 86% 
of risks 
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Mandarin Jardine 
Oriental Strategic 
18.5 72.19 
31 107.61 
44.5 153.61 
50.5 190.73 
45 228.41 
38 232.85 
40 314.1 
41 353.25 
48 334.64 
54 276.91 
60.6 339.34 
11 11 
42.92 236.69 
11.4 97.03 
0.27 0.41 
To understand the contribution of mutual ownership to firm value, imagine a company 
named Jardine, Matheson Direct (a veiled reference to Jardine Matheson Holdings and all 
the companies it manages, minus Jardine Strategic) with investments in three companies, 
Jardine Pacific, Jardine Fleming and Jardine Insurance Brokers. We will use 1991 betas 
(derived from Datastream) and 1992 earnings as reported in the Jardine, Matheson & 
Company Annual Report and Heng Seng Index. The Capital asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is 
calculated thus: 
• CAPM = Risk free rate X B (Market Rate - Risk free rate). The risk free rate is 
estimated at .06 and the market return is estimated at .20. 
US Millions Jardine Pacific JIB Jardine Fleming Jardine, Matheson 
B 3.04 3.37 
Direct 
1.55 2.08 
Earnings 107 31.5 80 166.8 
Fraction Owned by 
Jardine, Matheson 
1 0.63 0.5 
Direct 
$M to Jardine, Matheson 107 19.8 40 166.8 
Direct 
CAPM 0.49 0.53 0.28 0.35 
Cost 220 37 144 
Total 401 
Total Value 474.94 
Added Value 18.4% 
If Jardine, Matheson Direct had to buy these investments on the open market the cost would 
be $474.94M, a savings of $73.94M to Jardine, Matheson Direct - and an increase to 
Jardine, Matheson Direct of 18.4% Added Value. 
Another scenario proposes a company called Jardine Strategic Direct, with investments in 
Dairy Farm, Hongkong Land and Mandarin Oriental. Using 1991 betas and 1992 earnings, 
the model looks like this: 
US$ Millions DalryFann Hongkong Land Mandarin Ortental Jardine Strategic 
Direct 
B 1.33 1.07 0.32 1.01 
Earnings 303 301 40 255.7 
Jardine StrategiC 0.46 0.32 0.5 
Direct Ownership 
Fraction 
$M to Jardine 139.38 96.32 20 255.7 Stra~c Direct 
CAPM 0.25 0.21 0.1 0.2 
Cost 566 459 191 
Total 1,216 
Total Value 1.269 
Added Value 4.5% 
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In each scenario, the fractional ownership of high-risk businesses affords Jardine, Matheson 
Direct and Jardine Strategic Direct added value at less risk. Was the governance structure 
designed for this purpose? Certainly, the foregoing makes the case that Jardine, Matheson 
& Company's complicated ownership structure was designed for this purpose. Whether or 
not the evidence proves design, this is certainly an example showing that added value could 
occur due to governance structure, that is to say, due to firm architecture. 
Financial Analysis 
Based on actual cash flows from 1990 through 1996, the firm is valued to the Year 2002, 
based on current strategies. Following the asset sales of the late 1970's and early 1980's, 
the firm has focused on a limited portfolio of business services and high margin, consumer 
businesses. 
Actual and Projected Cash Flows 1990·2002 (US Millions) 
Actual '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96 
Cash Flow 6.4 134.4 344.1 -182.3 1,070.2 1,131.8 1,193.7 
Projected '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 Total Value 
Present Value 1,426 1,650 1,875 2,000 2,323 2,548 25,480 
Next 5 Years 
Discount at 10% 1,296 1,364 1,408 1,366 1,442 1,438 14,380 
WACC 
Total Present 8,201 
Value 1997-2002 
+Present Value of 14,380 
Terminal Value 
Total Value 1996 22,581 
- Liabilities 7,788 
Added Value 14,793 
The reported 1996 market value of Jardine, Matheson was $36 billion. 
The cash flow analysis suggests that Jardine, Matheson & Company is in a strong 
bargaining position for loans for unrelated diversification. The firm has made a solid 
comeback after the asset sales of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The firm's value has 
doubled with anticipated growth of 10%. 
Despite the firm's commitment to Hong Kong and investment in China, much of the actual 
revenue growth over the period 1990-1996 came from investments outside Hong Kong, 
which had averaged 9.69% from 1982-1987; 56,29% from 1985-1990, and 69.64% in 1991-
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1996. Foreign sales as a percentage of total sales over the same period increased to 
68.08% from 1991-1996. Foreign income as a percent of total income increased from 
45.47% in 1982-1987 to 279.69% in 1991-1996. The following Chart 23 depicts the returns 
on Jardine, Matheson's major businesses from 1987-1996. 
Chart 23: Return on Equity (%) of Jardine, Matheson Businesses 1987-1996 
Year JM JS HKL OF MO JIM JLT C&C 
1996 9.12 7.64 8.69 2.71 6.05 19.91 0.12 17.15 
1995 12.87 7.42 2.83 13.6 5.49 39.56 34.03 17.5 
1994 16.67 10.15 4.77 25.68 5.85 37.21 32.31 14.04 
1993 21.07 14.07 10.16 25.93 6.27 51.51 41.93 11.37 
1992 21.1 14.92 7.01 55.43 6.23 128.19 44.22 12.29 
1991 27.68 17.96 9.87 30.57 5.87 34.21 47.07 15.96 
1990 15.54 8.97 8.29 22.75 9.58 23.57 48.71 15.79 
1989 21.45 10.52 3.57 18.09 7.65 58.02 51.96 12.43 
1988 9.75 5.11 18.01 48.64 7.12 
1987 27.41 15.95 40.36 44.18 5.84 
Len' eg d. JM Jardine Matheson. JS Jardine Strategic. HKL Hongkong Land, OF DairY Farm, MO Mandann Onental, JIM Jardine 
Intemational Motors; JL T Jardine Lloyd Thompson; C&C Cycle & Carriage. Source: Worldscope. Comperable data not 
available for Jardine Fleming. 
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Chapter 5: Section 6: Fundraising for Investment 
Speaking of the firm's entree into the United States as the conclusion of a pan-Pacific 
coverage objective, Henry Keswick wrote, "The establishment of the San Francisco office 
means that we now have coverage by direct representation across the Pacific region." He 
promised, "to continue to build up our management resources in order to increase the 
profitability of our present business to the maximum. At the same time the search for new 
enterprises in which to invest our assets and skills will continue .• 151 
As he would explain to The New York Times, the company accomplished product/market 
expansion through investments, purchasing (mainly but not entirely) minority positions with a 
guaranteed voice in policy. Jardine did not dilute equity by buying a company with stock, 
and during this period acquired little long-term debt. 
The firm's ability to expand its influence in Hong Kong, while parlaying its reputation and 
wide network of business relationships in new markets, lay in its unique governance and 
organization methods - building on historical alliances and interlocking directorships that 
dated back to the early days of British commercial enterprise in the East, and supported by 
minority control. It was a way to manage businesses when distance was great and direct 
intervention impossible. 
In Hong Kong, Jardine, Matheson used both money and managerial skill to establish many 
of Hong Kong's important ventures, including utilities, wharf companies and hotels. As 
these grew, Jardine floated them off in public offerings, retaining only a small equity interest. 
The articles of fifteen Hong Kong companies permanently appointed officials of Jardine, 
Matheson as chairmen or otherwise awarded them policy-making authority. The chairmen 
of Hong Kong's largest wharf company, the Hongkong & Kowloon Godown Company, and 
biggest real-estate developer, Hongkong Land Company, were both Jardine, Matheson 
executives, although the firm owned less than 10% of their equity. The articles of Lombard 
Insurance Company, established by Jardine, Matheson in 1836, gave the firm virtually 
unlimited management authority so long as the firm owned 10 shares. Such extraordinary 
powers could be abolished only by a vote representing three-quarters of the total shares. 
Jardine, Matheson had management or ownership links with public utilities - including the 
tramway, ferry, electric and telephone companies - and no legal requirement prevented 
these companies from favoring Jardine, Matheson as a supplier. The firm and its 
competitors jOintly set the colony's insurance rates (much as Jardine, Matheson, Dent & 
151 
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Company and the Canton Insurance Company had done a hundred years before), subject to 
no regulation. Jardine, Matheson could buy or sell stock in its own $35 million portfolio, or in 
the funds it managed, on the basis of advance information gathered at directors' meetings. 
There were no "insider" trading rules in Hong Kong. The "advantage" was shared by the 
taipans of Jardine, Matheson, Swire, Hutchison and other British commercial interests, who 
sat in the colonial government's council. 
In addition to its growing contribution to Hong Kong, Jardine, Matheson entered new Asian 
markets, buying firms that engaged in finance, insurance and shipping (the firm's core 
capabilities) and expanding the reach of these capabilities throughout the Pacific. In the 
past, Jardine, Matheson had dipped into its treasury for cash whenever it wanted to take 
over a company. As Hong Kong and the ASEAN became increasingly attractive to investors, 
equity financing was used to finance Jardine's growth. Hence, the firm would choose to 
make new diversification moves in line with capital market expectations 
Of the 437 acqUisitions made in the Exploit and Develop period, 1972-1977 and 223 made 
in the Harvest and Divest period, 1978-1984, some 216 were divested during 1978-1979. 
These divestitures were made for strategic reasons - failure to meet the firm's 25% hurdle 
rate after 3 years. All funds from divested firms were plowed into reserves to finance more 
growth. Among divestments made in 1978-79 were investments in shipping and overseas 
properties that were unprofitable, as well as its interests in several subsidiaries. The firm 
expected that these asset sales would be sufficient to increase working capital and cash 
flows (200% increase by 1985). The growth rate was anticipated to be approximately 14% 
from 1980 to 1985, close to the actual Heng Seng Index (HSI) earnings growth rate of 16%. 
The asset sales of the late 1970s were followed by asset acquisitions in 1980-1981, notably 
in real estate, as Jardine, Matheson built up extensive holdings in Hongkong Land at a time 
when the cost of funds was high. The firm's debt to equity ratio was .87:1.00 in 1981. By 
1984, total debt was more than two times equity. Return on assets in 1984 declined 50% 
from peak 1981 levels. This reflects the firm's high debt and low income levels and points to 
an unrealistic dividend payout policy in the face of rising debt and reduced earnings. 
Some 120 divestitures took place in 1981-1983 to reduce the firm's indebtedness resulting 
from the Hongkong Land stock purchase and new equity-based accounting procedures 
were mandated in the publicly traded firms. 
Divestment did not mean ex-growth, however. In 1986 Simon Keswick introduced a new 
cross-ownership governance structure, described in detail in the previous section, that 
stimulated fundraising activity by all of the major subsidiaries while setting rigid revenue 
targets. 
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Chapter 5: Section 7: Choices. Failure and Investment: 
Interpretation of Strategic Management in Jardine, Matheson 
Using Resource-based Theory 
This Chapter concludes with a review of questions addressed in previous sections, offering 
a Resource-based interpretation and touching base with alternative Harvard and Chicago 
school views. Those questions were: 
• How and why did Jardine, Matheson's founders and managers choose to develop 
particular resources and services? (Question 1) 
• The firm's choices met with some notable successes - and some notable failures. How 
are the firm's failures explained? (Question 3) 
• How did Jardine, Matheson's managers raise funds to finance investment? (Question 7) 
Basis of Resource and Services Choices (Question 1) 
A Resource-based response would argue that Jardine, Matheson's product/services choices 
were based on capabilities, mapped to an analysis of environmental needs. Again, a 
Harvard school response would emphasize monopoly positioning; a Chicago school 
response would emphasize the role of vertical integration or ownership. 
Even in this Chapter, where acquisitions are discussed at a very high level, it is clear that 
Jardine, Matheson attempted to put its capabilities to use in response to perceived 
opportunity and environmental requirements, as the company understood them. The 
assessment of Henry Keswick that the firm sought to infuse its own methods into, but not to 
strip the assets of, acquired companies provides some insight into firm thinking. 
From 1961-1971, Jardine, Matheson sought to deepen its involvement in Hong Kong, 
diversifying into growing textile and electronics businesses while building its core financial 
services, shipping, insurance and trading businesses in the Colony. The firm also sought to, 
export its core businesses into new markets, like Australia, Japan, South Africa and 
Singapore through joint ventures and acquisitions. 
Jardine's market diversification - from Hong Kong and China into Australasia, Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia - reflects the firm's long history in Asia, where company financial 
strength and prestige are persuasive yet unspoken messages that sell products and make 
deals. Jardine capitalized on its reputation in finance, insurance, trading and shipping to 
build some powerful Jardine named-brands in related industries, speCifically: financial 
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services - Jardine Fleming in Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Philippines, Australia and 
United Kingdom; insurance - Jardine Lloyd Thompson in Hong Kong, one of Asia's largest 
insurers; trading: Jardine Pacific in 30 Asian nations; and transportation - Jardine Ship 
Management throughout Asia Pacific and the Middle East. Jardine has been able to turn 
this reputation to advantage in Asia. By extension Jardine's reputation for property 
management, investment and development has helped to extend formerly local brands like 
Hongkong Land to Singapore with Singapore Land and China with China Land, associated 
with commercial and infrastructure development projects, and the Mandarin Oriental chain 
of hotels, now in Hong Kong, Singapore and Macau. 
The firm's reputation has given the firm exclusive rights in Asian markets to privileged 
franchises like Dunhill, Moet Hennessy, Caterpillar, Sherwin-Williams, Chubb, IKEA and 
Taco Bell. 
The firm's diversification into raw materials, natural resources and manufactures was an 
innovative, if risky, solution to the problem of the excess physical capability of its fleet and 
the opportunity to provide access to markets to producers of raw materials, natural 
resources and manufactures in the ASEAN. These firms required shipment from one 
location to another as primary goods and manufactures were transformed into end-user 
goods, marketed and distributed. Such goods could fill existing Jardine ships at several 
value chain stages - and the firm, its customers and its joint venture partners could realize 
savings from Jardine, Matheson's integrated end-to-end shipping services. By making the 
appropriate investments, Jardine, Matheson could capture and appropriate more of the 
value available from upstream and downstream stages of the value chain. 
Jardine, Matheson's Explanation of Failure (Quest/on 3) 
The firm's choices met with some notable successes - and some notable failures. A 
Resource-based response to Question 3 would argue that strategic choices are based on 
capabilities, hence failure can be attributed to the firm's misunderstanding of its existing 
capabilities or the capabilities required in a new market. A Harvard school interpretation 
would argue that Jardine; Matheson's strategic choices were based on the pursuit of 
monopoly positions. Where the firm's strategy failed, failure can be attributed to changes in 
industry structure that could have been predicted - and avoided by investment in entry 
barriers, signaling and pricing strategy. A Chicago School response would argue that 
Jardine, Matheson's strategic choices were based on the pursuit of ownership advantages. 
Where the firm's strategy failed, the firm was trapped into short term, higher cost contracts 
that did not provide the cost and time efficiencies possible through direct ownership. 
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Shipping had been an historic strength of Jardine, Matheson. It was difficult for Simon 
Keswick to see the firm's shipping interests as "non-strategic," the firm had "grown up with 
shipping." But during the mid 1970s and early 1980s, Jardine, Matheson had become too 
asset heavy, and the shipping and oil servicing businesses were very capital intensive. To 
raise funds to support shipping and oil, Jardine borrowed - or increasingly frequently sold 
property to the Hongkong Land Company, of which it was a 12% owner. When the 
Hongkong property market declined, Jardine, Matheson lost significantly, both as an 
investor and as a seller; but it was Jardine's reputation for financial savvy that took a 
beating. Jardine's real estate sell-offs (using Hongkong Land as a bank) were seen by 
entrepreneurs like Li Ka'shing as a sign of management weakness, and the Keswick family's 
10% ownership - which was low-enough to stimulate investment by other firms - also made 
Jardine, Matheson a possible takeover target. Li Ka'Shing made a bid for Hongkong Land. 
Jardine retaliated by buying 40% of Hongkong Land. The Land Company retaliated by 
buying 40% of Jardine, Matheson. The mutual hostage taking moves were protective - and 
very costly. They were made to protect the Keswick family's interest in Jardine, Matheson. 
To protect them in the longer term required a an aggressive management stance: more 
stringent controls on investment projects through governance structures like Jardine 
Strategic, the public sacking of execs who had worked in property, oil and shipping (when 
the areas they represented were divested), the reorganization of Hongkong Land, and the 
removal of corporate headquarters from Hong Kong to Bermuda, so that the firm would be 
under British law and under a different takeover code. 
How Jardine, Matheson Raised Funds for New Investments (Question 7) 
A Resource-based interpretation would suggest that raising funds, when necessary, is part 
of the managerial or entrepreneurial task. This task might be accomplished through 
"external organization" in which the raising of funds is relatively easy - or through intrafirm 
firm boards that review and approve fundraising projects to safeguard against opportunism 
and to consider the potential project in light of its larger effect on businesses currently 
managed by the holding company. A Harvard interpretation would emphasize the existence 
of internal routines for analyzing the market, competitors, new entrants as well as the needs 
of buyers and sellers. New projects would be put through a rigorous competitive analysis. 
A Chicago school interpretation would affirm that there are internal routines for fund raising 
for projects. Managerial initiative and opportunism are handled through rigorous cost/benefit 
analYSis, the establishment of hurdle rates and bonuses are based on project returns. 
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Until 1972, funds for investment derived from internal sources, during the Exploit and 
Develop period, the firm borrowed to support growth. Jardine, Matheson established 
aggressive targets for acquired firms, and sold non-performing investments within three 
years, returning the proceeds of asset sales to reserves for future growth. 
In 1987, to even out the spread of profits and reduce risk, Jardine, Matheson created a 
novel governance form - the holding company reporting to a holding company parent and 
paying a fixed return to the parent. Jardine Strategic reduced the risk in Jardine, 
Matheson's portfolio. It was further found that Jardine, Matheson's use of Jardine Strategic 
to manage its high risk subsidiaries - indeed the use of holding companies for this purpose 
- actually added financial value to the firm without additional governance cost and provided 
subsidiaries the opportunity to raise their own equity. 
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Chart 15 Summary Financial Data, 1961-1969 
Jardine, Matheson & Company, Ltd. 
Summary Financial Data 
1961 - 1969 
(HK$) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Fixed Assets 39,394,000 23,379,000 24,569,000 85,812,000 106,056,000 99,179,000 96,604,000 85,810,000 82,782,000 
Loans Secured on Fleet 30,240,000 39,840,000 24,320,000 23,371,000 15,714,000 9,679,000 
Trade Investments and 
Unconsolidated Subsidiaries 27,800,000 39,895,000 42,062,000 39,681,000 43,593,000 49,029,000 56,809,000 64,742,000 94,617,000 
Other Investments and Current Assets 
less Uabilities and Provisions 50,582,000 56,830,000 62,516,000 60,042,000 55,330,000 56,340,000 57,289,000 68,747,000 61,332,000 
MinOrity Interests 9,549,000 9,468,000 956,000 15,743,000 19,448,000 20,830.00 20,574,000 22,206,000 23,585,000 
Stockholder Funds 108,227,000 110,638,000 119,561,000 139,552,000 145,691,000 159,398,000 165,757,000 181,379,000 205,467,000 
Trading Profit 15,246,000 14,135,000 18,326,000 19,762,000 22,373,000 26,172,000 28,083,000 34,588,000 45,576,000 
Taxes 5,378,000 5,213,000 5,431,000 4,697,000 5,106,000 6,014,000 6,550,000 5,745,000 5,819,000 
Net Profit less Minority Shareholder Interest 9,207,000 8,412,000 12,229,000 14,637,000 16,066,000 18,346,000 20,333,000 27,218,000 38,485,000 
Dividends to Stockholders 3,251,000 3,431,000 4,334,000 5,562,000 5,959,000 6,357,000 8,741,000 11,363,000 17,000,000 
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Chart 17 Summary Financial Data, 1970-1979 
Jardine, Matheson & Company, Ltd. 
Summary Finandal Data 
1970 - 1979 
(HK$m) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Group profit and loss accounts 
Turnover 1,264 2,323 2,935 3.969 4,419 5,175 5,723 
Profit before taxation 56 72 117 184 479 400 461 482 509 608 
Taxation 10 11 19 34 239 90 94 112 124 123 
Profit after taxation 46 61 98 150 240 310 367 370 385 485 
Minority interests 3 6 13 25 45 65 56 49 82 
Profit after taxation and minority interests 46 58 92 137 215 265 302 314 336 403 
Net exchange translation differences 59 86 55 
Extraordinary items (43) (6) 10 37 
Profit available for appropriation 46 58 92 137 215 265 259 367 432 495 
Dividends 21 26 40 64 87 116 \30 140 152 179 
Transfer to reserves 25 32 52 73 128 149 129 227 280 316 
-
Earnings per stock unit(HK$) 0.32 0.41 0.65 0.88 1.25 1.40 1.47 1.51 1.59 1.86 
Dividends per stock unlt(HK$) 0.15 0.19 0.28 0.39 0.49 0.57 0.63 0.67 0.71 0.82 
Group balance sheets 
Fixed assets 132 196 310 1,027 1,076 2.106 2,452 2,251 1,697 1,611 
Net assets of subsidiary insurance companies 31 54 45 20 28 57 77 90 101 
investments 159 194 418 928 1,051 1,052 1,180 1,392 1,617 2,267 
Long-term receivables 67 92 
Net current assets 81 120 91 327 437 830 750 706 1.020 1,085 
Employment of funds 372 541 873 2,327 2,584 4,014 4,439 4,426 4,491 5,136 
Share capital 120 132 241 781 824 1,110 1,239 1,259 1,287 1,310 
Reserves 139 176 332 677 813 883 749 789 1,029 1,327 
Stockholders' funds 259 308 573 1,458 1,837 1,993 1,988 2.048 2,316 2,637 
Minority interests 30 42 49 203 207 469 497 473 457 933 
Convertible loan stock 250 500 548 553 559 
Term loans 35 144 189 581 624 1,180 1,240 1,234 1,050 925 
Deferred liabilities 48 47 62 85 116 122 114 123 115 82 
Funds employed 372 541 873 2,327 2,584 4,014 4,339 4,426 4,491 5,136 
Per stock uniUHK$) 1.82 2.16 3.97 8.73 9.29 9.79 10.11 9.76 10.79 12.07 
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Chart 18 Harvest and Divest, 1978-1984 
Note: Shading indicates Service/Market exit during this period 
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Chart 18 Harvest and Divest, 1978-1984 
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Chart 19 Summary Financial Data, 1980-1989 
Jardine, Matheson & Company, Ltd. 
Summary Financial Data 
1980-1989 
(HK $111) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Consolidated profit and loss accounts 
Turnover 7,467 9,266 11,240 10,644 8,881 10,497 10,416 12.720 14.817 15.058 
Pnofit before taxation 968 1,300 1,287 567 431 565 900 1.237 1.607 2.306 
Taxation (290) (320) (286) (328) (276) (292) (343) (341 ) (314) (507) 
Profit after taxation 678 980 981 239 155 273 557 896 1.293 1.799 
Minority interests ( 153) (257) (273) ( 100) (75) ( 116) (78) ( I I I ) ( 180) (222) 
Profit after taxation and minority interests 525 723 708 139 80 157 479 785 1.113 1.577 
Extraordinary Items 548 226 (561 ) (88) (873) (426) 50 281 (33 ) 534 
1,073 949 147 51 (793) (269) 529 1,066 1.080 2.111 
Dividends (258) (316) (324~ ( 164) (41 ) (41 ) ( 165) (293) (404) (595) 
Transfer to reserves 815 633 ( 177) (113 ) (834) (310) 364 773 676 1.516 
Earnings per share (HK$) 1.15 1.13 1.26 0.20 0.13 0.30 0.90 1.47 2.04 2.95 
Dividends per share (HK$) 0.50 0.57 0.57 0.29 0.07 0.07 0.29 0.48 0.65 0.95 
Consolidated balance sheets 
Fixed assets 1.765 2.202 2.886 2,085 2.290 1.255 1.033 
1,384 1,646 1.975 
Associated companies 8 9.145 8.563 6,171 5,887 6.599 6.127 4.818 
8.940 11.040 
Other investments 481 599 624 464 402 356 216 239 
415 409 
Net current assets(liabilities) 796 1.525 \.271 1,318 678 216 794 789 209 (224) 
Employment of funds 10.903 13,471 13344 10.038 9.257 8,426 8,170 7,230 
11.210 13.200 
Share capital 1,834 2,004 2,437 2,457 824 825 827 1.234 
1.243 1.254 
Reserves 3,401 4.536 3.851 2.804 3,400 3.949 4.192 4.952 
8.597 10.109 
Shareholders' funds 5.235 6.800 6.288 5.261 4.224 4.774 5.019 6.186 
9.840 11.363 
Minority interests 1,327 1,645 1,474 811 803 948 245 311 
343 414 
Tenn loans 3.963 4.804 5,114 3,966 4.230 2.704 2.906 684 
842 1.232 
Deferred liabilities 378 422 468 49 
185 191 
Funds employed 10,903 13,471 13,344 10,038 9.257 8,426 8.170 7.230 
11.210 13.200 
Net asset value per share(HK$) 9.67 11.91 11.06 9.18 7.32 8.26 8.67 10.02 15.83 18.13 
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Chapter 6: "Industrial Logic" - Strategic 
Management through Acquisition and Divestiture 
Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 1, Section 2, the extraordinary range of producVmarket choices made 
by Jardine, Matheson during the period covered in Chapter 5 might be explained by a loss 
of focus with painful consequences, leading to a re-examination and re-focusing of the 
company along the lines of its historic capabilities. While the final outcome was indeed a re-
focusing, the internal and external factors responsible for the firm's choices defend their 
logic, consistency, insight into industrial development, and real productive opportunity for 
extending historical capabilities and relationships into new business areas. Hence, Chapter 
6 contributes to the architecture of this study by offering an in-depth analysis of the firm's 
investments, its acquisitions and divestitures from 1972 to 1996 to understand the industry 
(external) and skills (internal) factors responsible for Jardine, Matheson's resource and 
services choices (Question 2). 
From 1961 to 1996, Jardine, Matheson made approximately 850 acquisitions or investments 
at 20% of book value or more in very diverse businesses across the Pacific. Jardine, 
Matheson exploited sectoral opportunities in the ASEAN where these existed while it 
supported the continued development of Hong Kong as an industrial district. 
Without industry and market understanding, such frenetic activity, followed by rationalization 
in the mid 1980s, would appear to be a matter of vaulting corporate ambition with no clear 
and pragmatic strategic intent, until high debt and eroding profit necessitated a return to 
core competencies. 
A Resource-based interpretation argues that a firm grows by building on its resources and 
capabilities, transforming its physical and skill resources to create new products and 
markets. Firms might use equity, debt and trading relationships to extend their resource and 
capabilities outreach, building a network that extends well outside the firm - an external 
organization, as it were, governed by long-term relationships with well-known expectations 
and finanCial rewards, utilizing virtually frictionless contracts. Chapter 6, Sections 1-4 sets 
the stage for the discussion of Jardine, Matheson's external organization in Chapter 6, 
Section 5. 
To find a diversification pattern - or pathways - and ultimately understand the relationships 
between associated companies, their customers and even their competitors, this study used 
as its starting point an SIC-based methodology. The standard industrial classification 
system 
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(SIC) has been widely adopted as the standard coding system used to define and analyze 
industry structure. With SIC code analysis, materials, processes, logistics and end-uses 
emerge as connections between businesses and related skills. 
The precedent for SIC code analysis to establish the relatedness of businesses was set by 
the empirical research of Amit and Livnat,152 Krishna Palepu,1s3 Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt,154 and Grant, Jammine and Thomas.1ss Moshe Farjoun 156 broadened the 
discussion to include the relationship of skills required by each industry. He used SIC codes 
to establish business relatedness - and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data to identify the 
skills required for each SIC code - and compared them for manufacturing businesses. 
Like Farjoun's analysis, this study then progressed to a consideration of the skills required 
by each industry. Finally, the study looked to national and sectoral characteristics and 
foreign direct investment flows to establish a diversity pattern. The diversification and 
diversity patterns were then compared with those of other companies during the same time 
periods. 
The Chapter is structured as follows: 
Chapter 6: Section 1: External Factors - Jardine, Matheson's Acquisitions and 
Divestitures by Industry analyzes acquisitions and divestments by industry group and 
major category over each of the strategic sub-periods; 
Chapter 6: Section 2: Internal Factors - Skills Required by Acquired Firms identifies 
and compares the skills required by the firm's manufacturing, resource and services 
acquisitions with those required by Jardine, Matheson's core businesses. 
Chapter 6: Section 3: Geographic Spread of Jardine, Matheson's Acquisitions and 
Divestitures analyzes the entry and exit strategies of the firm; 
Chapter 6: Section 4: Comparison of Jardine, Matheson's Acquisitions with Tho.e of 
Other International Firms During the Same Periods looks at trends and patterns of 
acquisition activity across industries and geographies for the same period; 
152 
Amlt. R. and J. Livnat. "Diversification Strategies. Business Cycles and Economic Performance," ~ 
153 Management Journal. Vol. 9. No.2 (1988). pp. 99-110. 
Krishna Palepu. "Diversification Strategy. Profit Performance and the Entropy Measure," Strategic Management 
154 J2.!mW. Vol. 6. No.3 (1985). pp. 239-255. 
Sayan Chatterjee and Blrger Wemerfelt. "The Link Between Resources and Type of Diversification: Theory and 
155 Evidence," Strategic Management Journal. Vol. 12. No.1 (1991); pp. 33-48. 
Grant. R.M. and A.P. Jammine and H. Thomas. "Diversity. Diversification and Profitability Among British 
156 Manufacturing Companies. 1972-1984. Academvof Management Journal. Vo. 31. No.4 (1988), pp. 771-801. 
Moshe Fa~oun, "The Independent and Joint Effects of the Skill and Physical Basis of Relatedness in 
Diversification," Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19. No.7 (July 1. 1998). p. 611-630. 
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Chapter 6: Section 5: Could Jardine, Matheson Leverage Its Distinctive Capabilities 
More Effectively By Building An External Organization? The section examines the 
advantages to Jardine, Matheson of its "external organization," that is, its network of equity 
and trade relationships, versus market transactions. 
Chapter 6: Section 6: The Internal and External Factors Responsible for Jardine, 
Matheson's Resource/Services Choices: A Resource-based Interpretation. The 
Resource-based view is compared with Harvard and Chicago interpretations. 
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Chapter 6: Section 1: External Factors - Jardine. Matheson's 
Acquisitions and Divestitures by Industry 
This section analyzes Jardine, Matheson's acquisitions and divestments, fitting them into 
industry group and major category to understand how industries were structured; to asses 
how close to or distant they were from Jardine, Matheson's core businesses; to measure the 
extent of continued investment in core businesses versus new and unrelated businesses; to 
discover the logic of Jardine, Matheson's divestitures over the same period and to discern 
how Jardine, Matheson's senior leadership may have assessed the productive opportunity 
afforded by the 850 investments made during 1972-1996. 
To define and analyze industry structure and compare Jardine's investments, the standard 
industrial classification system (SIC) was used. The first two digits of the SIC code system, 
called Major Group, divide economic activity into the following ten major divisions. Note that 
not all two-digit classifications fall within a major group: 
Division Title Two Digit Major Gro~ 
A ~riculture, Forestry and FishinQ 01-09 
B MinirlR 10-14 
C Construction 15-17 
D Manufacturing 20-39 
E Transportation, Communication, 40-49 
Electric, Gas and Sanit<!!Y Services 
F Wholesale Trade 50-51 
G Retail Trade 52-59 
H Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 60-67 
I Services 70-89 
J Public Administration 91-97 
The third-digit subdivides activity into a more specific industry group, and the fourth digit 
defines a particular industry. This progressive refinement is illustrated by the example of 
Wholesale Trade, given below: 
Division F Wholesale Trade 
Major Group Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 50 
Industry Group Machine Equipment and 508 
Supplies 
Industry Industrial Machinery and 5084 
Equipment 
The four-digit SIC code is assigned on the basis of what the business does. If a corporation 
has subsidiaries, it is assigned a four-digit SIC code based on its own activities and the 
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activities of its direct and indirect subsidiaries. Subsidiaries are assigned four-digit SIC 
codes solely on the basis of their own activities unless they in turn have subsidiaries. 
When a company's activities cover multiple SIC codes, they are listed in descending order 
of importance, measured by the percent of total dollar volume produced or the order of 
importance cited by management when the exact percentage is not provided. 
All of Jardine, Matheson's acquisitions and investments from 1961 to 1996 were charted 
along with country of operations, year acquired, year divested, percent owned, line of 
business and primary SIC code. Only those investments valued at 20% or more of book 
were reported in the firm's consolidated Annual Report; lesser holdings were not reported. 
The spreadsheet program employed permits multiple views of the same information. The 
charts referenced in this chapter reflect these views. 
In this section, we will look at several views: 
• Total number of acquisitions and divestitures by year 1972-1996; 
• Total acquisitions by 4-digit SIC Code, number of acquired firms and description of 
activity; 
• Total acquisitions by major group by year; 
• Total divestitures by major group by year; 
• Total number of acquisitions and divestitures within division and within major group 
during sUb-strategic periods: Exploit and Develop (1972-1977); Harvest and Divest 
(1978-1983); Focus on Distinctive Capabilities (1984-1996). 
• Total number of horizontal (between major groups) and vertical (between industry 
groups) acquisitions and divestitures. 
In Chart 24, on the next page, we can see clearly the years of greatest acquisition and 
divestiture activity for the firm. It is evident from the table that divestiture was an ongoing 
process, averaging three divestitures for every five acquisitions. The firm was always 
divesting non-performing assets, according to previously cited Annual Reports. In ten years 
the number of divestitures was equal to or exceeded the number of acquisitions. In 10 out 
of 24 years the ratio of acquisitions to divestitures was: 3-1 or better. 
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Chart 24: Total Number of Acquisitions and Divestitures by Year 1972.1996 
Year Number of Acquisitions Number of Divestitures 
1972 22 
1973 10 4 
1974 153 
1975 160 11 
1976 46 19 
1977 45 59 
1978 39 51 
1979 37 165 
1980 15 2 
1981 24 10 
1982 67 55 
1983 12 10 
1984 29 23 
1985 19 32 
1986 0 
1987 35 9 
1988 20 9 
1989 29 19 
1990 14 6 
1991 14 20 
1992 9 9 
1993 17 5 
1994 8 13 
1995 14 7 
1996 8 
Total 846 538 
Acquisitions for the period as a whole fell into 152 separate SIC codes, spread over 112 
industries in 49 major groups. See Chart 25: Total Acquisitions by Industries and 4-c:11glt 
SIC Codes, at the end of this chapter. 
Acquisitions and divestitures by major group by years are accounted for in Charts 26 and 
27, on the following pages. A number of patterns emerged leading to the identification of 
four growth periods between 1961 and 1996. 
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Chart 26: Total Acquisitions by Major Group by Year 
Year 01- 10- 15- 20- 40- 50- 52- 60- 70- 91- TOTAL 
09 14 17 39 49 51 59 67 89 97 
1972 1 2 2 5 10 2 22 
1973 1 9 10 
1974 3 3 39 24 22 2 49 12 154 
1975 3 6 20 42 19 2 48 20 160 
1976 3 4 11 6 13 9 46 
1977 10 12 2 1 13 7 45 
1978 1 1 3 12 1 15 6 39 
1979 2 10 3 15 7 37 
1980 1 1 12 1 15 
1981 1 1 1 1 13 7 24 
1982 2 2 3 15 4 1 39 1 67 
1983 1 1 3 7 12 
1984 2 3 5 3 4 10 2 29 
1985 1 5 3 1 8 1 19 
1986 
1987 1 4 2 1 3 21 3 35 
1988 1 1 3 9 6 20 
1989 2 1 3 21 2 29 
1990 1 1 3 8 1 1 15 
1991 2 2 8 2 14 
1992 3 4 1 1 9 
1993 2 3 2 5 5 17 
1994 1 1 1 5 8 
1995 1 2 1 8 2 14 
1996 1 2 2 3 8 
TOTAL 3 13 16 94 146 87 37 349 100 1 848 
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Chart 27: Total Divestitures by Major Group by Year 
Year 01- 10- 15- 20- 40- SO- 52- 60- 70- 91- TOTAL 
09 14 17 39 49 51 59 67 89 97 
1972 
1973 1 1 2 4 
1974 
1975 4 4 1 2 11 
1976 1 5 3 1 6 3 19 
1977 9 11 10 21 8 59 
1978 1 1 14 9 5 14 7 51 
1979 1 3 5 19 45 15 1 55 21 165 
1980 2 2 
1981 1 2 1 6 10 
1982 3 7 21 17 7 55 
1983 2 1 7 10 
1984 5 4 3 11 23 
1985 1 1 3 6 3 16 2 32 
1986 
1987 1 1 5 2 9 
1988 1 8 9 
1989 2 2 2 1 9 3 19 
1990 6 6 
1991 1 2 1 3 10 2 1 20 
1992 1 1 1 5 1 9 
1993 1 3 1 5 
1994 2 1 1 7 2 13 
1995 1 1 1 1 3 7 
1996 
TOTAL 1 6 9 64 100 72 12 209 64 1 538 
The first period identified was one of sequential growth to 1971 during which time the firm 
used its trading, shipping, finance and insurance core businesses to move into new markets, 
establish a representative office, usually a holding company, often by investing in or 
acquiring a local trading business. For purposes of classification, I called this period 
"Stepping Stones." 
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The second period from 1972-1977 was characterized by very aggressive growth pursued 
simultaneously along two paths. The first path was a continuation of its Stepping Stones 
approach into new geographic markets. The second path involved building chains of related 
businesses or clusters within specific industries and across geographies. A total of 427 
acquisitions or investments were made (and 93 divestitures). Some 65.5% of acquisitions 
during the period were in finance, insurance and real estate; transportation and 
trading/wholesaling; primary goods, machine tools and other manufacturing interests as well 
as retail sales (some 35.5% of acquisitions, including 17% manufacturing, 12.6% in retail, 
2% primary goods). I called this period "Exploit and Develop," because the firm was building 
or extending existing capabilities to new markets while acquiring new capabilities. Of the 
divestitures made during this period 70% were of non-performing assets in core businesses. 
A~gldl!ltI2ns Dlvesllturls 
Agriculture and forestry (01-09) 3 0 
Mining (10-14) 6 1 
Construction (15-17) 10 0 
Manufacturing (20-39) 75 14 
Shipping, Transportation (40-49) 92 19 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 54 16 
Retail Trade (52-59) 5 0 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (60-67) 142 30 
Business Services (70-89) 50 13 
Other (91-97) 0 0 
Total 437 93 
From 1978 through 1984 the firm began to rationalize products and markets, building a 
more focused portfolio that could be replicated in each market. A total of 223 acquisitions 
were made, compared with 317 divestitures. Of acquisitions, 75% were in core businesses 
(50% in finance, insurance and real estate; 20% in transportation and 5% in wholesaling). 
Of divestitures, 74% were in core businesses, 12% in manufacturing, and 10% in services. 
classified this third period "Harvest and Divest." The period was characterized by exit from 
businesses the firm believed to be no longer strategic and the spin off of successful 
businesses to new owners, including Swire, Hutchison and Old Mutual/Safren. 
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Acgyl!ltI2n! Dlv!siltyres 
Agriculture and forestry(01-09) 0 1 
Mining(10-14) 6 4 
Construction( 15-17) 3 7 
Manufacturing(20-39) 13 41 
Shipping, Transportation(40-49) 44 69 
Wholesale Trade(50-51) 13 47 
Retail Trade(52-59) 9 1 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate(60-67) 111 112 
Business Services(70-89) 24 35 
Other (91-97) 
Total 223 317 
From 1984-1997, Jardine, Matheson's business interests were reduced. Growth continued, 
but far less visibly, through the diversification strategies of subsidiary and associated 
companies. The firm continued on this track through 1996 (the end of the period covered by 
this dissertation). During this time, 67% of acquisitions and 70% of divestitures were in 
financial, insurance and real estate; 26% of acquisitions were in retail and services. I 
classified this period "Focus on Distinctive Capabilities,· because the firm's intention was to 
limit investment to a few core businesses, while the experimentation and innovation was 
taking place at the level of the firm's associated companies. 
Acgulsilions Q!ve!tliur!s 
Agriculture and forestry (01-09) 1 0 
Mining (10-14) 1 1 
Construction (15-17) 3 2 
Manufacturing (20-39) 6 9 
Shipping, Transportation (40-49) 12 12 
Wholesale Trade (50-51) 20 10 
Retail Trade (52-59) 20 13 
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (60-67) 87 67 
Business Services (70-89) 26 16 
Other (91-97) 1 1 
Total 188 128 
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Chapter 6: Section 2: Internal Factors - Skills Required by 
Acquired Businesses; Comparison with Skills Required by 
Historic Core Businesses 
Moshe Farjoun's 1998 study presents an analysis of skills required across manufacturing 
businesses. Farjoun used SIC codes to identify individual lines of business within a firm and 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Survey (OES) data to identify the 
skills required within those lines of business. The similarity in required skills was used as an 
indirect indicator of diversification related to firm-specific resources. After a discussion of 
Farjoun's methodology, the same methodology will be applied to an analysis of the skills 
required by Jardine, Matheson's acquired businesses. 
Looking at manufacturing firms only (SIC codes 20-39), Fa~oun drew a sample of firms from 
the TRINET data set 157 and Fortune 500 manufacturing firms. Using a skill-based 
approach, he characterized each industry by its underlying profile of specialties, defined as 
the different types and extent of human skills required in the industry, as identified by 
occupational distributions. Farjoun then grouped industries with similar skill profiles. 
To measure the human skills requirements, Fa~oun used OES data, which defines 
industries at the 3-digit SIC code level of detail. The OES contains data about the 
percentage distribution of 480 occupations in all industries. The occupational employment 
ratios are an indicator of both the different types of human expertise needed in industry and 
the extent to which they are required. 
In developing skills profiles, Fa~oun used all major groups of occupations employed in 
manufacturing, from management to marketing and sales, administration, service, 
production and agriculture - 38 types of skills in a/l - to create an industry-by-industry 
·similarity-in-skill matrix" that would subsequently be used to cluster businesses within 
manufacturing. 
Fa~oun's matrix groups each occupational variable by its Major Group affiliation. It further 
details the distribution of the standardized occupational variable in each of 8 skill-related 
industry groups identified in the cluster analysis. See embedded Chart 28: Analysis of 
Manufacturing AcquiSitions - Types of Skills and Chart 29: Analysis of Manufacturing 
Acquisitions - Cross Tabulation of Skills and Industries. These two tables capture both 
phYSical and skill-based systems. The skill-based system uses skill profiles to group 
industries that require similar production skills, scientific and engineering know how, and 
157 
Davis, R. and I. M. Duhaime, "Diversification, Industry Analysis and Vertical Integration: New Perspectives and 
Measurement," Strategic Management Journal, Vo. 13, No.7 (1993), pp.511-524. 
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administration , and to a lesser extent service and marketing skills. The physical-based 
system captures similarity in raw materials, physical production processes and end use. 
Farjoun predicted that these two systems - physical and skills-based - will agree that 
industries are related when they employ similar production technology, require similar skill s 
and use similar physical processes, and that the classifications will disagree when the 
grouping is based on an aspect that is specific to only one system. 
Chart 28: Analysis of Manufacturing Acquisitions - Types of Skills 
Industry Clusters 
Skills Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Top Management 2.61 1.34 0.16 -0.15 0.11 0.02 -0.36 -1.41 0.16 
Financial Managers 0.36 0.17 -2.06 -0.27 -0.99 0.10 0.95 0.16 1.36 
Marketing Adv. Pro 0.41 0.26 -1.58 -0.31 -0.97 0.09 0.92 0.03 0.99 
Human Resources 0.23 0.11 -2.15 -0.12 -0.93 0.10 0.68 0.08 1.31 
Purchasing Manager 0.15 0.07 -2.01 -0.28 -0.67 0.34 1.01 lA6 073 
All Other Managers 2.01 1.22 -1.16 -DAD -0 .72 -0.21 1.60 3.01 088 
Management Support 2.07 1.38 -1.08 -0.35 -0.90 0.04 1.29 4.06 0.81 
Aeronautic Engineers 0.07 0.50 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.12 -0.06 614 -0.15 
Chemical Engineers 0.23 0.58 -0.39 -0.24 -0.39 -0.32 -0.12 -0.10 2.21 
Electrical Engineers 0.74 1.73 -0.43 -0.38 -0.43 -0.06 2.71 1.58 -0 .10 
Mechanical Enqineers 0.69 0.73 -0.93 -0.53 -0.83 0.69 0.70 2.94 
0 .28 
Other Engineers 1.02 1.75 -0.58 -0.29 -0.47 0.13 0.56 5.11 0.06 
Life Scientists 0.09 0.47 0.00 -0.06 -0.17 -0.19 -0.02 -0.19 1.00 
Physical Scientists 0.41 0.91 -0.45 -0.18 -0.43 -0.35 -0.17 -0.24 2.28 
Other Natural Scientists 0.30 0.34 -0.88 -0.51 -0.68 -0.03 1.30 2.36 0.99 
Soc. Science & Prof. 0.87 2.86 -0.30 -0.27 -0.17 -0.19 -006 0.11 -0. 14 
TechniCians 2.84 2.61 -1 .06 -0.54 -0.84 0.01 2.20 1.88 
107 
Marketing and Sales 3.21 2.67 -1.15 -0.09 -0.19 -0.22 -0.07 -106 
015 
Admin. Support 12.19 5.69 -1 .33 -0.52 -0.22 -0.12 0.62 0.16 0.36 
Service Occupations 1.79 0.77 -1.48 0.38 -0.37 -0.09 -0.43 -0.02 
0 .38 
Suparv. Blue Collar 4.46 1.33 -2.33 0.55 -0.39 -0.08 -0.84 -1.22 094 
Construct. And Extract 1.71 3.11 -0.50 0.36 -0.29 -0.14 -0.41 -0.04 0.28 
Mechanics & Install. 4.47 2.72 0.11 0.88 -0.66 -0.40 -0 .81 -029 0.63 
PreCision Metal Work 3.31 4.76 -0.70 -0.30 -0.60 0.94 -0.05 0.39 -043 
Inspectors & Graders 2.88 2.14 -1 .26 0.06 -0.29 0.24 0.81 044 -0.39 
Other Precis . Prod. 2.77 4.63 -0.60 -0.13 1.58 -0.49 -0.15 -0.51 
-0.58 
Machine Tool Cutting 4.24 5.93 -0.71 -0.35 -0.50 1.14 -031 002 
-0.68 
Metal & Plastic Work 2.28 4.19 -0.54 0.26 -043 0.39 -0.37 -0 .33 -0.54 
Printing Workers 1.59 5.25 -0.30 -0.15 0.77 -0.27 -028 -0.30 
-0.30 
Textile & Rltd. Work 3.31 10.87 -0.30 -0.10 1.09 -0.28 -0.28 -0.30 -0.17 
Other Machine Setting 9.48 8.49 -1 .07 0.56 017 -0.54 -0.65 -086 0.68 
PreCision Assemblers 1.34 2.51 -0.54 -0.52 -0 .54 0.49 2.03 1.27 -0 .39 
Other Assemblers 9.88 8.87 -1 .10 -0.32 0.05 0.78 0.53 -0.63 
-069 
Plant and Systems 0.66 2.14 -0 .32 -0.12 -0.30 -0.28 -0.29 -0.21 
1.76 
Matenal Moving 2.19 1.88 0.54 0.67 -0.51 -0.26 -1.02 -0.98 
012 
Transport & M. Moving 2.21 4.46 2.97 0.55 -0.20 -0.37 -046 -0.39 -0.16 
Helpers and Laborers 8.46 5.63 -1.03 0.97 041 -0.57 -103 -1 29 
-0.49 
Agn. Forest Fishing 0.88 6.33 9.60 -0.05 -0.10 -014 -014 -014 
-011 
Percentage of employees in each occupation across all U.S. manufacturing Industries. 
The entries for each cluster Indicate standard deviations from the mean occupallOnal employment In II manufaclurlng Industries. 
Source: Moshe Farioun 1998 
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Chart 29: Analysis of Manufacturing Acquisitions --- Cross-tabulation of Skills and Industries 
3-019it Skill 3-OIglt 
2-0I-.9It SIC SIC Industry Title Groue 2-0101t SIC SIC Industry Title 
20- Food 201 Meal Products 3 28-Chemlcal 283 Drugs 
202 Dairy Products 2 284 Soap 
203 Preserved Fruils 2 285 Paints 
204 Grain Mill Products 2 286 Indus. OrganIC Chem 
205 Bakery Products 2 287 Agn. Chemicals 
206 Sugar 2 289 MISC. CherT1lC8ls 
208 Beverages 2 29-Petroleum and 291 Petr. Refining 
209 MISC. Food 2 Coal 295 Misc. Petr. 
21-Tobacco 210 Tobacco 2 3O-Rubber 301 Tires 
22-Texllle 221 Weaving 3 302 Rubber Products 
225 KniHlng Mills 3 307 MISC. Plasbc Prod 
227 Floor Covenng 2 31-Leather 311 Footwear 
229 Misc. Textile 2 313 Luggage 
23-Apparel 231 Apparel 3 32-Stone, Clay 321 Flat Glass 
239 MISC. Apparel 3 & Glass 322 Glass & Glassw re 
24-Lumber and 241 Logging 1 327 Concrete & Gypsum 
Wood 242 Sawmills 2 329 Other Clay 
243 Millwork 3 33-Primary 331 Blast Fumaoes 
244 Wood Containers 3 Metals 332 Iron & Steel 
245 Wood BUilding 2 335 Nonferrous Roiling 
25-Furnlture and 251 Household Furniture 3 336 Nonferrous Foundnes 
Fixtures 252 PartitIOns 3 339 Other Pnmaty Metals 
254 Office Furniture 3 34-Fabncated 341 Metal Cans 
26-Paper 261 Pulp & Paper Mills 2 Metals 342 Cutlery 
264 Converted Paper 2 344 FabrIC Struc. Melal 
265 Paperboard 2 345 Screw Machone Prod 
27-Pnnhng and 271 Newspapers 8 347 Metal Coating 
PUblishing 272 Periodicals 8 348 Ordnance 
273 Books 8 349 Misc. FabrIC. Metals 
274 Misc. Publishing 8 35-lndustrlal 351 Engines & Turbines 
275 Commercial Printing 3 Machlneryi 352 Farm & Garden Mach 
278 Blankbooks 3 Equipment 353 Construction Machines 
279 All Other Printing 3 354 MetalWOfklng Machines 
28-ChemlCals 281 Indus. lnorg. Chern. 7 355 $peetal Indus. M hlne 
282 Plastics Materials 7 356 Genoral lndus Machine 
357 Office & Comput EqUi 5 37-Transport 372 Aircraft and Parts 
358 Refrigeration 4 EqUipment 373 Shlp& boats 
359 MISC. Indus. Mach. 4 376 Guided MiSSiles 
36-ElectroOlcJ 361 Electnc OIstr. Equip 4 379 All Other Trans 
Electric 362 ElectrIC Ind. App. 4 38-lnstruments 381 Englneenng Instru 
EqUipment 363 Householld Appliances 4 382 Me SUring DevIces 
364 Elec. Lighting Equip 4 384 MedlCSllnstruments 
365 Elec. Household EqUIp 4 386 PhotographIC EqUIp 
366 CommunicallOn Equl 5 389 All Other Instruments 
367 Elec. Components 5 39-Mlsc. 391 Jowelry 
369 Misc. Elect. Equip 4 Manufacturing 393 Toys & Sporting 
371 Motor Vehicles 4 394 Other Manufacturing 
Souroe _ F81joun 1998 
Skills Required for Jardine, Matheson's Manufacturing Acquisitions 
It is valuable to an understanding of Jardine, Matheson's diversification during the Exploit 
and Develop phase (1972-1977) to plot the firm's manufacturing acquisitions using Farjoun's 
approach. For comparison with Farjoun's data. I plotted only those acquisitions 
corresponding to the subset of manufacturing industry SIC codes Farjoun studied, as well as 
the OES data relating to those codes, 
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The skills required by Jardine, Matheson's manufacturing acquisitions are identified in Chart 
30: Jardine, Matheson's Manufacturing Acquisitions and Required Skills, 1972-1977, 
below. In the chart, the first left column identifies the manufacturing industry cluster number 
(based on Chart 28). The second column indicates the number of manufacturing firms 
acquired by Jardine, Matheson from 1972-1977. The third column identifies the 
industry(ies) and related three-digit SIC codes, and the column on the right summarizes the 
skills required for each industry cluster over and above those for manufacturing as a whole. 
Some 50 of Jardine, Matheson's manufacturing acquisitions during the study period fall into 
cluster 2, with helpers and laborers and transport and materials movers preponderant, and 
cluster 4, with top management and precision workers preponderant. The skills required for 
cluster 2 are common across frozen food, textiles, concrete and asbestos, primary metal 
industries and iron and steel foundries . The skills for cluster 4 are common across 
conveying equipment, elevator and moving machinery, machine tools, special industry 
machinery and printing equipment. Together, they represent 67% of Jardine, Matheson's 
manufacturing acquisitions between 1972-1977. Cluster 4 makes the tools and moving 
equipment used by businesses in cluster 2. 
Chart 30: Jardine, Matheson's Manufacturing Acquisitions and Required Skills, 1972-1977 
Cluster No. of Firms Industry (3·digit SIC) Skills Required 
Firms Acquired by 
Jardine 
(1 ) 3 Logging, Sugar Growing, Rubber (072·085) Agri, Forest Fishing; transport 
and materials moving; top 
manaQement; technicians (2) 50 Dairy products preserved fruits; grain mill Helpers & laborers; transport & 
products; bakery products; sugar; beverages; materials moving; other 
misc. food; tobacco; floor covering; misc. machine setting; metal & 
textile; sawmills; wood building; pulp and plastic work; supervisory blue 
paper mills; converted paper; paperboard; collar; mechanics & installers 
misc. petroleum; rubber products; misc. plastic 
products; flat glass; glass & glassware; 
concrete & gypsum; other clay; blast fumaces; 
iron & steel foundries; other primary metals; 
metal cans; ships & boats 
(202,203,204,205,206, 208,209,210,227, 
229,242,245, 261 , 264,265,295,302, 307, 
321,322,327,329,331,332,335,336, 339, 
(3) 341,347, 3731 4 Meat products; weaving; knitting mills; Top management; other 
apparel; misc. apparel; millwork; wood precision products; textiles & 
containers; household furniture; partitions; related workers; helpers 
office furniture; commercial printing; & laborers 
blankbooks; all other printing; footwear; 
luggage (201, 221, 225, 231, 239, 243,244, 
251,252,254,275, 278,279, 311 313) (4) 24 Cutlery; plumbing & heating; fabric. Structural Top management; precision 
metal; screw machine prod. ordnance; misc. metal work; machin tool 
fabric metals; engines & turbines; farm & cutting; precision assemblers; 
garden mach.; construction mach; spec. Indus. other assemblers 
mach; gen. Indus. mach; refrigeration; misc. 
indus mach; electric distr. eq; electric indo app; 
household appliances; electric lighting eq.; 
electric household eq; misc. electric eq; motor 
vehicles; ali other transportation; jewelry- toys; 
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Cluster No. of Firms Industry (3-dlglt SIC) Skills Required 
Firms Acquired by 
Jardine 
other manufacturing (342, 343, 344, 345, 348, 
349,351,352,353.354,355,356) (5) 5 Office & computer eq; communications eq; Financial managers; 
electrical components; engineering marketing, advertising, pr; 
instrumentation; measuring devices; medical 
instrumentation; all other instrumentation (357, 
366,367,381,382.389) (6) 1 Aircraft & parts; guided missiles (372, 376) 
(7) 1 Industrial inorganic chem; plastics materials; 
drugs; soap; paints; indus. org. chem; agri 
chem; misc. chem; petro refining; tires; 
photographic eq (281,282,283,284,285, 
286,287,289,291,301 386) (8) 1 Newspapers; periodicals; books; misc. 
publishing 
(271,272.273,2741 
There is a close relationship as well between Fa~oun's clusters 4, 5 and 6 and Jardine, 
Matheson's core transport business, in which engineers predominate. See embedded 
Chart 31: Engineers as Percent of Total Employment by Industry, for relative 
percentage of engineers employed in transport vs. other businesses. Jardine, Matheson's 
manufacturing and core businesses required a heavy concentration of engineering talent. 
Chart 31: Engineers as Percent of Total Employment by Industry 
INDUSTRY PERCENT ENGINEERS OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
Shipping 3.94 
Motor vehicles and eqUipment 3.7 
Aircraft and parts 3.65 
Electronic components and accessories 3.62 
Personnel supply services 2.13 
Electric services 2.13 
Measuring and controlling 1.95 
Computer and office equipment 1.89 
Wholesale trade 1.89 
Medical Instruments and supplies 1.52 
Photographic equipment 1.25 
Computer and data processing services 1.23 
Crude petroleum. natural gas 0.85 
For comparison purposes, the cross-industry average for engineering employment 
according to OES data is .26%. 
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Skills Required for Core Jardine, Matheson Businesses Compared with Those 
Required for Manufacturing and Service Business Acquisitions 
What is the relationship between the skills required for Jardine, Matheson's original and core 
businesses, and those required for manufacturing acquisitions from 1972-1977 and service 
acquisitions during the same and later periods? Chart 32: Skills Required Across 
Jardine, Matheson's Original and Acquired Businesses, at the end of the chapter, uses 
OES data to track skills required by Jardine, Matheson's original businesses and service 
acquisitions in the 1970's and 1980's. Concentrations of skills appear in bold. A few 
industries outside Jardine, Matheson's acquisitions portfolio - namely, pharmaceuticals, 
electric services and telecommunications - were introduced for possible comparison. 
Overall, Jardine, Matheson's move into service businesses required skills that the company 
had accumulated in its core businesses. Each acquisition in a new industry added a few 
asset specific skills to the top or middle management requirements. Embedded Chart 33: 
Capital and Skill Intensity of Selected Hong Kong Industries, provides insight into the 
capital and skill intensity of Jardine, Matheson's bread and butter businesses. The firm's 
original and core businesses are marked with an asterisk. Note that import/export, shipping, 
finance and insurance are significantly more capital and skill intensive than manufacturing 
exports. 
Chart 33: Capital and Skill Intensity of Selected Hong Kong Industries 
Industry Depreciation/labor Skill Ratio (Professionals In 
Expressed In HK$/Employe. Major SIC Group/Total) 
Manufacturing Exports 2,683 2.49 
Import/Export Trade" 5,328 7.03 
Wholesale Trade 2,945 2.9 
Retail Trade 2,851 2.03 
Shipping" 21,160 5.16 
Air Transport 9,465 12.23 
Communication 16,146 12.4 
Storage 12,992 2.85 
Finance" 5,706 5.52 
Insurance" 4,618 8.12 
BUSiness Services 11,989 29.95 
This suggests that the former required a higher investment in assets and human resources 
which Jardine, Matheson found justifiable because trading, transportation and financing 
continued to generate higher profits than the firm's other business lines. These were the 
core businesses of the firm and a source of long-term competitive advantage. Chart 32 
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shows that several skills were common across these core businesses, specifically, 
management, marketing and finance. The expertise would likely be shared across 
businesses, as fast track executives from functional disciplines were given additional market 
or business experience. 
Note that manufacturing exports, wholesale and retail trade require comparatively low 
capital investment and far-less-costly skills. These were businesses that could provide 
Jardine, Matheson with a high return on sales - but with very easy exit, if the venture proved 
unsuccessful after 3 years. By the end of the 1970s, Jardine, Matheson had begun to 
rationalize its manufacturing, ship building/ship owning and natural resources interests and 
refocus the enterprise on services, which could be standardized and replicated at low 
investment and operating costs, and staffed by local nationals. This format is characteristic 
of Jardine's extension of Jardine, Fleming; shipping services; Securicor and Securair 
security services; Jardine Insurance Group; the Mandarin Oriental Chain of hotels; Franklins 
and Kwik Save Supermarkets; industrial laundry and contract cleaning services, Taco Bell 
and other franchises. 
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Chapter 6: Section 3: External Factors (2) - Geographic 
Spread of Jardine. Matheson's Acquisitions and Divestitures 
Jardine, Matheson's desire to broaden its outreach in Asia and reduce its dependency on 
Hong Kong and China is clear from a geographic market-by-market review of the firm's 
acquisitions and divestitures. While committed to building its presence in Hong Kong, the 
firm was not alone in its pursuit of other Asian markets at this time. World trade had begun 
to exceed the growth of world production during the mid-1950s, and by the early 1960s firms 
sought to grow by direct foreign investment in the developing countries of Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia across a wide range of industries. The strategy was to 
exploit knowledge and expertise gained in one Pacific market elsewhere in the region. '58 
At the same time, it is obvious from the breadth of acquisitions that Jardine. Matheson 
wanted to sustain its competitive advantage in Hong Kong, where GOP was rising 10% per 
year, interest rates were low and the island was emerging as an important regional finance 
center. 
This section establishes the factors responsible for GOP growth and the flow of foreign 
direct investment into the ASEAN and Hong Kong from the 1960s through 1990s and 
reviews Jardine, Matheson's investments in the area and contribution to GOP growth from 
1961-1996. 
GDP Growth and Foreign Direct Investment In Hong Kong and the ASEAN 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - the original member 
states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) experienced dramatic 
growth in real GOP. Between 1965-1985, GOP rose 4.8% in Indonesia; 4.4% in Malaysia; 
2.3% in Philippines; 7.6% in Singapore and 4.0% in Thailand, largely from corporate foreign 
direct investment, a significant portion of which came from Hong Kong firms. 159 
Between 1967 and 1993, Japan and Hong Kong were the two largest investors in Indonesia, 
measured in terms of foreign direct investment, and in terms of cumulative foreign direct 
investment, Hong Kong was among the top three largest investors in Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand. Between 1967 and 1997, Hong Kong invested some US$14.6 
158 
Edward Chen, "Economic Restructuring and Industrial Development In the Asia Pacific: Competition or 
159 Complementarity?" Busjness & the ComtemDory World (Spring, 1993), p. 68. 
Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, Transnational CQrporation and Business Networks (LQndQn: Routledge), pp. 18·19 
GOP growth in Hong Kong and ASEAN; p. 86 Hong Kong FDlllows tQ ASEAN. 
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billion in Indonesia; in Malaysia, Hong Kong's paid-up capital in approved foreign direct 
investment projects in the manufacturing sector was US$256 million (or 4.2% of the total). 
In the Philippines, Hong Kong firms invested up to US$233 million (or 6.3% of the total) in 
cumulative foreign equity investment between 1965 and 1991. In Singapore, Hong Kong's 
cumulative foreign equity investment between 1981 and 1994 was US$3.3 billion or 2.5% of 
the total. 
Hong Kong firms looked to ASEAN countries for specific sectoral advantages: Indonesia 
and the Philippines offered greater competitiveness in resource-rich primary and labor 
intensive manufacturing industries. Malaysia and Thailand were more competitive in 
manufacturing industries that required higher technological and capital inputs. In cumulative 
terms, from 1967 to 1993, some 70% of Hong Kong's foreign direct investment in Indonesia 
WAS concentrated mainly in six industries - textiles (US$838 million); office building 
(US$792 million); paper (US$658 million); hotels and restaurants (US$606 million), the 
chemical industry (US$604) and the basic metal industry (US$596 million). The top four 
manufacturing industries are related to resources abundant in Indonesia. For the textile 
industry, the availability of labor is an important factor, whereas the availability of natural 
resources is crucial to the chemical and basic metal industries. 
In MalaYSia, between the years 1975 to 1994, the majority of Hong Kong's foreign direct 
investment went into five industries: textiles, chemicals, electronics, food manufacturing and 
wood products. These five industries accounted for 94% of total Hong Kong foreign direct 
investment in 1975 and 87% in 1994. The textile, electronics and wood industries were the 
top employers in Malaysia - some 35,000 were employed by Hong Kong firms, the largest 
employer in that industry. 
In the Philippines, agro-industries, mining/ mineral and chemical industries attracted most of 
the Hong Kong foreign direct investment from 1972 to 1987. Since 1982, the service sector 
has absorbed 51% of Hong Kong's total foreign direct investment. 
As early as 1963, Hong Kong's foreign direct investment in Singapore's manufacturing 
sector represented 9% of total manufacturing foreign direct investment. Since 1985, the 
leading sector for Hong Kong's foreign direct investment has been financial and business 
services. 
In 1970, Hong Kong's foreign direct investment in Thailand was concentrated in three 
sectors - trade, industry and construction, representing 87% of Hong Kong's total foreign 
direct investment. In 1980, the commercial and services sectors reemerged as the leading 
sectors for foreign direct investment. The five major industries or sectors were: financial 
institutions; trade; services; housing; and hotels. In the manufacturing sector, electrical 
appliances and 
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chemicals were the leading industries for Hong Kong's foreign direct investment in 1980. 
From 1980-1995, the service sector dominated, at some 63% of total foreign direct 
investment, with financial institutions and real estate the two largest recipients of foreign 
direct investment. 
Jardine, Matheson's Investment and Acquisition Strategy In Hong Kong and the 
ASEAN 
Hong Kong had been Jardine, Matheson's home market for 129 years and the firm enjoyed 
a formidable reputation for financial strength and political influence. From 1961 to 1974, 
Jardine expanded its interests in Hong Kong, acquiring firms engaged in finance, insurance 
and real estate, as well as manufacturing, construction, transportation, wholesale and retail, 
and personal and business services. 
Jardine, Matheson began the decade with investments in finance (a new investment 
management and financial services joint venture with Robert Fleming & Co., London and the 
Empire Finance Company), insurance-broking (Turnbull Gibson and Lombard), ship owning 
(Indo-China Steam Navigation Company), engineering (Jardine Engineering) diamond 
trading (Gregory), marketing (Harry Wicking, Inc., Dunhill, Inc.) and security services (Hong 
Kong Security, Chubb). 
By 1974 the firm began to expand its range of transportation services to accommodate 
Hong Kong's entrepot trade, buying container operations (Dominion Line), container 
services (Hui Kong), container reconditioning and expanding into air charter operations 
(Eupo-Air), air cargo forwarding (Freight Express), cargo handling and storage (Gateway), 
and air cargo terminal (Hong Kong Air Cargo terminal). Jardine, Matheson had seven Hong 
Kong registered ship owning companies in 1974. 
By the same year, the firm had acquired six financial services, merchant banking or 
securities firms and 11 property and insurance companies, reflecting confidence in the 
development of Hong Kong as a major economic center and entry point for international 
firms looking to do bUSiness with Asia, but with limited risk. Jardine, Matheson had five 
insurance underwriting and brokerage firms in Hong Kong in 1974 - Turnbull Gibson, 
Lombard Insurance Company, Chinese International Underwriters, Jardine, Matheson 
Insurance Brokers and Hong Kong Fire Insurance Company. 
In addition to its real estate investments, Jardine, Matheson also invested in a number of 
construction companies beginning in 1974 (Schindler and Gammon). 
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Taking advantage of low-cost labor and the re-export market, the firm invested in local 
manufacturing businesses, including jewelry manufacture, office partitioning, toys and radios 
for export, precious and semiprecious stones, canvas and webbing equipment, watch parts 
manufacture, rainwear, and electronic plating, as well as business services, hospital and 
contract cleaning, car park and garage (Zung Fu Motors), hotels (Excelsior) and TV rentals 
(Rentacolor). See Chart 34, Jardine, Matheson Market Presence: Hong Kong, 1972-
1996, at the end of the chapter. 
Chart 35, below, shows that some 75% of Jardine, Matheson's acquisitions were made in 
Asia, including 40% in Hong Kong or China and 25% in Southeast Asia. Hong Kong 
predominates with 226 service area acquisitions. But Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Japan, Thailand and Indonesia - and even more prominently South Africa - were also major 
markets for Jardine, Matheson's investment, particularly in manufacturing and services. 
Jardine, Matheson's manufacturing investments in the ASEAN supplied product to the firm's 
Hong Kong's wholesale and retail trade investments. 
Chart 35: Geographic Spread of Manufacturing, Service and Natural Resources 
Acquisitions and Investments -1961-1984 
REGION MANUFACTURING SERVICES RESOURCES 
Africa 7 119 4 
Hong Kong/China 24 226 
Singapore 18 46 5 
Malaysia 9 35 3 
Philippines 16 17 
Europe 120 
US 8 46 7 
North East Asia 14 1 
Other 5 107 19 
Total 87 722 39 
By 1974, Jardine, Matheson had made significant investments in Singapore in ship owning, 
container freight stations, road transportation, agricultural Industry manufacturing, textiles, 
SCientific equipment, medical and hospital supplies. The firm invested in oil exploration in 
1974 and bought three Singaporean companies engaged in oil industry supplies, 
manufacturing and servicing. In 1975, Jardine, Matheson acquired two firms to manage its 
oil interests and service oil rigs. Also in 1975, the firm brought in Jardine Fleming, Schindler 
Elevators, Rentacolor and a Hongkong Land-type property company, Singapore Land. 
Jardine acquired Promet Berhad, a company that undertook civil engineering and 
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construction, steel fabrication and marine transportation. See Chart 36: Jardine, 
Matheson Market Presence: Singapore,1972-1996, at the end of the chapter. 
Jardine, Matheson entered the Philippines with the acquisition of two life insurance 
companies and holdings in three sugar milling companies, an air conditioning and TV 
manufacturing company, a joint venture with Sherwin Williams to manufacture industrial 
machinery and the acquisition of a machinery distribution company. In 1975 Jardine, 
Matheson established Jardine, Davies, a holding company with Theo. Davies, long 
associated with sugar plantations in the East Indies, to manage a portfolio of food and 
kindred products, timber trading, clothing and machine tools manufacture. Shipbuilding and 
repair was added in the same year. Financial services was added in 1978. See Chart 37: 
Jardine, Matheson Market Presence: Philippines, 1974-1996, at the end of the chapter. 
Jardine entered South Africa in 1974 with the acquisition of Holiday Inn franchise licenses 
and local companies engaged in clothing, luggage and outdoor equipment manufacture. In 
1975, Jardine, Matheson acquired 53% of Rennies, a 165 year old trading conglomerate, 
based in Johannesburg with interests in shipping, ship owning and tourism. The association 
quickly became extremely profitable, very quickly, with the subsidiary contributing 12% to 
parent company profits by the end of the decade and operating in eight African nations. 
From 34 acquisitions by the end of 1977, the firm reduced its holding to 23 in 1979 and had 
sold off all of its African holdings by 1980. See Chart 38: Jardine, Matheson Market 
Presence: South Africa: 1974-1979, at the end of the chapter. 
Like other ASian, European Community and United States investors during the early 1970s, 
Jardine, Matheson made a significant investment in Australia. It was Jardine's plan to 
create another Hong Kong, that is to say, another home base in Australia. 
In what became the firm's signature style, Jardine, Matheson established holding companies 
in anticipation of exporting its finance, insurance and retail "brands." By 1977, Jardine had 
acquired 18 firms engaged in finance, insurance and real estate - ship owning, shipping 
services, airways, security services, sugar harvesting equipment manufacture (to 
accommodate the firm's sugar milling businesses elsewhere in the Pacific), commodity-
broking, sanitation services, refuse removal and other personal and business services, as 
well as manufacturing businesses. From 22 businesses acquired during the Exploit and 
Develop period, Jardine, Matheson's holdings in Australia were reduced or consolidated to 7 
in the Harvest and Divest period and to 5 in the Focus on Distinctive Capabilities period, 
ending up with 1 in financial services; 1 in property, 1 in holding, AND 2 in supermarkets. 
Jardine, Matheson went from 22 wholly owned subsidiaries in 1978 to 6in 1980 and 2in 
1996. See Chart 39: Jardine, Matheson Market Presence: Australia, 1972-1996, at the 
end of the chapter. 
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Jardine, Matheson Contribution to GDP Growth in Hong Kong and the ASEAN 
In 1972, 82% of the firm's profits derived from Hong Kong, as well as 78% of its equity. In 
the same year, Northeast Asia (largely Japan) contributed 7% to profits and represented 2% 
of firm equity. Southeast Asia (largely Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Ph ilippines) 
contributed 3% to profits and represented 3% of firm equity. But by 1978, Hong Kong was 
contributing 45% to profits and represented only 37% of equity. Japan was contributing 
12% to profits and represented 5% of equity; Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines were contributing 6% to profits and 12% of equity. See embedded Chart 40: 
Jardine, Matheson's Profits and Equity Holdings by Geography and Sector, 1972-
1982, below. 
Chart 40, Jardine, Matheson's Profits and Equity Holdings by Geography & Sector 1972·1982 
1972 1973 19H 1975 1976 1977 1978 1978 1981 1912 
PROFITS .,. 
Hong Kong 82 55 15 49 54 57 45 49 71 51 
N E. ASia 7 10 5 7 8 12 9 • S.E. ASla 13 11 13 6 6 13 
Australasia 4 4 2 
N America 5 49 15 15 8 
Europe 13 16 14 5 6 
Souther Afnca 6 6 8 12 
MIddle East 9 14 3 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
EOUITY % 
Hong Kong 78 43 35 45 39 37 37 38 74 6 
N.E . ASia 2 1.5 4 3 4 5 5 2 2 
SE Asia 27 9.7 10 11 11 10 12 14 5 
Australasia 11 .5 5.8 10 10 12 14 11 8 I 
N America 106 84 11 6 7 8 8 9 9 
Europe 48 31 30 19 16 15 12 13 6 
Southem Africa 6 6 5 5 8 6 
Middle East 5 10 8 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
PROFIiTS % 
BY SECTOR 
Trading and Lighl InduSlry 19 23 24 23 23 30 
SaMess (and Transportallon) 22 22 31 24 22 29 15 18 
Financial Services 2 26 19 17 19 12 24 24 
Natural Resources 46 17 21 8 10 6 ·2 3 
Property 11 12 28 26 23 25 10 
Engineering and Construction 20 25 
MarkeUng and Dlslnbulion 18 20 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Indeed, Jardine, Matheson had an extraordinary impact on the national economies in which 
it invested so heavily. With Hong Kong representing 37% of turnover in 1977, Jardine, 
Matheson represented 3.9% of Hong Kong 's GOP. With Singapore, Indonesia. Malaysia 
and the Philippines representing 4% of turnover in 1977, Jardine, Matheson represented 2% 
of their combined GOP. South Africa represented 5% of the firm's turnover In 1977 and 2% 
of the nation's GOP. See Chart 41: Jardine, Matheson Contribution to GOP, at the end 
of the chapter. 
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During the period examined in this paper (1961-1996) peer firms like Swire and Hutchison 
Whampoa never took the multi-market approach of Jardine, Matheson, making it part of 
their strategy to focus on Hong Kong and China. Only in the mid 1970s, when Swire was 
issuing shares, did Swire's contribution to Hong Kong GOP begin to rise to 1.9% at the end 
of the decade. By 1984, Swire had eclipsed Jardine, Matheson's contribution to the colony. 
By 1986 Hutchison Whampoa was contributing 2.1 % to Hong Kong GOP. Chart 42: 
Comparison of Jardine, Matheson with Competitors, Contribution to GOP and Added 
Value, at the end of the chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Section 4: Comparison of Jardine. Matheson's 
Acquisitions with Those of Other International Firms During 
the Same Period 
This section looks at trends and patterns of acquisition activity across industries and 
geographies for the same period. 
A study by R.S. Khemani 160 of recent worldwide trends in merger and acquisition activity 
classifies merging parties into 29 industrial categories for the consolidated years of 1978-
1979, 1983-1984 and 1988-1989. Within manufacturing, the categories correspond 
generally to the two-digit SIC (major group) codes, whereas outside manufacturing they 
represent one or more industrial divisions (Le. several major groups). Hence, the numbering 
system used by Khemani is unique to this investigator, but the industrial categories 
correspond to the verbal descriptions of the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes, which have been used throughout this Chapter. Khemani's industrial categories are: 
1. Agriculture 15. Printing, Publishing 
2. Forestry 16. Primary Metals 
3. Fishing and Trapping 17. Metal Fabricating 
4. Mines, Quarrying, Oil Wells 18. Machinery 
5. Food and Beverages 19. Transportation Equipment 
6. Tobacco Products 20. Electrical Products 
7. Rubber 21. Non-metallic Mineral Products 
8. Leather 22. Petroleum and Coal Products 
9. Textiles 23. Chemicals and Chemical Products 
10. Knitting Mills 24. Misc. Manufacturing 
11. Clothing 25. Construction 
12. Wood 26 Transportation, Construction, Utilities 
13. Furniture and Fixtures 27. Trade 
14. Paper 28. Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 
29. Community, Business or Personal Services 
1~ R " 
.s. Khemani, "Recent Trends in Merger and Acquisition Activfty in Canada and Selected Countries, 
Corporate Globalization through Mergers and Acquisitions, p. 1-22. 
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Comparing these figures, it is notable that the majority of mergers and acquisitions studied 
by Khemani over the time period tend to be broadly horizontal - approximately 57% of total 
activity in the years 1978-79 and 1983-84, and at a significantly higher level of 66% in 1988-
89. But there is considerable variation in horizontal merger activity within different industry 
categories during the three time periods. 
Also of interest is the variation in total merger activity in the different industry categories. 
That is to say, the level tends to be high when the acquiring firm falls into one of the 
following categories: Transportation, Communications and Utilities; Wholesale and Retail 
Trade; Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; and Community, Business and Personal 
Services. The number of mergers and acquisitions is also high in mining - Mines, Quarrying 
and Oil Wells, particularly in the years 1978-79 and 1988-89. Toward the end of the 1980s, 
M&A activity was also pronounced in the Food and Beverage Sector, most of which tended 
to be horizontal. 
Another striking observation is the proportion of firms in Wholesale and Retail Trade, which 
were acquired by firms outside that category. Acquisitions in this category increased from 
14% in 1978-79 to 70% in 1983-84 and were at 57% in 1988-89. This may reflect forward 
integration of economic activity by firms located in different industries. Also striking is the 
number of acquisitions made by firms in Finance, Insurance and Real Estate spanning the 
broad spectrum of the non-financial sector. The magnitude of these mergers and 
acquisitions increased from 17% to 82% and then dropped to 62% over the three time 
periods. This trend reflects the changing regulatory environment, which governs the 
operation of financial companies and the removal of certain barriers between different 
segments of financial markets. 
Using Khemani's methodology, and the same industrial categories and charting formats, 
Jardine, Matheson's acquisitions were tracked over five periods. Two earlier periods were 
included, because Jardine, Matheson's acquisition strategy was well underway in 1972-74 
and at its apex in 1975-77. As noted above, the firm made a total of 437 acquisltions-
32.5% in finance, insurance and real estate; 21% in transportation, 17% in manufacturing 
and 13.5% in wholesale and retail trade, 11.4% in services, 2% in mining and agriculture. 
See Chart 43: Jardine, Matheson & Company Compared to Global Firm., Trends In 
Mergers & Acquisitions, 1972.74 and Chart 44: Jardine, Matheson & Company 
Compared to Global Firms, Trends In Mergers & Acquisitions, 1975·77 at the end of the 
chapter. Jardine's very broad horizontal M&A activity, including 18% in manufacturing and 
resources, is similar to that of the trading and financial companies Khemani studied. 
Overall, a full 32% of Jardine, Matheson's acquisitions were horizontally distributed. 
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In the subsequent series of Charts 45 through 47: Jardine, Matheson & Company 
Compared to Global Firms, Trends in Mergers & Acquisitions, Jardine, Matheson's 
activities are highlighted in gray and can be compared directly with Khemani's findings for 
the same time sequences. In reviewing these charts, it should be noted that the totals along 
the diagonal in these figures represent the number of acquiring and acquired firms that fall 
into the same broad industrial category. The transactions may be viewed as Mbroadly 
horizontal" in nature (Le. where the firms have operations in the same or similar products). 
The industry categories are sufficiently broad; however, that these numbers include related 
product diversification as well. The totals at the base of the columns indicate the industry 
categories in which the target (acquired) firms operate. Similarly, the totals at the end of the 
rows indicate the total number of firms in each industry category in which the acquiring firms 
are based. The number of mergers and acquisitions not located on the diagonal suggest 
the extent of non-horizontal activity; these include transactions that are conglomerate and 
vertical (forward-backward) in nature. 
By 1978-79 Jardine, Matheson's M&A activity in manufacturing and resources is reduced. 
As previously noted, the firm had reduced many of its non-core holdings. The 1983-84 and 
1988-89 charts reflect reduced and highly focused M&A activity in the areas of finance and 
transportation, retail and services. See Charts 45, 46 and 47, Jardine, Matheson & 
Company Compared to Global Firms Trends in Mergers & Acquisitions, 1978-1979, 
1983-1984, and 1988-1989, at the end of the chapter. 
Hence, the overall shape of Jardine, Matheson's acquisition pattern was familiar to that of 
trading and financial firms studied by Klemani, broadly horizontal at the outset (for Jardine, 
Matheson this was 1972-77, not 1978-79) with increasing contraction through 1988-89. 
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Chapter 6: Section 5: Could Jardine. Matheson Leverage Its 
Capabilities More Effectively Through An External 
Organization Than Through Contractual Relations with 
Outside Parties? 
This section examines the advantages to Jardine, Matheson of its "external organization," 
an "industrial district" spread across the Pacific, linked by shipping, insurance, finance and 
distribution services: in what way was this network of equity and trade relationships more 
advantageous to Jardine, Matheson than vertical integration or market transactions? 
Henry Keswick had made the claim that Jardine, Matheson's acquisition strategy had 
"industrial logic" behind it. At the very least, the claim implies strategic choice and superior 
knowledge. To examine what kind of strategic choices Jardine, Matheson made during the 
period, we examined Jardine, Matheson's investment in associated and subsidiary firms 
across 152 business lines, the relationship between businesses and required skills, 
Jardine's choice of geographic markets. 
This section now turns to the clustering of skills sets within geographic markets of skill sets 
held by associated and subsidiary firms, and available to the business as a whole and 
examines the financial benefits of intra-organizational contracting for the parent firm and its 
associates. 
In addition, this section examines two additional areas related to superior knowledge that 
explain the perceived value to the firm and to its associates of Jardine, Matheson's strategic 
resource and services choices justifying the mutual advantage of what may be described as 
an "external organization," in the Marshallian sense of a pattern of relationships within and 
outside the business. 
Industrial Clusters 
One can look at the three-digit SIC codes represented among Jardine, Matheson's 
investments - that is, major industry - and plot these by stage in the value chain (primary 
goods or resources; manufacturing; services) and by geography. This shows the 
interdependence of Jardine, Matheson's acquired companies within product systems for 
materials and metals (the steel product system), forest products, transportation, textiles, oil 
and gas and sugar, producing what might be called "Industrial Clusters." 
The analysis of these "Industrial Clusters" revealed that many firms acquired by Jardine, 
Matheson between 1972-1977 were steel dependent. Included were oil refining, shore 
drilling 
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and offshore services, construction and elevator installation, sugar milling, sugar harvesting 
equipment manufacture, ship building and repair, steel foundry, piping and components, 
machine parts, agricultural equipment manufacturing, air conditioning manufacturing, 
electricity and supply, motor distribution, steel fabrication, hydraulic components, crane and 
winch trading, industrial equipment, oil equipment and services. See Chart 48: Industry 
Clusters, at the end of the chapter. 
Further, this analysis shows how the separate product systems actually related to each 
other and to Jardine, Matheson's own historical capabilities. 
For example, the steel product system supplied flexible steel for cladding and decking to the 
transportation (shipbuilding) product system: machinery to both oil and gas as well as sugar 
product systems. The steel product system also supplied piping and aluminum components 
to the oil and gas product system, and the transportation product system supplied 
shotblasting and marine engineering services to that product system. A dramatic example 
of product system interdependencies was the impact of the energy price crisis of 1973 on 
shipbuilding and - domino-like - on the steel industry. The energy crisis hit the automobile 
industry and the housing industry in the industrialized West (US, UK, Europe) and in Japan: 
demand for steel slumped. But in the newly industrializing nations of Australia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore and South Africa demand for steel produced and used in the same 
region accelerated with GOP growth - and Jardine, Matheson was there with the capabilities 
to take advantage of a spectacular opportunity. 
While Jardine, Matheson was largely involved in its core activity of matching buyers and 
sellers of diverse products, the firm was also entrenched in a number of key industries. This 
was not on a one-time, ad hoc baSis, but on a recurring basis and at very different stages of 
the value chain. Relying on its broad architecture, its relational contracts, Jardine, 
Matheson would purchase raw materials, assemble them, coordinate their flow from firm to 
firm, through the production and distribution chain, using its own vessels and supporting the 
effort with its own marketing services. The firm would not only buy and sell the product at 
various stages, it would arrange the logistics, handle the foreign exchange aspects, 
documentation, customs clearance and other details. 
Financing was another important aspect of Jardine, Matheson's service to client and 
associated firms. The firm acted as a retailer of loans, borrowing wholesale at preferential 
rates and re-Iending the money to finance the trade. Because of its intimate customer 
contact and its insurance-broking services, Jardine, Matheson had the highest quality credit 
information on current and prospective clients. The firm's capacity to gather and distribute 
information was an important commodity. 
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How was clustering an advantage to Jardine, Matheson, the parent company? The range of 
related services that Jardine provided to firms in its network generated commissions to 
Jardine and its shippingl transportation services, financing, insurance, distribution and 
marketing businesses. 
At each stage, from production to final sale, Jardine, Matheson both provided value-
knowledge and know how - and extracted value as a buyer or a seller, on its own account 
or as a broker or shipper, operating on commission and absorbing the risk for companies in 
the chain. Using 1977 as an example, Jardine, Matheson's value chain for steel offered at 
least 61 separate points at which the firm could extract value, make a commission as it 
were, going back to the firm's history in the commission business. 
How Jardine, Matheson Extracted Value At Each Stage of the Steel Value Chain 
STAGES BUY OPTIONS SELL OPTIONS 
Iron Ore Local and International Local and International 
Own account Own account 
Broker Broker 
Ship Ship 
Finance, Insure Finance. Insure 
Blast Furnace Product mix Product mix 
Contract Unused Capacity 
Contract 
Steel Ingots Local or International Local or International 
Own account Own account 
Broker Broker 
Contract Contract 
Ship Ship 
Finance. Insure Finance, insure 
Manufactures Local or International Local or International 
Own account Own account 
Broker Broker 
Contract Contract 
Ship Ship 
Finance. Insure Finance. Insure 
Engineering and Construction Local or International Local or International 
Own account Own account 
Broker Broker 
Contract Contract 
Finance. Insure Finance, Insure 
Looking back at the classification scheme used earlier in this section to discuss Jardine, 
Matheson's growth periods, it is evident that the opportunities that the firm and Its managers 
saw for capturing value changed dramatically between 1974 ("Exploit and Develop") and 
1978 ("Harvest and Divest" period). The data derive from the firm's Annual Reports: In 
1974, the firm made 19 cents of every dollar buying and seiling the manufactures of 
associated firms; 22 cents on transporting goods; 2 cents on financial services. By 1978, 
the firm was 
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making 30 cents on every dollar from making and selling manufactures, 29 cents from 
transportation and 22 cents on financial services to its associated firms. By 1981 this 
configuration had changed. The firm had divested its manufacturing interests, divested its 
ship owning interests, and was building a business concentrating on service delivery. For 
every dollar of profit generated in 1981, 77 cents was derived from services, versus 53 cents 
in 1974 and 61 cents in 1979. 
The External Organization as Quasi-Insurer 
As noted in an earlier section, some 75% of acquisitions were made in the Asia Pacific 
Region, 40% in Hong Kong and China and 25% in Southeast Asia. North East Asia 
represented only 10% of acqUisitions because import quotas and trade restrictions limited 
entry. 
The availability of low cost labor in the Asia Pacific was attractive to Jardine, Matheson, 
particularly when the firm was entering manufacturing and resource businesses, unrelated 
to its core finance, insurance, shipping and trading businesses. Entry into unrelated 
businesses depended on ease of exit (reflected in a low current ratio) and the potential for 
high returns. Chart 49 Return on Equity and Current Ratio for Selected Industries, 
Worldwide Statistics -1967-1998, end of chapter, provides insight into these 
characteristics. In geographies where labor and energy costs were low, the firm could 
expect to appropriate more of its total revenue. With low exit costs, the firm could easily 
divest a non-performing investment and add proceeds to reserves to fund future growth. As 
documented earlier in this chapter, half as many divestitures as acquisitions were made 
from 1972-1996. 
Knowledge about investment opportunities and available returns was obtainable on site 
through the firm's trading and shipping experiences. In cases like Rennies of South Africa, 
Guthries of Singapore and Theo.Davles of Hawaii, the acquired firms were large trading 
firms that shared scope of activity and long-experience with Jardine. Jardine, Matheson 
also had access to information brokers like Lloyd's List and Drewry's Shipping Consultants. 
The value to Jardine, Matheson of dependable long-term relationships with businesses in 
Asia Pacific was higher returns and lower-cost inter-firm transactions. Lower-cost inter-firm 
transactions were also of direct benefit to Jardine's associated firms. 
To evaluate the ability of the Jardine, Matheson network to retain more profitable revenue 
than any individual firm, we looked at the ratio of taxes paid to profits, reserves to 
stockholders funds, and operating profits to operating costs; see Chart 50: Higher Profits, 
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Lower Costs Available through Jardine, Matheson's External Organization during 
Exploit and Develop Period, 1972·1977, below. 
Chart 50: Higher Profits, Lower Costs Available through Jardine, Matheson's External 
Organization during Exploit and Develop Period, 1972·1977 
'72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 
Taxesl 19 34 239 90 94 112 
Profit Attributable 92 137 215 265 259 367 
Ratio 20.60/0 24.8% 111% 34% 36.2% 30.5% 
Trans. to Reserves! 73 128 149 129 227 280 
Stockholders Funds 573 1,458 1,637 1,993 1,988 2,048 
Ratio 13% 8.7% 9% 6.4% 11.4% 13.6% 
Operating Profit 117 184 479 400 461 482 
Cost of Operations 1080 1844 2535 3508 3937 
Ratio 17% 28% 15.7% 13% 12.2% 
Source. Jardine, Matheson Annual Report 
During 1972-1977, Jardine's taxes paid as a percentage of earnings was dramatically lower 
than for individual firms engaged in manufacturing or resource industries, an average of 
29.32% (excluding 1974) versus 33.35%. The highest taxes affected the resource group, 
which averaged 46.61 % during this period. Jardine, Matheson also achieved a higher 
operating profit- to-costs ratio - an average of 16.78% per annum versus 15.14% per 
annum. For a comparison with individual, publicly traded firms within industries included in 
Jardine, Matheson's portfolio, see Chart 51: Profits and Costs Available to Individual 
Firms, Across Business Sectors, 1967.1983, on the next page. 
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Chart 51: Profits and Costs Available to Individual Firms, Across Business Sectors, 
1967-1983 
I d I I n ustr a s Composite 
'67 '72 '73 '74 75 76 '77 
Taxes/Profit Attributable 29% 30.4% 32% 36.5% 35.2% 35% 26.4% 
Operating Profit/Ops Cost 15.55% 15.06% 15.84 15.36 14.38% 14.42% 14.36% 
'78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 
Taxes/Profit Attributable 33.5% 33.3% 31.7% 29.1% 25.6% 26.5% 
Operating Profit/Ops Cost 14.40% 14.37% 13.16% 12.92% 12.78% 13.64% 
R C esources omposlte 
'67 '72 '73 '74 75 76 '77 
Taxes/Profit Attributable 23.3% 37% 39.5% 52.7% 53% 48.3% 49.2% 
Operating Profit/Ops Cost 21.55% 22.32% 25.22% 22.89% 19.87% 17.37% 16.48% 
'78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 
Taxes/Profit Attributable 46.1% 47% 44.8% 38.9% 34.6% 34.5% 
Operating Profit/Ops Cost 16.04% 18.09% 15.53% 13.87% 13.86% 16.29% 
M h' ac mery 
'67 72 '73 '74 75 76 77 
Taxes/Profit Attributable 39% 39% 39% 34.7% 32.3% 33% 34% 
Operating Profit/Ops Cost 15.81% 17.71% 17.38% 16.01% 15.79% 15.35% 16.43% 
'78 79 '80 '81 '82 '83 
Taxes/Profit Attributable 37.9% 34.65 34.1% 35.1% 30.3% 48.2% 
Operating Profit/Ops Cost 12.55% 12.48% 11.46% 12.35% 9.81% 7.36% 
Iron & Steel 
'67 '72 73 74 75 76 77 
Taxes/Profit Attributable 14% 15% 23.6% 32% 17.7% 7.1% -30% 
Operating Profit/Ops Cost 14.75% 11.26 12.04% 14.54% 10.30% 8.64% 5.59% 
78 '79 '80 '81 '82 '83 
Taxes/Profit Attributable 15.2% 2.7% 6.8% 30.4% -55.5% -17.4% 
Operating Profit/Ops Cost 8.91% 7.97% 6.45% 7.81% 2.28% 4.23% 
p aper & Forest Products 
'67 72 73 '74 '75 '76 77 
Taxes/Profit Attributable 23.2% 20.7% 27% 32% 26.7% 25.3% 23% 
Operating Profit/Ops Cost 14.49% 12.24% 14.67% 16.43% 15.50% 15.69% 14.87% 
'78 79 '80 '81 '82 '83 
Taxes/Profit Attributable 254.2 28,3% 22.5% 28.3% 10.5% 12.7% 
Operating Profit/Ops Cost 14.55% 13.69% 11.94% 10.60% 8.42% 10.72% 
Source. Standard & Poors Data 1967-1983 
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Experienced financiers and insurers, Jardine, Matheson achieved higher profits, retained 
more income for future growth, and maintained lower operating costs overall as a member 
of an external organization than the average individual firm dealing with suppliers on a 
contract basis. The anticipated financial value would have been important to Jardine, 
Matheson, but also minimizing the peaks and valleys of profits and costs in an uncertain 
environment would have been important both to Jardine and its associated firms. 
Comparison of Jardine, Matheson's Internal and External Organization with the 
Japanese Sogo Shosha 
In studying Jardine, Matheson & Company and its external organization, it is useful to 
compare this firm with the Japanese general trading company, or sogo shosha. Both share 
a similar history: the sogo shosha that came into being in Japan at the same time as the 
agency house in Canton. 
Like Jardine, Matheson, the primary function of the sogo shosha was trading - that is, 
matching buyers and sellers of diverse products. In performing this core activity, it was 
entrenched in a number of key industries, at different stages of the value chain, from the 
purchase of raw materials to the marketing of the final product. It played a role in vertically 
integrated commodity systems, particularly in basic commodities such as textiles, iron and 
steel, nonferrous metals, chemicals and foodstuffs. The sogo shosha, like Jardine, 
Matheson, provided essential links between stages in a product system for a client firm, only 
one stage of which was trading. 
The Japanese general trading company entered the transaction as an intermediary between 
the supplier and the purchaser, accepting payment from the buyer in the firm of a bill of 
payment and issuing its own bill to the supplier. The supplier'S extension of credit was to the 
trading company, not to the purchaser. Similarly, the liability of the purchaser was to the 
trading company rather than to the supplier. The trading company's role was analogous to 
that of an insurance agency. Although the trading company didn't receive insurance 
premiums directly, it was actually in the insurance business and it received commission 
income, usually a small percentage of the value of the transaction. See Chart 52: 
Transaction Flow In Sogo Shosha, following 
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Chart 52: Transaction Flow in Sogo Shosha 
Transaction Flow in Sogo Shosha 
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A recent study by Chee Ng et al. 161 uses SIC code analysis to identify the length of credit 
terms extended by the sogo shosha. It was possible depending on the extent of value chain 
activities - raw materials, manufacturing, wholesale, services and transportation between 
points - that as much as two years of credit was extended by the trading firm, who WHICH 
brokered all of the transactions . 
Importantly, both Jardine, Matheson and the sogo shosha were linked to the associated and 
subsidiary firms in their network as well as to national GOP through trade, through 
investment, through trade credits and through employment. The impact of the six major 
sogo shosha on Japan's GOP was estimated by Sheard at 28% per annum in 1979. 
Jardine, Matheson's contribution to Hong Kong's GOP was 4% in that year, and to 
Singapore 2% and South Africa . 
While the similarities between Jardine, Matheson and the sago shosha were extraordinary, 
the differences are also interesting. Unlike the so go shosha, Jardine, Matheson was in 
business to maximize retained earnings for growth. While the sago shosha did not aim to 
maximize trading profit by buying low and selling high into the market, Jardine, Matheson 's 
basic modus operandi was to comb the market looking for the opportunities with the best 
prospect for high yields. While the sogo shosha was compensated for acting largely as a 
161 
Ng Chee et aI. , "Evidence on the determinants of credit terms used in Inter-firm trade," The Journal of Finance 
(June 1,1999), p. 1118. 
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purchasing agent for a relatively fixed group of long-term clients, for which it received a 
predetermined, volume-based commission or a relatively modest trading profit, Jardine, 
Matheson knew that its share value and market capitalization were critical to draw investors 
to its subsidiary businesses. Chart 53: Sales, Profits, Assets and Margins of the Six 
Largest Sogo Shosha in 1979 - Comparison with Jardine, Matheson's Flnanelals 
reflects differences in the management and measurement styles of Jardine, Matheson and 
the leading shosha. 
Chart 53: Sales, Profits, Assets and Margins of the Six Largest Sogo Shosha In 1979 -
Comparison with Jardine, Matheson's Flnanelals 
Company Sales Profits Assets Net Margin % Employees 
(thousands) 
Mitsubishi 48.325.2 77.4 18.824 0.2 13.0 
Mitsui 44.886.6 54.1 20.964 0.1 13.6 
C.ltoh 35.490.7 10.9 13.614 0.0 9.8 
Marubeni 33.592.6 38.3 14.322 0.1 10.0 
Sumitomo 30.438.9 40.3 8.637 0.1 10.0 
Nissho-Iwai 23.106.8 17.5 8.541 0.1 8.3 
Jardine 14.540.0 99.0 344 6.8 50.0 
Matheson 
During the mid 1970s, the Japanese general trading companies and Jardine, Matheson 
were most similar in their activities, and both were concentrated in the basic sectors of the 
newly industrializing ASEAN economies - metals, fuels, food, fibers, machinery and 
construction. To Jardine. Matheson's advantage, the sogo shosha supplied only the 
Japanese market at this time. That left Jardine, Matheson to explore other Pacific markets 
as well as to deepen its relationship with Hong Kong. 
Jardine, Matheson offered something more to its customers and Investment partners than 
the sogo shosha. While the sogo shosha did relatively little business Involving brand name 
consumer products that required extensive advertising and service, Jardine Matheson built 
an Asian presence and awareness for international brands like Dunhlll, Moet-Hennessy, 
Caterpillar, Sherwin Williams, MacMillan Bloedel. More recently It did the same KFC, Taco 
Bell and Ikea. Its point of differentiation was its superior marketing ability. Jardine, 
Matheson's advertising joint venture, MacMillan Jardine, provided marketing and advertising 
services to a raft of brand names handled by Jardine. 
Chapter 7 continues the discussion of Jardine, Matheson's Internal and external organization 
and its contribution the management of uncertainty. 
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Chapter 6: Section 6: The Internal and External Factors 
Responsible for Jardine. Matheson's Resource and 
Services Choices: A Resource-based Interpretation 
This concluding section of Chapter 6 reviews the internal and external factors responsible 
for Jardine, Matheson's resource/services choices (Question 2) from 1961 to 1996. 
A central theme of this study has been the Resource-based view Jardine, Matheson 
developed a pattern of relationships within and outside the business which would foster the 
flow of information, the knowledge with which to interpret it, the ability to influence others 
and the reputation to attract and retain trading partners. Chapter 6 took an in-depth look at 
the equity-based relationships Jardine, Matheson built with hundreds of firms engaged in a 
cluster of industries to understand how the businesses related to each and the unique role 
they played in their industry. 
From 1972 to 1996, Jardine, Matheson made half as many divestitures as acquisitions, 300 
of which were in broadly horizontal businesses and 500 in vertical businesses. There was a 
significant increase in divestiture activity during the Harvest and Divest period 1978-1984, 
particularly among Jardine's manufacturing and resource acquisitions, but divestment was 
integral to firm strategy throughout the study period. 
Chapter 6 closely tracked Jardine, Matheson's these vertical industry acquisitions and 
divestitures to uncover the relationship if any between businesses within the same industry. 
The firm made 146 investments in the transportation industry, including warehouses, 
container ports, containers, transshipment, airfreight and security services for container 
ports - some 28 four-digit SIC codes in all - across Hong Kong and China, Singapore, 
South Africa, Australia and the Philippines. On average 20% or more of every transaction 
Jardine, Matheson made between 1972 and 1984 derived from transportation services. 
Finance, insurance (major category 60-67) accounted for 198 of the acquisitions Jardine, 
Matheson made during the period. These acquisitions involved some 16 four-digit SIC 
Codes. From the beginning of the decade at 2% of every transaction to the end of the 1970s 
when 29% of every transaction involved financial or insurance services, financing was a 
very important aspect of Jardine, Matheson's service to client and associated firms. The 
firm acted as a retailer of loans, borrowing wholesale at preferential rates and re-Iending the 
money to finance the trade. Because of its intimate customer contact and its insurance-
broking services, Jardine, Matheson had the highest quality credit information on current 
and prospective clients. The firm's cepacity to gather and distribute information was an 
important commodity. 
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In studying the skills associated with Jardine, Matheson core trading, finance, insurance and 
transportation businesses and comparing these skills with the requirements of Jardine, 
Matheson's manufacturing, resource and later retail and other businesses, it is striking that 
Jardine, Matheson's trading and financial services core businesses put a high demand on 
top management, marketing and financial management skills that were transferable across 
the firm's newly acquired businesses. While Jardine, Matheson's manufacturing 
acquisitions relied on low cost labor available in the ASEAN between 1972 and 1977, the 
firm's expansion into new retail and grocery industries in the 1980s required investment in 
industry-specific skills. 
Jardine, Matheson's reasons for divesting its manufacturing and resource acquisitions In the 
late 1970s are not too different from its reasons for divestment - the critical dependencies 
that could provide additional sources of value to the firm, could also destroy value all along 
the value chain. 
For example, the steel product system supplied flexible steel for cladding and decking to the 
transportation (shipbuilding) product system; machinery to both oil and gas as well as sugar 
product systems. The steel product system also supplied piping and aluminum components 
to the oil and gas product system, and the transportation product system supplied 
shotblasting and marine engineering services to that product system. A dramatic example 
of product system interdependencies was the impact of the energy price crisis of 1973 on 
shipbuilding and - domino-like - on the steel industry. 
Jardine, Matheson retreated from manufacturing and focused on services acquisitions about 
five years before this became an acquisition strategy of the international firms studied by 
Khemani whose activities are detailed in this Chapter. 
A Harvard school interpretation would argue that the speCific advantages of Hong Kong and 
the cluster of expatriate competitors clustered there had more influence on Jardine, 
Matheson's resource and service portfolio than the firm's explicit management choices. But. 
as in the early period, Jardine, Matheson was a creator of such clusters of industries within 
a very large industrial district framed by the Pacific, Indian and South Atlantic oceans. 
Jardine, Matheson sought to create hubs very similar to Hong Kong - with deep water ports 
and facilities for finance, insurance and transportation - in Australia, Singapore, South 
Africa and Hawaii. 
While a Chicago view would argue that Jardine Matheson's choice of resources and 
services was based on ownership opportunity - enhanced by the British rule of law in Hong 
Kong, which enabled and protected private ownership, that interpretation would hold only in 
Hong Kong. Elsewhere in the Pacific, the geographic spread of Jardine, Matheson's 
acquisitions 
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and the firm's strategy of pursuing only minority equity holdings does not support that 
interpretation. Instead, the clustering of resources in deep water ports around the Pacific 
created an "industrial district," in the Marshallian sense, where shipping, financing, 
insurance, distribution and marketing were the lingua franca for transportation, oil servicing, 
sugar, leather, textile and other industries in which Jardine, Matheson invested. 
As noted here, the dense network of relationships Jardine, Matheson built with associated 
firms is reminiscent of the Japanese sogo shosha, the general trading company whose 
relationships with firms in the keiretsu were likewise built on trade, equity and credit. 
Jardine, Matheson was compared with the Japanese general trading company, acting as a 
quasi insurance-agent, providing trading and production credits to customer and supplier 
firms and deriving competitive advantage, from a hybrid governance arrangement that was 
neither internalization (vertical integration) nor market governance (commodities purchase in 
the open market). 
Jardine, Matheson was far more interested in potential profits coming from the knowledge of 
its subsidiaries and associates than the government-sponsored sogo shosha. 
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Chapter 6 Charts 
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Chart 25 Table Acquisitions by Industry and 4-digit SIC Codes 
Industry 4.Dlglt SIC Number Ac~ulred 
Oil and gas extraction 1311 4 
Oil and gas field services 1382 7 
Oil and gas field services, not otherwise classified 1389 4 
General Building contractors 1542 2 
Construction other than building construction 1611 13 
Construction - misc. special trade contractors 1799 2 
Food and kindred products - Ice cream and frozen desserts 2024 3 
Food and Kindred Products - Frozen bakery products 2053 1 
Food and kindred products - Sugar cane except refining 2061 7 
Food and kindred products -Candy and other confectionery 2064 1 products 
Food and kindred products - Malt beverages 2082 1 
Food and kindred products - Bottled and canned soft drinks and 2086 2 
carbonated waters 
Food and kindred products - Misc. food preparations 2099 1 
Textile mill products - Yarn spinning mills 2281 1 
Textile mill products - misc. textile~oods 2299 1 
Apparel and other finished products made - misc. apparel and 2389 5 
accessories 
Lumber and wood products - millwork, veneer, plywood and 2431 1 
structural wood 
Lumber and wood products - millwork, veneer, plywood and 2435 1 
structural wood; Hardwood veneer and plY'V'{ood 
Furniture and fixtures - Wood household furniture 2512 1 
Printing, publishing and allied industries - Books, publishing and 2731 1 printing 
Printing publishing and allied industries -Plate making and 2796 1 
related services 
Petroleum and related products - Petroleum refining 2911 1 
Leather and leather products - Men's footwear except athletic 3143 1 
Leather and leather products - luggage 3161 1 
Stone clav, glass and concrete products - cement, hydraulic 3241 2 
Stone clay, alass and concrete products - Clay refractors 3255 1 
Stone clay, glass and concrete products - Abrasive, asbestos 3292 1 
and nonmetallic mineral products 
Primary metal industries - blast furnaces and steel works and 3312 5 
rolling and finishing mills 
Primary metal industries - iron and steel foundries 3325 1 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and transportation 3479 1 
equipment - coating, engraving and allied services 
Machinery, except electrical- Conveyors and conveying 
eQuipment 3535 1 
Machinery except electrical - Elevators and moving stairw~s 3534 9 
Machinery, except electrical - Machine tools metal cutting types 3541 4 
Machinery, except electrical- Food products machinery 3556 1 
Machinery, except electrical; Printing trades machinery and 3555 4 
eQuipment 
Machinery, except electrical; Special industry machinery 3559 4 
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Industry 4-Digit SIC Number Acquired 
Machinery, except electrical - Refrigeration and service industry 3589 2 equipment 
Machinery, except electrical; Industrial and commercial 3599 1 
machinery and equipment 
Electrical and electronic machinery; Telephone and telegraph 3661 1 apparatus 
Electrical and electronic machinery; Electronic coils, 3677 1 transformers and other inductors 
Electrical and electronic machinery; electronic components 3679 3 
Transportation equipment - 3711 2 Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment 
Transportation equipment - misc. transportation equipment 3799 1 
Measuring, analyzing and controlling - Surgical, medical and 3841 7 dental instruments and supplies 
Measuring, analyzing and controlling; Watches, clocks, 3873 1 
clockwork operated devices and parts 
Misc. manufacturing industries; Jewelry, precious metal 3911 3 
Games, tOYS and children's vehicles, exce~t dolls and bicycles 3944 1 
Sporting and athletic goods 3949 1 
Costume Jewelry and Costume Novelties 3961 1 
Motor freight transportation and warehousing - 4222 1 
Motor freight transportation; Terminal and joint terminal 4231 1 
maintenance facilities for motor freJght 
Water transportation; Deep sea foreign trans~rtation of freight 4412 4 
Water transportation of passengers 4499 43 
Transportation by air; scheduled 4512 1 
Transportation by air; air courier services 4513 3 
Transportation by air; nonscheduled 4522 3 
Transportation by air; airports, flying fields and airport terminal 4581 4 services 
Transportation services; travel agencies 4724 9 
Transportation services; tour operators 4725 4 
Transportation services; arrangement of transportation of freight 4731 64 or cargo 
Transportation services;packil}Q and crating 4783 15 
Transportation services; not elsewhere classified 4789 2 
Communication - Telephone communications 4813 1 
Electric, gas and sanitary services; electric services 4911 1 
Electric, gas and sanitary services; Water sUQQ!y 4941 2 
Electric, gas and sanitary services; Sewer~e systems 4952 1 
Electric, gas and sanitary services; Refuse ~stems 4953 1 
Wholesale trade -durable goods; motor vehicles 5012 12 
Wholesale trade - durable goods; automotive supplies and new 5013 2 ~arts 
Wholesale trade - durable goods; furniture and home furnishings 5023 3 
Wholesale trade - durable goods - lumber and other construction 5031 3 
materials 
Wholesale trade - durable goods; PhotographiC equipment and 
sllpplies 5043 1 
Wholesale trade - durable; Medical, dental and hospital 5047 2 
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Industry 4-Digit SIC Number Acquired 
equipment and supplies 
Wholesale trade - durable goods - Metals service centers ad 5051 1 offices 
Wholesale trade - durable goods; Electrical apparatus and 5063 1 e~uiQment, wiring supplies and construction equipment 
Wholesale trade - durable goods; Electronic parts and 5065 1 ~uiQment, not elsewhere classified 
Wholesale goods - durable; Warm air heating and air 5075 5 conditioning equipment and supplies 
Machinery equipment and supplies; Construction and mining 5082 1 (except petroleum) machinery and equipment 
Machinery equipment and supplies; Industrial machinery and 5084 9 ~uiQment 
Machinery, equipment and supplies; Transportation equipment 5088 1 
and supplies, except motor vehicles 
Wholesale jloods - durable; Toys and hobby ooods and supplies 5092 7 
Wholesale goods - durable; Jewelry, watches, precious stones 5094 7 and semiprecious stones 
Wholesale --.aoods; durable, not elsewhere classified 5099 7 
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods; drugs, drug proprietaries 
and druggists' sundries 5122 3 
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods - nondurable goods; 5131 1 ~arel, piece ~oods and notions 
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods; Groceries and related 
products;~eneral line; 5141 1 
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods; Groceries and related 5148 1 products; fresh fruits and vegetables 
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods; Groceries and related 5149 2 ~oducts; not elsewhere classified 
Wholesale trade; Farm-product raw materials 5153 1 
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods; Beer, wine and distilled 
alcoholic beverages 5181 1 
Wholesale trade, nondurable goods; Wine and distilled alcoholic 
beverl!Qes 5182 8 
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods; Tobacco and tobacco 5194 1 
. products 
Wholesale trade - nondurable goods; Paints, varnishes and 5198 3 supplies 
Wholesale trade, nondurable goods; n~ot elsewhere classified 5199 5 
Retail trade; Grocerv stores 5411 16 
Retail trade; Automotive dealers and gasoline service stations; 5511 3 
motor vehicle dealers 
Retail trade; Furniture and furnishings and eauipment stores 5712 2 
Retail trade; Misc. Furniture and furnishi~s stores 5719 1 
Retail trade; Eatino and drinkif!9..Qlaces 5812 10 
Retail trade; Dn.Jgstores and ~r~rietaJY stores 5912 2 
Retail trade; Hobby, toy and game sho~s 5945 5 
Deposito"'!y institutions' Commercial and stock savinas banks 6021 1 
D~ository institutions; commercial banks 6022 8 
Depository institutions; commercial banks not elsewhere 6029 2 classified 
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Industry 4-Dlglt SIC Number Acquired 
Savings Institutions 6036 1 
Business credit institutions; short-term 6153 1 
Business credit institutions; miscellaneous 6159 3 
Mortgage bankers and brokers and loan correspondents 6162 1 
Mortgage bankers and brokers; loan brokers 6163 5 
Security and commodity brokers and dealers; Security brokers, 6211 17 dealers and flotation companies 
Security and commodity brokers and dealers; commodity 6221 7 contracts brokers and dealers 
6289 6 
Insurance; Life insurance 6311 4 
Insurance; Pension, health and welfare funds 6399 2 
Insurance; Insurance carriers 1 
Insurance; Insurance agents 6411 86 
Real estate; Operators of nonresidential buildings 6512 31 
6519 2 
Real estate; agents and managers 6531 3 
Real estate; Subdividers and developers 6552 5 
Holding and other investment offices 6712 3 
Holding and other investment offices; offices not elsewhere 6719 126 classified 
Holding and other investment offices; Unit investment trusts 6726 6 
Holding and other investment offices; Trusts 6733 9 
Holding and other investment offices; Patent owners and lessors 6794 2 
Holding and other investment offices; real estate investment 6798 7 trusts 
Holding and other investment offices; investors 6799 1 
Hotels, rooming houses, camQ and other 10c!.9.ing places 7011 30 
Personal Services; Miscellaneous, not elsewhere classified 7299 1 
Business Services; Advertisill9 7311 1 
Business Services; Building cleaning and maintenance services 7349 3 
Business Services; News syndicates 7359 5 
Business Services; help supply services 7363 2 
Business Services; computer and data processing services 7372 1 
Business Services; computer related, not elsewhere classified 7379 2 
Business Services; Detective,.Jtuard and armored car services 7381 2 
Business Services; Security systems services 7382 7 
Business services; not elsewhere classified 7389 8 
Automotive repair, services and ; passenger car leasing 7515 1 
Automotive repair, services and~arages; automobile parking 7521 1 
Automotive repair, services and garages; tire retreading and 
repair shops 7534 2 
Automotive repair, services and garages; general automotive 
r~air shops 7538 1 
Automotive repair, services and garages; automotive services 7549 1 
except repair and car washes 
Miscellaneous repair services; refrigeration and air conditioning 
r~air 7623 1 
Motion picture and TV distribution services; Video tape rental 7841 1 
El}gineering, Architectural and Surveyi~ Services; engineering 8711 6 
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Industry 4-DIglt SIC Number Acquired 
services 
Engineering, Architectural and Surveying Services; Surveying 8713 1 
Engineering, Architectural and Surveying Services; Commercial 8732 2 
economic, sociological and educational research 
Management and Public Relations Services; Management 8741 4 services 
Management and Public Relations Services; Management 8742 14 consultina 
9280 1 
Nonclassifiable establishments 9999 55 
Other 37 
Total 949 
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lYPES OF SKILLS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Skill. 
Freight, stock,and materials moving 
Able seamen, ordinary seamen 
Captains and pilots 
All other material, moving equipment operators 
All other food preparation and service workers 
lIiIates, Ship, boat and barge 
Ship Engineers 
Blue collar worker supervisors 
All other helpers, laborers and material 
movers, hand 
Industrial truck and tractor operators 
lIiIalntenance repairers , general utility 
General omce clerks 
All other transportation and material moving 
equipment operators 
CommUnications, transport, and utilities 
operations manager 
BOOkkeeping, acct. and auditing clerks 
Industrial machinery mechanics 
All other sales and related workers 
Secretaries, except medical and legal 
Tramc, shipping and receiving clerks 
General managers and top eKecutlves 
. Crane and tower operators 
Small engIne specialists 
Billing, cost and rate clerks 
All other service worker. 
Cashiers 
All other cleaning and building service workers 
All other engIneer. 
TrUCk drivers, light and heavy 
All other mechanic., Installers and repairers 
Welder. and cutter. 
Accountant. and auditors 
Service station attendant. 
All other clerical and admln. support workers 
All other managers and administrators 
GUarda 
Dlapatchers, except fire, police and ambulance 
Riggers 
Bus and truck mechanics and diesel engine 
Specialist. 
All other management support workers 
lIiIoblle heavy eqUipment mechaniCS 
Financial Manager. 
Carpenters 
PaInters and paperhangers, construction 
and maintenance 
lIiIarketlng and sales worker supervisors 
PayrOll and timekeeping clerks 
lIiIarketlng, advertising and p .r. managers 
Stock clerks 
All other professional workers 
Administrative services managers 
Personnel, training and labor relations manager 
Source: Industry/Skills Matrix, OES Data 
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lYPES OF SKILLS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE Security & Fire. "'ariu8. Hotels. rAOIOf Wdtef CONTROL : COIHROl : CONTROL : 
Skills F.eight Trans"ort Wholesale Retail 
Commodity Com,nelcial Casual ty LodUiluJ Dairy Vehicle S UJlllly& lel c ofllu,S Drugs Electric 
Water 
Arrangement Trade Trade E)(chan(IOs Banks: Insurance Placos P.oducts Deale,s Sanitation Services Transpon 
61 Production, planning and expedltJng clerks 
033 (I :06 OS:; 
0" ' 
62 079 
og n¥ n I'll ' -
Inspectors, testers, gntder. and precision 021 
53 Electricians 02 
o c7 o 1 ~ 
64 Painters, transportation equipment o 17 
65 PUrchasing aoentll, except wholesale, retail 
0 17 (I 17 
and fann products a 16 
66 Personnel, training and labor relations specialist a 16 
57 
os 
Hoist and winch operators a 16 
58 06 057 059 
0'9 (119 
Database administrators, computer support o 14 o 15 
69 
"peclalists and all other computer scientists 
All other technicians a 15 
60 
1 5. 
Baggage porters and bellhops 013 
61 056 057 254 
211 094 
Computer programmer. 013 
62 105 05 
07 ' 0= -1 
PurChasing managers o 13 
63 0 4 1 031 03 1 ~5 
1 67 lin 1 r.! 
System" analysts 013 
64 19.22 ~ 
073 o q3 
65 
All other sales and related workers 3 .58 3 ,38 4.73 05 1 1 78 4 ,19 4 .49 
General ornce clerks 
66 Order fillers, wholesale and retail sales 
295 3 .12 
67 25 3 .6 3 
o 4S 089 21.33 0""-' 
68 
Salespersons, retail Igq 0 41 n 19 1 ~c, 
All other assemblers, fabricators and hand 
69 
wOrkers 191 1 57 4 .26 4 .99 103 087 202 :! )1 , 7-
Clerical supervllors and managerl 4 .93 
- " 
70 ~09 188 9 .9 4 
6 .37 059 o 15 OM 
71 
Order clerks, materials, merchandise and service ~06 , 1 71 09 
6 .45 ~ 76 S ;i 
All other helpers, laborers and material 
72 
mOYers, hand 1]<' 1100 
Electrtcal and electronic technicians and 
7J 
teChnologists 13 07 1 
74 Wholesale and retail buyers, expect rarm products 1:'4 
76 Ornce machine and cash raglster services 119 1 44 
3 .62 
76 Hand packers and packagers 1013 033 
1 7_ ~ i 7 
Maintenance repairers, general utility 0 46 17 101 o ~ I 1 75 
074 023 o =,G o ~ 1 
Receptionists and Information clerks 1~ 4 .57 78 096 6 .32 094 
79 
Oriverlsales workers 074 6 .32 UG3 077 n j':' 0,"7 1 .. '1 
Adjustment Clerks ~ 17 
90 (169 1 28 
3.38 033 
.:' ~4 
All other machine operators, tenders, setters 
81 and set-up operator. 066 
82 Data proceSSing equipment repairers 063 0 44 023 
0 4: 078 o 7f, 
83 
Bill and account collectors 8 .82 
84 Securities and finanCial services sales workers 6 .39 
1 26 
85 
BrOkerage clerks I 34 : 1 12 035 I ~3 
03-1 
86 Data entry keyer. , except composing 073 0" 1 14 
a ,,~ n 57 
87 Computer operators except peripheral equipment 07 08 
ea 
Economlats 063 066 o 7q 
Mall clerks, except mall machine operators 025 89 037 059 03 1 
0 46 
90 DUPlicating, mall and other omce machine openttors 056 1 0 1 
1 07 
91 
Lawyers 055 n 1 ~ 
92 Public relations specialists and publicity writers U 48 
031 
93 
Statistical clerks (1 48 a 4 ~ n 2<;l n B~ 
94 Engineering, science and computer systems mgrs. o 1& 043 036 
0,1] 074 
SWitChboard operators o 15 o 3~ n :'4 96 039 O~ 
067 
96 Personnel training and labor rei specialists oJCt 
97 
Credit checkers n36 
98 BUdget Analvsts o 1:'- n :~t 
( , l ,c, 
99 
Correspondence clerks 
036 0_'8 
:! ..:1,;. 
File clerks 
100 Statement clerks 
O:!6 11 1 
101 Bank teUers 
11_'" 27 .27 
SOurce: Industry/Skills Matrix, OES Data 
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TYPES OF SKILLS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Skills 
1Cl2 Ele trt 103 AII~ · .. cal an~ ~Iectronlcs enQI",jlers . ... . ..... 
ther matenal recording, scheduling and distribution 
wOrl<ers 
COmputer engineers 
Credit analysts 
Legal s.cr.taries 
All other communications equipment operators 
Manag.ment analysts 
Insurance sales work.rs 
All other legal assistants, incl. Law clerks 
Loan omcers and counselors 
N.w accounts clerks, banking 
Loan and credit cl.rks 
.Janitors and cl.aners, incl. Maids, houseke.ping 
Loan interviewers 
M •••• ng.rs 
Billing, posting and calcula.tlng machine operators 
Manaiement analysts 
P.ripherai computer equipment operators 
Typists, Incl. Word procnslng 
Operations res.arch analy.ta 
R.servatlon and transportation tlck.t ag.nts 
::r~igherS, measurers, check.rs, samplers 
oth.r material moving equipment operators 
Automotive m.chanlcs 
Insurance adJust.rs, .xamlners Investigators 
Insuranc. policy processing cl~rI<. 
Underwrlt.rs 
Claims examln.rs, prop.rty and casualty 
Insurance claims clerks 
All oth.r adjust.rs and inv.stlgators 
Personnel clerks, except payroll 
Paral.gals 
Correspond.nc. clerks 
;oin and v •. n.ding machine servicers, repair.rs 
ood prepsratlon worl<ers 
P
FoOd counter, fountain and related worker. 
harmacy technicians 
~ackaglng and filling machine operators and tenders 
ooks, short order and fast food 
Artists and commercial artists 
~ewlng machine operators, garment 
eslgners, exc.pt Int.rlor designers 
PrOcur.ment cl.rI<. 
Home appliance and power tool repslr 
Counter and r.ntal cl.rks 
Administrative service. manag.rs 
Walt'n! and waltres.e. 
Hot.1 d.sk clerks 
COoks, restaurant 
Dining room and caf.teria attendants bar helpers 
AmUsement and recreation attendan~ 
Bartenders 
Water 
Transport 
104 
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110 
111 
112 
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116 
117 
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166 
167 
FOod ServiCe and lodging managers 
Institutional cleanlnl! supervisors 
~aundry and drycleaning machine operators and tenders, ex. Pressing 
ardeners, nursery workers and laborers , landscaping, grounds 
Source: Industry/Skills Matrix, OES Data 
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TYPES OF SKILLS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Skills 
Hosts and hostesses, restaurant, lounge, cotree shop 
Tax drivers and chautreurs 
Recreation workers 
Parking lot attendants 
Cooks, Institution or cafeteria 
Detectives and InveStigators, exc. Public 
Painters and paperhangers, construction and maintenance 
Dairy proceSSing equipment operators, lncl. Setters 
~I other precision food and tobacco workers 
Science and mathematics technicians 
Industrial production managers 
Machine feeders and otrbearers 
Water 
Transpon 
Extruding and forming machine setters, operators and tenders 
Crushing and mixing machine operators and tenders 
Separating and stili machine operators and tenders 
Cannery workers 
Vehicle washers and equipment cleaners 
Cutting and slicinng machine operators and tenders, food, tobacco 
Bus and truck mechanics and diesel engine specialists 
Mechanical engineers 
Heat , air c.ondltlonlng and refrigeration mechanics and Installers 
Carpenters --
Chemists 
Stationary engineers 
Painters, transportation equipment 
Service station attendants 
Refuse collectors 
Water and liquid waste treatment plant and system operators 
Meter readers, utilities 
Customer service representatives, utilities 
Power generating and reactor plant operators 
All other engineering technicians and technologists 
Welder. and cutters 
PlUmbers, pipetitters and steamfitters 
Grader, bulldozer and scaper operators 
Pipelayers and plpelaylng fitters 
CiVil engineers, Incl. Tratflc engineers 
Mobile heavy equipment mechanics 
Geologists, geophYSiCists and oceanographers 
Telephone and cable TV line Installers and repairers 
Central Office and PBX Installers and repairers 
StllJlon installers lind repairers, telephone 
Electrical powerllne Installers and repairers 
Electrical and electronics engineers 
Biological SCientists 
Engineering, science and computer systems managers 
Crushing and mixing machine operators and tenders 
Agricultural and food sclentlsts 
Medical scientists 
Source: Induslry/Skills MatriX. OES Data 
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086 
083 
0 7 
02 
o 1':l 
o Ib 
o 15 
015 
Motor 
Vehicle 
Dealers 
6.16 
0% 
o ].:j 
Water 
SU1I "ly& 
Sanitation 
o 4b 
~ 44 
034 
028 
15.35 
3.79 
I 3~ 
1 25 
089 
Uti') 
nfl, 
o 5~ 
049 
024 
a 2~ 
(1 21 
n 16 
CONTROL : 
Telcolllll1s 
4 .95 
9.23 
12.31 
6.62 
4 .05 
CONTROL: 
Drugs 
I S"< 
1 78 
3.68 
4.69 
~ 15 
1&9 
1 41 
CONTROL : 
[Iectrie 
Services 
4.24 
Chart 34 Jardine, Matheson Market Presence: Hong Kong, 1972-1996 
Bualne •• SIC Are. 
FI',.nea 
Code 1972 1973 1974 1976 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1986 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1996 
Proporty & 'IiVOSt.no". Socurltlus 6 7 6 4 .. 3 6 6 6 .. 4 ti 6 " " 
2 7 2 2 
" " Dtan,onds 2 
" " 
6 6 4 7 
" " 
J 7 2 3 • 7 b J " 
, 
" " Tr.dlng , , , 0 
Manag_n,on, & Mark •• lng 3 3 .. .. 3 2 .. .. 
" 
, , 0 0 
Security S.rvlce 
" 
.. 2 , 
" " " " Shl,) chano, In9 
, , , , , , , , , , 
, 
J.""""ol'Y Mfg_ 
, , , , , , , 
" Shl,l o,,",,"I"U 2 2 2 2 2 2 U 
Shl,:. Oper.tluu 7 2 2 6 7 8 G 0 
Ship Manage., .... 1 
, 0 
Engln .... lng , , 
, , , , , U 7 
h,.u".nce Braking Z 6 6 6 6 
" 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
R.a' !:t'lt'_ 2 2 
" " 
6 7 6 7 
" 
7 6 .. 3 2 , , 
" 
, 
Property Services 
, 
" 
9 8 6 6 6 7 
" 
3 
" 
3 7 2 7 0 
, 
Oeposlts & t:lCchango tI,oker 
, 
Holding , , , 
" " 
, , , U 
f 0];' t:xpon. & H.adlos 7 7 7 4 6 .. 3 0 
Offi ce Partitioning Z 
" 
:l 2 
" 
U 
Share ReUI .... ,.. , , , 0 
FI ... Alann Sywue.ns , , , 
, 
Cont.l"e .. Reconditioning 
, , , 0 
Hospital Claanln9 2 0 
P,.ctOU1t & S.tnl Precloua 
, 0 
ManUfactur'nl) ( Stool) 0 
Cu ....... u.o..,. , 0 
Co"talne, SaMe •• 0 
tlotel. , , 1 1 1 1 
Air C hane, Ops 2 2 2 0 2 ;) 
" 
2 2 
" 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
All- Cargo FO~.fllln!J , , , , , , , 1 1 1 
, 
Cargo ........ lIlIng & Storago 0 
Air Cargo Tern.lnal 0 
ConvenUon Center- ""'9 n U 1 
, 
Elect"onlc Ca,npanle. Mfg . 
, 0 
AI,pon Servlcea D 
01 ••. TV rll .. ,. , 1 
Cornottltv O .. oklng , 0 
,:or .... P .. ot1ucta 1 0 
Conu"erclal Cleaulng , , , 2 0 
TV Rental. , , , , 0 
E'.vato,.. 2 2 2 2 2 0 
Airport Security , 1 , , , 1 , 1 
Wiltc h Pa ..... Mfg . , , , n ~ ~ 
Flnr.t,.ntllr. PI"UnO , 0 
R ... I\II¥ .... Mfg . , , 1 0 
C":nn.~ln" .. o .. ,.nt 2 , 0 
Water To ...... , , R 
Eloct .. onlc Mfn . , , , 0 
" Panalon & PrDv'dont Fund , 2 0 
Publishing 0 
Co .... ructlon 0 
Ca, Park 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 
0 ... 11 .... 1" ' .. V_tOle .... , , , 0 
011 Induat.ry SUp,)llea , , , 0 
011 Equl"n, .... , 0 
~::~:~e ~II ellul,.n"lont Opera.h"ll, 0 
O«.ho .. : S:~: ~:=:: ~'-ne"~hlp 0 , , 0 Gannont Mfg. perat on , , 0 
E'Octrlc Motor. , 0 
Wa ••• DI •• )oaat Sftrv 0 
R., •• 1r & Delivery . , , 0 
T .. anaport SI'.clall.talMolor 01.- 0 
~:~~r:'~aa.::!~~~"D , 0 
~::::::'a~.!fnUD'" Dlspoa,-1 0 
~~'7e~~:~~:::'CO'd a 'orago 
, 
" , , 
HK Electric 
, ~ 3 :J :I 3 3 .. .. 
~hlppln9 Ago .... 0 
Medical SUI'pll •• 
, 0 
" 
, 1 1 II 
Compu ••• SO~a.e , , 0 
G.ound Handll"g Survlce 
O •• tlce' Prod .. ~ 
0 
OrU9810,O. 
" Conv.nl.nco Sto,e. 1 11 
'nU . Movement of V.aluahlos 
F"',nlcur. ReC.llln!) 
" Coq»orac& In'Olligonce , 
All Cu,uIIUuul"U (C hi" .. , 0 
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Chart 36 Jardine, Matheson Market Presence: Singapore, 1972-1996 
Bualne .. SIC A ... Code 1972 1973 1914 1915 1976 1911 19i9 i980 :;981 1982 1993 1994 1985 1996 1997 1999 1999 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1979 Oi.mond T.ading 
.... dlul.& Sdentific: 
OU Industry Supplies & SerYices 
011 Rig 8.okln9 
UgrnL Oillt InlaleAs 
<:onfectlon.'Y 
Denial Supplies 
Uoney Braking 
Engln •• ring & AYi .. ion 
Uer~ant Banking 
Holding 
1~lance 
S".I Pr.d .... UI, . 
Commodity B,akln9 
.... nn. (ngln,.,lng Contrilctors 
Shlpbulhling .nd Engln.ering 
Television Renta' 
Elevato, Sa' .. & 'nst .. U.,ion 
ShodllastJng 
Propel1y 
VnselMgml 
O.llnl & Winch Tlading 
"I$II'.oce 
Containe, F,e ighl Shltion 
Ship Owning 
Roadl,aM. Holding (l=h.etwayq 
UtlllryFu,n 
T extil, Impof1s. Gaun,n' Manf. 
ProJet1 119m. & ConsttuCllon 
TV Rent,l 
Ho ... Supplies 
Suglt HlfYfttIEqulpmlnl Mfg_ 
Sdenllnc Equlpmenl 
V,hklelu ... Fin (f"'IWays) 
T,.cUng 
R_Olsp. 
T'~nsport (fleetwllyst 
Security Service {FI •• twaysa 
Commodity Braking 
Entlneering, 
W.,ch &J .... ,ry 
AJrCf.ft S.les, Hire & SIIMdng 
Custorn Agents 
Finance 
Supenn.tkelS 
Restaurants 
UOIOf Oktribllfion 
AI"leI9'" 
Notes: Insurllnce .. A Hoffman 46\ 00 
All. I vi . , HOc at 10' " In 1916 In 1917. Jardine Insurllnce Bloke,s est &1100\ 
r .. "9 prol1.ny In 1987, JM ell"'. buk In ,,,. whh 60.,. ownership In Colllen, J.rdlne . . 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 1912 1974 Own 1916 Own 1979 Own 1919 Own 1990 Own 1985 Own 1996 Own 
SlIhsldl.ries 
Al:aacla1 •• I~ 18 JO 22 27 19 
II 5 
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Chart 37 Jardine, Matheson Market Presence: Philippines, 1972-1996 
Business SIC 
Area Code 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 . 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Insurance 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 2 1 1 1 0 Sugar Milling 3 3 3 j 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 
Industrial Machinery Mfg. 1 1 2 2 1 0 
Air Cond & TV Mfg. 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Machinery Dis1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Asbestos Cement Products Mfg. 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 
Ship Building & Repair 1 1 1 0 
Cocunl;lt & By-products 1 1 1 1 0 
.. .... ... ..... ' . 
Ooth/ng & Wearing Apparel ... , .... - ... , ........ ' .. 1 f ·· 1 0 
Holding & Mgmt. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Hotels 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Timber Trading 1 1 2 2 0 
Machine Tools 1 0 
TV Rental 1 0 
Finance 1 0 
Transportation (Shipping Agents) 0 
" ....... " 
.................. - ... -.. 
100% 100% 100% 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 Own 1982 own 1987 1992 1996 Own . 
SUbsidiary 5 7 7 7 7 0 7 2 j : 2 2 0 Associates 5 10 9 11 19 3 1 1 2 
..... .. 
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Chart 38 Jardine, Matheson Market Presence: South Africa" 1974-1979 
............................................... 
iArea 
: Outdoor Equipment 
:Luggage .. . 
:~~~y.~.~.c:).~i~g .. ~t:-ippi~.g ... 
:Hotel 
iGarage !Whoi·es·aiing·· ................. . 
: Container Freight Handling 
· ~p'J.~~ fa~t:-ilJ.f.I.r.u.tfg· ..... 
• Securi~ & Courier Service 
!I~~th~.~ .. P.r.~·.~~~.Mtg.·...··. 
jTravel& Shipping Service 
: Pailet & Wooden Container 
:Plant Hire 
·SelfOrlveTruc"·Hlre ... . .......... :. 
I·fr.~·ig.·~.~.··f.~.·~~.r.~.i·~g.·.·.·.·.·.· .. ·.·.·.·.· ............................................................  
Aircraft Owning & Chartering 
• Bulk HandlingTermlnal 
• <:::()~~~rI1i~g"F.i~~~c~~g ..... 
: Holding & Mgmt 
·~~~c.~i.~~liv~ry$.~ril.i·~~···.······ 
:Abnormal Load Trans. 
i Insurance Claims 
.~~~t.I~~~c:.~JJ..r.'J.~if.l.g.:. ..:.. . :. . .. 
.~J:lc:)I!~.,Q~~~IJ.'.lr.JqlJipl!'.:tn.t,~pt:tf"t ..... 
:~~p 1~~I.fJr.~J.:tc.:t.P.J~~.f.lin.g .. ....... .... . . 
:.p.r.~p~~ .......................................................... . 
·Transport & Warehousing 
·Shipping 
.Uquor Stores 
.·Wine&SpiritS .................... . 
il.~·~a..~~t~.~~··.· .. 
.1V. Rental. 
: Shipping Agents 
Finance 
..................•...•..••.•.•.•.•........ '" ............................. ~ .. 
1974 .1·975 •..... ·1976:1977 
1 
1 
. ...............•...•.......•...... ~ 1:1··· 
.•.•.•.......•....•....•....•.•....................•....... ~ ..... . 
. ...................... :- .. . 
1: 1: 
1 1 
1 
........ - .... ~ ... 
J: 1· 
1 i .............. : .... 1: 
·······11 2: 
2: 2: 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 ~ .......... t ... . 
......jJ 1: 1 
.. . ......... :.2. J ...... ····?I 2 
2: 2: 1 
f 1 1 
1: ........ 1 .. 1 
······················· ........ ?f. 2· 6 
1: ....... .......jJ ..... ·::f·· 
.1': 1: 
l' f 
.jJ 
........................... Ji. 
• 1 : 
.. ..... ············ .. ·1: 
1. 
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1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1978 1979 
2 
Chart 39: Jardine, Matheson Market Presence: Australia, 1972-1996 . 
. _ E:lU.~il'l.e.ss SIC 
... 
. 19S7 .. 1988 Area Code i972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 - 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1986 1986 1989 1990 1991 1992" 1993 1994 1996 1996 
Holding l ' 3 5' 0 
Propeny 11 12 0 ' 2 I . 
Insurance 4 3· J 2 ' 
Container freight Sta 
Siolp OWlling 
" 
0 
Road Trails lloldln9 (FleelWaysJ 
Utility Fum. 
Textile hllpor1$. Ga"nelll "'0111. 1 0 
Project "'ymt & COllstruction 0 
TV Rellt.1 2 1: 0 
HOlel Supplies 1 1 
Sugar HaN. Etlulp. Mtg. l' 0 
Scl.lltiflc Equipment 1; 0 
Vehicle L •••• Fill. (FleelWays) I ' 
Trading l ' 0 
Refuse Dlop . 1 0 
Transportation (Fl88twaysJ 2 , 1 n 
S.curlty Servo (FI •• IWays) 1 1 1: 0 
-. !=~Itl"'~tI''Y. . ~r.o.k!!'9 ..... _. _ .... 
-' . ' .. 
.0_ .. 
-. E.~91~e~r'!!YIFI"et. f.or.geJ... ...... 1 . .1. . ..... 0, ."".". 
W.lch and Jewelry 
... 1- 0 
AlrCfah Sal .... Hlr. & Servicng 
" 
0 
CU&lom Agents 1 1 - 0 
t:1!lance 2 2 2 I.: 
Supermarkets 1 1 1 
Restaurants 2 2 
MOlo. Olslrihutloll n 
Airfreight 
~tes: I"s"'once _ A. liotrmon. Assoc at 46\\ 10100\\ In 1976. In 1977, J.rdlne IlIsur.llce Broke~ est. at 100110 
or leavlllg prollerty In 1901. JM como back Itt 1994 with 60 110 ownership III Colliers. Jarrllne. 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1972 1974 : Own ' 1975 Own 1978 Own 1979 Own 1980 Own 1985 Own 1989 Own 
Suhsldlarles U 10 30 22 2T 19 0 6 5. 
Assucla188 9' 11 5 2 0 
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Chart 41: Jardine Matheson's Contribution to GOP 
JARDINE, MATHESON - cQ~I~~E.=Jl..JTI9~ .. I9GDP 
· US$MILLIONS 
..... ; .................................. ;
......... ··1977. US$M···· ··%GDP, ..... ··1970 1980 %GDP 
.·S~··Afiica····, ······················5 %J ....... ·.·.??Q;~~I ••••....•••.••.•••••• ?%........ . ......... ·6%·.· .• · ••.•••• ~i~.$Q .. · •.•••••••••••••••••••. 3% 
.~t.'~c:JP.f:!.]~J}~~~~~L... 5%· 258.75: 
• N.A. . ........... !~.}.~~~~~.... .......... ...... ........ 15%t!~ .• ?$i . 
!\.~~ralasi ......!~.. 309.33: ··················2% .... J~~~~~L 
·S.E.A...... 4% j...jt~~!~L 2DJ.a...: .. ~% .. ~1Q.~~ 2% 
.~~~.~~ ..... .. .. ]~:}~~~~~ . ...1?~t:i.?t·QQ .... 
· ME.... ..... ..............t:i.~.?t:i.~.~~.. 9%..~~~.1~ .. 
HK ~r~· 1~~~.Q~ 3% 45% 2328.75: 4% 4% 
· i r 
legend!............ ! .. .. . .. . .. L 
Australasia = Australia and New Zealan( • 
.• ~.:~: •• ~:~~:t~~:~~'r:a81~i8 .••• ~hilippine~Sing8Pore •.•• fh~iland.~ie:n8~.····· 
··H~~~r.ic··e.~:~~:~'.lg~:·:r~~~s from··PaCific.commerce GPP from UN StatisticafVearbook .............. . 
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Chart 42: Comparison of Jardine, Matheson with Competitions, Contribution to GOP and Added ValUe 
: : 
CONTRIBUTION TO HONG KONG GOP - JARDINE, MATHESON AND COMPETITORS 
. (US$MILLIONS) 
...... ~arc:Jifle,Math~ts()n I-ilJ~c:tlilS()n'fllttlll1'lp()~ First Pacific CITIC Pacific 
Turnover AV GOP Turnover Tumover AV GOP Turnover AV GOP Turnover AV GOP 
1913 164.15 5.1 
1914 301.68. 5.5 
1915 381.16 5 4.1 
1916 515.45 3.2 .. 
JW!... 513.89 5.1 .. 
1918 ·672:01·· 5.4 .. ~.9 . 
... .... .. 1?!9 ............ ·..·74324 ········5~5·.. 3.4 514.36 .. 1.9 
1980 .... ·········1454 . ······'2:5 .. ··· .. ····3.5 ......... ····64fLiis* ······1:9 
1981 . 1628 1.1 4 901.19 .. 2.5 
1982 1459.14 .0.0035 4.1 103j.14 .. 2.1 
1983 1368 1.1 4.B 1314.23 .. 3.8 
1984 1136 -10.1 3.5 1558.02 .. 4 
1985 .1344 3.9 3.9 1178.2 " 4.3 
1986 1352.12 2.3 3.3 2156.31 .. U 
19811631 5.9 3.3 2619:01·· 29 U ........1~ ..... .... . ··189'7 26 3.2 3260.12 :iii ·4.6 
1989 ........... ·············..4S3iiX B.5 6.9·....4S8itif "15:' .. ·····if 
1990 6034.5 3.4 B.ol 4145.19 4.5' 4.6 
1991 1190.2 3.6 B.36 4jli6.05 111.2 4.2 
1992 1899.5 4.1 1.8 5055.06 2B.2 4.1 
1993 8424.5 B.7 1.2 529389 38 7 
1994 ·9559 6.1 1.2 6·,85' .'32 3. 2O.B 3.8 
.. ;: ............ ... . ... ;j~~ ....... o~~~ ......... ii~O:......::~:~~~.9~~it: 
1991 11521jf" ................... ,-.................................................................... '" ":" ................... . 
911.79 .. 
"1366.75' ....... 44 
1612.07 1,. 
2264'''38 . 
2074 13 
2463 16. 
2695 22· 
3202 53.3 
3903 5.5· 
4531 2.2. 
8114"2 
*Informatlon unavailable • 
• GOP: UN Statistical Yearbook 
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2.1 
2.4 
2.5 
3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.4 
2.4 
2.6 
3.3 
5.1 
957.995 
980.9 .... 1J~~ .... 
. ... ······· .. '622.9 0~036. 
1984.8 .0.08 
2424.4 1.9 
2186.9 2.1 
3084.4 6.1 
3681.9 1.3 
5249.1 1.4 
1025.1 "9.5 ...... . 
1.9 
1.6 
2.4 
2.6 
2.8 
2.1 
2.6 
2.8 
4.2 
4.8 
3145.5 
1537.33 
1090.144 
1498.52 
1514.415 
1238.83 
·'656.62 
394 
46 
95 
30 
14.2 
.. i1 
3.7 
1.6 
0.09 
1.1 
1 
0.09 
1 
Wheelock 
Turnover AV GOP 
286.38 
289.1 
315.96 
.. 302.71 
158.41 
743 
10 
-13.5 
113 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
At'l.ul.riJI; 
Flr.m bt~ustry 
Category 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
\I 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
'" 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Source: MAUll Report dau 
Indust!v Codes 
I. A;ricultun 
2. Forestry 
2 
3 FislWt; uu\ Tl'IJI,iJI; 
: . ~.s,.Q~! ()~w.~~ 
• ~ood .udB~ra;e .. 
6. Tobacco Pnducls 
7. Rubber 
2 
Chart 43: Jardine, Matheson and Company Compared to Global Firms, Trends in Mergers 'and Acquisition, 1972-1974 
3 4 5 
0 0 4 
Acq"il'ed Firm btdustl'y Catt~ory 
6 7 
0 
8. Leaflter 
9. Texti1es 
10. Knittin; Mills 
.I1. :~.1o~. 
12. Wood 
., .... 
2 
13. Furniture :uul Fixtures 
14. Paper 
IS. Pl'illtin&, P1IIIlishi!lc 
8 9 
2 
10 11 12 
0 4 
. 13 14 15 
0 
16. Prilllary Metal 
17. Metal Fahl'icalillc 
18. Machillery 
..... I~.:r.I:a:nsP .. ~.tio.Ilf:rlI1ip~nt . 
. 20. Dec~ical Pnducls 
21.Non·JI\etalllc Milleral Products 
.22. Petrvlewn lIId Coal Pnducts 
23. CheJllicais aJId CheJllical Products 
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16 17 18 19 20 ~1 22 23 24 25 26 
""":" ',1"'"":;::::' ., .'. 1 \?:: $ ' 
0 5 0 0 0 4 3 36 
24. Miscellueous MaJtwactwi.n: 
25. Constl'llction 
26. TraJIS{Iortation, CollUftwricatioll. Utilities 
27. Trade 
28. FlIIlIIre, lnsUJ'lIIce. Red &tate 
29. COllUftwrity, B\lSines~ 01' Ptl'SOllal Selvites 
27 28 29 (Total) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
::/$ ":" ,';' 5S' 2ii 183 
0 
3S 58 ~o 183 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
11 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
15 
26 
n 
it 
29 
0 
So....,.: AM.al Report uta 
Industry Codes 
I" Ac;rinllurt 
2. r .... sh)' 
3 FislWt; and Tnninc 
4. Mboe" QIWTJbIc, Oil W.ns 
5. F ••• u' B .... "". 
6. THoen ProdllCts 
7, Rllhhor 
Chart 44: Jardine, Matheson and Company Compared to Global Firms, Trends in Mergers and Acquisition, 1975-1977 
3 5 
8 
0 o 8 
Acquired Fin .. bttIUSbJ Cate,ory 
6 7 
!F 
5 0 
~ . Leatker 
9. T.xtIles 
I O.lWttiJo; Mills 
II. ClatlWo; 
12. W." 
0 
13. F1Il'IIl1urt ud Fixtures 
14.P"or 
15. PriII~ , Pwblishiac; 
9 10 
.... , t.~. v.'" 
0 
II 12 
:;.~: 2 
0 
13 14 IS 
i" ,'. 
4 0 0 0 
16, Primal), Metal .. 
17. M.tal Fabrlratbc 
18. Machinery 
19. Tn1ISportation Equipment 
20, DtelJical Produtts 
21.Non·metallk MlneI"Sl Produtts 
22 . P.trole_ .... Coal Products 
~ 
23 . Cholllicals .... Chelllical Preducts 
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16 I i 
2 
18 19 20 
2 4 2 
~ 
11 
3 
0 0 
24. Mise.nanoous Muufaelwin; 
25. CO"'''"'OOIl 
26. Tt'allSJloluoon, Commwrlcatioll, Utilitios 
21 . Tnd. 
28. Finne •. lnsw'2IIC', Rnl Estalf 
29 . C ...... 1IJIity, Bus"' .... r Pu .... a! Setvie. s 
26 27 
4 48 
4 48 
~8 
2 .. 48 30 
~4 48 30 
(fotal) 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
189 
0 
189 
Chart 45: Jardine, Matheson and Company Compared to Global Firms, Trends in Mergers and Acquisition , 1978-1979 
Ac\uUiJt; 
Finn "'","Sby AcquUd Finn Iltdustry Cotf~ory 
Colo;ol')' 
2 3 5 6 7 8 9 
.. 
67 
5 40 
6 
7 5 
8 2 
9 9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 '''j 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 2 
24 I ' 
25 
26 3 
27 4 5 2 28 2 
.. ".~ ...... ';~ 
~. ~~·.·N .... """';::<" ..... 0.::-: .~ 
29 4 
6 84 51 10 
Soun.: Me",.r ~clst ... , Burtau ofC0"'P.titlo. Polity, 1978 aM 1979; Jo.rdiJIe. Motltes •• AluI.aI IlqIOI1 Data 
Industry Codts 
I. A(rinllure 
2. Fo ..... ".,. 
3 Fishbt; anj T"fPiI!c 
.. . MiRts, Q1llnJb!&. OU W.ns 
5. Fo.d ..... B ... "I. 
6. T.auo P .... w:1s 
7. R .... r 
8. L •• o..r 
9. T.xtIIe. 
10, IWhine Mills 
II.CIo~ 
12.W ... 
13. Fw'1litvo a.nd Flxturts 
I4.Papor 
15. PriJttin; . PublislWlc 
10 II 12 13 14 15 
3 
23 
10 
2 5 · 3 
16 
3 
.... ~: .~-: 'n • .. , .,.. 
-
',; 
. ~. ~.::~:: 
2 
0 5 27 14 10 27 
16. Prinlary Metal 
17. MeW Fahrintixc 
18. Mochintry 
19. TluspOl1ltio. Equiplll.llt 
20. Dtcbical Pro(",,1s 
21.No.· .. etalUt ~Un .. '" Prodw:ts 
22. P.b ........ OIl. Coal Products 
23. Ckemi<a1s ... Ckemi<aI ProduclS 
222 
16 17 18 19 20 21 12 23 24 25 26 27 28 
14 
5 
2 
27 3 2 I 5 8 
I 11 5 2 6 
3 I 14 6 
3 19 6 
7 2 9 
29 10 
2 12 II 
12 
55 I 8 
8 18 5 10 14 13 80 41 
2 I 54 
.... ~ .'~ .:::-:.; .•.. :~::: e ti 1O 
I 3 2 2 2 41 
5 45 48 32 31 10 16 50 37 16 74 100 266 
Dlo; .... Total:582 
24. Miscdlallf.as MOIIWlCruriJI; 
25. C .... b'ucti •• 
26. T ......... rtatio •• Commwtiroti ••• Utilities 
27 .Tnde 
28 .• tnlllc •• IIISllnllc •• R.aI £Stat. 
29. COIftJft..m~. Business or Pers •• al Stnirts 
::9 (ToW) 
11 
I 
86 
48 
0 
~ 
11 
0 
9 
36 
15 
II 
25 
5 
~~ 
36 
26 
31 
::2 
6 
50 
30 
14 
73 
216 
I 65 
9 ~~ 
65 128 
79 1070 
Chart 46: Jardine, Matheson and Company Compared to Global Firms, Trends in Mergers and Acquisition, 1983-1984 
; Acquiring 
,FiJ1n bulustry .. 
Cale~ory 
'2 
.3 
.4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
' 12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
'23 
24. 
'25 
3 
3 
28 
'26 2 
n 1 
5 
I 
27 
1. 
2 
8 9 
11 
..... 
1 
1· 
28 1 7 2 ~~<{?.;:~:~~'i~J :.:~::);;~~;]f1iliflM]]NH~~@t~~ltF%]~m ~< 11~~iffm~!1mH1M1M~{~1][ftti~~ Nmtl~ ~i!~~l~~m~~~~minm~%m@m~mm~mml::: ~~ .. 
29 
12 46 2 l ' 14 
SOllrte: Merger Rt~lster, Buroauor COlllpOtitioll Polil:y, 1978 and 1979 i Jardlne !~th,~s.o~ !\Jut_al Repon. Data 
htdustry Codes 
1. Alrh:u111lro 
.2. Fo~.try 
3 ... hiIt;.,..d Tr2fPinc 
4. MW.,Q~, oriw.ih 
S. Food and Bove""f 
6. Tobacco P ... duct. 
1. Rubb.r 
8 . Leatkor 
:9. Textilts 
1~ · . ~ttiJIg. Mills . 
11.Clo~ 
12. W.od 
13.F~tw .. ·lIIdFIxf,;; ... . 
14.P..,or 
15. Pdnlin;, Puhlisltin; 
10 11 
6 
1 
:1 
12 
8 
............... 0. :... 14 
13 14 15 
3 
21 
28 
7 2 
29 31 
16. Prim .. ')' Motal 
17. MotU Fabrh:.~ 
I~ ~ .~ltimry 
19. Tt'all5po.1atiolt EquJpmeltt 
20 . DfctriCal Products 
. 21.N~II.~talllt Mwl~ P,."ducts 
22. Poo1l1eulI .. nd Coal PllIducis 
23 . Chemicals and Chemical P,."ducts 
223 
16 11 18 19 
3 
2 
41 2 
.................... 
1 32 
1 
2 3 
2 
2 20 8 
2 
II 68 56 
20 
2 
1 
2 
20 
43 
2 
21 22 
15 
2 
2 
23 
1 
2 
:1 
46 
I 
24 25 26 27 28 
5 
3 
3 
3 
7 
\0 
8 
25 
2 
7 
12 
14 16 
12 
53 4 
74 J 
18 8 12 9 13 2 9 57 59 
6 
32 63 34 3 77 38 19 69 258 84 
Diagollal Total:71 O(ududfS wtclassifi.a) 
24 . Misrell"".ous Manwctwing 
25 . Construction 
. ~~: T':'""'Portation, COllllllwtication, Utilities 
27. Tna. 
28 . Finance , oow..,.c., Real Estat. 
29 . Commwtity, Busln.ss 01' Personal S.,,1CfS 
19 
3 
3 
3 
7 
8 
3 
84 
278 
(TotU) 
3 
3 
o 
46 
37 
3 
2 
o 
14 
1 
8 
8 
11 
30 
37 
o 
56 
50 
35 
83 
23 
9 
73 
~2 
15 
62 
92 
336 
1299 
Chart 47: Jardine, Matheson and Company Compared to Global Firms, Trends in Mergers and Acquisition, 1988-1989 
Ac\w-u.; 
nMIIllldll$try Acquir'l'd Firm Industry Cate,ory 
CatteoJ)' 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5 
2 
3 2 
" 
152 
~ 95 
6 
7 2 
8 1 
9 : 
10 
ii' ....... ' 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 I · 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 2 
24 
25 
26 
....... ...... , 
27 2 
28 2 10 10 
.::::: .............. '0/ ..•. ····w.v.:.· .::;~ ... ~:.:.:::::::.:::: :.:.; .: ...•. :::::::;::. ::~~ .. ' 
;~: 
2~ 
7 2 3 
" .J75, 109 0 6 2 3 
SOllrl:e: MeIJer Rtr;lsttr, BW'tau.orCo,,!etldoll PoJlc,., 19781JU1 1979; Janlhlt , Matltesoa Alutual RtpoJ1 Dan 
!!tdustry Codes 
1. ~rie1aJtun 
2. ForeslrJ 
1 FIsIWtc UJd T"ftiltr; 
4 . MInts, Quarryin;, on Wells 
5. Food W BeVllra;e 
6. Tobacco Products 
7. Rubber 
8. Leather 
9. T,,1iles 
1 O. KJlittiJt; Mills 
11. ClollWt; 
12. Wood 
13. Funlitw'l! ad lIxtuJ'ts 
14.Paper 
15. PrbttiJl; , PuhUshbt; 
10 11 12 
l' 
" " 
14 
1 
2 
1 11 20 
13· 14 15 
., 
" " 
,., 
.. , 
8 
14 
n 
2 
2 ! 10 
:.:, ', 
,.::::;' 
11 19 89 
16 .PrbnaJ,), Mehl 
17. Mehl FabricatIJII 
18. MacltilteJ, 
19. TJ'allSpoJ1atioll EquJpntelll 
20. Elecbical P,'Oducls 
21.Noll-nteta1lic Mineral Producls 
22. Peo'OleUJII altd Coal PJ'Oducts 
::~{:~:: ::::: 
'~.',' 
23. ClJentlcals altd Chemical PJ'Oducts 
224 
16 17 18 19 
2 
2 
4 
4 32 
1 
" 
3 4 
I 19 
2 19 
2 
3 
14 9 13 
.:;::';::: ;':"; 
.:;::.:. 
7 61 39 43 
10 
2 
I 
33 
1 
9 
48 
21 ~2 23 
26 1 
2 
30 
3 
'" :F' 
:.:. ':~/ 
30 1 51 
24 . MisreUatoll$ Maufactwia; 
2~ . COlIStrucdon 
24 
2 
1 
2 
19 
14 
:.:.:;: 
42 
26. TJ-ansportatloll. COJlUllunicatioll. Utilities 
27. TJ'ade 
28. FUture, htsunnce , Real [stale 
29. Community, Business or PeJ'Sollai Senoires 
25 26 2i 
2 3 
7 
6 
8 
2 
5 
2 11 19 
2 
12 
19 
7 
7 
103 3 
116 
3 17 48 
1 9 
2 6 
12 139 278 
28 29 (Tohl) 
5 
0 
3 175 
4 109 
1 
9 
4 
0 
9 
17 
9 
11 
:! 84 
38 
23 
25 
3 31 
14 87 
34 
2 19 
4 57 
31 
3 13 
9 124 
8 133 
149 63 398 
1,( f 21 
6 139 156 
178 256 1643 
Chart 48: Jardine, Matheson and Company - Industry Clusters 
Primary Goods AJaterlals/nfeta/s Market Forest Products Market Petroleum Market Transportation Market Textiles Market Sugar 
Iron and Steel TImber 011 and Gas USA Shlebulldlng E.o.l!.!Jg Planlation 
Pro mel Sleel Singapore MacMillan Jardine Malaysia Exeloratlon Tehran Promel Singallore Isherwood & Australia Honokaa S"9ar Hawaii 
Foundry Tirnber Products Dynalllarine Phililpines Dreyfuss Co. 
Singapore MacMillan Jardine HK Jardine DrillshlllS HK L aUI,ahoehoe Hawaii 
Sleel Singapore Forest Products Investlllent Bermuda Sugar Co. 
Pagadanan Timber Phillipines N.Anlilies 
Fabricated Iron and Fabricated Wood Oil Refining ShleOwnlng AI'llarel LUg. Sugar IAIIIID'1 
§ru! Cemac·Office HK Diamond tA USA Elegance Liberia Jardine Wicking HK Bogo./ltedellin Phillilrines 
Pro mel. Sleel Singapore Partitions Citalion Spencer Hay S. Africa Honokaa Sugar Hawaii 
Products Mfg. Acme Plywood Philllpines Companla Panama Ifltercontinent Phllllpin •• Co. 
Dlaward Sleel & Veneer Progress Garmenl ~1f9 . layoahoehoe Hawaii 
Works HK fWr San Carlos 
Khlnco Sdn. Bhd. tAalaysia t.lacMlllanOloedel CA Milling Phillipines 
Sleel products Singapore Japan Hawaiian. Phillipines 
Non·ferrons Phlllll,lne Co. 
r,wm ~ 
Pipes and Aluminum Jordan & Co. 
Components Fiji Shoes S. Afd ca 
I...!!ggm 
~t$lManll~tMes W\lo.lLMJ.u. Qil S~r:vJ'1 ~J)H.in MAlJDWu!I!I!I!Jll Rennies luggage S. Africa us.ar.l!Mt!lsUn.!l 
Flexible sleel Singapore MacRall Hold. S. A(rlca Jardine Fearnley HK Nautarln Coalings Singapore Holdings fruJ.iJl, 
Wooden conlalner, 011 SeIV. Equip . Steel Ship Cnllng Toft Bros. Australia 
pallets Anlah Holdings Malaysia PrOlnet lAarlne Singapore 
Machinery Toft Bros. Indus. A1row Inti. Engineering 
Sugar "ervesllng Australia logistics SIn9allore Conlraclors 
Equip. Brazil 
Slubenberg Co. Hawaii Prontet Singallore Sug!!r !lggl!~ Mfg. 
Sugar Harvesting Shotlliasting Assoc. Bakery 
Machine Parts HawaII Eng. Servo t.Ug . Fiji 
lIftlnstalal!on Singapore Promel Contractors 
liilo fion Works HawaII Offshore Servo S!~gapore Rodland Jardine HK 
Jardine Schindler HK Indus. SeIV. 
lift Inslaiatlon' S.lngaore 
tJalaysia 
Machine Tools Phillipines 
Services Jardine HK tAacMilianJardlne HK Offshore services HK Malheson HK Harry Wlck/ng HK Hawaiian Fluid Hawaii Planlalion Agencies . 
Engineering Markeling Panama Chart.rlng Co. Rennies S. Africa Power Co . Soin Ohd. t.lalaysia 
Pacific Machinery Hawaii Singapore hydrallilc components 
Machinery Dist. 011 Rig Oroking Singdl'ore Indo·Chlna Slum HawaIIan hrlgalion Hawaii 
Offshore Vessel Havlgallon Co. HK 
P.J. Jaya Mandarin Indonesia Operation Malaysia 
Agllng Mgnt!. Of Oil Jardine Shipping Thailand 
Engineering Sales Interests Agencies . 
& Dist. Jack Enen & Co. Singo"or. customs clearan ce 
Sherwin WllllalllS Phillipines Ollinduslry 
Markellng & Dlst. slIpplies 
Companla Panama 
Progress Co. 
225 
(DOe 
I-- . 
I-
... 11.1 .. ..... 
. .. . . Cl. 
" ... " .. " . ., ,,.,,,.-
t •• lliI .. ' . .... ". 
.. . , .. u" ........ ,,, .• 
lo.''''''' '.'.' '" 
Chart 49: Return on Equity and Current Ratio for Selected Industries, Worldwide Statistics 1967-1998 
' • • 11-- "" ~'t.~ 
t-
----1----1---1---1-- -
-
226 
-I-
- I--
t------ -
1--1-
- --
-+-------1.---- r- -
1--
-f--
.-I--
--t-
1--1--
--
Chapter 7: Managing Uncertainty - The Internal 
and External Corporation 
Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 1, Section 2, the firm's ability to grow depended on the capability and 
experience of its managers - including the ability to foster the flow of information, the 
knowledge with which to interpret it, the ability to influence others and the reputation to 
attract and retain trading partners. Hence, Chapter 7 contributes to the architecture of the 
current study by focusing the organizational structure of the firm, including both internal and 
external organizations, that allowed for consistent business routines and promoted 
organizational learning (Question 5). The chapter deals with organizational learning from 
the viewpoint of management processes, including the training of high potential 
management; the involvement of the firm's senior managers on the boards of influential 
external bodies, and the surfacing, review and approval of new investment ideas. The 
chapter also covers the management processes that protected the Company from ill-
considered or opportunistic projects sponsored by departments or by associated or 
subsidiary firms (Question 6). 
The ability of a sprawling international conglomerate like Jardine, to invest in - and manage 
its affairs through - joint ventures and acquisitions in multiple locations imposes a challenge 
to firm governance, resource use and information sharing. 
This chapter seeks answers to two of the questions posed in Chapter 1, Section 2: 
• What was the organizational structure of the firm, including both internal and 
external organizations that allowed for consistent business routines and promoted 
organizational learning? (Question 5) 
• How did Jardine, Matheson promote managerial initiative while curbing 
opportunism? (Question 6) 
Chapter 7 focuses on both internal and external institutional mechanisms and is divided into 
sections as follows: 
Chapter 7: Section 1: Interpersonal Networks tracks some 200 of Jardine, Matheson's 
managers from 1972 to 1996 to determine how managers contribute to the intra- and inter-
firm network. 
Chapter 7: Section 2: Internal and External Relationships: Parent and Subsidiary 
Firms - Afflliational Ties discusses resource dispersion and networks at Jardine, 
Matheson. 
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Chapter 7: Section 3: Encouraging Initiative While Curbing Opportunism discusses the 
role of boards in decision-making at Jardine, Matheson. 
Chapter 7: Section 4: External Relationships - Impact on Influence and Reputation 
discusses the information gathering, influence and decision-making roles played by Jardine. 
Matheson executives on the boards of government. bank and social/political clubs. 
Chapter 7: Section 5: Internal and External Organization and Growth discusses the 
roles of organization (Question 5) and managerial initiative (Question 6) in firm strategic 
management. and compares a Resource-based interpretation with alternative Harvard and 
Chicago school views. 
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Chapter 7: Section 1: Interpersonal Networks 
The internal and external organization of Jardine, Matheson & Company has been an 
important factor underpinning the firm's resilience in the face of external shocks to 
competitiveness and its propensity to carry out longer-term structural adjustments in 
response. Jardine's organization is based on flexible institutional mechanisms well suited 
for adaptation to change. The emphasis is on resilience, sustainability, not success or 
sustainable competitive advantage. 
Interpersonal networks connect Jardine, Matheson's vast geographically dispersed and 
internally differentiated businesses. Given the impossibility of building a fully connected 
network across all the individuals within the organization, the alternative is a network that 
relies on having at least a few individuals in each subsidiary who have a wide range of ties, 
what might be called "social capital" within and across the subsidiaries' boundaries. 
For the dissertation, the actual movements of 200 of Jardine, Matheson's managers were 
charted from 1972 to 1996 on a spreadsheet. Almost all of Jardine, Matheson's new hires 
or "cadets" were drawn from Oxford and Cambridge. They undertook a three-year training 
program and were mentored by senior managers. But that was only the starting point. To 
assess the on-the-job development of "social capital" within Jardine, Matheson & Company, 
I looked at: 
• average tenure, based on the notion that individuals with longer tenure will have a 
greater range of both interdepartmental and inter-subsidiary contacts; 
• amount of time prior to promotion to associate or director; 
• how managers on a "fast track" were assigned to multiple geographic and functional 
posts - and the number of moves made, pursuing the idea that the greater the number 
of departments an individual worked in, the larger the range of interdepartmental 
contacts, and the greater the number of subsidiaries an individual has worked in, the 
larger the range of inter-subsidiary contacts; 
• the extent to which headquarters and subsidiaries were represented on the firm's 
multiple boards of directors; the process by which investment decisions were made -
top down, bottom up, composition of review councils, etc.; 
• the role of senior executives on government and investment councils - and their role in 
decision-making; 
• the extent of local autonomy and local resource availability. 
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The Jardine, Matheson & Company Annual Reports 1972-1996 are a rich source of 
information on management movements. It was important for the firm's external contacts to 
know the rank and decision making authority of their local Jardine, Matheson contact. Each 
annual report included names of the members of the parent board, regional and Hong Kong 
boards, and heads of local offices, making it possible to see which individuals got promoted, 
how fast and with what cross-geographic or cross-functional skills. See Chart 54: 
Succession Planning and Management Development, 1972-1996, at the end of this 
chapter. 
The findings are interesting: Some 40 of Jardine, Matheson managers went on to become 
members of the parent board. On average, Jardine's managers enjoyed a length of service 
of 20 years or more. They made an average of three cross-functional moves, most often 
from finance, most often to general management, at a regional office. Jardine's managers 
made on average of three cross-geographic moves in their career. A senior manager at 
Jardine (associate director and above) reached board level in four years. In any year, two 
new members were added to the board, and two retired. The number of outsiders on the 
board at any time was two. The average tenure of board members was 12 years. The 
percentage of expatriates in board seats was 90% as late as 1996. Experience in key 
markets and businesses was critical to board appointments. Take, for example, a few 
representative executive profiles: 
Nigel Rich was a general manager for Finance in the Hong Kong office in 1975. Rich had 
one-year stints in South Africa and the Philippines prior to his appointment to associate 
director, Philippines in 1979. In 1981, he moved back to the Hong Kong Chairman's office 
and in 1982 was put in charge of property and hotels. Rich was appointed an executive 
director and member of the parent company board in 1983. When Jardine, Matheson 
created the Asia Pacific Regional Board to validate proposals prior to presentation to the 
parent company board, Rich was appointed a director of the new board. He became 
managing director of Jardine, Matheson Holdings in 1988, a position he held until 1992, 
when Alasdair Morrison replaced him. 
Alasdair Morrison was appointed general manager, Jardine Industries in 1975, an umbrella 
group newly established to provide management oversight to small manufacturing and 
trading companies. In 1979, he became general manager, Philippines, under Nigel Rich. 
Morrison was appointed general manager, Europe in 1982 - and appointed associate 
director in 1983. He was appointed a director of the company and member of the parent 
company board in 1984. He became a member of the Asia Pacific Regional Board in 1987 
and was named to the board of Hongkong Land in the same year. In 1993, Morrison 
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became managing director, Jardine, Matheson Holdings and continued in that position until 
1999. 
Anthony L. Nightingale was appointed general manager, Japan in 1979, a post he held for 
two years before becoming general manager, Hong Kong in 1981. Nightingale was 
appOinted associate director, Middle East in 1982. In 1987 he was appointed a director of 
the Asia Pacific Board and, in 1991, appointed director, Jardine Pacific. He became an 
executive director of the parent company board in 1991 and continued in that role through 
1996. 
Long-term employment, single-firm careers were and remain the norm at Jardine, Matheson 
& Company. To manage relations with subsidiaries and associates, Jardine, Matheson's 
directors were selected for representation on the subsidiary's board of directors. Since 
Jardine, Matheson's directors were responsible for firm strategy, they played an additional 
role representing the subsidiary's interests in Hong Kong, in Asia Pacific regional and global 
Jardine, Matheson strategy. 
Beginning in 1992, the practice changed somewhat as Dairy Farm, Cycle & Carriage and 
Jardine International Motors went through a rapid succession of chief executives. The 
board of each of these public companies remained essentially the same, while the changing 
chief executive guard reflected Jardine, Matheson's desire to change the public image of 
these companies. 
Despite the exceptions, the 1999 appointment of Percy Weatherall to the position of 
managing director reinforces the original model. He is a long-term Jardine, Matheson man, 
born in Dumphries, extensive experience in Hong Kong Land and Dairy Farm before his 
appointment. 
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Chapter 7: Section 2: Intrafirm Relationships: Parent and 
Subsidiary Firms - Affiliational Ties 
The relationships among Jardine, Matheson's associated and subsidiary firms involved 
highly localized networks of dense transactions, creating a stable framework of exchange -
with periodic collective action, as in the case of the Jardine Pacific and Asia Pacific Board 
activities noted above. Former managing director Jeremy Brown contrasted Jardine's style 
of governance with that of Hong Kong rival, Hutchison Whampoa: The latter's acquired firms 
were autonomous; Jardine, Matheson's governance style was midway between Chandler's 
"visible hand" (formal administration) and Adam Smith's "invisible hand" (autonomously self-
regulating): "We imposed some organization and controls on our subsidiaries, while 
Hutchison's subsidiaries rode off in all directions at once."162 
Governance was based on the nature of Jardine, Matheson's acquisitions - and the firm's 
expectations of its acquisitions, speCifically: 
(1) Jardine, Matheson chose high-potential acquisition prospects that would benefit from an 
infusion of cash, but could be expected to yield high returns within a relatively short 
period; 
(2) Jardine, Matheson owned 40% or less of roughly half the firms it acquired. The firm 
expected acquisitions to raise additional equity capital; 
(3) Half of all acquired firms were or became subsidiaries, if they met the firm's 25% hurdle 
rate within three years. 
(4) Divested firms continued to be successful-like Rennies and Hong Kong Electric and 
Gas, among others and Jardine, Matheson enjoyed a continued relationship with these 
firms 
(5) Resources were very widely dispersed among associated and subsidiary firms. 
In fact, part of the selection process for such firms was their ability to provide resource 
access in a part of the world where access was needed. Associates and subsidiaries were 
expected to participate in Jardine, Matheson's inter-firm market, that is to say, the 
identifiable flows of goods, services and resources among technologically separable units 
that transform raw materials into finished products. The product systems referenced in an 
earlier section, and coordinated by Jardine, Matheson, comprised an intermediate business 
model between the poles of corporate administration and market governance. It had the 
organizational 
162 
Jeremy Brown to Carol Connell, interview at Matheson & Company, London, May 1998. 
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routines, information sharing and flexibility of the former and the cost advantages of the 
latter. 
For example, 
Jardine, Matheson ran sugar plantations in Australia, the Philippines and Hawaii. 
The firm harvested its own sugar as well as sugar from other plantations with 
equipment from the sugar harvesting equipment plants it owned. Jardine sent the 
raw sugar to one of three sugar milling firms it owned and shipped the sugar to 
world ports in its own vessels - or stored it in its own container terminals. The 
sugar process involved the interaction of some four to six Jardine subsidiaries. 
• Jardine, Matheson had a cluster of services available to its business lines in each 
major market. Jardine Fleming financed the bailout of Hongkong Land. Jardine 
Engineering Corporation was awarded construction projects by Gammon 
Construction and the elevators installed were Schindler Lifts 
• In transportation and shipping services, Jardine, Matheson and its subsidiaries 
provided ship management and shipping agencies, terminal operations, logistics 
services (including air freight, warehousing and distribution from locations in China, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
To each of its subsidiaries and to the firms for which it acted as principal and agent, Jardine, 
Matheson provided a cluster of capabilities that included trading, banking, maritime 
insurance and shipping - the same services historically known in the China trade as 
"agency services." Underlying these was a network of relationships built and sustained by 
frequent communications and the development of logistical and organizational routines to 
faCilitate trade. Jardine, Matheson not only handled direct imports and exports to and from 
Hong Kong, but also handled third-country' trade, where the firm acted as a middleman. 
Jardine purchased raw materials and sold finished products throughout the WOrld, served as 
the eyes and ears of major clients, provided them with global market information and 
analysis through its associates and subsidiaries, and helped smooth out the rocky road their 
clients faced in dealing with foreign languages, foreign currencies and foreign governments. 
To manage relations with subsidiaries and associates, Jardine, Matheson's directors were 
selected for representation on the associate or subsidiary's board of directors. Jardine, 
Matheson & Company never held an interest without voting power in an associated firm. 
Jardine's directors were responsible for setting financial goals and communicating overall 
firm strategy, and they represented the associate's interests on the Hong Kong, Asia Pacific 
regional and Jardine, Matheson Holdings boards. 
233 
For example, MAR. Young-Herries joined Jardine, Matheson in 1948 and served in Hong 
Kong, Japan and Singapore. Herries was appointed managing director in 1962, and 
chairman and managing director in 1963. A 1971 biography describes Herries as chairman 
of these Jardine, Matheson Holdings: 
Bangour Investments International Pacific Securities Co., Ltd. 
Empire Finance Co., Ltd. The Jardine Engineering Corporation, Ltd. 
Ewo Breweries Ltd. Jardine, Matheson & Co. (Japan) Ltd. 
Harry Wicking & Co, Ltd. Jardine, Matheson & Co. (Taiwan) Ltd. 
Hongkong & China Property Co. Ltd. Jardine, Matheson & Co. (Australia) Ltd. 
HongkonQ Clays & Kaolin Co., Ltd. Jardine Waugh Ltd. 
The Hongkong Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. Lombard Insurance Co. Ltd. 
HongkonQ & Far Eastern Investment Co. Ltd. Pedder Industries Ltd.; Pedder Ventures Ltd. 
The HongkonQ &Kowloon Wharf & Godown Co. Ltd. The Shanghai & Hongkong Wharf Co. Ltd. 
The Hongkong Land Investment & Agency Co., Ltd. Plantation Agencies Ltd. 
Hongkong Tramways Ltd. The "Star" Ferry Co., Ltd. 
The Indo-China Steamship Co., Ltd. 
Young-Herries is listed as alternate chairman of Eastern Securities Co. Ltd, Hong Kong and 
Aircraft engineering Co. Ltd. He is listed as director of Dairy Farm Ice & Cold Storage Co., 
Ltd.; Dominion Far East Line Pty. Ltd; Harbour Center Development Ltd; The Hongkong 
Electric Co., Ltd.; The Hongkong Telephone Co. Ltd.; The Hongkong & Shanghai Banking 
Corporation; MacMillan Jardine, Ltd.; Mercantile Bank Ltd.; Shanghai Dockyards Ltd.; The 
Sheko Development Co., Ltd.; and the South China Morning Post. 
The historical practice of interlocking directorates continues. The embedded Chart 55 
shows the interrelatedness of Jardine's subsidiary businesses in 1992, a small slice of the 
overall picture but evocative of the principle in practice. 
Chart 55: Jardine, Matheson & Company - Cross-board Seat Holdings 1992 
Director JM Holdings Jardine Dairy Farm Hongkong Mathe.on & Mandarin 
Strategic Land Company Oriental 
Henry Keswick Chairman Chairman Director Director Chairman Director 
Nigel Rich Managing Managing Managing Managing Managing 
Director Director Director Director Director 
C.1. Cowan Director Director Director 
R.C. Kwok Director Director Director Director Director 
R.E. Moore Director Director Director Director 
Gregory Terry Director Director Director 
George Ho Director 
Simon KeSwick Chairman Chairman Director Chairman 
C.G.R. Leach Director Director Director Director Director 
Sir Charles Director Director Director 
Powell 
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Chapter 7: Section 3: Encouraging Initiative While Curbing 
Opportunism 
Prior to 1980, Jardine, Matheson & Company was organized on a functional basis in Hong 
Kong and on a geographic basis overseas. After 1983, functional management and 
grouping of related activities took priority over geographic organization. Distinct business 
units within Jardine, Matheson's core businesses were run as profit centers. The board of 
directors gave the managing directors of operating units near autonomy in running their 
businesses. Subsidiaries and associates made their own operating decisions. The parent 
company board approved every major investment decision. New investment opportunities 
were generated in two ways: 
(1) markets were identified where expertise in an existing core business would give the firm 
a competitive advantage and 
(2) key geographical areas were selected for expansion and viable businesses 
subsequently identified for investment. 
Responsibility for presenting the investment proposal to the board lay with the board 
member responsible for a function (business line) or geography. Jeremy Brown, former 
managing director of Jardine, Matheson during the mid 1970s confirms, "There tended to be 
over that period an alternation between a regional and a functional basis for management 
control purposes but, however they were defined, each area was always the responsibility of 
a main board director.163 Functional and geographic organizations reported to an executive 
director. Executive directors were members of the board. Chart 56: Organlgram 1984-
Microcosm of Jardine, Matheson & Company, on the next page, shows functional and 
geographic organizations reporting to an executive director. 
163 
Jeremy Brown, Esq. to Carol Connell, June 1998. 
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Chart 56: Organigram ]984 - Microcosm of Jardine, Matheson & ompany 
with Funct ional and Geographic OrganLwtions reporting to fin Exec ut ive Director (Board Member) 
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In 1986 an additional board was created, the Asia Pacific board , consisting of the managing 
director of Jardine, Matheson Holdings and the heads of Jardine's regional offices . Its 
purpose was to review the investment proposals, examining their potential impact on the 
region as a whole and assuring that the required supporting information and documentation 
had been evinced before a presentation was made to the Jardine, Matheson Holdings 
Board. This additional review opportunity - or approval layer - was one of several 
corrections made in the aftermath of the Hongkong Land stock swap. It was intended to 
ensure that information critical to decision-making was shared and evaluated across the 
company. 
Consider the hypothetical situation of an investment proposal for a new container port in 
Hong Kong . The Hong Kong head office, specifically the Ship Management Group, 
generates the initial investment proposal. The proposed container port will impact much of 
the imporUexport trade of Jardine Pacific; hence, Jardine Pacific vets the proposal. The port 
will handle re-exports from a number of Asia Pacific countries in which Jardine, Matheson 
has interests . 
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The proposal goes next to the Asia Pacific board where the container port's consequences 
for the broader pacific region are considered. The new Hong Kong container port is seen to 
have a potentially heavy impact on Jardine, Matheson's trade with Southeast ASia, which is 
expected to grow by 10 to 14% through the year 2006. The investment will give Jardine, 
Matheson a significant edge in Southeast Asia over container competitor Hutchison 
Whampoa. The cost of the new container project - and its potential profit for Jardine, 
Matheson - gets discussed next by the Jardine, Matheson Holdings board of directors and 
by Matheson & Company, which is always involved in investment and borrowing decisions. 
The participants in the container port discussion would have represented a cross-section of 
the firm's interests and some very senior managers. Jardine Pacific, which included the 
firm's transportation, trading and distribution interests, had the largest membership -
reflecting the dependence on these Pacific Rim services by Jardine's geographic and 
functional businesses around the world. 
The ability of groups of executives with increasing oversight to examine the potential 
consequences of an investment decision on the firm, its subsidiaries and the Asia Pacific 
region as a whole was a source of strategic strength to Jardine, Matheson and characteristic 
of the firm's use of its "feet on the ground" - its country offices and subsidiaries - as an 
information club. 
The following Chart 57 lays out who would have been involved at each stage of the 
discussion: 
Chart 57: Jardine, Matheson & Company Functional Boards, 1988 Example 
Hong Kong Head Jardine Pacific Asia Pacific Regional Jardine Matheson 
OffIce (Local Issues) Management Group Board Holdings Board 
(Trading Issues) ~R~lonall.su.s) (Corporate Issue~ 
RDP Michell Director GJ Terry MG Barrow Simon Keswick, Chairman 
RJ.O. Barton, Jardine RC. Sutton, Australia 
Insurance Brokers 
Nigel Rich Nigel Rich. MD 
W.M. Courtauld D. Hon, Canada RJ. Collins P.J. Collins, ED 
D.A. Heenan, Theo A.J.L. Nightingale, Hong RS. Sutton. Australia George Ho, OBE 
Davies Hawaii Kong 
RG. Lee H. Gunther Indonesia RC. Kwok Henry Keswick ED 
H. Yasuda, Japan D.A. Heenan, Thea. RC. Kwok 
Davies, Hawaii 
P. Po, Beijing RE. Moore. head, CGR Leach, head of 
Bermuda Operations Europe/UK 
K.C. Sitt, Shanghai A.G. Morrison, Hongkong RE Moore, head, 
Land Bermuda OJ)erations 
M. Lo Guangzhou RD.P. Michell 
E.P.w. Weatherall, AJ.L. Nightingale, Hong 
Philippines Ko~ 
Y.C. Boon, Singapore O.P. Howell-Price, Dairy 
Farm 
C.C. Willis, Jr., South R.E. Riley, Mandarin 
Korea Oriental 
A Mackinnon, Taiwan A.H.Smlth, Jardine 
Fleming 
K. Sarasin, Thailand G.J. Terry 
D.A. Heenan, Theo. H. Yasuda, Japan 
Davies, Hawaii 
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Hong Kong Head Jardine Pacific Asia Pacific Regional Jardine Matheson 
OffIce (Local Issues) Management Group Board Holdings Board 
(Trading Issues) (Regional Issues) (Corporate Issues) 
R.E. Moore, head, RJ.O. Barton, Jardine 
Bermuda Operations Insurance Brokers 
C.G.R. Leach, Europe/UK 
RB. Wilson, Middle East V.C. Boon, Singapore 
RH. Gunn, Netherlands 
A.H. Smith, Jardine 
Fleming 
O.P. Howell-Price, Dairy 
Farm 
A.G. Morrison, Hongkong 
Land 
RE. Riley, Mandarin 
Oriental 
RJ.O. Barton, Jardine 
Insurance Brokers 
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Chapter 7: Section 4: External Relationships - Impact on 
Influence and Reputation 
Jardine, Matheson's senior executives also played important external roles on behalf of the 
Company and its influence in Hong Kong - as well as in London's financial district. 
Representation on the Hong Kong Legislative Council 
Until 1997, the "unofficial" members of the Governor's Council were representatives of Hong 
Kong business and banking. "Unofficial" was an actual title. Two of the thirteen unofficial 
members of the Legislative Council were appointed as a result of an election by the 
Unofficial Justices of the Peace and by the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. 
From 1958 to 1962, H.D. M. Barton of Jardine, Matheson held a seat. From 1962 to 1968, 
S.S. Gordon, a chartered accountant, former chairman of the Hong Kong General Chamber 
of Commerce and a director of Jardine, Matheson, held a seat. From 1971 to 1978, MAR. 
Young-Herries, managing director of Jardine, Matheson, held a seat. 
As an "unofficial," the seat holder had no vote, but access to information was complete, and 
influence could be brought to bear on the Governor and on the Standing Finance Committee 
in private. Unofficial influence secured the withdrawal of bills even after their introduction 
into the Legislative Council. For example, the Commissions of Inquiry Bill of 1966 was 
withdrawn when the Attorney General acknowledged the misgivings which had been 
expressed to him by the unofficial and by the Incorporated Law Society of Hong Kong since 
publication of the bill. 
The "unofficials" represented a majority on the Standing Finance Committee and exerted the 
most influence there, where meetings were held in private and their proceedings were not 
published. Since most legislative and executives acts involved finance, the Standing 
Finance Committee discussed most aspects of Government policy, although discussions 
were limited to expenditures, not to revenue. 
Because the strength of the British Colonial Govemment rested on the alliance between 
British officials and the Chinese business community, support to both sides was assured by 
the British business community, which collectively contributed in excess of 12% to the GOP 
of Hong Kong and formed a highly influential power bloc. It consisted of Jardine, Matheson 
& Company; Butterfield and Swire, Hutchison Intemational, the Dairy Farm Ice & Cold 
Storage Company; Wheelock Marden & Co., and the Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking 
Corporation. 
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The meetings of the Standing Finance Committee were sometimes held at the Royal Hong 
Kong Jockey Club, whose stewards in 1969 included J.A.H. Saunders, chairman of the 
Jockey Club, member of the Executive Council and chairman of the Hong Kong & Shanghai 
Banking Corporation; Sir Sik-nin Chau, chairman of Dairy Farm Ice & Cold Storage; J.l. 
Marden, member of the Executive Council and chairman of Wheelock Marden; J.D. Clague, 
director of Dairy Farm and member of the Executive Council; Fung Ping-fan, member of the 
Legislative Council; MAR. Young-Herries, chairman, Jardine, Matheson & Company and 
member of the Legislative Council; and Djun J. Ruttonjee, formerly senior official in the 
Legislative Council. The exclusive club was immensely influential. The Jockey Club held a 
monopoly on legalized gambling in Hong Kong and its stewards were responsible for 
making lavish charitable donations from gambling earnings. Representatives of Jardine, 
Matheson also sat on specific committees of the Legislative and Executive Councils. 
Board Membership - Hongkong & Shanghai Bank 
From 1877 through 1996, members of Jardine, Matheson sat on the Board of Directors and 
the London Advisory Council of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation. See 
Charts 58 and 59, following. So did Jardine, Matheson's major competitors or peers in 
Hong Kong. The dozen or so rivals included Swire, Wheelock, and Cheung Kong 
(Hutchison Whampoa) among a dozen or so, as well as local competitors such as Dodwell's 
and Gibb Livingston. Therefore, these seats were even more important to information 
access - and potential collaboration - than to influence and individual firm advantage. 
Chart 58: Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation - Board of Directors 
COMPANY SUBSIDIARY YEARS REPRESENTED 
Jardine, Matheson 1877 
1962-1985 
Swire Group Butterfield & Swire 1914 
1962-1974 
John Swire & Sons 1974-1985 
Inchcape (HK) Gilman & Co. 1864 
1962-1985 
Dodwell & Co. 1895 
1962-1985 
Mackinnon, Mackenzie 1929 
1962-1974 
Imperial Chemical Industries 1946 
1962-1974 
Caldbeck, Macgregor 1956 
1962-1965 
Sir Elly Kadoorie & Sons 1957 
1962-1967 
John D. Hutchison 1930 
1962-1976 
Union Insurance Company of 1966-1968 
Canton 
HongkonQ Bank 1941 
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COMPANY SUBSIDIARY YEARS REPRESENTED 
1962-1985 
Deacon & Co. 1969-1980 
Wheelock Marden & Co. 1972-1985 
World Wide Shipping 1972-1985 
Central Development 1974-1985 
Mass Transit Railway 1979-1985 
Heng Seng Bank 1979-1985 
Cheung Kong 1980-1985 
Hong Kong Electric 1980-1985 
Gibb, Livingston & Co. 1,869 
Source. HKSB and Banking Commissioner S Office from V.C. Jao In Eastem Banking. 
Chart 59: Jardine, Matheson & Company - Executive Representation on the Board of 
Directors and London Advisory Council, Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation 
JARDINE, MATHESON BOARD OF DIRECTORS LONDON ADVISORY 
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 
William Keswick 1877, Deputy Chairman 1879-
80; Chairman 1880-81; 
Resianed 1886 
F.B. Johnson 1881-1886 
J. Bell-Irving 1886; Deputy Chairman 1887; 
Chairman 1888-89, Resigned 
1889; Retumed 1893; Deputy 
Chairman 1897-98; Chairman 
1898-99; Deputy Chairman 
1902-03 
J. J. Keswick 1890-95; 1899-00; Chairman 
1901-02 
H.D.M. Barton Chairman 1962-64 
J.H. Keswick 1962-70 
MAR. Young-Herries 1965-70 1970-75 
H.S.I. Keswick 1971-75 1975-Present 
D.K. Newbigging 1975-83 
S.l. Keswick 1984-Present 
Source. HKSB and Banking Commissioner's Office from V.C. Jao In Eastem Banking. 
Jardine, Matheson & Company and the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank became partners in at 
least six Jardine owned businesses: Central Registration - Hong Kong, 1973 (HKSB had 
50% equity;) East Point Reinsurance in 1979 (HKSB held 15% equity); Jardine Matheson 
Holdings (HKSB held 5% equity); British & Chinese Corp. (HKSB had 50% equity); Far 
Eastern EconomiC Review (HKSB held 50% equity) and South China Morning Post (HKSB 
held 40% equity). 
The British & Chinese Corporation was a 20th century relic of the firm co-founded by Jardine, 
Matheson and the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank to fund railroads in China. The collaboration 
continued deep into the 20th century. during the 1960s and 1970s, the period of Hong 
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Kong's industrial development. As discussed earlier, Jardine, Matheson & Company 
invested in every sector of Hong Kong business. At the same time, the Hongkong & 
Shanghai Bank made HK$976 million in loans and advances to local Hong Kong firms, often 
to companies which enjoyed a relationship with Jardine, Matheson in the areas of 
manufacturing, textiles, electrical and electronics, transport, electricity and gas, building 
construction and general commerce. 
The record of actual loans and advances made by the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank 
understates the whole investment story. The bank assisted local manufacturers through a 
phenomenon called "packing credits," bills of credit drawn on the Hongkong & Shanghai 
Bank by manufacturers for purchase orders from firms such as Jardine, Matheson; Gibb, 
Livingston; Dodwell's and Hutchison for the sale of merchandise. The packing credit 
provided an advance to the small manufacturer for the raw materials necessary to produce 
goods for shipment and sale. The packing credit is an example of the use of an unofficial, 
short-to-medium term loan to facilitate trade, where one or more of the participants has low 
working capital. Jardine, Matheson also made use of this convention in its relations with 
subsidiaries and customers. 
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Chapter 7: Section 5: The Firm's Internal and External 
Organization and Growth 
Chapter 7 explicitly deals with the role of Jardine, Matheson's managers and directors in 
building, guiding and managing the relationships between the parent firm and its 
subsidiaries and associated firms on the one hand, and negotiating the parent firm's 
relationships with the outside world on the other. 
This section concludes the discussion by returning to two questions were posed at the 
beginning of Chapter 7: What was the organizational structure of the firm, including both 
internal and external organizations, that allowed for consistent business routines and 
promoted organizational learning? (Question 5) And, how did Jardine, Matheson promote 
managerial initiative while curbing opportunism? (Question 6). 
The Internal and External Organization of the Firm (Question 5) 
A Resource-based response to question 5 would suggest that Jardine, Matheson's founders 
and subsequent managers developed an "architecture" or "administrative framework" for 
learning and collaboration. This framework included interorganizationallinkages that were 
mutually beneficial to participants and important to Jardine, Matheson for the development 
of capabilities, trustworthiness, and consistent patterns of behavior and effective forms of 
governance. Jardine, Matheson's plan for interorganizational continuity and growth required 
the exposure of high potential managers to a variety of geographic and functional 
assignments over time. This was accomplished without disruption to the business by a 
succession scheme under which junior managers would be groomed to replace senior 
managers who had been elevated to associate director and above. 
Senior members of the staff mentored junior associates for a three-year trial period until 
juniors were put in charge of a profit center and given the chance to prove themselves. The 
culture was a close one. 
Jardine, Matheson's managers on a fast track were expected to playa public role in the life 
of Hong Kong and the regions. As described in this Chapter, this life might Include 
membership on the Hong Kong Legislative Council - or membership on the Hong Kong or 
London board of the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. 
A Harvard interpretation would suggest that firm architecture is merely a response to 
industry structure, which has a strong influence in determining the competitive rules of the 
game as well as the strategies potentially available to the firm. The credo might be "It's 
About 
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Competition." But it was not about competition. It was about information, getting a piece of 
the opportunity for Jardine, building a community in which Jardine, Matheson was an 
influential player. 
Jardine, Matheson's knowledge-based culture was not at all above increasing efficiencies. 
Although the majority of the firm's relationships with customers and partners were the 
outcome of long-term contracts, the perceived benefit of these relationships was not, as a 
Chicago interpretation would have it, was not only (or most importantly) that they kept 
transaction costs low. While a Chicago interpretation would admit that firm architecture 
promotes and encourages organizational learning, the benefit - knowing how to resolve 
minor problems such as ones arising from contracts, for example, and the rules are for 
effective contract administration - was far from Jardine, Matheson's objective. 
The environment of risk and uncertainty made collaboration essential to survival. This 
meant collaboration between headquarters and associated firms - as well as between and 
among Jardine, Matheson's associated firms. The description in Chapter 6 of the 
geographic spread of Jardine, Matheson's resources, embedded in associated and 
subsidiary firms, and their involvement in the value chain of diverse industries supports the 
notion that this was a highly collaborative firm. In Chapter 7, the review boards established 
by Jardine, Matheson to assure that the potential for broader, geographic and organizational 
impact was explored before a decision was rendered on a potential investment, is a further 
example of organizational commitment to learning and sharing. While there is little doubt 
that the Jardine, Matheson's analysts saw cost reduction advantages to frictionless 
contracting among members of an external organization, the objective was collaboration not 
merely cost reduction. 
Encouraging Initiative while curbing opportunism (Question 6) 
In the Resource-based view, initiative or "enterprise" is rewarded and opportunism is more 
often depicted as opportunity - the opportunity to extend the firm's interorganizational 
linkages to include a new but familiar business partner with known and consistent business 
behaviors, making partners out of a competitors. In the Harvard and Chicago views initiative 
is rewarded, and opportunism curbed, by managerial bonuses based on over-achievement 
of results. In this section, the opportunism of competitors and associated firms is 
considered first, then managerial opportunism. 
As in the early period, bringing potential competitors into their orbit - making collaborators of 
competitors, like the Swire Group or Hutchison Whampoa - served Jardine, Matheson's 
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interests very well. Collaboration opened new opportunities for shared investment, access 
to information from different markets, and reduced the risk of commodity price and shipping 
rate fluctuations. 164 
In the twentieth century, Jardine, Matheson built a network of trade and minority equity-
based relationships with associated Hong Kong and ASEAN firms. As the network builder, 
Jardine, Matheson encouraged the initiative of local firms for which it served as a source of 
financial services, insurance and shipping. Jardine, Matheson's pattern of minority positions 
left the bulk of the fundraising to local firms, achieving growth at the expense of control. But 
Jardine's influence surpassed its equity stake. In building this network or "external 
organization," described in Chapter 7, Jardine, Matheson made itself indispensable to 
manufacturers, retailers and service establishments alike, who could expect credit terms of 
up to two years, as well as transportation, distribution and marketing services from their 
Hong Kong partner 
The firm avoided the fate of many merchant intermediaries who could be locked out or 
eased of business if their contractual agreements with manufacturers were not renewed. 
Network relationships were based on trust not contract. The advantages derived from the 
ongoing relationship with Jardine, Matheson were perceived by associated firms to be 
greater than the gains of opportunistic behavior. 
Resource-based, Harvard and Chicago interpretations all recognize that the best managers 
need to be compensated to remain with the firm to grow firm business. The key issue is 
incentive-compatibility. The distribution of knowledge in the firm (and among members of its 
external organization) may provide opportunities for individuals to gain by concealing or 
misrepresenting their private information, while reducing overall efficiency. However, 
restoring efficiency allows for gains all around, and so "farsighted" contracting permits the 
design of incentive structures which ensure disclosure of private information, if necessary, 
by putting the owner of this private information in charge. Examples of this kind of incentive 
structure includes the comprehensive education of Jardine, Matheson's high potential 
managers who were groomed for leadership, or creation of a board seat on the board of 
Jardine, Matheson & Company for the head of the Hongkong Land Company after the 
mutual stock swap and takeover attempt in the 1980s. 
164 D . 
unng the 1970s and 1980s, examples of Investment partners included the Swire Group, a joint venture 
partner in real estate; Mac Millan Bloedel In timber; SChindler in elevators and Securicor In security services .. 
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A Resource-based response to would argue that opportunism is often an opportunity to 
extend the firm's interorganizationallinkages to include a new but familiar business partner 
with known and consistent business behaviors. A Harvard school response argues that 
initiative is rewarded and opportunism curbed by managerial bonuses based on over-
achievement of results. Similar to that of the Harvard school, a Chicago school 
interpretation recognizes that agents are effort averse, owner-managers are paid higher 
bonuses or better benefits to attract and retain the best managers to grow its business. The 
point of view is based on the quid pro quo nature of contracts. 
Jardine, Matheson was very aware of the potential for opportunism, and used collaborative 
tactics - interorganizationallinkages, cross-board holdings, equity accounting, multi-board 
reviews, and pro-active government and bank relationships, among other inventions - to 
circumvent it. 
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Chapter 7 Chart 
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Chapter 8: Organizational Learning and Innovation 
- Strategic Audit of the Firm and the Industry 
Introduction 
The contribution of Chapter 8 to the architecture of this study was noted in Chapter 1, 
Section 2, specifically: To support a Resource-based interpretation of resource/services 
choices based on capabilities, the management of uncertainty, the development of external 
insight and continued organizational learning, Chapter 8 looks at the history of strategic 
management at Jardine, at four breakpoints - 1832, 1885, 1977 and 1996. 
As Brian Loasby has noted, "Human action is often the result of human design; but human 
design is inherently fallible, however secure its logic, since it is based on knowledge that is 
usually incomplete or erroneous .• 165 Humans and their organizations respond to uncertainty 
using coping strategies, the strict observance of routines and decision rules, the building of 
reserves and the generation of alternative institutions and artifacts on which future 
decisionmaking will be based. Loasby reasons, "on observing the outcomes they may 
select among them, according to the theories by which they impute causality and their 
criteria for what is desirable .... These ex post selections may lead to the generation of 
further hypotheses, sometimes .. .in a closely coupled way. Such evolutionary processes are 
likely to be an effective means of progress, though not always an improvement in terms of 
human welfare.· 166 
Hence, each of the chosen years finds the firm in a different industry, with different 
competitors. The resulting maps reveal the extent to which business models were 
changing, geographic boundaries were changing or disappearing, new competitors were 
emerging and new relationships were changing competitors into collaborators for survival 
and advantage in Hong Kong and the ASEAN. 
• 1832, the year the firm was formally constituted. As discussed in Chapter 4, the firm was 
descended from a line of partnerships unbroken since 1810; 
• 1885, the year the firm's accounts begin to show significant investments in 
manufacturing, mines and railroads; 
• 1977, at the height of the Exploit and Develop period; 
• 1996, during the Focus on Distinctive Capabilities period. 
165 B' 
166 nan J. Loasby, "The Evolution of Knowledge," DRUID Conference, Aalborg, May 11, 2001, p. 4. 
Ibid. p.6. 
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The chapter is based on the notion that auditing the past can provide insight and lead to a 
better understanding of current knowledge. However, no reasonable attempt can be made 
to deduce fresh knowledge, to predict future decisions or future outcomes, because 
information is incomplete and ambiguous and judgments made on the basis of this 
information possibly erroneous. 
As Loasby points out, "The difficulty of putting boundaries around the capabilities of 
individuals and organizations and the ambiguity of their range of application is a prominent 
theme of Nelson & Winter and underlies Penrose's emphasis on the need to perceive by 
non-logical means, how resources may be directed towards productive services." 167 
Given the foregoing caveats, can one justify the notion of auditing the past? Knight provides 
the best support for this approach, when we says, "in order to live intelligently in our 
world ... we must use the principle that things similar in some respects will behave similarly in 
certain other respects even when they are very different in still other respects." 168 
Again, back to Loasby's argument, "If we succeed in making new connections which 
constitute new knowledge, these connections will provide us with new rules and routines, 
releasing cognitive capacity for new applications, as in Penrose's (1959) conception of the 
use of the receding manageriallimit.,,169 
Therefore, we go forward with this audit in the hope of shedding light on the changing 
characteristics of the marketplace and the opportunities they presented, as Jardine, 
Matheson might have perceived them, including their impact on relationships, organization 
and capabilities .. 
Chapter 8 is organized into three sections as follows: 
Chapter 8: Section 1: Strategic Audit of the Environment and the Industry 1832-1996 
begins with a series of questions aimed at identifying Jardine, Matheson's principal external 
relationships with suppliers, customers and competitors, and how those relationships 
changed over time. 
Chapter 8: Section 2: Strategic Audit of the Firm, Jardine, Matheson & Company. 
1832-1996 considers how Jardine, Matheson's capabilities have been deployed in the firm's 
chosen markets, how appropriable were their returns, and the extent to which the firm's 
capabilities changed over time to meet changing business needs. 
167 B' 168 flan J. Loasby, ibid., p. 11. 
169 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, ibid., p. 206 
Idem, p. 10-11. 
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Chapter 8: Section 3: Implications for Learning and Innovation considers the change in 
value and use of resources and capabilities over time to detect human action, intention, and 
perception of possibilities 
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Chapter 8: Section 1: The Strategic Audit of the Environment 
and the Industry, 1832·1996 
The Audit Questions and Answers 
The answers to a standard set of questions, proposed by John Kay170 and comprising a 
"strategic audit of the industry," enable the identification of environmental factors as well as 
the firm's principal external relationships with suppliers, customers and competitors, to see 
how advantage established in the markets in which it competes and to assess how these 
factors are likely to evolve. 
A few terms used in the audit require some definition: 
• The industry is defined as a group of firms producing technically related products. 
• The strategic group is composed of firms that adopt similar strategies and hence see 
themselves as in direct competition. 
• A resource is what a company needs to have to perform its capabilities. That is to say, 
behind every distinctive capability, there is a resource or team of resources. Resources 
can be tangible (human, physical assets, capital) or intangible (brands). 
• A core competence or capability is what a company needs to do in order to achieve 
its unique strategic positions. Capabilities and competencies perform. By nature, they 
reside within people. 
• A distinctive capability is what a company needs to have in order to offer a 
differentiated value to the market. 
• Added value consists of the reserve financial assets a company develops to adapt to 
changes in its environment and sustain its ability to compete. 
• Reputation is a distinctive capability; a name for high quality characteristics that cannot 
easily be monitored; enables contracts to be made or made on better terms than would 
otherwise be possible. 
• Innovation is often used to refer to technology, but here it characterizes new products, 
processes or styles of relationship. 
170 
John Kay, The Foundations of Corporate Success (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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• Architecture is a distinctive collection of relational contracts the benefits of which 
typically rest in the development of organizational knowledge, flexibility in response and 
information exchange within or between organizations. 
• A strategic asset is a source of competitive advantage derived from factors external to 
the firm. rather than from it's own distinctive capabilities 
The questions included in this audit are: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
What is the industry? 
Which are the major strategic groups? Who are their members? 
What are the principal trends in industry and market? 
Is there a relevant regulatory environment? 
What markets are served? Define as many distinct markets as possible in 
product and geographic terms. 
What are the key product characteristics. in terms of consumer needs? 
How do consumers learn about these characteristics? 
Define the value chain; include previous and subsequent stages of production. 
What are the main influences on costs at each stage? 
What firms in the industry add value? Construct added value statements and 
identify marginal players 
Is innovation important? Can it be protected? 
Do firms have internal or external architecture and what speCific benefits do 
they gain from them? 
• Are there long-term experience characteristics for which reputation matters? Do 
such reputations exist? 
• Are there strategic assets? What is their origin? Are they durable? 
• Define the range of distinctive capabilities which appear in these markets. 
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• Which firms enjoy them? 
• How effectively are they translated into competitive advantage? 
• Are these competitive advantages sustainable, appropriable? 
• What is the profitability of the marginal firm? 
• Is competitive advantage reflected in added value? 
The questions and their answers have been put into two grids, Charts 60 and Chart 61, 
following. 
Chart 60: INDUSTRY AUDIT _19TH CENTURY: 1832 AND 1885 
INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 1832 (I) 1885 (II) 
1 What is the industry? Trading in commodities Trading in commodities; Investment 
2 What are the major strategic groups? Govemment trading monopoiy Private traders; banks; investment 
Private traders groups 
3 Who are their members? East India Company for the Jardine, Matheson & Co., 
monopoly; Jardine, Matheson Butterfield & Swire and some 100 
& Company. Dent & Co. for agency houses; London investment 
the private trade houses like Matheson & Company, 
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank 
4 What are the prinCipal trends in Houses of agency, Low Investment in China manufacturers 
industry and market? working capital: Bills of credit and infrastructure; wealth through 
on purchase and sale of investment in raw materials, mines 
goods; insurance of goods 
during shipping 
5 Is there a relevant regulatory Opium Commissioner Treaty Port System, Treaty 
environment? 
H.M. Superintendent of Trade 
Commissioner 
Demand and Markets 
6 What markets are served. in product Opium - Canton and coastal China: 15 treaty ports 
and geographic tenns? 
Cotton - Canton London: Investors 
Tea - Great Britain 
Silk - Great Britain and 
Europe 
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INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 1832 (I) 1885 (II) 
7 What are key product characteristics Tea must be kept dry and China: Cottons - Treaty Port 
(in terms of consumer needs. not suffers If on the ocean a long System assuring more purchases 
producer technology)? time; faster arrival times from of British cottons. but Chinese 
Canton to Mincing Lane a textile firms opening with joint 
plus. Tea has many grades; venture money from Westem 
clientele has sophisticated agency houses; Railroads mines -
tastes. Investments and loans to 
Silk has many grades; silk government through agency 
culture impacted by weather houses and banks 
and disease. Some high Japan: Cotton and silk factories 
quality not always available. opening with joint venture money 
British cottons of limited from Western agency houses. 
appeal. but market required to London: All tea and silk through 
off-load excess manufactures private trade 
Opium is illegal and sale 
suffers when govemment 
enforces anti-smoking laws 
8 How do consumers learn about these Local newspapers. Co-Hong Local newspapers; Agents In treaty 
characteristics? merchants in Canton; agents ports. 
in Great Britain 
Costs and Value 
9 What is the value chain. including Suppliers in India ->private Suppliers in India. Japan. 
previous and subsequent stages of receiving ship to Canton -> Singapore. Malaysia ->prlvate 
production? Sell to Co-Hong in Canton. steamship to one of 15 treaty ports 
(offer financing) purchase ->sell to merchants at the treaty 
teas. silks on behalf of port. purchase tea. silks -7prlvate 
London. Glasgow. West Indies steamship to London 7 purchase 
clients (offer financing. steel. textiles (to sell on 
insurance) -> private clipper consignment) 
ship to West Indies. London. 
Manchester-> sell teas. silks; 
buy spices. tin. steel. textiles 
(to sell on consignment) 
10 What are the main influences at each From India to Canton - price From India. Japan. etc. supply 
stage? volatility. risk of piracy. Insufficiency. price volatility; at the 
shipwreck; at Canton. Co- Treaty Ports. tariff regulation; at 
Hong loan default. London. angry merchants wanting 
govemment restrictions; from to offload more textiles on China 
Canton to London - weather. market. 
price volatility 
11 Which firms in the industry add Garden. Matheson Jardine. Matheson 
value? Dent & Company Butterfield & Swire 
Finlay & Company 
E.D. Sassoon 
Distinctive Capabilities and 
Strategic Assets 
12 Is Innovation important? Can It be Innovation In speed. routes. When business model Is changing. 
protected? communication essential. Innovation Is the only way to 
capture value 
13 Do firms have intemal or external Firms have agents in supply Same as earlier - except more 
architecture and what specific and demand markets for trade markets opening - Japan. 
benefits - information flows. flexibility as well as Information flow. Malaysia. Slam. Borneo. 
of response. organizational 
knowledge - do they gain from 
them? 
14 Are there long-term experience Sound financial management Same as earlier. but relationships 
characteristics for which reputation Is essential with government Insiders and 
matters? would be Insiders critical. 
Traders became ASEAN 
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INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 1832 (I) 1885 (II) 
15 Do such reputations exist? Yes, but rare in the private Yes, again rare in the private trade. 
trade. Speculation caused Competition with banks on 
demise of houses like Palmer reputation for investment capital. 
& Co., Dent & Co., among 
others. 
16 Are there strategic assets? No. Yes, the Treaty Port System; 
railway contracts; shipping routes 
17 What is their origin - incumbency, N/A Regulation - Treaties guarantee 
cost structure, and regulation? trade and IIne-of-slght duties; 
govemment contracts for railways; 
Far East Shipping Conferences for 
shipping routes and commissions. 
Competitive Advantage 
18 What is the range of distinctive Architecture - feet on the Architecture - same as earlier BUT 
capabilities, which appear in these ground in major markets; Includes access to London 
markets? innovation -speed, new investors: Innovation same as 
routes, new sources, earlier BUT Includes working the 
communications: reputation - value chain to competitive 
sound financial management, advantage; Reputatlon-
excellent credit, influence in increasingly Important to work with 
London and/or China Chinese bureaucrecy 
19 Which firms enjoy them? Architecture - Jardine, Innovation - Sassoon & Co. -
Matheson; Dent & Co.; Palmer Offered production credits to opium 
& Co. suppliers and captured opium 
Innovation - Jardine, 
advantage; Butterfield & Swire, 
bought Russell & Co., and captured 
Matheson & Co., Russell & shipping advantage; 
Co. (American) 
Reputation - Jardine, 
Reputation - Jardine, Matheson & 
Matheson & Co. 
Co .. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank 
20 How are they translated into More agents, more overall More Chinese government 
competitive advantages? trading business contracts: more London Investors 
In raw materials, mining contracts 
21 Are these competitive advantages Yes, until there is a change In Yes, until there Is a change In the 
sustainable, appropriable? the business model - for bualness model. For exemple, 
example, Sassoon's achieved competition In risks from banks, like 
competitive advantage by Hongkong & Shanghai Bank; 
offering production advances competition In shipping from 
to Indian suppliers. Butterfield & Swire lifter vertical 
Integration of American shipbuilder 
Russell & Company 
22 What is the profitability of the Binney & Co., Madras Henderson & Co., Singapore 
marginal firm? (founded 179) -.2 million (founded 1856)-1.46 million 
(coffee plantation) Oute, paper) 
23 Is competitive advantage rellected in Not necessarily. It was the Yes. Competitive advantage would 
added value? practice of many early firms Increase the amount available for 
that partners remove their Investment and loan, hence 
money when they retired from Jardine, Matheson's Investments In 
the business. the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 
sugar, warehouses, cold storage 
and other firms, as well as Its 
absorption of 26 million In railroad 
loans suggest extraordinary 
competitive advantage. 
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Chart 61: INDUSTRY AUDIT - 20th CENTURY: 1977-1996 
INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 1977 (I) 1996 (II) 
1 What is the industry? Trading in commodities International brand 
representatives 
2 What are the major strategic Traditional commodities Multi-industry conglomerates 
groups? specialists 
Commodities generalists 
3 Who are their members? Traditional commodities Swire Pacific. Hutchison 
specialists: S&W Berisford. Whampoa. First Pacific. 
Booker McConnell. Daigety. Wheelock. CITIC 
James Finlay and service: 
Inchcape. Sime Darby; Single 
country or single product: Steel 
Brothers. United City Merchants. 
Wood Hall Trust. 
Generalists: Jardine. Matheson 
Gill & Duffus. Harrisons & 
Crosfield. S. Hoffnung 
4 What are the prinCipal trends in Investment in Hong Kong Intermediary role to Asian trade 
industry and market? 
Intemationalization 
has faded but stili vital to 
franchises with equity involvement 
China Entry Investment in China 
manufacturers and infrastructure 
Service business focus 
5 Is there a relevant regulatory Liberal government; low corporate Takeover Code In Hong Kong; 
environment? tax rates: some protectionism In China govemment approval of 
Singapore. Indonesia. jOint venture partners. 
Demand and Markets 
6 What markets are served in Hong Kong - Supplier of Hong Kong - Property 
product and geographic terms? manufactures; entrepot: property N. E. Asia - market for merchant market banking. lUXUry autos. business 
S.E. Asia - Raw materials. services 
manufactures. engineering and S.E. Asia - market for business construction contracts 
services. franchise 
Europe - source of manufactures Australasia - market for business for sale to China 
services. franchise 
North America - source of N. America - market for manufacturas for sale to China insurance. merchant banking 
South Africa - Raw materials; Europe - market for property textiles development. Instance. merchant 
banking 
7 What are key product Could be anything at ali. from Luxury goods and services -
characteristics (in terms of noodles to missiles Automobiles. hotels with 
consumer needs. not producer International brand names 
technology)? 
Franchises - Consistent. 
recognizable quality 
Supply chain management -
Transportation 
Merchant Banking and Insurance 
- International Brand names 
8 How do consumers learn about 
these characteristics? 
Extensive local advertising Extensive trade edvertlslng 
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INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 1977 (I) 1996 (II) 
Costs and Value 
9 What is the value chain? Using steel as an example, raw Using transportation services as 
Including previous and materials by Liberian vessel an example, Jardine Ship 
subsequent stages of production? (Jardine owned ship) ->blast Management arranges 
fumace or manufacturing site warehousing, documentation, 
(Jardine, Matheson associated financing and Insurance for IKEA 
firm)->intermediate goods (steel furniture manufactures bound for 
ingots) by Liberian vessel (Jardine Singapore->ship arranged with 
owned ship) or road transport Rennies & Safmarine, South 
vehicle (Jardine owned) -> Africa, ship owners -> fumiture 
industrial client warehoused at Jardine container 
freight station, Singapore facility-
>carried by Jardine truck to IKEA 
outiets, Singapore, franchise held 
by Jardine, Matheson 
10 What are the main influences at Raw material prices->unused Total volume to be shipped = 
each stage? capacity at blast furnace, product commission fees charged; 
mix issues-> freight transportation financing and insurance = interest 
commission rates (depends on rates ->ship chartering fees-
overall ships capacity)-> industrial >warehousing fees->ground 
client accepts shipment and pays. transportation fees->% of each 
Payment can be 2 years out. sale benefits franchisee 
11 Which firms in the industry add From added value table: From added value table: 
value? 
Jardine Matheson -14% CITIC - 55% (but issuing shares) 
Sime Darby - 10.6% Jardine, Matheson - 22.40% 
James Finlay - 8.3% Swire Pacific - 22% 
Inchcape - Profit 6.1 % 
Harrison's & Crosfield - 3.4% Hutchison - 20% 
First Pacific - 22% 
Wheelock - 19% 
Distinctive Capabilities and 
Strategic Assets 
12 Is innovation important? Can it be Innovation - finding ways to When business model is 
protected? increase profit margin. Of changing, innovation is a way to 
competitors, Jardine, Matheson re-capture value - at another 
had highest profit margin-14% stage of the value chain. 
on a sale because of its value 
capture. 
First shipping company in Asia 
Pacific to adopt cellular telephone 
use 
13 Do firms have internal or external Feet on the ground essential - Feet on the ground essential -
architecture and what specific 
benefits - information flows, 
50,000 employees 200,000 employees. 
flexibility of response, 
organizational knowiedge - do 
they gain from them? 
14 Are there long-term experience Sound financial management is Same as earlier, but relationships 
characteristics for which essential. with government insiders and 
reputation malters? would be insiders critical. 
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INDUSTRY BACKGROUND 1977 (I) 1996 (II) 
15 Do such reputations exist? Yes. Inchcape, Butterfield & Yes. But China approval is a 
Swire have such reputations more useful reputation - hence 
CITIC and Hutchison Whampoa, 
part of the Cheung Kong group, 
which has substantial China 
support. 
16 Are there strategic assets? First mover advantages in ASEAN Some first mover contract 
markets after ASEAN; Far advantages in China. 
Eastem Shipping Conferences; 
Hong Kong govemment contracts 
and licenses 
17 What is their Origin - incumbency, Incumbency and regulation. Incumbency, willingness to Invest 
cost structure, and regulation? In China for less or diminishing 
ownership. 
Competitive Advantage 
18 What is the range of distinctive Architecture - feet on the ground Architecture - same as earlier 
capabilities that appear in these in major markets; innovation - BUT includes access to London 
markets? speed, new routes, new sources, Investors; Innovation - same as 
communications; reputation - earlier BUT includes working the 
sound financial management, value chain to competitive 
excellent credit, Influence in advantage; Reputation -
London and/or China increasingly Important to work 
with Chinese bureaucracy 
19 Which firms enjoy them? Jardine, Matheson, Butterfield & Swire Pacific, Hutchison 
Swire, Wheelock Marden Whampoa, elTIC, First Pacific, 
Wheelock, and Jardine Matheson 
20 How are they translated into More agents, more overall trading More Chinese govemment 
competitive advantages? business contracts; more London Investors 
In raw materials, mining contracts 
21 Are these competitive advantages No, sustalnability means constant Same as earlier period. However, 
sustainable, appropriable? change, because over concentration on services, a few 
dependence on a single market or intemational brands and 
single sector of the economy can franchises Increases profits 
be fatal. Exchange rate risk limits attributable. 
approprlability. 
22 What is the profitability of the 1.9% S&W Berlsford Wheelock - 6.94% 
marginal firm? 
23 Is competitive advantage reflected Yes. Yes, although profitability and 
in added value? added value have a misleading 
ralationshlp. For example 
marginal firm Wheelock has high 
added value because of 
divestments but profitability Is low. 
261 
The Environmental and Industry Audit Comparison -1832-1885; 1977-1996 
Industry Background 1832-1885 
As shown in Chart 60.1. 1 the industry in 1832 was trading in commodities, largely carried 
on by the British East India Company, which had for two centuries dominated trade, raised 
armies, minted money and demolished nations. It was the operational arm of Britain in 
China, Australia, India and the American colonies. Trade outside of the East India 
Company's jurisdiction was called the "private trade," and it was largely "business-to-
business" or "merchant-to-merchant." The relationship between government monopoly and 
private trade was symbiotic: a portion of the cash raised by the private trade financed the 
East India Company's China tea purchases. 
There were two strategic groups at the outset of this study (Chart 60.1. 2) - the government 
trading monopoly and the growing private trade. The early private trade was characterized 
by independent merchants who, for low working capital, could earn up to 45 cents on 
commission from every transaction dollar by absorbing the risks of their customers. The 
wealthier of these merchants through investment or partnerships would integrate forward 
into shipping, finance and insurance to appropriate more of the value of the transaction. 
In 1832, the largest of the private traders, with large teams of agents working on their behalf, 
were Jardine, Matheson & Company and Dent & Company. Palmer & Company had been 
the leading competitor, until 1830, when the firm was bankrupted in a speculation crisis. 
(Chart 60.1. 3) 
The principal trend in the industry in 1832 (Chart 60.1. 4) were the emergence of the agency 
house with many associated private merchants, and the institutionalization of the group of 
services which became known as "agency services." While the agency house was primarily 
a trading firm, through its "agency services," it also acted as banker, bill-broker, ship owner, 
freighter, insurance agent and purveyor, maintaining a growing network of branch houses 
and agents. The agency house reduced the entry barriers for would-be traders with low 
working capital: they could become associated agents. The agency house reduced as well 
the risks for buyers and sellers - offering credit or insurance at each stage of a transaction 
for a commission, as depicted in Chapter 5, Commissions Charged by Agents. 
The environment for trade in 1832 was volatile (Chart 60.1. 5), because Chinese 
government pursuit of private traders intermittently suspended business activities - and 
because piracy was an everyday threat. 
In contrast, Chart 60.11. 1 depicts aggressive expansion in the industry by 1885 - the 
movement beyond trading in commodities to investment, the establishment of an associated 
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investment house as a "free standing company." The investment house was not a 
repository for trading wealth, but for information about investment opportunities, gained from 
trading. 
The strategic groups (Chart 60.11.2) have changed, the trading firm with associated 
investment house is now in competition with banks and investment houses, located not in 
the Far East but in London. 
The major members of the strategic group (Chart 60.11. 3) are Jardine, Matheson & 
Company, and Butterfield & Swire - still competing in Far East with a hundred other agency 
houses - and the London investment offices of Matheson & Company, John Swire & Sons, 
and the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. 
The principal trends in the industry of 1885 (Chart 60.11. 4) are the development of the free 
standing investment houses, associated with a Pacific or otherwise distant trading firm - and 
the investment in infrastructure (railroads) and manufactures, raw materials and mines in the 
Far East, Africa, South Africa, even parts of Southern Europe. Knowledge of investment 
opportunities and operational management of the mining or manufacturing or railroad project 
were the roles that fell to the Far East trading company. The associated investment house 
lined up the investors and offered an "independent" evaluation of the merits of the 
investment. 
The Treaty Port system (Chart 60.11.5) opened markets to dependable trade at fixed tariffs, 
reducing trading risk and encouraging commerce. 
Demand and Markets 1832.1885 
In 1832 (Chart 60.1. 6), the long list of commodities offered for sale could be reduced to four 
staples, three of which were legal, two of which were sold to Great Britain and Europe, that 
is tea and silk; and two sold to the Chinese, cotton and opium, the former at less than cost 
to keep the machines running in Lancashire, the latter more profitably. The legitimate 
trading frontier was limited to Canton - the opium trade included the China Coast. 
Demand (Chart 60.1. 7) was affected by product quality in the case of tea, silk and cotton. 
Local weather and transport could affect tea quality. Some higher grades were not always 
available. Tea had to be kept dry and suffered if it was at sea too long. Quality degradation 
resulted in lower prices paid by London tea buyers. 
Silk culture was impacted by weather and disease - and high quality varieties of silk were 
not always available. Lesser quality silk did not sell. 
British cottons were of very limited appeal in China, but required to off-load excess 
manufactures. The private traders had more success selling Madras cotton to the Chinese. 
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Opium was illegal and its sale suffered when the Opium Commissioner enforced 
antismoking laws. 
In 1832, buyers and sellers learned about the prices and quantities and anticipated 
shipments of commodities from trade papers like the Canton Register and the Straits Times 
- and from the private traders to their suppliers and major customers (Chart 60.1. 8). The 
CO-Hong merchants in China communicated to their clientele. 
By 1885, the Treaty Port System (Chart 60. II. 7) guaranteed a minimum purchase of British 
cotton. But the rich agency houses formed joint ventures for textile manufacture in China, as 
well as cotton and silk factories in Japan. By this time, the agency houses brokered all of 
the tea and silk sales; the East India Company was long out of the picture. 
The investment houses associated with the trading firms brokered the demand for 
investment opportunities. By 1885, some 35% of British overseas investments were 
solicited by investment houses associated with trading firms (Chart 60.11.8). 
Costs and Value 1832-1885 
The value chain of the trading firm in 1832 (Chart 60.1.9) began with suppliers in India (1), 
loading goods onto a receiving ship bound for Canton. Payment was made via letter of 
credit from the merchant's bank. Goods were sold to co-Hong merchants in Canton (on 
finanCing terms). In return, teas, silks were purchased on behalf of merchants in London, 
Glasgow, and West Indies (for finance credit, insurance). Goods were transported via ship 
to West Indies, London, Manchester, where they were sold, and where tin, steel, textiles, 
etc. were picked up to sell on consignment. 
Each stage of the value chain (Chart 60.1.10) had associated risks - from India to Canton, 
price volatility, risk of piracy or shipwreck; at Canton, loan default on the part of CO-Hong 
merchants, government restrictions on trade; from Canton to London, weather that could 
slow or damage, and price volatility. 
The 1832, firms with a reputation for strong financial management as well as architecture (a 
long-lasting network of local relationships) added value. The data is insufficient to offer 
added value statements for 1832. The argument for strong financial management can be 
made on the basis of leading firm Palmer & Company, whose group capital was $5 million in 
1830, the year the firm went bankrupt. (Chart 60.1.11) 
The value chain looked different in 1885 (Chart 60.11.9), because the treaty port markets 
added to the number of supplier and purchaser markets. Suppliers in India, Japan, 
Singapore, Malaysia boarded their goods onto merchant steamers bound for one of 15 
treaty 
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ports in China. Payment was made via letter of credit from the merchant's bank. Goods 
were sold to merchants in the treaty ports (on financing terms); tea and silks were 
purchased for sale in resale in London (for finance credit, insurance). At London, steel and 
textiles were purchased for resale at the treaty ports (on consignment). The transaction 
opportunities (and credit financing opportunities) increased as the number of supplier and 
purchaser markets increased. 
In 1885 the supply insufficiency from India and Japan were major influences on value (Chart 
60.11.10), resulting in higher prices. At the Treaty Ports, tariff regulation was an issue. In 
London, angry merchants pushed the agency houses to sell more textiles for China. 
In 1885, four firms established before 1885 were thriving and adding value, as evidenced in 
their ability to undertake investments (Chart 60.1.11). Group capital estimates for these 
firms are derived from Chapter 4, Chart 13. 
• Jardine, Matheson & Company, established in Canton, with 1.72M (1891) - trading, 
banking, shipping, insurance, cotton, mines, railways; 
• Finlay & Company, established in Bombay, with 4.36M (1898) - trading, banking, 
shipping, cotton mills and tea estates; 
• Butterfield & Swire, established in Shanghai, with 4.15M (1900) - trading, banking, 
harbors and docks, shipping, railways, petroleum; 
• E.D. Sassoon & Company, established in Bombay, with 6-7M(1920) - trading, 
shipping, banking, breweries, cotton mills, tramways. The group capital figure is 
late, but was the only figure I could find. Nevertheless, the archives of the period 
indicate E.D. Sassoon had taken over the lucrative opium market as early as the 
1860s. 
• Note: Dent & Company was no longer in existence in 1885. 
Distinctive Capabilities and Strategic Assets (1832.1885) 
Innovation - in speed, in routes, in financing and in communications - was important and 
competitive advantage depended on it (Chart 60.1.12). Architecture was essential to what 
was essentially an inter-firm market, and strong architecture provided the information flow 
that communicated information about supply, demand and risk conditions (Chart 60.1. 13). 
A trading firm's ability to broker risks depended on a reputation for sound financial judgment. 
A very few firms in the industry could charge higher prices because of this reputation (Chart 
60.1. 14 and 15). 
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In 1832. other than the British East India Company. trading firms enjoyed no strategic 
assets. that is to say. owned advantages external to the firm (Chart 60.1.16 and 17). 
By 1885. the business model had changed. from pure trading house to trading house with 
associated investment house (Chart 60.11.12). Innovation was critical to respond to new 
opportunities to benefit from investment in fixed assets. from license and contract 
arrangements. Trading firms put their architecture to work identifying investment 
opportunities in the supply and demand markers (Chart 60.11. 13). The reputation of a 
trading house and that of an investment house are different. hence the move by trading 
firms to establish independent "free standing companies" with veto power over investment 
proposals. Investment houses were headed by members of the trading firm who had gone 
home to London and had constituencies there - in both the metaphorical and literal sense. 
Some heads of investment houses were former traders turned ASEAN. Relationships with 
government as investment partners were critical. (Chart 60.11. 14 and 15). 
A stunning revelation that the strategiC audit permits is the search evident by 1885 for a 
claim to a fixed. external advantage. evidenced in the Treaty Port System. railway contracts. 
licensed shipping routes. and fixed assets like gold and tin mines (Chart 60.11. 16). 
Regulation is the origin of these strategic assets: treaties guaranteed trade and line-of-sight 
duties; railway contracts were supported by government; and what became known as the 
Far East Shipping Conferences literally amounted to industry self-regulation (Chart 60.11. 
17). 
Competitive Advantage 
In 1832. competitive advantage depended on innovation. architecture and reputation (Chart 
60.1.18). In that year. Jardine. Matheson & Company and Dent & Company enjoyed a 
breadth and depth of architecture unmatched in the industry. Jardine. Matheson & 
Company and Russell & Company (the latter an American firm) built innovative new ships, 
powered by sail. later by steam, for faster access to markets and faster communications. 
Jardine, Matheson & Company preempted the field in reputation for financial probity (Chart 
60.1. 19). Firms strong in these distinctive capabilities attracted more agents and more 
business-to-business trade (Chart 60.1. 20). The advantage provided by architecture and 
reputation was sustainable, because it was built on self-selected business behavior that was 
also very important to the China market, where long-term relationships were favored over 
spot contracts (Chart 60.1. 21). However, sustainability could be (and was) challenged by 
changes in the business model: for example. the move from pure commission to advances 
on future sales that gave Sassoon's the edge. 
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In 1832, the marginal firm - an individual merchant or private partnership - could 
appropriate 35% of earnings, with 10% for meager office, warehouse and staff; 55% for cost 
of goods sold (Chart 60.1.22.) 
In 1832, competitive advantage was not necessarily reflected in added value (Chart 60.1. 
24). It was the practice of many early firms for partners to remove all of their accumulated 
capital when they retired from the business. So, available financials would give an 
incomplete view. 
By 1885, architecture, innovation and reputation are equally as important as in 1832 - but 
reputation has become far more important to the accumulation of strategic assets (Chart 
60.11. 18). 
When Butterfield & Swire bought innovative American ship builders Russell & Company, 
they accumulated the largest fleet in the Pacific and captured the shipping advantage. 
Jardine, Matheson & Company joined the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, an advanced its 
reputation in finance and investment. Both Buttterfieid & Swire and Jardine, Matheson & 
Company were displaced in the opium business by E.D. Sassoon & Company, who offered 
production credits to opium suppliers and captured the advantage in that industry (Chart 
60.11. 19). 
Reputation translated into more Chinese government contracts in 1885 - and more London 
investors for raw materials and mining projects (Chart 60.11. 20). 
The advantage derived from distinctive capabilities was sustainable, so long as firms 
continued to grow and evolve those capabilities to address changes in the business model. 
It is obvious from the behavior of firms in 1885 that the acquisition of strategic assets 
appeared to offer a guarantee of sustainability and appropriability beyond that afforded by 
distinctive capabilities alone (Chart 60.11. 23). 
The Industry Background 1977.1996 
In 1977, the industry is trading in commodities. (Chart 61.1. 1). There were at least two 
strategic groups, defined by security analysts of the period (Chart 61.1. 2): 
• Traditional commodities speCialists, focused on a single country, single product or 
service. 
• Commodities generalists, including the sogo shosha or general trading companies. 
In 1977, traditional commodities speCialists included S&W Berisford, Booker McConnell, 
Daigety and James Finlay. 
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Generalists included Jardine. Matheson. Gill & Duffus. Harrisons & Crosfield. S. Hoffnung 
and also Mitsubishi. Mitsui. Marubeni - the latter. Japanese general trading companies 
(Chart 61.1. 3). 
The principal trends in the industry were intertwined: the opening of China to trade made 
investment in Hong Kong. the financial capital of Asia. desirable both on the part of Hong 
Kong based firms and North American and European firms looking to establish an office 
close to China. Members of the industry served as intermediaries or consultants to firms 
seeking an Asian presence {Chart 61.1.4}. 
The government of Hong Kong had a reputation for liberalism and tax rates were low. There 
was variable protectionism in the ASEAN markets (Chart 61.1. 4). 
By 1996. the industry had changed dramatically: it is known as the multi-industry 
conglomerate sector (Chart 61.11. 1). The strategic groups are: 
• The largest members were Swire Pacific (descended from Butterfield & Swire); 
Hutchison Whampoa; Wheelock (descended from Wheelock Marden). Jardine. 
Matheson. First Pacific and the Chinese investment conglomerate. CITIC {Chart 
61.11. 3}. 
• The intermediary role to Asian trade is still vital to privileged franchise expansion. 
but the Pacific trade and distribution (or trade and marketing) segment of the 
conglomerate's business is one spoke in the wheel of businesses which may be 
very diverse - telecommunications. infrastructure. aviation. banking. property and 
development {Chart 61.11. 4}. 
• Under the Takeover Code. Hong Kong would return to China in 1997. The business 
atmosphere was apprehensive (Chart 61.11. 5). 
Demand and Markets 1977-1996 
In 1977. the trading company was selling on its own account and as an agent of foreign 
firms. Hong Kong was a supplier of manufactures. a major entrepot for export. import. re-
export. and a booming property market. Southeast Asia was a source market for materials. 
manufactures. engineering and construction contracts. South Africa was a source market 
for raw materials. textiles. and leather. North America and Europe were a source of 
manufactures for sale to China - and a demand market for Southeast Asian and South 
African raw materials (Chart 61.1. 6). 
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Outside of Hong Kong. the industry was business-to-business in 1977 (Chart 61.1.7). 
Commodities traders brokered everything sold to international business customers from 
noodles to missiles. 
Business-to-business communications was largely through Lloyds' List. the respected 
publication of the commodities and shipping industries. the Financial Times. South China 
Morning Post. Far East Asian Review. and local advertising (Chart 61.1.8). 
By 1996. Hong Kong was largely a container port and property market for the 
conglomerates. Northeast Asia had become a market for merchant banking. lUxury autos 
and business services. Australasia and Southeast Asia were markets for business services 
and franchises. China was a market for infrastructure investment. manufacturing and 
privileged franchises. North America and Europe were markets for merchant banking. 
insurance and property development (Chart 61.11.6) 
By 1996. the conglomerates had bought the right to sell international brand names in Asia -
lUxury cars. hotels. restaurants. They owned basic services - transportation. electriCity and 
telephone - or sophisticated business services. international brand names in merchant 
banking. insurance and aviation. They owned privileged franchises (Chart 61.11. 7). 
Extensive trade and brand advertising campaigns were launched to support their offerings 
(Chart 61.11.8). 
Costs and Value 1977-1996 
In 1977. commodities traders. like the early private traders. broke red the whole transaction. 
Using steel as an example. the trading firm would up the raw product in its own vessel. 
transport it to a blast furnace or manufacturing site. and pick up the steel ingots or product of 
manufacture for transport by sea or road to an industrial client (Chart 61.1. 9). 
Raw material prices might be impacted by unused capacity at the blast furnace - or product 
mix issues. Freight transportation commission rates depended on ship capacity. By the 
time the industrial client accepts the goods and pays. perhaps two years have elapsed 
(Chart 61, I. 10). 
For the trader. the credit terms he can extend to industrial clients on the one end of the 
value chain and raw materials producers at the other are a source of his advantage to this 
market. 
In 1977. firms able to profit from the arrangement included Jardine Matheson at 14%; Sime 
Darby at 10.6%; James Finlay at 9.3%. Inchcape at 6.1% and Harrlsons & Crosfield at 3.4% 
(Chart 61.1.11). 
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By 1996, the value chain has changed. The conglomerate more often than not doesn't have 
its own ships. Its expertise on behalf of an industrial client may be supply chain 
management at a distance: arranging warehousing documentation, financing and insurance 
for international IKEA brand furniture bound for Singapore; ship arranged through Safmarine 
& Rennies, South African ship owners. The fumiture might we warehoused at a container 
freight station in Singapore, them carried by truck to IKEA outlets. The conglomerate might 
do aU of the supply chain management for franchise business it has an equity stake in 
(Chart 61.11. 9). 
At each stage of the value chain there are charges. There is a commission charged on the 
total volume to be shipped. There are interest rates on any financing and insurance 
provided. There are ship chartering feeds, warehousing fees and ground transportation fees 
- and a percent of each sale benefits the franchisee (Chart 61.11.10). 
Looking at the largest conglomerates in 1996, CITIC has achieved an added value of 55%, 
because it issued new shares in 1996. Jardine, Matheson's added value is 22.4%; Swire 
Pacific's and First Pacific's are both 22%; Hutchison's is 19% (Chart 61.11.11). 
The industry and its ability to add value have undergone tremendous change since 1977. 
And many of the major players are entirely different. 
Distinctive Capabilities and Strategic Assets 
In 1977, innovation was important, bringing new technology to bear on communications (ceU 
phones, faxes) and logistics (EDI) would for a time provide an advantage to firms on the 
leading edge of the new technology. But the technology was not proprietary to the trading 
firm and was easily copied or purchased. Other innovations were more lasting in their 
impact. Like the particular business model a firm chose (Chart 61.1. 12). Architecture was 
even more important in 1977, because a firm's international business customers were 
looking for everything they didn't have in Asia - relationships, knowledge, impact and 
influence (Chart 61.1. 13). 
In 1977, the long-term experience in Asia of trading firms like Jardine, Matheson, Harrisons 
& Crosfield, James Finlay and others was a powerful advantage in the eyes of firms looking 
for knowledgeable agents or strategic partners. Such prospective partners would be looking 
for long-term profitability and added value as an indication of sound financial management 
and sustainable competitive advantage (Chart 61.1.14 and 15). 
To the extent that first mover advantages can be strategic assets, such existed in the 
ASEAN after WWII. The Far Eastern Shipping Conferences, still in existence in 1977, 
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erected barrier for new entrants into Asian shipping. There was considerable competition 
for Hong Kong government contracts and licenses - and all of the old trading companies 
made sure they had representatives on the Legislative Council, on the board of the 
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank and among the stewards of the Jockey Club, so they 
maintained access to information and influence (Chart 61.1. 16). The origin of strategic 
assets was incumbency and influence (Chart 61.1. 17). 
By 1996, the conglomerates were beginning to be held to the same standards as modern 
businesses - cash flow analysis, valuation modes. EVA being used to determine the 
contribution of individual businesses in conglomerate hands. the strength of cash flows and 
the impact of the holding company or corporate center to add value. Innovative business 
routines and architecture were important capabilities in 1996 (Chart 61.11.12 and 13). 
Long-term experience became a double-edged sword in 1996. when an opium past would 
be held against some of the old trading companies. now conglomerates, wishing to establish 
joint ventures in China. A strong relationship with China's government was seen as a better 
reputation to have, evidence the strong positions CITIC, Hutchison Whampoa and Swire 
Pacific have been able to achieve (Chart 61.11. 15). 
Some first mover or privileged joint venture contract advantages existed in China in 1996 
(Chart 61.11, 16). Their origin is incumbency and willingness to invest in China's 
infrastructure. 
Competitive Advantage 
In 1977, architecture, both internal and external, was crucial to the general trading company. 
whose advantage lay in its dense network of inter-firm relationships. (Chart 61.1.18). 
Relationships were important to the specialist commodities traders, and a constant flow of 
information was essential to both strategic groups. 
The Japanese sogo shosha - Mitsubishi, Mitsui, among others - enjoyed these capabilities, 
as did a few of the old agency houses, like Jardine, Matheson & Company and the Inchcape 
Group. They distinguished themselves from potential competitors by choosing to follow a 
very different business model - one very similar to the agency services model, but providing 
a complete value chain to its industry clients (Chart 61.1.18). 
The competitive advantage of the sogo shosha model is its ability to provide credit to 
primary goods producers and manufacturers. 
271 
Chapter 8: Section 2: The Strategic Audit of the Firm. 
Jardine. Matheson & Company. 1832·1996 
The answers to a standard set of questions - again proposed by John Kay and comprising a 
·strategic audit of the firm" - define the firm's corporate and business strategy. 
The questions are: 
• What are the firm's distinctive capabilities - reputation, architecture, and innovation? 
• What strategic assets does it hold? 
• Are there incumbent advantages, licenses or other protection, access to scarce 
factors? 
• What are the relevant markets? Identify the product and geographic dimensions. 
What are the markets in which its distinctive capabilities and strategic assets are 
valuable? 
• Are there other markets, linked to these by scale or scope economies, which it pays 
to serve even if there is no direct competitive advantage? 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
What competitive advantages are derived from these distinctive capabilities? Over 
whom? 
How do industry conditions affect the translation of competitive advantage into 
added value? 
Relate added value to share-price/cash-flow performance? 
Review the sustainability and appropriability of competitive advantage 
Does the firm's distinctive capability dictate its market positioning? If not, review 
positioning relative to competition 
Is the competitive environment stable or unstable? Can stability be increased? 
In a stable environment, review industry pricing policies and rules 
In an unstable environment, review pricing strategies relative to competition 
• Are economic markets as fully segmented as possible? 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
How do customers obtain information in the principal markets? 
Can reputation/brands be extended and where? 
What functions do brands serve in these markets? 
Review sustainability of brandslreputations and evaluate relative to competitors. 
Define principal relationships with suppliers/distributors 
What is the relationship to market structure? 
Is added value defended from customers and suppliers? 
How do vertical relationships divide risks create incentives and protect against 
opportunism? 
What is the appropriate contract style - relational, classical or spot? 
These questions and answers are laid out in Charts 62 and 63, below. 
Chart 62: FIRM AUDIT _19th CENTURY: 1832 and 1885 
FIRM 1832 (I) 1885 (II) 
CORPORATE STRATEGY 
1 What are the firm's distinctive Architecture - 50 agents on the Architecture 150 agents on the 
capabilities? ground in major markets; ground; access to London 
innovation -speed - 12 clippers, investors; Innovation - steam 
new routes, coastal; ships replaced clippers; 
communications - management Reputation - Member of London letters; reputation - sound Advisory Council and Board of financial management, excellent Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. 
credit, member of Parliament in Strong relationship with Chinese Great Britain. govemment 
2 What strategic assets does it UK govemmant protection: From In China, govemment railway 
hold? Are there incumbent Napier to Palmerston. First Opium development contracts shared with 
advantages, licenses or other War and cessation of Hong Kong Butterfield & Swire in the name of th 
protection, access to scarce largely the result of a campaign of British and Chinese Corporation 
factors? British merchants organized by 
Jardine. Matheson. 
3 What are the relevant markets in Canton/Macau - Buy tea. silk; pay 1 Treaty Ports In China -
terms of product and geographical through opium. cash Purchase of tea. silk; sale of 
dimensions? 
India - Buy opium. pay through bills cottons 
of credit Treaty Port in Japan - purchase 
Great Britain - Buy cotton. pay of silk 
through bills of credit; sell tea. silk London - Influence 
London - Influence 
4 What are the markets in which its Same as relevant markets. 15 Treaty Ports in China 
distinctive capabilities and strategic Treaty Port in Japan 
assets are valuable? 
London 
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5 Are there other markets, linked to East Indies - Source of commoditie Treaty territories like Singapore, 
these by scale or scope Ceylon - Being built into buy/sell Straitts, Malaysia, Siam, Borneo-
economies, which it pays to serve 
market with Chinese labor tin, rubber, petroleum, gold 
even if there is no direct investments 
competitive advantage? Australia - being built into buy/sell 
market with Chinese labor 
6 What competitive advantages are Architecture - More agents than Architecture - Fewer agents than 
derived from these distinctive Dent & Co" largest competitor Sassoon & Co., lead competitor in 
capabilities? Over whom? Innovation - Faster ships than opium 
Dent & Co. Innovation - Rivals with Butterfeld 
Reputation - Sound finance; Dent & Swire In steamship wars with 
& Co., Palmer & Co., major Japanese 
competitors, succumb to credit Reputation - Jardine, Matheson 
crises preeminent In Hong Kong and 
London. 
7 How do industry conditions affect th Trading firms operated mostly on Same at earlier, but edded value, 
translation of competitive advantagE commission. Capital accumulated I period 1 enabled 
into value added? requirements were low. Jardine, Matheson to establish 
Competitive advantage was very textile manufacturing, sugar 
appropriable milling and warehousing 
Facilities. 
8 What is the relationship of added With working capitel low and Based on firm and partner date In 
value to share price/cash flow purchases on bills of credit, the 1875, added value was 40% of 
performance? firm that adhered closely to a overell turnover. 
commission business could put 
aside up to 46% of a transaction 
(minus actual shipping and 
carrying costs) 
9 How sustainable or appropriable is Operating on a commission besls, Operating on a commission basis, 
competitive advantage? competitive advantage was wholly competitive advantege was wholly 
appropriable to the trading firm. appropriable to the trading firm. 
With the business model changing 
to a loan/Investment basis, there 
was greater risk of when 
governments were Involved. 
Business Strategy 
Pricing and Positioning 
10 Does the firm's distinctive capability Yes. Relational contacts are Yes. Reputation Is responsible for 
dictate its market positioning? important to all stages of the value government contracts and Investor 
chain; buyers and sellers alike capltel. 
trust a firm with a solid reputation; 
innovation essential to capturing 
more opportunity. 
11 If not, review pOSitioning relative to Jardine, Matheson was able to N/A 
competition In a stable environment charge more for shipping services 
review-pricing strategies relative to because of Its reputation. 
competition. 
12 Is the competitive environment Unsteble - Speculation and reliance Steble - Trading competitors more 
stable or unstable? on credit has undermined firms. firmly grounded In commission 
Information access has been an business. 
Important dlfferentlator. 
13 Can stability be increased? Yes. No. 
14 Are economic markets as fully No, because Imperial government No, because accass to China and 
segmented as possible limitations on trade prevail. Japan Is through Treaty Ports only. 
Branding and Advertising 
274 
FIRM 1832 (I) 1885 (II) 
15 How do customers obtain informatio The trade, including the Co-Hong Lloyds List and local circulars. 
in the principal markets? has the Canton Register for 
product, pricing information. 
16 Can reputation/brands be extended, London Ceylon, Australia, Malaysia, Siam, 
and where? Borneo through trade and/or 
investment 
17 What functions do brands serve in The trading company is the brand. The trading company and the 
these markets? investment house are separate 
brands targeted at different 
audiences. 
18 What is the sustainability of brands Reputation is important. Jardine, Reputation is Important, enhanced 
and reputation and evaluate relative Matheson's reputation for sound by membership of the board of the 
to competition. finance has given it a 213 lead over Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank and 
competitors. London Advisory Council. 
Vertical relationships 
19 Define prinCipal relationships with Biggest supplier J. Jeejeebhoy Biggest supplier: Govemments-
suppliers and distributors. Distributors/Agents: E. de Otadui, China, Japan 
Remington Distributors/Agents: Matheson & Co 
20 What is the relationship to market Identicel. Identical 
structure? 
21 Is added value defended from Yes, strict commission basis Yes, strict commission basis 
customers and suppliers? assures this. assures this. 
22 How do vertical relationships There were no vertical Matheson & Company has 
divide risks, create incentives, and relationships originally. Prlnclpal- emerged as a separete 
protect against opportunism? agent behavior allowed trading on Investment house entity; has veto 
own account; the desire for future power over financial commitments 
trade was the only protection of Jardine, Matheson & Co. 
against opportunism. 
23 What is the appropriate contrect Relational between firm and its Relational between firm and its 
style - relational, classical, or spot? major supplier and agents; major supplier and agents; 
elsewhere, spot relational with Investors; 
elsewhere, spot 
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Chart 63: FIRM AUDIT: 1977 -1996 
FIRM 1977 (I) 1996 (II) 
CORPORATE STRATEGY 
1 What are the firm's distinctive Architecture -50.000 employees; Architecture - 200.000 employees 
capabilities? Consider 41.000 in Asia. agents on the ground; access 
innovation. reputation and Innovation - Speed In through brokers to Asian and 
architecture. 
communications. first to use cell worldwide Investors. 
phones. EDI in Asia Pacific; three- Reputation - Strong cash flows. 
year plans updated monthly; But weakened Net Asset Value 
working the value chain to capture versus competitors. Known as higher value; reputation - sound intematlonal brand builder financial management. excellent because of success with Chubb. 
credit. "unofficial" member of Hong IKEA. Meet-Hennessy. Taco Bell. Kong legislative council KFC, and own brands Dairy Farm, 
Jardine Fleming. Mandarin 
Oriental. 
2 What strategic assets does it Trading/shipping routes protected Leases and contracts with 
hold? Are there incumbent by Fast East Shipping; leases. intemational franchisers. 
advantages. licenses or other First mover advantage in Contribution to Hong Kong GOP 
protection, access to scarce Singapore. Malaysia. Australia at 8.06% exceeded only by 
factors? and Japan. Conferences; Hong competitor First Pacific Ltd. 
Kong govemment contracts; 
Jardine Matheson represented 
17% of the total cepitallzation of 
Hong Kong stock exchange; 
contribution to GOP in Hong Kong 
at 3.9% higher than competitors. 
same or higher in Singapore. 
Japan. South Africa alone among 
competitors. 
3 What are the relevant markets? Hong Kong - Home market; Hong Kong - Home market; 
Identify the product and Industrializing; regional financial Major financial center; major 
geographical dimensions. center; major entrepot entrepot; link to China market for 
N. America and Europe - Americas and Europe 
Import/Export with Hong Kong China - Infrastructure projects; 
Southern Africa. N.E. Asia, S.E. manufecturing; franchises 
Asia and Australasia - Source N.E. Asia. S.E. Asia and 
markets; potential entrepots Australasia - Entrepots. 
services. franchises 
4 What are the markets in which its Markets - Percentage Profit Markets - Percentage Profit 
distinctive capabilities and Contribution; Equity Contribution 
strategic assets are valuable? Contribution Hong Kong and China - 61% 
Hong Kong - 57%; 37% NE Asia -14.5% 
Australasia - 7%; 14% SE Asia -11.9% 
N. America - 7%; 8% Australasia -1.6% 
Europe - 7%; 8% N.America -1.03% 
Southem Africa - 5%; 5% Europe and Middle East - 9.7% 
Middle East - 6%; 6% 
5 Are there other markets. linked to SE Asia - 4%; 10% Australasia - 1.6% 
these by scale or scope NE Asia - 7%; 5% Americas - 1.03% 
economies, which it pays to serve 
even if there is no direct China China 
competitive advantage? 
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6 What competitive advantages are Innovative routines - investments Innovative routines - Investments 
derived from these distinctive have 3 years to meet hurdle rate have 3 years to meet hurdle rate 
capabilities? Over whom? of 25% or they are divested; 3 of 25% or they are divested; 
year performance plans updated highest quick ratio in business. 
monthly Reputation - Somewhat tamished 
Reputation -Essential to enable in investor Circles from high debt 
connections to Asia for N. Americar 1970's, and decreasingly 
and European firms. important to Europe and N. 
America for trade. 
7 How do industry conditions affect Jardine, Matheson's profit margin Added value can grow very large 
the translation of competitive at 14%, higher than all for reasons of stock issue (CITIC) 
advantage into value added? competitors in commodities or divestments (Wheelock) 
speCialist, single product and without competitive advantage. 
manufactures sales and a service 
groups 
8 Relate added value to share High cash flows; but heavy High, stable cash flows; added 
price/cash flow performance. indebtedness, Added value at 5%. value at 20%, far lower than Swire 
at 26% and equal to Hutchison at 
20% 
9 Review the sustainability and Yes, depends on flexible Yes, depends on flexible 
appropriability of competitive adjustment to change In value adjustment to change in value 
advantage source source. 
Business Strategy 
PriCing and Positioning 
10 Does the firm's distinctive capability Reputation causes Jardine, Jardine's reputation has 
dictate its market positioning? Matheson to be the chosen contributed to Jardine Fleming 
partner on deals; highest profit being #1 financial services 
margins in trading at 14%, 3 company In Japan, Hong Kong; 
percentage points higher than Jardine Lloyd Thompson. 
nearest competitor. Jardine, Matheson" architecture 
has contributed to Dairy Farm 
being #1 grocer In Asia; 
11 If not, review positioning relative to N/A N/A 
competition In a stable environment 
review pricing strategies relative to 
competition. 
12 Is the competitive environment Unstable. Unstable. 
stable or unstable? 
13 Can stability be increased? Yes. Jardine, Matheson sought to Yes. Focus on high margin 
stabilize It with equity Investment businesses, 
in upstream value chain activities 
14 Are economic markets as fully No. Very segmented 
segmented as possible 
SI'8ndlllfl.nd Advertising 
15 How do customers obtain Local and trade advertising Local and trade advertising 
information in the principal Coverage In Investor media Coverage In Investor media markets? 
16 Can reputationlbrands be Geographically - Europe, North Geographically - Europe, North 
extended, and where? America, Latin America broadly America, Latin America as 
as Investor and specifically as Investor and brand builder 
intemational brand builder 
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17 What functions do brands serve in Jardine, Matheson has built Jardine, Matheson has built 
these markets? several brands in Asia: financial several big brands in Asia -
services-Jardine Fleming; Jardine Fleming, Jardine Lloyd 
insurance - JIB Group. Brands Thompson (insurance); Cycle & 
enhance reputation, hence Carriage; Jardine Intemational 
Jardine's move to put its name on Motors; Mandarin Oriental Hotels; 
products. Its historical expertise Dairy Farm. 
also valuable to intemationai firms 
like Dunhlll, Caterpillar, Sherwin 
Williams, British Steel. 
18 Review sustainability of brands and Jardine, Matheson #1 trading Jardine Fleming number 1 
reputation and evaluate relative to house in Hong Kong on basis of merchant bank in Asia; Dairy 
competition. overall revenues and profit Farm number 1 grocery retailer I 
margin. Asia; Jardine Riche Monde 
(liquor) number 1 in Asia 
Vertical relationships 
19 Define principal relationships with Consultant to international firms Transportation, finance, insurance, 
suppliers and distributors. wishing to supply/distribute; also, marketing and distribution services 
supplier/distributor lm..QYm to international suppliers and own 
~ account. 
20 What is the relationship to market Jardine, Matheson is the industry. Jardine, Matheson 'owns' or 
structure? leads transportation services, 
engineering and construction, and 
retailing and distribution financial 
services (First Pacific is only 
competitor). 
21 Is added value defended from Yes, Jardine, Matheson ·owns· Jardine, Matheson has highest 
customers and suppliers? the product system and capturas COGS in its competitive group 
more value. CITIC- 92.06% 
Hutchison -71.05% 
Swire Pacific - 76.06% 
First Pacific - 89.99% 
Jardine, Matheson - 94.49% 
(Note: Jardine, Matheson has 
lowest cash flow/sales ratio and 
highest return on equity) 
22 How do vertical relationships Jardine, Matheson provides Attribute high COGS to trading 
divide risks, create incentives, and trading credits at each stage of credits. Impact on added value 
protect against opportunism? the value chain from primary hard to ascertain because added 
goods to sales and services. value at 22.40% is high reletive to 
Jardine makes greater overall compatition. 
profit; ·owns· the product system. 
23 What is the appropriate contract styl Relational contracts - increases Relational contracts - increases 
- relational, classical, or spot? stability stability. 
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The Firm Strategic Audit Comparison -1832-1885; 1977-1996 
Corporate Strategy 1832·1885 
In 1832, the strength of Jardine, Matheson & Company (Chart 62.1.1) lay in its reputation 
for sound financial judgment and its network of agents and suppliers. The partners did not 
speculate on commodities operated on a pure commission basis only, earning 
$150,OOO/annum in commissions. Jardine, Matheson was jealous of the dependability of 
the letters of credit the firm advanced to suppliers, purchasers and agents. This focus paid 
off. The firm earned a reputation for reliability and soundness that made it an ideal business 
and investment partner, as well as banker and insurer. 
Jardine, Matheson inherited a network of some 50 agents in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta 
from predecessor partnerships, like Magniac & Company. The Jardine, Matheson archives 
house correspondence that continues unbroken from 1810 - predating the formal 
announcement of the partnership of William Jardine and James Matheson. The firm added 
to what was already there, without the learning curve or expense of building from scratch. 
The large network, even in the infancy of the partnership, provided regular information on 
prices and available commodities. Information from the network informed James 
Matheson's Canton Register, 1827-1843. 
In 1832 the firm held no strategic assets (Chart 62.1. 2), but tried successfully to build 
influence by entertaining Her Majesty's Superintendent of Trade in Canton and London, and 
by seeking election to Parliament. In 1832, the firm sought Government protection for the 
Canton merchants. James Matheson had published Prospects for the British Trade with 
China set about getting suppliers and agents to sign a petition urging the British government 
to enforce the natural law of trade. The First Opium War and cessation of Hong Kong to 
Britain were largely the results of the campaign of British merchants organized by James 
Matheson. 
The firm's major markets in 1832 - and those In which its distinctive capabilities were most 
valuable - (Chart 62.1. 3) were Canton/Macau, for the purchase of tea and silk, financed by 
cash and opium; India, where opium was purchased and paid for with bills of credit; Great 
Britain, from which the firm bought cotton, paid for with bills of credit, and sold tea and silk. 
Spain, Portugal and the Americas sought trade opportunities in Canton/Macau - and the 
access to those traders in fact extended Jardine, Matheson's reach beyond the Far East in 
due course (Chart 62.1. 4). 
The Jardine, Matheson archives indicate a rich correspondence between the firm and its 
contacts in markets linked to the firm's major markets by scale and scope economies, 
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namely the East Indies, a source of many commodities; Ceylon, which was beginning with 
Chinese labor, to be built into a tea producing nation; and Australia, also being built with 
Chinese labor, a source of wool and other commodities (Chart 62.1. 5). 
The firm's competitive advantage in 1832 was its architecture and its reputation for financial 
prudence (Chart 62.1. 6). As frequently noted, at every stage the trade was financed by bills 
of credit. Credit crises were frequent. Palmer & Company was by far the largest competitor 
in 1830, with $5 M in group capital. Their bankruptcy sent shock waves through the 
merchant community. Jardine, Matheson's bills of credit were trustworthy, and banks in 
london and the United States backed them. The Jardine, Matheson archives endorse the 
firm's use of its agents to keep an eye on the credit-worthiness of the banks with which it did 
business. Hence, Jardine, Matheson enjoyed an advantage over firms that didn't have its 
superior reputation. 
Time and again, the Jardine, Matheson correspondence - see again James Matheson's 
letters to nephew Hugh - inveighs against speculation and advises its agents and affiliates 
to adhere to a strict commission basis. With working capital requirements low, on this basis, 
a firm could appropriate 45% of every transaction dollar, minus actual shipping and carrying 
costs (Chart 62.1. 7 and 8). 
Operating on a commission basis, competitive advantage was fully appropriable to the 
trading firm. Given the importance of reputation, a time and location based capability (Chart 
62.1.9), Jardine, Matheson could expect to sustain its advantage, until the requirements of 
the market changed. See this point discussed in 1885. 
By 1885, the market requirements had changed. Now, the Chinese government sought 
loans for new infrastructure projects - railways, mines, armaments - and the ability of firms 
to offer such loans had an impact on their access to joint venture arrangements and future 
business. And China wasn't alone; Japan, Thailand, Singapore, and other ASEAN nations 
welcomed foreign investment. This was the beginning of Significant foreign direct 
investment by British entrepreneurs. 
Jardine, Matheson had the financial strength, and the firm's sustainabillty in the Far East, 
depended on its ability to lend funds and generate investment capital. IncreaSingly in 
competition with banks as we" as other trading firms for the privilege, Jardine, Matheson & 
Company joined the Board of the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank and its London Advisory 
Council (Chart 62.11. 1). 
The acquisition of strategic assets - railway contracts, for example - involved a formidable 
capital investment and was often pursued with a partner, in the case of the railroads 
Butterfield & Swire (Chart 62.11. 2). 
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By 1885, Jardine, Matheson's relevant markets were the 15 Treaty Ports of China and the 
new Treaty Port in Japan. Through Matheson & Company, London, the firm was engaged 
in joint ventures in treaty territories like Singapore, Straits, Malaysia, Siam, Borneo for tin, 
rubber, petroleum and gold (Chart 62. II. 3, 4, and 5). 
Jardine, Matheson was increasingly an investment company, in search of strategic assets 
on which to build sustainable advantage and added value (Chart 62.11.6 and 7). The firm's 
Far East trade had changed dramatically from 1832-1885. Inter-firm credits were a 
continuing fact of merchant life - but they now began to be offered by E.D. Sassoon & 
Company to the opium producers, at the far upstream end of the value chain, an innovation 
which gained the Bombay firm advantage over former opium leader, Jardine, Matheson & 
Company. One of Jardine, Matheson's competitors, Butterfield & Swire, established in 
Shanghai in 1848, bought American shipbuilders Russsell & Company, and became the 
largest shipper in the region. 
Jardine, Matheson sought to establish its advantage in investment, through joint ventures in 
sugar, silk, textiles, cold storage, warehousing and docks in Hong Kong and Japan. 
Through Matheson & Company, its London investment house, it was well spread out in 
mining, finance/insurance, manufacturing, shipping and railway building. Based on available 
firm and partner capital data, Jardine, Matheson was able to put away 40% of overall 
turnover. 
Business Strategy 1832.1885 
In 1832, relational contracts based on trust were important to all stages of the value chain. 
In a high-risk business, a reputation for sound management was very valuable. Jardine, 
Matheson could charge more for Its services (Chart 62. I. 10 and 11). 
The competitive environment was highly unstable (Chart 62.1. 12); speculation and reliance 
on credit meant that firms were only as a strong as their decisions were sound. Access to 
information was critical and an important differentiator. Stability could be Increased. but only 
with the intervention of the British government (Chart 62.1. 13). Market segmentation was 
very rudimentary. In China, the trading frontier was limited to Canton (Chart 62.1.14). 
Jardine, Matheson corresponded with its suppliers, agents and customers, sending letters 
with every ship -some 300,000 in all between (dates). The Jardine, Matheson archive is a 
tribute to management and marketing communications during the period. In addition to 
regular letters, the Canton Register provided the only source of reliable information to the 
merchant community in Canton (Chart 62.1. 15) 
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In 1832, the firm's reputation was its brand. If the environment had not been unstable, 
Jardine, Matheson might have begun extending into Europe and the Americas, because the 
Canton trading environment was already filled with Spanish, Portuguese and North 
American traders. Jardine, Matheson did take advantage of relationships with American 
traders, when the British merchants were expelled from Canton in 1839 and James 
Matheson transshipped goods to Manila in American clippers (Chart 62.1.16). 
Jardine, Matheson had already extended its brand to London, where partners served as 
MPs and sat on the Select Committee for Trade (Chart 62. I. 16). 
In many respects, the firm's reputation was a lightening rod for suppliers, agents, customers 
- as well as for private individuals who used the trading firm as a deposit bank, earning 
returns of 8% or more. When Palmer & Company went bankrupt in 1830, it was one of six 
agency houses to do so (Chart 62.1. 17 and 18). 
Jardine, Matheson inherited from Magniac & Company its relationship with Jamsetjee 
Jeejeebhoy, the largest supplier of opium and cotton in India. The firm provided Jamsetjee 
with frequent information about political conditions and market prices in China. The 
relationship was close and based on trust (Chart 62.1. 19). In 1832, the trading frontier was 
limited to Canton. Jardine, Matheson never got to know the merchants and consumers 
beyond the group of co-Hong merchants in Canton. The firm's relationships with suppliers 
(and lack of same with distributors) mirrored the Canton marketplace (Chart 62.1.20). 
In 1832, Jardine, Matheson could expect to accrue $150,000 in commissions yearty. The 
firm could expect a profit margin of 25% on 48,000 chests of opium, a year's supply of 
opium. The capital required to run the business was minimal. James Matheson called this 
"the snug way of the China trade" (Chart 62.1.21). 
There were no vertical relationships as such. Jardine, Matheson's dense network of inter-
firm relationships was sustained by frequent correspondence and by shared personnel. The 
relationships were long-term, often pre-dating the current partnership. The longevity of the 
relationships and desire for continued business reduced the risk of opportunism within the 
firm's network (Chart 62. 1.22 and 23). 
By 1885, Jardine, Matheson was as fully engaged in investment as it was in trade: its 
information access and financial reputation enabling Matheson & Company to attract 
investors from London and Europe in a wide range of projects (Chart 62. II. 10). 
While in 1832 the services connected with the trade - shipping, insurance, finance - were 
still part of the cluster of services available to members of Jardine, Matheson's trading 
network, by 1885, these individual services had also been spun off as a standalone 
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business. In shipping, there was the Indo China Steamship Company with 20 vessels in 
1885. There was the Canton Insurance Company, engaged in far more than marine 
insurance, and Jardine, Matheson & Friends, an investment bank. There was also 
Matheson & Company, the investment house and ship charterer. The freestanding 
companies produced additional customers (as well as incremental income) for Jardine, 
Matheson & Company. 
The stability of the Treaty Port system, and the development that was going on in the Asia 
Pacific Region, suggested to Jardine, Matheson's managers that there existed an unmet 
business need for shipping, insurance and financial services by new entrants to the trade, 
who lacked Jardine, Matheson's resources (Chart 62.11. 12 and 13). 
Jardine, Matheson's trading, shipping, finance and insurance services were well covered by 
Lloyd's list, an important international publication for trading firms. They would also have 
been covered by Drewry's Shipping Reports. The firm's investments would have been 
reported in The South China Morning Post, the Far East Asian Review, the Financial Times 
and the London Times (Chart 60.11. 15). 
By 1885, Jardine, Matheson was immersed in building its reputation and influence in Hong 
Kong. William Keswick had been elected chairman of the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank in 
1880, Jardine, Matheson pioneered the Hong Kong Tramways in 1884 and in 1889, James 
Johnstone Keswick became the first joint Permanent and Managing Director of the 
Hongkong Land Company. 
As a trading company in 1885, Jardine, Matheson was interested in expanding its trading 
enterprise into western China, if transport steamers could be employed in the Upper 
Yangtze. The firm was also deeply involved with silk trade in Yokohama (Chart 62.1. 16). 
The reputation and authority of foreign trading houses like Jardine, Matheson (Adamson, 
Bell & Company, Comes & Company, among others) raised the status of the Japanese 
bUSinessman, formerly a fourth class citizen and encouraged the expansion of native 
industries and the development of facilities for trading, such as banks, telegraphs, shipyards 
and light houses. (Chart 62.1.17) 
The expanding Japanese export trade was largely dominated by silk. The resulting balance 
of foreign eXChange enabled Japan to buy more raw materials, machinery and foreign goods 
of all kinds 
As an investment house, Matheson & Company sought partners in mining, engineering and 
railway projects. In 1885, Jardine took over the government's Kaiping Mines, north of 
TientSin, with the stipulation that the firm was to run day-ta-day operations unimpeded by Its 
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government partner. By this time Matheson & Company had a reputation for finance and 
investment and Jardine, Matheson a reputation for sound business management (Chart 
62.1. 18). 
Corporate Strategy 1977-1996 
In 1977, Jardine, Matheson & Company was engaged in an aggressive acquisition 
campaign that included investments in raw materials as well as manufacturing. Among 
Western firms trading in general commodities -like Harrisons & Crosfield, Gill & Duffus 
among others - the firm was unique, pursuing equity relationships with buyer and seller 
firms both upstream and downstream in the value chains for transportation, steel, textiles 
and sugar. Jardine, Matheson offered acquired firms investment, as well as financial, 
insurance, shipping, marketing and distribution services at lower cost than would be 
available in the marketplace. Jardine, Matheson had a reputation for financial management 
that was appealing to ASEAN firms low on working capital and the architecture necessary to 
secure buyers for their goods. In 1977 Jardine, Matheson had 50,000 employees - 41,000 
of whom were on the ground in Asia (Chart 63.1.1). 
Strategic assets in 1977 included the firm's trading/shipping routes, protected by the Far 
East Shipping Conferences, a self-governing body. Jardine, Matheson used its equity 
relationships to establish first mover advantage in Singapore, Philippines, Malaysia, 
Australia and Japan. In Hong Kong, Jardine, Matheson represented 17% of the total 
capitalization of the Hong Kong stock exchange. The firm's contribution to Hong Kong GOP 
was 3.9%, higher than any competitor. The power and influence accruing to a firm that 
important to a national market, while based on distinctive capabilities and assets, is itself a 
strategic asset of the firm (Chart 63.1. 2). 
The markets for Jardine, Matheson's distinctive capabilities (Chart 63.1.3) in 1977 were: 
• the home market, Hong Kong, where contribution to GOP, "unofficial" involvement of the 
Legislative Council and Board Membership in the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank, gave 
Jardine, Matheson the "ear" of the colonial govemment and access to government 
contracts. Jardine, Matheson was heavily involved in manufacturing, business services 
and property development in Hong Kong; 
• Southern Africa and Australasia were a source of primary goods and manufacturing 
sites in which Jardine, Matheson invested; 
• North America and Europe, interested in buying and selling in Asia Pacific, but lacking 
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the local contacts. Jardine, Matheson understood the value its architecture would have 
to firms seeking an Asian presence, and advertised its consulting services on a 
$30,000/month retainer. 
In 1977, the profit/equity contribution (Chart 63.1.4) of the markets for Jardine, Matheson's 
distinctive capabilities was 
• Hong Kong 57%/37% 
• Australasia 7%/14% 
• N. America 7%/8% 
• Europe 7%/8% 
• Southern Africa 5%/5% 
• Middle East 6%/6% 
In addition, Southeast Asia, contributing 10% of the equity, but only 4% of the profit and 
North East Asia, contributing 5% of the equity and 7% of the profit were important markets 
for Jardine, Matheson. Southeast Asia was a source of raw materials and manufacturing 
(Chart 63.1. 5). 
Emulating a business model closer to the Japanese sogo shosha than to the conventional 
trading firm, Jardine, Matheson created a broader and different presence for itself in Asia, 
based on architecture. Competitors like the Swire Group and Wheelock Marden were 
focused mainly on Hong Kong. Jardine, Matheson bought innovation to its portfolio 
management scheme, giving associated firms 3 years to meet a hurdle rate of 25% - or 
divesting them. The year 1977 saw nearly as many divestitures as acquisitions, an 
extraordinary affirmation of a pipeline management strategy at play (Chart 63.1.6) 
Compare Jardine, Matheson's corporate strategy in 1996. The firm's reputation for financial 
strength and its financial performance had been weakened by the Hongkong Land affair and 
consequent debt accumulation. The market began giving Jardine, Matheson bad grades for 
management and for building a defensive control mechanism in the center, Jardine 
Strategic, seen as getting in the way of the profitability of Jardine's businesses. It would 
appear that Jardine; Matheson had lost the right to grow and was unable to convince the 
market that the company's businesses were sufficiently strong and well run to sustain the 
diversion of cash and management attention to growth initiatives. Chapter 7 endorses the 
view that, far from ex-growth, the company continued to grow not by changing the industry 
structure through acquisitions and alliances, not by integrating vertically and not by 
expanding into new 
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geographies, but rather by taking new approaches to marketing and distributing to existing 
customers; applying its superior local knowledge to managing privileged franchises; and 
investing in the growth of existing subsidiaries and associates. 
The reputation the firm had gained for international brand marketing, made Jardine, 
Matheson the partner of choice for Chubb, IKEA, Taco Bell, Moet-Hennessey, among 
others. The firm had built several of its own brands into substantial, stand-alone businesses 
- Jardine Fleming in finance, Dairy Farm in grocery, Mandarin Oriental in hotels, Jardine 
Lloyd Thompson in insurance. (Chart 63.11.1) 
Jardine, Matheson's strategic assets were its leases and contracts with international 
franchisers, in 1996 (Chart 63.11.2). 
The firm's 1996 markets were largely confined to the Pacific region: Hong Kong and China 
representing 61% of the firm's profits; Northeast Asia 14%; Southeast Asia 12% (Chart 
63.11.3 and 4). 
North America, Europe and the Middle East collectively accounted for 11 % of firm profits; 
Australasia for another 2% - together they gave Jardine, Matheson a worldwide reach and a 
base from which to launch into new businesses, should the need rise (Chart 63, II. 5). 
Jardine, Matheson's competitive advantage in 1996 derived from strong cash flows 
generated by its franchises and name brands. The advantage was over conglomerate 
competitors like Hutchison Whampoa and Swire Pacific, both of which were selling at a 
higher price per share than Jardine. Jardine, Matheson's added value ratio, 1992-1996 was 
22%, the same as competitor Swire Pacific, compared with Hutchison Whampoa's added 
value ratio of 29%. (Chart 63.11.6,7,8). 
Compared with Hutchison Whampoa, which had built dominant and defendable positions in 
rapidly growing infrastructure businesses in Hong Kong and was investing in Chinese ports, 
Jardine, Matheson appeared in 1996 to be unable to invent a future (Chart 63.11.9). 
BUSiness Strategy 1977-1996 
In 1977, Jardine, Matheson's reputation and architecture made the firm a desirable trading 
partner. Jardine, Matheson had the highest profit margin in the commodities trading industry 
- some 14%, 3% over the next leading competitor (Chart 63.1.10,11). Compare with 1996, 
brands not commodities lead. Jardine, Matheson's name brands are market leaders: 
Jardine, Matheson Holdings #1 in Hong Kong shipping services, Jardine Fleming #1 in 
Japan and Hong Kong; Dairy Farm #1 grocer in Asia; Jardine Lloyd Fleming. (Chart 63.11. 
10, 11) 
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In 1977, Jardine, Matheson sought to capture more value by investing in upstream value 
chain activities - raw materials, manufacturing - in emerging economies, where labor costs 
were low. Jardine's acquisition strategy set it apart from competitors who lacked the added 
value to change the industry structure (acquisitions), grow outside industry boundaries 
(vertical integration) and expand into new geographies. Competition was unstable and it 
was in Jardine, Matheson's best interests to destabilize it (Chart 63 I, 12, 13). Compare 
with 1996: Jardine, Matheson was focused on its high margin brands, sending a signal to 
the market that it knew how to manage its businesses for profit and cost containment. But 
the firm is not involved as are competitors Hutchison Whampoa and Swire Pacific in 
developing China's infrastructure, manufacturing and technology industries. Jardine, 
Matheson's relationship with China had begun to thaw in 1996, but was not in the same 
league as Hutchison Whampoa's. Hutchison'S chief Li Ka-shing had met Deng Xiaoping in 
1986 and had maintained personal contact with the top five figures in central government 
ever since (Chart 63.11, 12, 13). 
In 1977 Jardine, Matheson was extending its long-term experience, own-name brands 
(Jardine, Fleming et. al.) to new geographies as well as marketing international brands in 
search of an Asian presence. Jardine, Matheson was literally a floating representative office 
for companies like Caterpillar, Dunhill, Sherwin Williams and British Steel (Chart 63.1. 18). 
In terms of overall revenue and profit, Jardine, Matheson & Company was the number one 
trading house in Hong Kong in 1977. 
Compare with 1996: Jardine, Matheson had built its own-name brands into leadership 
positions in Asia, and extended the Jardine name into luxury goods with strong results: 
Jardine Riche Monde (liquor and wine) was number one in Asia in 1996: Jardine 
International Motors was the leading Mercedes Benz dealer in Asia (Chart 63.11.18). 
In 1977, Jardine, Matheson was the industry; the firm was vertically integrated with suppliers 
through equity or trade credits, which reduced opportunism and risk for participating firms. 
Jardine, Matheson thus ·owned" the product system or value chain and was able to capture 
more value and appropriate more added value (Chart 63.1. 19-23). 
By 1996, Jardine, Matheson's businesses were largely decentralized, linked to Jardine, 
Matheson Holdings or to Jardine, Strategic by the financial obligations imposed by the firm's 
complicated cross-share holding scheme. The firm's emphasiS had shifted to evaluating 
business performance on a stand-alone basis. The firm's high (94.49%) cost of goods sold 
relative to competitors (Hutchison at 71%, Swire Pacific at 76%) suggests Jardine: 
Matheson was not pursuing available scale economies, perhaps attributable to the firm's 
desire to run each business as a separate profit center. 
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Chapter 8: Section 3: Implications for Learning and 
Innovation 
The development of knowledge and skills, whether by individual managers or by the firm 
itself, depends and builds upon a network of existing capabilities and underlying resources, 
intemal and external relationships, as well as routines and rules for conceptualizing and 
resolving problems. This section identifies summarizes the conditions creating the impetus 
for change, followed by a discussion of the persistent baseline against which change and 
innovation occurred. 
Conditions Creating the Impetus for Change; Jardine, Matheson Response 
Some of the major changes made by Jardine, Matheson were induced by changes in the 
environment and industry - or by the existence of a vacuum in strategic groups. In the midst 
of such change - or in the absence of competitors - Jardine, Matheson was able to apply its 
market knowledge to capture greater value: 
• 1982 - >1885 - Value moving from trade to investment. Changes in strategic groups. 
• 1977 - >1996 - Value available at many stages of the supply chain. Vacuum in 
strategic groups 
• 1977 - >1996 - Value moving from commodities to brands. Changes in strategic 
groups 
• 1996 - >Present - Value moving from new businesses to replication and franchise. 
In Chart 60: Industry Audit, 1832·1885, one can see that there was been aggressive 
expansion in the industry, from commodities trading in 1832 to international investment in 
1885. While China and the treaty countries had opened major projects for private 
investment and co-management by foreign firms, the root cause was excess capital (added 
value) from foreign trade, which made Investment in ral/ways, mines and manufactures 
appealing to European and London investors. The strategic group had changed to include 
banks and investment houses, as well as trading firms with associated investment houses. 
By 1885 (Chart 62: Firm Audit 1832.1885), Jardine, Matheson had responded to changes 
in the competitive environment by setting up its own investment house, Matheson & 
Company, soliciting investments in mines, railways, shipping, manufactures, and finance 
and insurance businesses; by joining its potential competitor, the Hongkong & Shanghai 
Bank as 
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a member of the Bank board and as an investment partner in Chinese railway projects; and 
by partnering with competitor Butterfield and Swire on a number of joint venture projects in 
China. 
Chart 61: Industry Audit 1911-1996 depicts an industry in 1977 composed of commodities 
generalists and specialists barely breaking the surface of the Pacific opportunity. American 
and European companies wanted a Pacific presence but lacked the architecture. 
Companies in newly emerging and ASEAN economies had resources and low cost labor but 
lacked the capital and the architecture to bring their raw materials and products to market. 
In Chart 63: Firm Audit 1911-1996, the exiting industry in 1977 was inadequate to capture 
the value possible. Jardine Matheson changed the industry through acquisitions, alliances 
and vertical integration to capture more value in 1977 at many stages of the supply chain. 
By offering financing and insurance services to firms at upstream and downstream ends of 
the supply chain, Jardine, Matheson & Company was testing a new business model, similar 
to that of the Japanese sogo shosha. 
Again, in Chart 61: Industry Audit 1977-1996, the industry is shifting from commodities 
trade to international brand marketing. The strategic groups are increasingly multi-industry 
conglomerates with alliances with international brand owners for distribution and marketing 
of brands in Hong Kong and China or in Asia. While the emphasis on outsourced 
architecture remains the same, the competitive focus is clearly on marketing skills. Chart 
63: Firm Audit 1911-1996, shows Jardine, Matheson in a leadership position with finance, 
insurance, dairy and liquor brand offerings under its own or subsidiary firm brand names. 
The firm has made Asian market leaders of Caterpillar, Dunhill, Sherwin Williams and 
Kodak, companies that have used Jardine, Matheson as their floating representative office. 
A development of the 1990s is the international franchise business. In Chart 63: Firm 
Audit 1911-1996, Jardine, Matheson has franchise licenses with IKEA, Taco Bell, Seven 
Eleven, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Pizza Hut. 
With more firms capable of extracting added value in the 1990s, there is more competition 
for obvious growth opportunities - and a greater role for process innovation and new 
business models that remove operating and asset costs from the business, while they 
extend the reach of the business and the value of its services. 
Baseline Attributes: Capabilities and Resources 
Across all four breakpoints, the customer for Jardine, Matheson's products and services was 
more often a business than a private individual and at a significant distance from the market 
for supply or demand. For example, the customer in 
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1832 - Chinese merchants buying opium for distribution; London merchants buying silk, tea 
and other commodities; 
• 
• 
1885 - Asian and London merchants transporting, financing and insuring goods carried 
by third party ships. Investment in manufacturing plants, railways, mines; the investor 
sometimes a wealthy individual, more often a firm; 
1977 - International firms seeking a market presence in Asia; Asian companies looking 
for a partner to finance, insure and broker the relationship with a buyer; 
• 1996 - International brand owners looking to establish Asian franchises. 
At each of the four breakpoints, customers have had a single goal: 
• 1832 - To grow rich from trade; 
• 1885 - To invest to grow richer with less effort; 
• 1977 - To expand into new markets; 
• 1996 - To continue expansion with less effort. 
At each breakpoint, it was of highest value to the business customer to achieve wealth while 
lowering risk through the agency services of a trusted partner, like Jardine, Matheson. 
The basis of trust was reputation, built on financial probity and the ability of the firm to 
absorb trading risk while profiting from the experience. To absorb the risk of others, Jardine, 
Matheson itself required long-term internal and external relationships built on high trust and 
the avoidance of speculation in commodities (like indigo in the early period) - or in other 
business interests (like Hongkong Land) - about which information (in this case about 
individual investments and commitments) was incomplete. 
While environmental change brought on by competition, globalization, change in the 
regulatory environment - and other aspects of the external environment - make it unlikely 
that any capability will continue to remain valuable independent of the scenario in which a 
firm is operating, there has been great stability in the value of Jardine, Matheson's 
capabilities and the resources underlying them. 
The resources underlying Jardine, Matheson's distinctive capabilities are its trading 
relationships, market knowledge and investment capital. Risk brokerage, supply chain 
expertise, financial and capital management were the early capabilities or competencies of 
the firm on which it continues to build. 
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In Chart 64: Jardine, Matheson & Company Directed Network As A Framework for 
Growth - 1832-1885, below, the firm 's trading relationships are a source of market 
knowledge and vice versa . In 1832, the firm leveraged these intangible resources to 
become a risk broker and supply chain expert, the basis for its strategic position in 1832. 
Through risk brokerage, the firm came to own the relationship between customer, agent and 
supplier (that is, the architecture) and to develop a reputation for financing and capital 
management. Managing risk and stretching capital required innovation, which further 
increased the firm 's financial returns and freed up some of the company's financial capacity 
for further investments (added value). By 1885, Jardine, Matheson had applied its trading 
relationships, market knowledge and (some limited) investment capital to the creation of a 
freestanding investment house, Matheson & Company. In 1885, while sti ll engaged in the 
Pacific trade, the firm leveraged these resources to become an investment manager and 
financier. The firm earned a reputation for financial management, risk management, capital 
management and deal structuring, competencies that are transferable across many markets 
and businesses. The firm 's reputation was a source of added value for continued growth. 
Chart 64: Jardine, Matheson & Company Directed Network As A Framework for 
Growth -1832-1885 
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In Chart 65: Jardine, Matheson & Company Relationship between Resources. 
Competences and Capabilities -1977-1996, on the next page, there are new resources-
which draw on existing skills and require the short-term developments of new skills. The 
opportunity to capture greater value from trading relationships, market knowledge and 
investment capital in 1977 created a new class of resources, namely equity relationships, 
and these have required the engagement of Jardine Matheson's existing financial 
management, risk management, capital management and deal structuring skills - as well as 
the short and medium term development of new competencies, like acquisition and post 
merger management skills and marketing skills. These skills added to Jardine, Matheson's 
reputation and architecture, while requiring heavy investment capital (and reducing added 
value). Strategic divestment in 1977-78 and again in 1981-83 reduced the burden of equity 
relationships. By 1996 another class of resources had been added, privileged franchises, 
built on trading relationships and market knowledge. This class of resources put less drag 
on investment capital, used existing financial management and marketing skills, and 
required the short-term development or acquisition of retailing skills. The ability to develop 
or acquire new skills, or to put existing skills to new uses, has added to a third distinctive 
capability, namely, innovation. In 1996, Jardine, Matheson & Company continues to acquire 
significant added value for future growth. 
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Chart 65: Jardine, Matheson & Company Relationship between Resources. 
Competences and Capabilities - 1977-1996 
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Historically, Jardine, Matheson's talent pool had included business builders and 
entrepreneurs, comfortable with ambiguity and change, top-line focused, sharp 
decisionmakers, free to act with autonomy and mandated to create and build businesses. 
The founders and early taipans and managers of the firm from 1832 to 1885 practiced those 
skills, In the 20th centuries, Jardine's rising star business leaders held multiple cross 
geography, cross function appointments, and were charged with contributing to firm 
influence and reputation by playing active roles in Legislative, Bank and other external 
councils as well as occupying positions on the Boards of subsidiary companies. The 
appointment of Percy Weatherall , head of Hongkong Land to replace Jard ine, Matheson 
senior managing director Alasdair Morrison in 1999, confirms a tradition of choosing leaders 
with long experience at Jardine and a large stake in the firm . 
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In the Resource-based or Penrosean firm, growth depends on the ability of a firm's 
managers to establish effective administrative coordination. The firm's preponderance of 
growth-enabling skills suggests a strong commitment to growth across all four breakpoints. 
Jardine, Matheson hired and developed managers who excelled at acquisition management, 
deal structuring, financing, risk management and capital management - skills that have 
broad applicability across markets and geographies. These long-term skills are embedded 
in Jardine, Matheson's core businesses, financial services and insurance - businesses that 
were part of the package of "agency services" the firm provided to risk averse customers. 
Jardine, Matheson's capabilities and broad internal and external organization were 
responsible for the firm's successful growth by 
• Expanding into new geographies: During the late 1800s, Jardine, Matheson's trading 
experience and ability to fundraise through its freestanding investment house Matheson 
& Company in London, allowed Jardine to join partner firms in new ventures in the 
ASEAN. In the 20th century, during the Exploit and Develop period, 1972-1977, Jardine, 
Matheson expanded into new geographies through acquisition and investment in 46 
geographical markets on 5 continents; 
• Increasing sales of existing products or services to existing customers. Growth 
sustaining companies are adept at finding new ways to expand sales of existing 
products and services to existing customers. In the early period, Jardine, Matheson 
offered 16 separate services, along with trading, to its business customers in the United 
Kingdom, South America and India, who were at a great distance from China and 
wanted to trade at low risk. Operations were conducted through a closely-knit external 
organization of agents, some 150 by 1832, when the firm was formally constituted. In 
the later period, from 1972 to 1977, Jardine, Matheson offered the same services to 
primary goods producers and manufacturers in the ASEAN as well as to European and 
American firms with products intended for ASEAN customers. Reviewing the firm's 
acquisition strategy from 1972 to 1996, Jardine, Matheson's made its largest 
investments in financial services (SIC codes 60-67; 60%); transportation services (SIC 
codes 40-49; 20%) and business services (SIC codes 70-79; 20%) - the so called 
"agency services" of the early period. During the period, Jardine, Matheson built an 
external organization of some 850 firms in "industry clusters," held together by equity 
and trade linkages. 
• Developing better delivery systems: In the early period, Jardine, Matheson was a leader 
in ship building innovation, investing in clippers and steam to move goods and speed 
communications with its customers and agents. In the 20th century, transportation and 
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distribution grew from 19% of Jardine, Matheson's earnings in 1974 to 30% in 1979, 
37% in 1989 and 30.9% in 1996. (A 1999 jOint venture between Jardine Logistics and 
its Chinese partner puts the firms supply chain expertise online). The ability to deliver 
primary goods to manufacturers and finished goods from manufacturers to distributors 
reduced cost both for Jardine and its associated firms. 
• Changing the industry structure through acquisitions and alliances. Consider Jardine, 
Matheson's creation of a freestanding investment house in the late 1880s, turning the 
firm from trading to investments, or the development of joint ventures with competitors 
like Butterfield & Swire to build railroads, turning competitors into collaborators. Most 
Significantly in the 20th century, the firm's acquisition of natural resource and 
manufacturing firms in the Exploit and Develop period, 1972-1977, was sufficient to 
create complete business-ta-business value chains, enhanced by finance, insurance 
and shipping services. 
• Establishing new competitive arenas - integrate vertically, use existing business skills in 
new industries, create businesses or use firm architecture to gain access to new 
businesses. In the early period, Jardine, Matheson used its external organization of 
associated agents to sense what was happening in the marketplace and interpret 
developments for its customers and suppliers, In the late 1880s, Jardine used this 
external organization to identify new projects for investment throughout Hong Kong and 
the ASEAN - and its associates at Matheson & Company to identify investors. Jardine, 
Matheson had grown from a trading company to an investment house, where 
fundraising for future growth was done at a distance. In 1972-1977 Jardine, Matheson 
built an external organization, virtually and "vertically integrated" through minority 
investments in ASEAN firms, largely in manufacturing industries g and natural 
resources, pursuing a business model closely akin to the Japanese sogo shosha in 
which debt, equity and trading relationships keep the network of associated firms 
together. In the early 1990s, when the consumer goods market experienced a 
receSSion, Jardine, Matheson began to change its business strategy from business-to-
business to business-to-consumer, based on its superior knowledge of the marketplace 
and customer wants and needs. 
Baseline Attributes: Routines and Rules 
In an uncertain environment the reputation Jardine, Matheson enjoyed for sound financial 
management and knowledge of trade in the Pacific was a distinctive capability and critical to 
the firm's competitive advantage. Uncertainty made reliance on routines and decision rules 
a 
295 
necessity. In the early period, regular correspondence with agents railed against speculation 
in commodities and used the examples of the bankruptcy of Palmers and Dent to drive 
home the message. In the 20thcentury, representative offices would be shut down if 
managers speculated on their own behalf, risking the reputation of the firm on shaky 
business ventures. In the 1980s, the Hongkong Land affair exposed Jardine, Matheson to 
speculative real estate deals that were not accounted for in Land's financial reports. 
Jardine, Matheson responded with drastic measures to ensure that the two firms followed 
identical accounting practices matched and that Hongkong Land's investment decisions 
were subject to review and approval by the Jardine, Matheson board. 
Information about risk and impact beyond the immediate investment proposal was a second 
area of concern to Jardine, Matheson and responsible for a new regional review and 
approval process for investment schemes that came out of the Hongkong Land affair. 
A third and related issue was fundraising for growth. ·Use other people's money" was a 
common expression at Jardine, Matheson from the 1880s, when the firm established 
Matheson & Company as its freestanding investment house to the 20th century, when the 
firm undertook an aggressive growth strategy, financed by minority equity investments in 
some 850 firms. The strategy encouraged associated firms to fundraise within and outside 
the Jardine, Matheson orbit to achieve their own growth objectives. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
Introduction 
Chapter 9 summarizes the findings of this research, re-examines the applicability of a 
Resource-based - versus monopoly (Harvard) or ownership (Chicago) - interpretation of 
strategic management in Jardine, Matheson, examines the contribution of this study to the 
strategic management literature and suggests directions for further research. 
The chapter is structured as follows: 
Chapter 9: Section 1: Summary of Research Findings recaps the major findings of 
Chapters 4 through 8. 
Chapter 9: Section 2: The Applicability of A Resource-based Interpretation of 
Strategic Management in Jardine, Matheson & Company, 1832-1996 re-examines the 
questions and issues proposed in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 9: Section 3: Contribution of this Study to the Strategic Management 
Literature and Directions for Future Research 
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Chapter 9: Section 1: Summary of Research Findings 
The purpose of this dissertation is an analysis/history of strategic management in Jardine, 
Matheson & Company, using Resource-based theory as an underlying framework. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are largely historical treatments; Chapters 6 through 8 use the history to 
create unique views of the firm's growth, organization and learning. 
Chapter 4 focused on the early firm, 1810-1906. The primary source was handwritten 
correspondence now housed in the Jardine, Matheson Archives at Cambridge University. 
From the correspondence a picture of the firm's operations, capabilities, routines and 
relationships unfolds. 
• Even before Jardine, Matheson was formally constituted in 1832, the firm already had 
long-term relationships with agents, suppliers and customers - some 50 correspondents 
were noted in the pre-1832 letters. The relationships were the consequence of an 
unbroken chain of private partnerships from 1810 to 1832. Reputation and trust were 
essential to the China trade and led to very long-lived relationships. 
• The routine of frequent correspondence (letters dealing with management subjects not 
only with sales and remittances) between partners, agents, customers and suppliers 
was well established. The archives of the British East India Company at the British 
Library between 1600 and 1842 are full of such letters. Jardine, Matheson letters were 
modeled on the British East India Company prototypes. A Jardine, Matheson innovation 
was the signature of an individual partner on some 3000 letters in the Private Letter 
Books. These signed letters are distinctive in discussing the economics and politics of 
the trade, the firm's plans and enlisting the correspondent's assistance. 
• The routines of the commission trade (the interest rates to be charged for shipping, 
insurance, banking, etc.) were well known and accepted by the emerging industry of 
private traders. A private trader could make 45 cents on every dollar from some 16 
separate commissions called "agency services." 
• Little working capital was required to run a profitable business in the Far East. As 
James Matheson advised his nephew Hugh, with little investment, it was possible to 
grow very rich "in the snug way of the China trade." 
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• Many private traders and agency houses went bankrupt engaging in speculation in 
commodities. Jardine, Matheson & Company prohibited its agents from speculating on 
their own account. 
• The firm communicated its financial reporting and investment policies to its agents and 
monitored their performance, often sending junior partners to work alongside intractable 
agents. 
• The firm was both the inheritor of a reputation for financial management and a builder of 
such a reputation. 
• Jardine, Matheson sought to shape and did shape its political and economic 
environment, campaigning for government intervention in trade and later for the treaty 
port system. James Matheson's Prospects of the British Trade with China, published by 
Smith Elder, was a speech he made to Parliament urging government intervention and 
drawing on the principles of natural law. James Matheson, William Jardine and their 
successors sat on the Select Committees for Trade in London, and both founders 
played an active role in the founding of Hong Kong and later the Treaty Port system. 
• The firm saw advantage in partnering with government in railway, mining and quarrying 
projects and sought investment capital abroad to finance these projects, adapting to the 
trend toward free-standing investment houses associated with trading firms. 
• The firm invested in warehouses, textile, sugar and silk manufactures both in Japan and 
China, when the Chinese and Japanese governments began to allow joint 
manufacturing ventures. 
• Jardine, Matheson partnered with Dent & Company on insurance and with Butterfield & 
Swire on shipping and later on investment projects with the Chinese govemment as a 
partner. Such collaboration reduced risk. 
Chapter 5 focused on Jardine, Matheson's expansion, 1961-1996. The primary source was 
the company's complete Annual Report archives housed at Matheson & Company, London. 
Among key findings: 
• Jardine, Matheson increased its market diversity by leveraging Its reputation for sound 
finance, insurance, trading and shipping - that is to say, for agency services -
throughout Asia. 
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• The period of the firm's greatest expansion and diversification occurred when the firm 
was a ship owner and may initially have been a response to excess physical capacity on 
board Jardine, Matheson's 35 vessels - as well as access to opportunities through the 
commodities trade. 
• During 1972-1977, the firm diversified forward and backward into shipping services and 
made horizontal acquisitions in a number of raw materials, natural resources 
manufacturing, building an external organization to share knowledge and capture value 
at every stage of the value chain for transportation, steel, oil, sugar, coconut and other 
businesses. 
• Jardine, Matheson corrected the course of its growth trajectory several times during the 
period, selling off unprofitable assets in 1978-1979 and again in 1981-1983, while giving 
acquired firms some three years to meet an established hurdle rate. 
• Even when the firm appeared to go ex-growth after the Hong Kong Land-Jardine 
Matheson mutual stock swap, related diversification continued - at the level of the firm's 
subsidiary and associated companies. 
• To even out the spread of profits and reduce risks, Jardine, Matheson created a novel 
governance form - the holding company reporting to a holding company parent (Jardine 
StrategiC) and paying a fixed return to the parent (Jardine Matheson Holdings Inc.). 
• Jardine Strategic reduced the risk in Jardine, Matheson's portfolio. It was further found 
that Jardine, Matheson's use of Jardine Strategic to manage its high risk subSidiaries -
indeed the use of holding companies for this purpose - actually added financial value to 
the firm without additional governance cost, and provided subsidiaries the opportunity to 
raise their own equity for further development and expansion. 
Chapter 6 focused on the nature of Jardine, Matheson's acquisitions and divestitures from 
1972-1996, and the skills required by acquired businesses. 
• During 1972 to 1996, Jardine, Matheson made half as many divestitures as acquisitions, 
375 of which were in broadly horizontal businesses and 575 in vertical businesses. 
Finance, insurance and real estate (major category 60-67) accounted for 198 of the 
vertical businesses. 
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• There was a significant increase in divestiture activity during the Harvest and Divest 
period 1978-1984, but divestment was integral to firm strategy throughout the study 
period. 
• Jardine, Matheson's trading and financial services core businesses put a high demand 
on top management, marketing and financial management skills that were transferable 
across the firm's newly acquired businesses. 
• The firm's manufacturing acquisitions relied on low cost labor available in the ASEAN 
between 1972 and 1977. When the firm divested these holdings, exit was easy. 
• Jardine, Matheson's expansion into new retail and grocery industries required 
investment in industry-specific skills 
• The overall shape of Jardine, Matheson's acquisition pattern was similar to that of 
trading and financial firms studied by analysts of mergers and acquisitions like R.S. 
Khemani, that is broadly horizontal at the outset (for Jardine, Matheson, this occurred 
five years earlier, 1972-77, not 1978-79) with increasing contraction through 1988-1989. 
• Overall, some 75% of Jardine, Matheson's acquisitions were made in Asia, including 
40% in Hong Kong or China and 25% in Southeast Asia. 
Chapter 7 focused on Jardine, Matheson's architecture, that is the relationships developed 
by the firm's managers with associated and subsidiary firms, government and 
banking/investment institutions. Among key findings: 
• Senior management at Jardine, Matheson enjoyed long tenure. 
• How much senior managers know about custom, language, doing business In a 
geography as well as functional knowledge is very important to Jardine, Matheson, 
hence the firm moved senior executives around from one function to another and from 
one geography to another. The firm published the names of senior executives down to 
the level of regional or country office head in its Annual Report. It was obviously 
important to the firm's customers to know that their Jardine, Matheson representative 
had authority and recognition. 
• Jardine, Matheson's senior executives were expected to playa role on the boards of 
subsidiary firms, including monitoring performance, advising on investments, and 
sharing their functional or company knowledge. 
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• Jardine, Matheson's senior executives were expected to serve on the external boards of 
highly visible and influential government and banking/investment bodies, like the Hong 
Kong Legislative Council and the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. 
• Jardine, Matheson held very widely dispersed resources. That meant that the firm could 
supply its full range of services anywhere in the world, adding to the firm's competitive 
advantage. It also meant that relations between headquarters and subsidiaries were 
interdependent, suggesting a transnational management system. 
• When compared with the Japanese sogo shosha, Jardine, Matheson also emerges as a 
quasi-insurance agent, providing trading and production credits to customer and 
supplier firms and deriving competitive advantage from a hybrid governance 
arrangement that was neither internalization (vertical integration) nor market governance 
(commodities purchase in the open market. 
• Like the sogo shosha, Jardine, Matheson's architecture was based on dense inter-firm 
relationships that contributed to the competitive advantage of the firm and to the national 
economies in which the firm operated. 
Chapter 8 audited the environment, the industry and the firm to develop a portrait of 
Jardine, Matheson across four breakpoints: 1832 when the firm was formally constituted; 
1885 when the firm that developed a free standing investment house and was engaged in 
railways, mining and quarrying with government support and outside investment capital; 
1977 at the height of the firm's Exploit and Develop Period; and 1996 during the Focus on 
Distinctive Capabilities Period. 
• Jardine, Matheson's customer across all four breakpoints was (1) more often a business 
than a private individual and (2) at a Significant distance from the market for supply or 
demand. For example, the customer in: 
• 
• 
• 
1832 - Chinese merchants buying opium for distribution; London merchants buying 
silk, tea; 
1885 - Asian and London merchants transporting, financing and insuring goods 
carried by third party ships. Investment in manufacturing plants, railways, mines; 
the investor sometimes a wealthy individual, more often a firm; 
1977 -International firms seeking a market presence in Asia; Asian companies 
looking for a partner to finance, insure and broker the relationship with a buyer; 
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• 1996 - International brand owners looking to establish Asian franchises . 
• At each of these breakpoints Jardine, Matheson belonged to a different strategic group 
within a different industry with different kinds of competitors and collaborators. Industry 
changes over the four breakpoints can be attributed to new opportunities to capture 
value. 
• In 1832 the government monopoly had declined; the private trade in commodities was 
growing. Jardine, Matheson's value was largely commissions-based. Competitors were 
agency houses like Dent & Company. 
• There was aggressive expansion in the industry, from commodities trading in 1832 to 
international investment in 1885. While China and the treaty countries had opened 
major projects for private investment and co-management by foreign firms, the root 
cause was excess capital (added value) from foreign trade, which made investment in 
railways, mines and manufactures appealing to European and London investors. The 
strategic group had changed to include banks and investment houses, as well as trading 
firms with associated investment houses. 
• Jardine, Matheson responded to changes in the competitive environment by setting up 
its own investment house, Matheson & Company, engaged in SOliciting foreign direct 
investment in mines, railways, shipping, manufactures, and finance and insurance 
businesses; by joining its potential competitor, the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, as a 
member of the Bank board and as an investment partner in Chinese railway projects; 
and by partnering with competitor, Butterfield & Swire, on a number of jOint venture 
projects in China. 
• By 1977 the existing industry of generalists and specialist commodities traders was 
inadequate to capture the value possible from new raw material markets and 
manufactures. Jardine Matheson changed the industry through acquisitions, alliances 
and vertical integration to capture more value in 1977 at many stages of the supply 
chain. 
• Offering financing and insurance services to firms at upstream and downstream ends of 
the supply chain, Jardine, Matheson & Company was testing a new business model, 
similar to that of the Japanese sogo shosha . 
• From 1977-1996 two major changes took place: the worldwide growth in services 
bUSinesses and the migration of value from commodities trading to international brand 
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marketing. Jardine, Matheson begins a sell-off of manufacturing and other fixed assets, 
concentrating on business services, including marketing services to international clients 
like Dunhill, Moet-Hennessey, among others 
• By 1996, the strategic groups were increasingly multi-industry conglomerates with 
alliances with international brand owners for distribution and marketing of brands in 
Hong Kong and China or in Asia. 
• In 1996 value is moving from new businesses to replication and franchise, from 
business-to-business to business-to-consumer. Jardine, Matheson trades reputation, 
financial acumen and property for privileged franchises like Taco Bell, IKEA, 7 Eleven 
and others. The firm invests heavily in retail establishments - chain restaurants, 
computer hardware and software, clothing and optical store chains - under the aegis of 
its subsidiaries. 
• Of consistent value to the market across all four breakpoints were Jardine, Matheson's 
distinctive capabilities, specifically: External organization or "architecture" of customers, 
Suppliers, partners, government; distribution network; Reputation, based on architecture, 
but also on financing and risk management skills, capital management skills; in 1977 
and after - acquisition and post-merger management, brand management; Ability to 
antiCipate change and "innovate" organizational routines. develop new skills or bundle 
skills to meet changing customer needs, test new business models. 
• Jardine, Matheson's distinctive capabilities have remained important to the market 
largely because the firm's international business customers prefer to concentrate on 
their strengths and to "outsource" architecture, relying on an "outsource" partner with 
long-lived experience and reputation in the region. 
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Chapter 9: Section 2: The Applicability of Resource-based 
Theory to An Interpretation of Strategic Management in 
Jardine, Matheson 
Throughout this dissertation questions have been raised about the resources/services 
choices, failure, organizational structure, environmental factors, managerial initiative versus 
Opportunism, and the fundraising activities of management. Specifically, 
• How and why did Jardine, Matheson's founders and managers develop particular 
resources and services? (Question 1) 
• What internal (including the firm and its agents) and external (including competition, new 
entrants, buyers and suppliers) factors were responsible for their choices? (Question 2) 
• The firm's choices met with some notable successes - and some notable failures. How 
are the firm's failures explained? (Question 3) 
• At the firm's origin - and again after WW2 and the Korean War - there were as yet no 
markets in Asia, in the sense of market institutions. What role did the firm play in the 
development of markets? (Question 4) 
• What was the organizational structure of the firm, including both internal and external, 
that allowed for consistent business routines and promoted organizational learning? 
(Question 5) 
• 
• 
How did Jardine, Matheson promote managerial initiative while curbing opportunism? 
(Question 6) 
How did Jardine, Matheson raise funds for growth, given managerial 
initiative/opportunism and governance issues? (Question 7) 
What follows is a summary discussion ofthese questions in light of Jardine, Matheson's 
distinctive capabilities and critical uncertainties. The Resource-based view Is compared with 
Harvard and Chicago interpretations. 
Strategic BaSis of Resource/Services Choices 
Overall, the research findings support a Resource-based interpretation In which firm growth 
is based on initial resources and capabilities and strategy evolves to take advantage of 
manager perceived opportunities to capture value. "Manager perception" Includes 
entrepreneurial vision and innovation as well as fallible conjecture. 
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The resource and services choices made by Jardine, Matheson were necessitated by the 
trade, the distance, the risk, the cultural divide between Chinese and Indian and private 
English participants, as well as the piratical practices that prevailed on the High Seas and 
coastal waters. Chapter 4 looked the demand for security among private traders and their 
clientele, in the midst of high risk and political volatility endemic to trade and particularly to 
the burgeoning private trade. Trading credits loans and insurance on every facet of the 
trade reduced risk for buyers and sellers; hence financial management, insurance, banking, 
shipping and trading became the cluster of capabilities known as "agency services." 
The security of buyers and sellers depended largely on the financial probity of the agency 
house, intangible, hence ascertainable largely through reputation. The pursuit of security 
was an overweening concern of Jardine, Matheson and Company, exemplified in the firm's 
abjuring speculation at all costs and disciplining agents who speculated on their own 
account and jeopardized the reputation of the firm. The contrast was made early with the 
vicarious experiments by competitors like Dent & Company and Palmer's, among many 
other trading firms, that engaged in speculation in commodities like indigo, and lost 
everything. 
The pursuit of monopoly (Harvard view) was not an issue since the demise of the British 
East India Company. Opportunity was everywhere, but risks, too, were everywhere. 
Collaboration rather than competition the preferred survival tactic. Notable examples were 
the development of an external organization to reduce risk in the shipping and insurance 
businesses (specifically the Canton Insurance Company, led in alternate years by Jardine, 
Matheson & Company and Dent & Company, and the Shipping Conferences of the 1880s, 
founded by Butterfield & Swire to which the major houses like Jardine, Matheson belonged). 
A second example is the "freestanding" investment house, which sought to spread business 
risk among private investors. 
In the early period, ownership (Chicago view) too was not an option. The private traders 
preferred the "snug way of the China trade" because their lack of working capital was not a 
disadvantage in a business built on commissions, reducing the cost of production through 
vertical integration. While British rule of law might have provided an advantage close to 
ownerShip, it was a pipe dream of the private trade until the creation of the Treaty Port 
system. which regularized the trade and the system of tariffs and duties for all competitors. 
In the twentieth century, Jardine, Matheson attempted to put its reputation and architecture 
to use in response to perceived opportunity and environmental requirements, as the 
company understood them. The assessment of Henry Keswick. that the firm sought to 
infuse its own methods into - but not to strip the assets of - acquired companies. provides 
some inSight into firm thinking. 
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From 1961-1971, the firm sought to deepen its involvement in Hong Kong, diversifying into 
growing textile and electronics businesses while building its core financial services, 
shipping, insurance and trading businesses in the Colony. The firm also sought to, export 
its core businesses into new markets, like Australia, Japan, South Africa and Singapore 
through joint ventures and acquisitions. 
In the 1970s, the firm's diversification into raw materials, natural resources and 
manufactures was an innovative, if risky, solution to the problem of excess physical 
capability - and the opportunity to provide access to markets to producers of raw materials, 
natural resources and manufactures in the ASEAN. These firms required shipment from 
one location to another as primary goods and manufactures were transformed into end-user 
goods, marketed and distributed. Such goods could fill existing Jardine ships at several 
value chain stages - and the firm, its customers and its joint venture partners could realize 
savings from Jardine, Matheson's integrated end-to-end shipping services. By making the 
appropriate investments, Jardine's managers sought to capture more of the value available 
from upstream and downstream stages of the value chain. 
Monopoly (Harvard) and ownership (Chicago) advantages were not operative here. As 
noted in Chapter 5, Jardine, Matheson & Company emerged from WW2 with few of its 
assets intact. The firm's decision to become a publicly traded company in 1961 -like the 
decision in 1885 to create a "freestanding" investment house - can be explained as a desire 
to grow but at less risk. Jardine, Matheson's development of an extensive external 
organization across the Pacific, cemented by minority equity positions and trade credits, can 
be explained as the pursuit of opportunity and value, and the absorption of risk for 
organization members who would not have found markets for their products without access 
to Jardine, Matheson's capabilities. 
From 1977 to 1996, Jardine, Matheson's strategic moves have focused on selling off 
physical assets and concentrating on franchises and business services, providing to its 
customers the value of its architecture and reputation. 
Internal and External Factors Responsible for the Firm's Resource and Service. 
ChOices 
A central theme of this study has been the Resource-based view that Jardine, Matheson's 
development of a pattern of relationships within and outside the business which would foster 
the flow of information, the knowledge with which to interpret It, the ability to Influence others 
and the reputation to attract and retain trading partners. 
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A Harvard school interpretation would argue that the specific advantages of Hong Kong and 
the cluster of expatriate competitors clustered there had more influence on Jardine, 
Matheson's resource and service portfolio than the firm's explicit management choices. A 
Chicago view would argue that Jardine Matheson's choice of resources and services was 
based on ownership opportunity - enhanced by the British rule of law in Hong Kong, which 
enabled and protected private ownership. 
The Harvard and Chicago school interpretations presume the existence of a protected 
trading area. The story told in this dissertation predates any such protection. A single firm, 
Jardine, Matheson, played a major role in the establishment of Hong Kong as a trading 
colony and the subsequent creation of a Treaty Port system. 
Again after WW2 and the Korean War, Jardine, Matheson and the Honking & Shanghai 
Bank financed Hong Kong's development as a light manufacturing center and regional 
financial hub. 
In both periods, the firm and its partners antiCipated market opportunity and created 
institutions to exploit and regularize it in an environment that was highly volatile. 
In the early period, as explained in Chapter 4, an environment of high risk and uncertainty 
made partnerships and alliances both necessary and attractive to Jardine, Matheson. 
Clearly an early advantage to the firm were the 50 agents inherited from the previous 
partnership of Maniac & Jardine. Jardine, Matheson went on to build a network of 150 
agents. Among the first steps the firm took to create community among the European 
traders and their suppliers and customers was the publication of the Canton Register and 
the firm's practice of corresponding with its constituents on issues of market conditions and 
social and political developments, as well as routine news of impending shipments. When 
Jardine, Matheson needed support for its appeal to Parliament to protect the trade, the 
trading community that James Matheson built signed a petition that Matheson read in the 
House of Commons. 
While working capital requirements were low, the more prosperous trading firms like 
Jardine, Matheson sought to own their own ships. Given the capital-intensive nature of 
shipping, it was a costly endeavor to expand market penetration. Forging SUbstantive 
strategic partnerships or alliances was attractive to Jardine, Matheson because It allowed 
the firm to accomplish market expansion with less risk and cost. Jardine, Matheson & 
Company joined John Samuel Swire's Shipping Conference which, even to the present, sets 
shipping routes and discourages participants from engaging In a competitive fight to the 
finish. 
Jardine, Matheson's range and flexibility increased dramatically when partnerships were 
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created that linked Hong Kong and Calcutta, Hong Kong and Singapore, Hong Kong and 
London. As noted above, relationships with American and British manufacturers increased 
the firm's access to capital and investments. The political risks of war and blockade became 
more manageable because cargoes could be diverted to other ports, like Manila in the case 
of James Matheson and the opium blockade. Even when the Chinese government forced 
British traders out of Canton. Jardine, Matheson & Company continued its trade using 
competitive American firms as intermediaries. 
The captains or supercargoes of foreign merchant ships were useful partners, strengthening 
shipping interests, increasing international contracts and introducing into the firm associates 
who knew another aspect of the import-export trade. 
During the early period, collaboration with competitors was also a means of survival in the 
insurance business. Jardine, Matheson and Dent & Company shared management 
responsibility for the Canton Insurance Company and pooled their resources to manage the 
risks of piracy, storms at sea, spoilage among other potential hazards to which they and 
their customers were exposed. 
In the latter decades of the 19th century, the Treaty Port system had an extraordinary effect 
on trade and development in Asia, making trade more predictable and opening new markets 
to trade and development. During this time, Jardine, Matheson and Butterfield & Swire were 
frequent investment partners in China, Jardine, Matheson found investors and partners for 
its manufacturing, mining and other ventures through Matheson & Company, its 
freestanding investment house. 
As detailed in Chapter 5, Jardine, Matheson & Company invested heavily in Hong Kong, 
southern China and the ASEAN during the mid 20th century, building an external 
organization through minority equity positions and joint ventures with local entrepreneurs, 
government and cooperating competitors. This was the period when Hong Kong 
experienced dramatic changes in its industrial structure and economic development. 
Manufacturing industries came to the forefront. Jardine, Matheson & Company and the 
Hongkong & Shanghai Bank offered packing credits to Hong Kong firms - or bought minority 
holdings in these firms. 
Jardine, Matheson and its partners exerted pressure on the government in Hong Kong as 
"unofficial" (a formal term) but highly influential members. Under their influence, the Hong 
Kong government pursued a general laissez-faire approach, offering various liberal, fiscal 
and monetary measures such as tax incentives and free capital mobility were implemented 
to stimulate industrial and economic development. 
In the 1980s, when the future of Hong Kong became uncertain, Jardine, Matheson's 
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relocation of its holding company to Bermuda in 1984 was significant. As Simon Keswick 
said at this time, "When we are competing in the market for major long term contracts, it is 
undoubtedly a disadvantage to have to deal with questions regarding the long-term future of 
Hong Kong. We want to put these questions behind us once and for all." 
The conflicting pursuit of China opportunity in the midst of political uncertainty in China is 
reflected in Jardine, Matheson's investments during the 1990s. Some 80% or more of the 
firm's capital base derives from Hong Kong and China. 
Explanation of Failure 
According to a Resource-based interpretation, Jardine, Matheson's strategic choices were 
based on the firm's interpretation of the opportunity present to which its distinctive 
capabilities might be put. When the firm's strategy failed, that failure could be attributed to 
the firm's misunderstanding of its current capabilities or the capabilities needed in a new 
market. A Harvard school interpretation would attribute the failure of firm strategy to 
changes in industry structure that could have been predicted - and avoided by investment in 
entry barriers, signaling and pricing strategy. In a Chicago school interpretation, strategic 
failure was evidenced when the firm was trapped into short term, higher cost contracts that 
did not provide the cost and time efficiencies possible through direct ownership. 
In the early period, Jardine, Matheson considered its decision to avoid speculation to be a 
reason for its financial stability and the basis for the firm's reputation and sustainability. 
Avoiding speculation was tantamount to limiting risk by focusing on what a firm's agents did 
or could know about a market through local communications and sharing knowledge among 
agents, firm partners, suppliers and customers. Jardine, Matheson sought to instruct, 
disCipline, send representation if necessary (in the case of Otadui & Company) and penalize 
associated agents who speculated on their own behalf. Into the early 20th century, the firm 
would close offices if necessary: for example, Jardine, Matheson's New York office was 
closed in the early 1930s because the associates speculated in dog fur. 
There was a natural tension between the type of personality attracted to trading - and the 
safekeeping (or risk averse) personality required to protect the assets of customers and the 
reputation of the company. More will be said about the potential for opportunism in section 
6. 
Jardine, Matheson sought to develop an entrepreneurial culture that was based on 
accumulating and sharing local market knowledge, on the basis of which sound judgments 
were made. That the firm was successful in this aim is demonstrated by its ability to survive 
the credit crises that bankrupted firms like Palmers and Dents. 
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In the mid 20th century, Jardine, Matheson confronted its first experience of failure as a 
public company. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, to support its capital intensive 
shipping and oil servicing businesses, Jardine borrowed from, or increasingly frequently sold 
property to, the Hongkong Land Company, of which it was a 12% owner. When in the early 
1980s, the Hong Kong property market began a swift and steady decline, Jardine, Matheson 
lost significantly, both as an investor and as a seller. However, it was Jardine's reputation 
for financial management that took a beating with the press and the firm's investors. 
Jardine's real estate sell-offs (using Hongkong Land as a bank) were seen by entrepreneurs 
like Li Ka'shing as a sign of management weakness, and the Keswick family's 10% 
ownership - which was low-enough to stimulate investment by other firms - also made 
Jardine, Matheson a possible takeover target. Li Ka'Shing made a bid for Hongkong Land. 
Jardine retaliated by buying 40% of Hongkong Land. The Land Company retaliated by 
buying 40% of Jardine, Matheson. The mutual hostage taking moves were protective - and 
very costly. They were made to protect the Keswick family's interest in Jardine, Matheson. 
To protect these interests in the longer term, Jardine, Matheson adopted a more aggressive 
management stance: more stringent controls on investment projects through governance 
structures like Jardine Strategic; the public sacking of executives who had worked in 
property, oil and shipping (when the areas they represented were divested); the 
reorganization of Hongkong Land, and the removal of corporate headquarters from Hong 
Kong to Bermuda, to ensure the firm would be under British law and under a different 
takeover code. 
In its public acknowledgement of the failure, Jardine, Matheson blamed its ignorance of the 
extent of the contracts Hongkong Land held for highly speculative real estate development 
projects. (Hongkong Land did not operate on equity accounting convention; hence its 
investments were not transparent to Jardine, Matheson.) The "judgment" of former Jardine, 
Matheson Taipan David Newbigging was called into question and Newbigging was fired. 
The failure in Jardine, Matheson's view was lack of information, or failure to pursue 
information, necessary to make sound financial judgments. Unlike episodes in the pre-
public history of the firm, this failure of the public company had a significant Impact on 
Jardine, Matheson's reputation and the reputation of the firm's owner, the Keswick Family -
who perceived the reputation of family and firm to be one and the same. 
The Role of Jardine, Matheson & Company In Creating Market Institutions 
A Resource-based interpretation would acknowledge the existence of only rudimentary 
market institutions and the importance of firms in creating such institutions. A Harvard 
interpretation would argue that there was already a market, if fragmented, and that Jardine, 
311 
Matheson would have used its advantage to get all of the market for itself by signaling 
strategy, erecting entry barriers, encouraging competitors to leave - or buying them out. A 
Chicago school interpretation would argue that creating a market means increasing demand 
and sale of already existing products by being more efficient and reducing price to increase 
total sales and profits. 
A Resource-based interpretation makes far better sense of the challenge and opportunity 
Jardine, Matheson shared with other private firms operating in the shadow of the East India 
Company in 1832 - and again recovering from the shocks of WW2 and the Korean War in 
1961. 
While the East India Company had held a monopoly on trade in the East, Jardine, Matheson 
and peer firms lacked the Royal Charter, the self-perpetuating institutions of minting money 
and raising a militia. Out of the East India Company came a rich heritage of management 
letters. From 1810 to 1906, Jardine, Matheson & Company added its own letters to that 
history, generating some 200,000 letters to its constituents and agents, framing business 
arrangements, making payment and insurance promises and disciplining agents. 
Without the East India Company's Royal Charter, firms needed to rely on their own 
capabilities, reputation, relationships, and innovation, to build consumer confidence and 
secure the trade. Jardine, Matheson sought to build its reputation on financial wisdom and a 
network of relationships that its constituents could rely upon. The firm had to absorb the 
trading risk of its constituents by basing its own bills on trustworthy financiers in Britain and 
the United States. Essential to financial wisdom was the firm's avoidance of speculation, 
which had brought down many agency houses. 
In the early period, private traders were more often collaborators in the development of 
market institutions - setting and agreeing to interest rate commissions on agency services, 
pOOling resources for paying insurance claims and establishing shipping routes. 
As explained in Chapter 5, during the early period Jardine, Matheson & Company, Dent & 
Company and others in the private trade committed themselves to live by a set of rates for 
agency services. The price of the commodities they traded was communicated broadly in 
"The Price Current," a bi-monthly insert in The Canton Register, the first English-language 
newspaper in China, published by Jardine, Matheson & Company. 
The personal efforts of William Jardine and James Matheson to secure the trade resulted in 
the ceding of Hong Kong to Britain, and the creation of the Treaty Port system, which 
provided for the first time a level of regularity to trade and predictability to the costs of trade 
with China, Singapore, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa and Japan that lasted until WW2. 
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The creation of Matheson & Company, a freestanding investment house, provided shared 
benefits and limited risks among institutional and private investors, using Jardine, 
Matheson's superior market knowledge to identify new prospects for funding. The outcome 
for Jardine, Matheson & Company was indeed enhanced wealth, but competitors (like 
Butterfield & Swire) were welcome. Jardine Matheson & Company and Butterfield & Swire 
were collaborators on railway and other projects, with government as a public partner, well 
into the twentieth century. 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Jardine, Matheson & Company was one of the first 
Hong Kong firms to provide foreign direct investment to growth in the ASEAN. The firm's 
development of an external organization linked by minority equity holdings throughout the 
ASEAN was an adaptation of the Japanese general trading company or network 
organization model and allowed partiCipating firms with limited working capital - and little if 
any access to markets - to benefit from Jardine, Matheson's market knowledge, and 
finanCing, insurance and shipping and distribution services. 
The Internal and External Organization of the Firm 
Jardine, Matheson's founders and subsequent managers developed an 'architecture' or 
'administrative framework' for learning and collaboration. This framework included 
interorganizationallinkages for risk reduction and learning important for developing 
capabilities, trustworthiness, and consistent patterns of behavior and effective forms of 
governance. It was part of interorganizational succession planning that managers could be 
moved from one geography to another, one function to another, with enhanced 
effectiveness and without disruption of the business. A Harvard interpretation would 
suggest that firm architecture is merely a response to industry structure, which has a strong 
influence in determining the competitive rules of the game as well as the strategies 
potentially available to the firm. It's about competition. Learning is based on a rigorous 
analysis of the market, the industry and the strengths and weaknesses of competitors. The 
Chicago school would see firm architecture as a way of increasing efficiencies and rents 
through ownership or long-term contracts that keep transaction costs low. Firm architecture 
promotes and encourages organizational learning - specifically knowing how to resolve 
minor problems arising from contracts, for example, and what the rules are for effective 
contract administration. A further example, learning also takes place in the production area 
where it is accomplished through on the job training or more formal training and education. 
The environment described in Chapter 6 made collaboration essential to survival. This 
meant collaboration between headquarters and associated firms - as well as between and 
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among Jardine, Matheson's associated firms. The description in Chapter 6 of the 
geographic spread of Jardine, Matheson's resources, distributed among associated and 
subsidiary firms and their involvement in the value chains of diverse industries supports the 
notion that this was a highly collaborative firm. In Chapter 7, the review boards established 
by Jardine, Matheson assure that the potential for broader, geographic and organizational 
impact was explored before a golno go decision rendered on a potential investment, is a 
further example of organizational commitment to learning and sharing. 
Historically, Jardine, Matheson's management team has included business builders and 
entrepreneurs, comfortable with ambiguity and change, top-line focused, sharp 
decisionmakers, free to act with autonomy and mandated to create and build businesses. 
Chapter 7 demonstrated that Jardine's rising star business leaders held multiple cross 
geography, cross function appointments, and were charged with contributing to firm 
influence and reputation by playing active roles of Legislative, Bank and other external 
councils as well as occupying cross-board positions on the Boards of subsidiary companies. 
(The appointment of Percy Weatherall, head of Hongkong Land to replace Jardine, 
Matheson senior managing director Alasdair Morrison in 1999, confirms a tradition of 
choosing leaders with long experience at Jardine and a large stake in the firm). 
Encouraging Initiative while curbing opportunism 
In the Resource-based view, initiative or ~enterprise" is rewarded and opportunism is more 
often depicted as opportunity - the opportunity to extend the firm's interorganizational 
linkages to include a new but familiar business partner with known and consistent business 
behaViors, making partners out of a competitors. In the Harvard and Chicago views, 
initiative is rewarded, and opportunism curbed, by managerial bonuses based on over-
achievement of results. 
Bringing potential competitors into their orbit - making collaborators of competitors, like Dent 
and Russell and Butterfield & Swire - served Jardine, Matheson's interests very well. 
Collaboration opened new opportunities for shared investment, access to information from 
different markets, and reduced the risk of price and shipping rate fluctuations. 
In the twentieth century, Jardine, Matheson built a network of trade and equity-based 
relationships with associated Hong Kong and ASEAN firms. As the network builder, 
Jardine, Matheson encouraged the initiative of local firms to which it served as a single 
source for financial services, insurance and shipping. In building this network or "external 
organization," described in Chapter 7, Jardine, Matheson made itself Indispensable to 
manufacturers, 
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retailers and service establishments alike, who could expect credit terms of up to two years. 
The advantages derived from the ongoing relationship were perceived by its members to be 
greater than the gains of opportunistic behavior. 
Another source of managerial initiative and potential opportunism was Jardine, Matheson's 
cadre of agents in the field and managers at headquarters and in the branch offices. 
As evidenced in Chapter 4, Jardine, Matheson's early taipans were attentive to the training 
and disciplining of those who would be the keepers and brokers of the firm's reputation. 
Instruction in company routines and desired behavior was conducted via frequent 
management letter and, whenever possible, in person. 
Agents were strongly discouraged from speculating on their own behalf. They would be 
reprimanded or, like John Shilaber and E. de Otadui, might be visited by a Jardine associate 
with a mandate to set the business straight. In the early 20th century, representative offices 
might be closed if the firm could not control its associates from speculating on their own 
behalf, lOSing the company's money and endangering its reputation. 
Nevertheless, entrepreneurship was strongly encouraged, as in the story of David 
Newbigging and the cadet-run profit centers told in Chapter 5. As described in Chapter 7, 
associates with high potential were groomed for senior management and given cross-
functional and cross-geographic experience to round out their knowledge and understanding 
of Jardine, Matheson's businesses and build social capital that would make them effective 
directors and, eventually, members of the board. The average term of employment with 
Jardine, Matheson was 20 years or more: the average length of time to a board seat from 
associate director was 4 years: the average length of time on the board was 12 years. 
Employment with Jardine, Matheson is another example of a long-term relationship built on 
trust, where the advantages outweighed the potential rewards of opportunism. 
Resource-based, Harvard and Chicago interpretations all recognize that the best managers 
need to be compensated to remain with the firm to grow firm business. The key Issue Is 
incentive-compatibility. The distribution of knowledge in the firm (and among members of its 
external organization) may provide opportunities for individuals to gain by concealing or 
misrepresenting their private information, while reducing overall efficiency. However, 
restoring efficiency allows for gains all around, and so "farsighted" contracting permits the 
design of incentive structures which ensure disclosure of private Information, If necessary, 
by putting the owner of this private Information in charge. Examples of this behavior Include 
the comprehensive education of Jardine, Matheson's high potential managers who were 
groomed for leadership, or creation of a board seat on the board of Jardine, Matheson & 
315 
Company for the head of the Hongkong Land Company after the mutual stock swap and 
takeover attempt in the 1980s. 
How Jardine, Matheson Raised Funds for New Investments 
In the Resource-based view, raising funds, when necessary, is part of the managerial or 
entrepreneurial task. This task might be accomplished through an "external organization" in 
which the raising of funds is relatively easy - or through intrafirm boards that review and 
approve fundraising projects. 
In the Harvard view, there are internal routines for analyzing the market, competitors, and 
new entrants as well as the needs of buyers and sellers. New projects would be put through 
a rigorous competitive analysis. In the Chicago view, there are internal routines for 
fund raising for projects, including the establishment of hurdle rates and bonuses based on 
project returns. 
From 1885 to 1961 Matheson & Company, the firm's freestanding investment house, raised 
funds from European and American investors to finance new projects, like the silk and textile 
mills in China and Japan, mining expeditions in Africa, Spain and Korea. The "freestanding" 
investment house handled investments in other companies, as well as all investments in 
projects discovered by or operated by Jardine, Matheson & Company. 
From 1961 to 1972, all of Jardine, Matheson's investment was internally financed. During 
the Exploit and Develop period, 1972-1977, the firm borrowed to support growth. Jardine, 
Matheson established aggressive hurdle rates for acquired firms, and sold non-performing 
investments within three years, returning the proceeds of asset sales to reserves for future 
growth. 
From 1980 and through 1996, Jardine, Matheson redesigned its corporate structure a dozen 
times, as discussed in Chapter 5 to reduce risk and contain costs as well as to allow 
subsidiary and associated firms to continue to fundraise outside the Jardine, Matheson orbit. 
In 1987, to even out the spread of profits and reduce risk, Jardine, Matheson created a 
novel governance form - the holding company reporting to a holding company parent and 
paying a fixed return to the parent. Jardine StrategiC reduced the risk In Jardine, 
Matheson's portfolio. It was further found that Jardine, Matheson's use of Jardine stratagic 
to manage its high risk subsidiaries - indeed the use of holding companies for this purpose 
- actually added financial value to the firm without additional governance cost and provided 
subsidiaries the opportunity to raise their own equity. 
316 
Chapter 9: Section 3: Contribution of this Study to the 
Strategic Management Literature and Directions for Future 
Research; Jardine, Matheson in 2001 
This dissertation has attempted to use the Resource-based view to interpret the historical 
development of a major company, explaining that firm's sustainability and the consistency of 
its strategic practices, policy and management. The choice of a trading firm underlines the 
importance of this category to the development of the international services business. 
The multinational trading company is also a worthy target of study because of its 
contribution to foreign direct investment and the GOP of nations in which it owns assets, 
employs agents and intermediates trade. 
Theories of the firm have infrequently used the trading firm as a model of behavior. The 
Chicago school with its emphasis on ownership had a firm with owned assets like patents 
and processes in mind. The Harvard school with its emphasis on monopoly (or positioning) 
had utility companies and single product firms in mind. 
Recently, researchers like Casson and Roehl and Hennart have applied transaction cost 
theory to an analysis of trading companies, identifying information asymmetry and 
opportunism as important considerations for diversification into non-trading activities. The 
trading company has had greater coverage among business historians, from the previously 
mentioned Mira Wilkins and S. Chapman to the recent work of Geoffrey Jones.171 
What makes the early trading firm an interesting candidate for a Resource-based 
interpretation is, first and foremost, the lack of working capital needed to get into business 
(the non-existence of entry barriers), the perception of productive opportunity (managerial 
enterprise) independent of licenses and exclusivity contracts and physical assets (no 
ownership advantage), and the development by private traders, like Jardine, Matheson. of 
Simple deCision rules for profit and growth in highly uncertain times (the existence of 
strategic management). These rules were: Avoid speculation and use other people's 
money. 
The deCiSion rule Mavoid speculation" was critical to the development of reputation, 
immensely important to customers at a vast distance from the goods to be bought or sold on 
171 
Mark Casson, "The Economic Analysis of Multinational Trading Companies,· in Geoffrey Jones, ed. IbI 
Multinational Traders. Also: Thomas Roehl, "A Transaction Cost Approach to International Trading Structure: 
The Case of the Japanese General Trading Companies,· Hilosybtlhi Journal of EcgngmICl. 24 (1983), pp. 119-
135 and Jean-Francois Hennart. "The Transaction Cost Theory of the Multinational Enterprise.· In N. Pltelil and 
R. S~gd~n. The Nature of the Transnational Firm (London: Roulledge. 1991). Geoffrey Jones. Merchanll to 
Muinnatlonal!i.lOxford: Oxford University Press. 2000). 
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their behalf. What was speculation and what was wise investment was oftentimes a fine line 
to draw, the difference between the two being history, experience, the shared knowledge of 
peer firms and the counsel of partners in the firm. This decision rule was the basis of 
Jardine, Matheson's sustainability through the credit crises of the early period and the 
dismemberment of the Hongkong Land Company after the stock swap and takeover attempt 
of the 1980s. Jardine Strategic was created in 1986 to control the speculative behavior of 
the firm's high growth businesses, the Hongkong Land Company and its formerly associated 
businesses, the Mandarin Oriental chain and Dairy Farm. 
The decision rule to seek external investment capital was critical to growth and 
sustainability. Tying up your own money in a single venture meant that it was unavailable to 
pursue other opportunities as they came along, that your fortunes rose and fell with a Single 
"stOck." Pursuing this decision rule made Jardine, Matheson a collaborator, a risk-sharer, 
more often than a competitor in the ASEAN. This decision rule was the basis of the 
development of an external organization based on long-term trading relationships and 
minority equity holdings. 
The use of Resource-based theory as an interpretive framework for strategic management 
in Jardine, Matheson & Company does not diminish the importance of uncertainty and risk. 
Since the necessary conditions for Resource-based theory are highly imperfect knowledge 
and cognitive limitations, any intendedly comprehensive strategy must indude more than the 
development and application of capabilities; it requires the management of uncertainty, 
which is a question both of productive and marketing capabilities and of governance. The 
Simple decision rules discussed above were intended to manage uncertainty, while building 
the firm's knowledge-based capabilities. There is an unavoidable tension between 
uncertainty and knowledge. Jardine, Matheson's decision rules were created to make the 
firm the best negotiator of this tension on behalf of Its customers, partners and investors. 
Contrast the Resource-based view with the assumptions about knowledge that underlie 
monopoly (Harvard) and ownership (Chicago) models. In these models, the optimal choices 
about portfolio management, production or marketing are inherent in the data. Everything 
can be known at the expense of rigorous analysis. All that Is needed Is a system that will 
make the overall optima inherent in the data also the private optima for all those who have 
the power of deCision. Governance, therefore, is a matter of applying the known and 
eliminating managerial opportunism. 
Resource-based theory views the constraints on governance to be (a) the perception of 
productive opportunities, which depends on entrepreneurial skills operating on developing 
capabilities and (b) the 'receding managerial limit. In Penrose's theory, raising funds Is part 
of the managerial/entrepreneurial task and essential both to the pursuit of opportunities and 
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the reduction of the managerial limit to expansion. In the history of Jardine, Matheson, he 
managerial fundraising task was expanded by the creation of an 'extemal organization' in 
which the raising of funds was relatively easy, "using other people's money." In the early 
period, this took the form of Matheson & Company, a freestanding investment house. In the 
mid 1970s, this was accomplished through minority equity holdings in hundreds of firms in a 
cluster of industries in Hong Kong and the ASEAN. While the relationship with Jardine, 
Matheson was advantageous, providing services and favorable credit terms, each of the 
associated firms was forced to fundraise on its own behalf. In 1980s and 1990s, the 
creation of a new govemance model, Jardine Strategic, imposed on managed firms the 
obligation to seek funding outside the Jardine, Matheson orbit. In each of these cases this 
external organization was the result of strategic choice. 
The notion that a firm may derive value from and provide value to associated companies, 
suppliers, customers, competitors and new entrants by strategic choice stands the Harvard 
school model on its head. That such value is obtained through trading relationships or 
minority equity investments not ownership is antithetical to a Chicago interpretation. 
Unlike Fa~oun, Palepu, Montgomery and others cited in this study who looked at physical 
relatedness and skills relatedness of acquired business for an explanation of the acqulrer's 
growth and profitability, I am convinced that the quantification (in the sense of who buys 
what from whom, let us say) of the pattems of relationships built by Jardine, Matheson & 
Company would add support to the argument of conscious strategic choice. An increase or 
decrease in the value of relationships to Jardine, Matheson would result in a change in 
strategy - and possibly the emergence of a new network builder from the existing network, 
or outside it. More than the interrelatedness of resources and capabilities, the external 
organization through which these resources and capabilities are deployed Is the real 
differentiator and source of new growth opportunities and the sustalnabllity of the firm. 
In 1998, I asked former managing director Jeremy Brown, howe-business would change the 
asset intensity of Jardine, Matheson's Asian business operations. He responded that the 
relationship with China required continued high levels of physical asset ownership if not 
investment. But, in fact, in the last three years, Jardine, Matheson has been extending Its 
architecture and creating "virtual networks· for supply chain, customer relationship 
management and financial services - services that have been the firm's historic source of 
wealth and the basis of its reputation. 
Based on the preceding discussion of external organization - and the worldwide growth of 
e-business - it is not surprising that Jardine, Matheson, through the computer services 
division of Jardine Pacific (JardineOneSolution), has partnered with CommerceOne Bank to 
provide 
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IP based supply chain and procurement services to trading partners like Swire Pacific in 
Hong Kong and China through a virtual trading company e-marketplace called Asia2B, a 
new virtual market institution for putting business service providers and customers together 
at low risk. 
Founded in March 2001, Asia2B is a joint venture comprising SUN Microsystems eVision, 
the Swire Group, New World China Enterprises. Beijing Enterprises Holdings and 
CommerceOne. 
The partnership provides collaborative commerce. procurement and fulfillment services. 
using the Internet to correct the inefficiencies in the traditional supply chain. The trading 
portal comprises many industries including aviation. automotive supply chain, building 
materials, computers and components. fixed and wireless telecommunications. hotels, 
medical and healthcare products. retail. shipping and logistics. 
JardineOneSolution is the largest IT hardware. software and services provider in Hong Kong 
at $500M US/annually. Jardine OneSolution (JOS) has also formed of a joint venture with 
TELUS International Inc .• a wholly owned subsidiary of TELUS Enterprise Solutions Inc., 
one of Canada's leading IT consulting and outsourcing services providers to provide 
information technology (IT) related consulting, Customer Relationship Management (CRM) 
and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and e-Procurement outsourcing to Hong Kong and 
China. The JardinelTelius joint venture is 75% owned by Jardine OneSolution and 25 % by 
TELUS International. The joint venture has an initial focus on the Hong Kong market and will 
expand into the nearby region after establishing itself in Hong Kong. 
Jardine Motors' French subsidiary, Cica. operates a range of franchises. including BMW, 
Ford, Mercedes. Opel and Peugeot. Exlinea. a new subsidiary created by JIMH France and 
other investors. is a pioneer in the use of IT to market used and new cars through its Carsat 
auction system and its Internet Degrifcar and Proveo sites. 
In 1997, Jardine, Matheson sold its financial services company Jardine Fleming to Chase 
Bank for $1.2 billion US. In 2001, Jardine, Matheson is rebuilding its financial services 
business, under the leadership of David Keenan. recently of UBS Warburg. Jardine's new 
finanCial hub will provide secure Internet banking and mortgage banking services to 
consumers and businesses globally. 
Using its historic capabilities - including architecture and reputation - and competencies -
including financial management, risk brokerage and retail - Jardine, Matheson continues to 
grow and to innovate, linking its business customers to each other and to end users in an 
increasingly virtual marketplace. Cementing these relationships are Jardine, Matheson's 
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historic "agency services, " financing, insurance and distribution services. The firm is living 
example of the Resource-based view: making decisions that build on historic capabilities 
and exploit opportunities in the marketplace, learning from failure, creating new market 
institutions, relying on an internal and external organization to deliver business value and 
manage uncertainty, fundraising for growth and encouraging continued innovation. 
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Appendix A: 
Jardine, Matheson Archives, 
Management Issues 1810-1906 
(Samples) 
Relationships with Correspondents 
• C9/1 Donald Matheson to John Abel Smith June 21, 1846: 
Mr. A. Matheson has no doubt informed you of the intended changes that are about to 
take place in our Agency in Manila. Mr. Otadui is now winding up his affairs with the 
assistance of Mr. Macleod, and the former embarks on the Colon for Cadiz about the 
end of July --- Mr. Barretto who has been for a length of time in our office here, goes 
over in a few days to take up the business of E. de Otadui & Co., and I have 
recommended Mr. Jones to go over at the same time, so that he may enjoy the advice 
and assistance of Otadui, who still possesses considerable influence with the 
government, besides having an intimate acquaintance with all the individual members of 
it. I may also mention the following favorable omen. Mr. Macleod having been 
entrusted with a communication regarding these bills on a former occasion, he might 
naturally be looked upon as your probable agent in the business, and we have just 
heard that for some unknown cause, the Governor has been lavishing on Mr. Macleod 
most unusual favors, allowing him to hold lands and houses in Manila and the other 
reports of Natives, etc. Mr. Otadui also writes under date June 3: 'The Intendente has 
asked me whether I know anything of certain bills for $300,000 for which Mr. J.A.S. had 
arranged to take payment here in Tobacco. It appears that the Intendente has now 
orders for their payment.' I think the above augurs a favorable issue ... 
II 
• 
Competition •• And Competitive Advantage 
• C4/2 James Matheson to Charles Thomas, Singapore Sept. 30, 1832: 
" ... in the present state of our English Exchange (which is likely to be 1/6 per dollar) as 
an effective bar to the arrangement which you propose for our supplying you with dollars 
even if the absolute scarcity of the coin were not a still more powerful obstacle. To 
render the plan feasible it would be necessary that we should be assured of a certain 
portion of your own capital being embanked in your coffee shipment, say 1/4 as security 
against loss on the remaining 3/4 which would be advanced by us. In the present state 
of your account, I do not see how this object could be obtained. Our attention, like that 
of the commercial community all over the world, has been called to the circumstance 
value of the demand for coffee being likely to exceed the production for the next 4 or 5 
years, but this very circumstance of so many being on the same scent gives room for 
apprehension that the price may be run up beyond a prudential limit, while on the other 
hand, this advice cannot but have a powerful effect in checking the consumption. It is 
observable too that every article suitable for the Europe market is, in general, eagerly 
sought after by your neighbors as a mere means of remittance without any view to profit, 
and the same is more or less the case all over India, owing to the means of remittance 
being less than the trade requires, and the consequent necessity of resorting to bullion 
and every sort of unprofitable medium which necessity can suggest. While you 
speculate in the face of a high exchange and at your own risk, your neighbors do so at 
the risk of their constituents and often for the sake of effecting sales at anything likely to 
pay an indifferent exchange. Hence, It generally happens that those who are first In 
the market on these occasions, whether from priority of Infonnatlon Of' .uperiOf' 
discernment In foreseeing a u.e, make handsome profits, while those who follow 
experience a very different fate. It Is not, however, on account of the.e view. that 
we feel an Insuperable objection to Incur the risk of such speculation. They are 
foreign to the line of our business, and we have neither the time nor Inclination for 
acquiring the requisite Infonnatlon to give us a fair chance of avoiding the most 
serious errors. 
C4/2 James Matheson to John Macvicar Nov. 14, 1832: 
If by chance you should find lower rates than ours brought to your notice in the Piece 
Goods department, I think you may safely refer your friend to the example of our 
constituents in India who confide to us so large a preponderance of the business of the 
Port, well knowing the lower terms of others, but having also by experience the superior 
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advantage of our system .. .! shall therefore add that we find an incalculable advantage 
for the extent of our concerns, rendering us a general focus or medium, a sort of 
clearing house* (to compare small things with great)* for transacting a preponderating 
amount of the business of this Port. Hence it is that we can see further and sooner than 
others and can take our measures by anticipation accordingly, and we are seldom or 
never compelled to appear in the market as applicant for what we want. Bills on 
England, for instance, come in upon us so regularly for our remittance from parties 
anxious to sell that we need never appear anxious to buy, and the difference between 
the relative positions is of essential consequence in making a bargain. 
C4/2 James Matheson to Duncan Matheson Nov. 13, 1833: 
Such is my impression of the extent to which the trade in British manufactures will be 
overdone here by the resistless impulse of steam that I cannot consider it desirable for 
the general merchant to engage in it in competition with the manufacturers, who will be 
satisfied with the lowest scale of remuneration that will enable them to work their 
machinery without loss. The accompanying paper of "Hints" willi think convince W. 
Duncan that he can supply funds here, without resorting to a remittance, either in ... or in 
treasure and the probability is that he can obtain bills in India that will yield him a 
handsome profit. Should he be disposed to run the risk, of our having to draw from 
China at a high exchange for a part of the requisite funds, there can be no objection to 
the plan, and it will have the advantage of his not being called on to fork out the cash, till 
six months after his teas reach him, in place of having to advance it twelve months 
previously. It will be desirable that in this event he sent us out a credit for some part of 
first rate credit and the more thoroughly secure it be the better will be the rate of 
exchange. A credit from one of the Edinburgh Banks would answer famously. I enclose 
a form of the part of credits usually granted by Baring Brothers & Co. of which hundreds 
of thousands are annually negotiated here --- we can manage without any credit at a 
trifling disadvantage in the exchange - should he feel disposed to trade, he should 
consult Mach'cun whose address is ... as any advice which I could give from hence must 
of necessity be so materially modified by the nature and extent of exports in the 
intermediate nine months before you get this as to be quite inapplicable. Maeh'eun if as 
I presume he has an eye to the exports going on should be able to give advice to the 
purpose. Cotton yarn is a bulky article and fills tonnage at little cost... 
IV 
• PLB William Jardine, January 16, 1833: 
"Our idea (in building a new clipper) is that the opium trade after the expiration of the 
East India Company's charter is likely to be so much run upon by speculators of every 
description for the mere sake of remittance without a view to profit that it can hardly be 
worth our while pursuing on the old plan unless by operating on a large scale, and on a 
secure footing of always being beforehand with one's neighbors in point of intelligence." 
• PLB, Hongkong to India to RW Crawford, Bombay, April 9, 1846: 
"Competition has ruined the opium trade for a time and we must wait for the trade to ruin 
our competitors." 
• PLB India to F. F. Lidderdale, Bombay, August 17, 1868: 
"Your opium advices are again unaccountable and I am surprised that shippers are 
found at prices which cannot but lose money. The state of the China market appears to 
be ignored and it will be curious to watch how long this ruinous business can be carried 
on. Any permanent improvement can only be brought about by limited shipments from 
your side." 
• PLB India to Remington & Co., Bombay, August 2, 1872: 
"The old trade of foreigners buying to supply the various northern markets has entirely 
died out and what little local (Hongkong-Canton) consumption goes on is supplied by 
(Sassoons) on credit in a sort of retail way ... The trade altogether has gone to the dogs 
and my surprise is the infatuation still shown on your side." 
v 
• 
Training and Development of Agents 
• C4/1 James Matheson to Wm. Mathieson, Esq., Glasgow, Jan. 17, 1831: 
Your continued warm interest in my nephew John calls for a repetition of my most 
grateful acknowledgment. He is yet so young both in years and in business that there 
will be ample time to deliberate as to how he is to get on in the world. I am not in favor 
of young men being brought forward on the stage of life without amply previous training. 
In regard to your plan of making him our "safe and confidential agent" in Glasgow, I 
should think some years must elapse before he can be qualified for such an office. And 
I apprehend it will not be in our power to direct any consignments to him from this 
quarter, or employ him in the execution of orders for China. It appears to me that the 
nature of the business will be entirely in export trade, on the part of the home 
manufacturers to this Country and that China produce will find its ways to you only as a 
means of remittance. 
Consequently, prices will be so maintained here as to preclude speculations unless on 
account of parties at home requiring remittances who will of course be their own 
consignees. In the meanwhile, Mr. Macvicar has suggested that It will be desirable for 
John to acquire a thorough knowledge of manufacturing business by being employed for 
one or two years in a Manchester warehouse without salary - should you approve of 
this, he offers his services for carrying the plan Into effect. And I will provide for his 
economical maintenance. Mr. Macvicar thinks the youth can afterwards with great 
advantage come out to India or this Country. 
C4/1 James Matheson to Hugh Matheson Nov. 4.1831: 
I shall proceed to add a hint for your guidance. I think you should avoid engaging for 
any long term of years. as you did in joining I.M.H., A short partnership with liberty to 
separate after a notice of six months or a twelve month will be the most likely to keep all 
parties contented. So long as you get on well. the chances are none of you will wish to 
separate. As it appears possible Mr. Wm. Lyall may have formed other arrangements at 
home, I would not consent to be advertised until It is ascertained that he has done 
nothing to interfere with you. This will effectively guard against a collision of Interests, 
and subsequent discontent. I think you should have an equal share with Mr. C. Lyall, If 
not now certainly in the course of a year or two. Your business this season will not be a 
fair criterion of what you may expect to Influence to the firm after your joining It, If the 
foreseeable prospects of the drug and the probability of unreasonably high prices In 
India, our remittances and those of our friends will probably be on a more limited scale 
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than usual. And 2ndly the greater confidence resulting from not having to rely on a 
single life will, it is fair to presume, gradually induce your friends to Increase their 
business. In saying this, however, let me warn you that the greater part of Magnlac & 
Co. 's business must necessarily go to Fergusson & Co. You can only have a small 
share and the less this is known to F& Co. the better. 
It will probably benefit the Firm to let your name appear in it as a partner. One of the 
Lyalls (Jos. or Robt.) contemplates it as desirable that you are Charles Lyall should go 
home in a year or two, but the utility of this I do not perceive, seeing that Wm. Lyall is 
always there to look after your interests and the absence of either of you would revive 
the objection of reliance on a single life, which now exists. 
- Subsequent letter to James Lyall confirming what he said to Hugh, November 9, 1831. 
• C4/2 James Matheson To Hugh Matheson May 9,1832: 
Your new partnership is the principal subject of interest which I have to advert to and 
that I am perfectly satisfied of its being a good arrangement, as introducing you into a 
thriving and united family, yet I should be wanting in candor If I did not avow that a 
shade of disappointment came over me on reading the particulars contained in your 
letter. The concern appears to me to depend more on futurity for what it expects to be 
than upon the degree of succass which it has yet attained. If the Lyall branch of the 
business should increase so much as to render 1/4 of it equal to the 3/4 which you give 
up of yours, you will be pecuniary as well as you were before, with this difference that 
you will earn the same income with infinitely more travail and in place of its coming to 
you without asking, in the snug way of the China business, it will be derived from more 
precarious sources, partly depending on advances which you will have to make. But 
from a commission business, which you state in its second year to 'have left a small 
surplus after paying all the expenses of the establishment it requires a great stretch of 
the imagination to expect in its third year an increase 3 or 4 fold, say 30 or 40,000rs. 
Yet this you must have from pure commission to make your situation as good as it was 
and all I shall say is God grant It may be the case. 
In your letter of December 24, you state that the Lyalls concurred "fully in my remarks as 
to the danger of speculating largely in Indigo, In the present times." Again, you say, it is 
not C. Lyall's wish to speculate largely in anything. Now in both these extracts thera is a 
reservation, a loop hole, if I may so call it, which by no means agrees with the strong 
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language used in my letter of Nov. 4 where I state that I give my opinion in favor of the 
partnership on the express understanding "that your house is to be one of mere agency, 
and that above all you must abstain from speculating in that most treacherous of 
articles, indigo." 
All I have since heard of indigo has given me even a greater horror of it than I had 
before. Indeed, there seems to be scarcely an instance on record of any sort of 
speculation answering in Calcutta. At all events the instance of failures are infinitely 
more numerous than those of success. 
Pursuing the same course of observation, I would further observe that 3/8 or nearly half 
of your emolument appears to me too great a share to be employed by a partner at 
home who does not share in the labors, privations and discomfort of those managing the 
business abroad. That the party at home should have a handsome compensation for 
his responsibility and influence in procuring consignments is fair and proper. But this is 
usually a percentage on the consignments which he actually influences. Mr. W. Lyall, 
as the founder of your house, may reasonably expect more, but I think 3/8 too much 
with due deference. 
As to the plan which you hint at to Mr. Jardine of the London and Calcutta houses being 
amalgamated into one concern, I do not see what object is to be gained from it. The 
consequence will be that neither house will know what they are worth, without waiting to 
learn the wind up of the accounts of the other, and both will be apt to be put out of 
humor in suffering for unlucky or mismanaged transactions, not their own, such as 
occaSionally occur in the best regulated concerns ... 
I should think Mr. Jardine would not object to let you have the loan of 15,000 rs which 
you apply for to pay up your capital in the concern. But at the interest of 8 percent 
which you propose, you could not have it without subjecting us to a loss - and being of 
opinion that it will be more decorous to let the request come from yourself to Mr. Jardine 
direct, I would recommend your applying to him accordingly, without specifying the rate 
of interest. 
... You are of course exempted from commission on your speculations In old Patna but 
both Mr. Jardine and I disapprove of you adventuring so deeply, particularly Alexander. 
as it does not look well in the eyes of the other assistants In the office. I am glad to think 
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that you will make a little money by this business, but it grieves me to observe that you 
will require it all to make you even with the world. 
Until you mentioned this, I had not the least idea that you were in debt... 
C4/2 James Matheson to Hugh Matheson, Calcutta December 15, 1832: 
It is under feelings of no ordinary anxiety that I send you ... the documents by which you 
are constituted agents for the 10th Canton Insurance Company. To the anxiety which I 
must always feel for your well-being is added the consideration ... your judicious 
judgment and the affair will depend much of the hitherto well-maintained high character 
of the concern as well as our justification for going out of our way to secure you the 
agency. let me beg and entreat, therefore, that you will not suffer yourself to be 
seduced either to the right or to the left by any selfish views or considerations of our 
favoritism--- but that you will in all cases be regulated by the single, straight forward 
principal of what may tend to the good of the concern. let me also Inculcate upon you 
to bear in mind who it is you are acting for and not to wound our feelings of self-
estimation by hawking about your shares to parties who may be indifferent about having 
them. A due medium between undue humility and unbecoming hauteur will be your 
proper path. In regard to Fergusson & Co., and Mackintosh & Co., It will be suffiCient 
that you intimate to them that you have learnt from us, we shall be glad to hear of their 
accession and that you beg to know what their intentions are. Some little deference to 
any wishes they may express will not be out of place. But beyond this you cannot be 
expected to proceed. If you take Calder and Gordon and Storm on the right tack, I have 
no doubt they will take shares and be disposed to support you from regard to the 
interests of their correspondents Dent & Co. From Fergusson & Co. I have no great 
expectation, but we should wish the offer to be made to them in a handsome manner to 
give them a fair chance of coming forward. What advantage do you anticipate from the 
suggestion in your letter of 26th April that your committee should consist of Houses and 
not of individuals? It seems an anomaly that will have an odd appearance. 
Dent & Co. have made strong intent with us for continuing the agency with Mackintosh & 
Co., stating as a recommendation that in the first 15 months of their agency they 
collected 120000 or 130000 rs. in premiums. If you do as much or more, of course, we 
stand justified with our co-proprietors. But in your thirst for premiums, you must take 
care not to be reduced to the taking of ineligible risks. 
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Your suggestion of placing the accumulation of premiums, government securities in the 
names of the Committee is undoubtedly preferable to any idea of a deposit in the Union 
Bank or in any of the great Agency Houses. 
I wish you had avoided saying anything as to conferring the London Agency on W. Lyall 
& Co. Your idea of their taking risks for the office in London shows a want of knowledge 
which I could hardly have expected and I was glad you had soon found out your error. 
A little more modesty of language in setting forth their pretentious would have been 
becoming. A variety of considerations make us averse to so total a separation of our old 
connections as would be implied in our passing over Fairlee & Co. in the London 
Agency. This is a most important department as depositaries of the London premiums 
which it is also possible they may be called on for heavy advances should we be 
unfortunate enough to meet with losses at the commencement of our career. I am 
aware that some little time ago, there were parties who spoke slightingly of our London 
friends. But we go upon good grounds in disregarding such insinuations which we know 
to be without foundation. 
We have taken into serious consideration your idea of confining the shares of a few 
Houses on whom you can depend for all their support rather than aiming at a wider 
distribution, which might fritter away your interest without adding to your strength and we 
are by no means disinclined to it, if you see your way clear. Only let me have practical 
proof of your modesty by your being satisfied with a moderate number of shares for 
yourselves. In our official letter, we have suggested your having 2. This is, of course, 
on the supposition of your finding eligible parties willing to take the rest off your hands. 
and to give you corresponding support. We wrote to Cockerell & Co. that we have 
recommended them to you are shareholders. 
In my opinion, it is of more importance to you as a young House to be recognized as the 
agent of a flourishing Insurance Company than the advantage of 1 or 2 thousand rupees 
per annum. which you might gain by every additional share appropriated to yourselves. 
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Finance and Insurance 
• C4/2 James Matheson to Charles Thomas, Singapore July 23, 1832: 
You will receive by this conveyance your account current to 30th June, and I cannot 
conceal from you how much I have been disappointed to observe the very considerable 
sum that will be still due after crediting your Benares opium, which we have hitherto 
been unable to realize. Let me beg and entreat in the most eamest terms that you will 
give effective attention to our wishes on this subject, which did now become the more 
indispensable in consequence of the dissolution of our former firm, when the present 
firm must either resolve to take upon themselves the responsibility of your Balance or 
report it to Mr. Macvicar as in suspendu. For indeed am I ... apprehending that the later 
course will be requisite. But you will see the necessity (in order to avoid it) of reducing 
the amount within reasonable limits. Permit me to suggest a plan which I think you 
might adopt with some advantage to yourself while it would tend to tranquilize our 
minds, viz. that you should instruct your agents at Calcutta, Bombay London to pass 
your consignments to them to our credit and let us draw upon them for the profitable 
proceeds. Had you done so with the 300 Ibs. of Camphor sent to the three above 
named places, it would have made a material reduction in your balance and saved you 
interest. The only objection which I see to it is the circumstance of your running your 
own risks to a certain extent. But if you would forget this doubtful advance and effect 
insurance in the regular manner on the full amount, I think we could make up the 
sacrifice to you in other ways, desirous as we are and have been of doing every thing in 
our power to promote your interests. 
I shall feel obliged if you will inform us of the rent obtained for your premises 
hypothecated to us, also who the tenants are • and if you will continue to do so, while 
the loan is unredeemed. I am aware that you yourself occupy one of the Houses in 
which Mr. Murchison resided formerly. 
I would also suggest that till your balance is reduced you shall consider as appropriate 
to us any eventual profits on the consignment of Norden, notwithstanding the letters 
which at your earnest request we sent you, for Messrs. Fergusson and Messrs. 
Remington & Co. and place the amount at your disposal. 
In making up your account current, we have omitted commission on bills of England 
remitted to you and on your bills which we have paid· Without however meaning this as 
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a precedent for future occasions. I trust your explanations respecting commissions will 
soon arrive and enable us to dismiss the subject from our correspondence for the future 
for it is truly irksome to revert to it so often. 
C4/2 James Matheson to John Macvicar (Confidential) April 25. 1832: 
For the sake of our friends. more than from any apprehension on our own part. we were 
most desirous to avoid bringing themselves extensive acceptances and have fortunately 
been able to do so. have been abundantly supplied with bills under credit from parties of 
the first respectability in America. most of them guaranteed by the agent at New York of 
Baring Brothers & Co. By offering our endorsement to these. they are equally 
negotiable in India as if drawn on ourselves. I shall annex a list of the Houses on which 
such bills are usually drawn. as well as of some others. and we shall feel obliged by 
your keeping us regularly advised of any circumstance which you may hear whispered 
to affect their credit. particularly that of Baring Brothers & Co. 
Names of House regarding whose credit we wish to be advised from time to time: 
Baring Brothers & Co. 
Thomas Wilson & Co. 
Timothy Wiggins 
Gillespie. Moffatt. Finlay & Co. drawers of John Jacob Astor a great capitalist 
of New York 
Gowar& Marx 
Bill and Grant 
W. & J. Brown & Co .• Liverpool 
Gledstone. Drysdale & Co. 
Small. Colquhoun & Co. 
C4/2 James Matheson to Hugh Matheson April 7. 1832: 
To enable you to answer any comments which you may hear in the mouths of others 
regarding the amount of bills in the market bearing our endorsement. I may observe that 
we seldom or never remit such bills except when called for by our constituents. and as 
the demand for them has latterly been very great. especially for Bombay (whence some 
would appear to have found their way to Calcutta) their amount has been considerable 
in proportion --- so much so that I think it likely three fourth of all the Exchange 
bUSinesses of Canton have passed through our hands this season. Bills drawn by 
ourselves are 
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sought after by Parsee agents here, at a penny or a half-penny lower than those we 
endorse, but these we attribute to their ignorance or to the nature of their orders from 
Bombay, because if there be any difference those which we endorse should properly be 
considered preferable, having the security of the drawers in addition to ours. It would be 
easy for us in place of endorsing bills to remit them all to Fairlie Bonham & Co, and then 
draw against them, but this, it appears to us, would be weakening the security of all 
parties, besides the possible injury that might result to Fairlie Bonham & Co. from an 
enlarged amount of their acceptance being afloat in the home money market. In this 
remark, I am far from meaning any disparagement to their London friends but as all 
security in commerce is relative, we think that we afford a stronger guarantee against 
the hazards incident to all human affairs by distributing the risk which is inseparable 
from doing business, among a number of good houses, whose bills we purchase and 
pay for rather than by relying on any single house, however strong -- this strong home, 
be it remembered, being always prepared to pay in case of need in protection of our 
endorsement. 
Of the bills which we endorse, those on Baring Brothers & Co. are always drawn under 
credits either from themselves or their attorney at New York, Mr. T.W. Ward, who has 
authority for the purpose. Other bills are drawn under credits from a known capitalist 
John Jacob Astor of New York, who owns lands almost equal to a principality in the 
United States. Bills on Gledstone, Drysdale & Co. are either drawn under credits from 
them or on the security of bills of lading for goods, They are a House of know property. 
Mr. Thomas Weeding on whom we draw is a merchant possessed of at least a lack of 
pounds sterling. Thomas Wyatt on whom we also pass bills is a stili greater capitalist 
tho only an oilman. Then there are Messrs. Spode and Copeland, China ware men of 
solid wealth and you may have seen some of our bills on them also. On the whole, we 
feel that we are now committing ourselves with people of far greater solidity than those 
whose bills are vaunted forth at 7/10112 at Calcutta. And if any disappointment should 
occur to us, divided as our risk is among various parties, It cannot but prove 
comparatively insignificant. 
It may probably prove a useful preparation on future occasions of sending you bills with 
our endorsement to state who the drawers are, and the nature of the security on which 
we rely authorizing you at the same time to assure parties taking them that Fairlie 
Bonham & Co. will be prepared to take them in case of need for our honor. But as I 
have said before it is not likely that we shall trouble you with anything 'til we hear that 
credit is reestablished in the mercantile establishments at Calcutta. 
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Tell me how the bills of the United States bank are valued at your place, whether they 
would sell equally well with those of the first Calcutta houses. They ought in fact to sell 
as well as the Company's. The security to my mind is better. 
You are at liberty to show this letter of course to your partner and to James and Robert 
Lyall but you must not let the whole of it be seen by any others for I should not wish it to 
be known that I have spoken so disrespectfully of the Calcutta houses 
C9/1 Donald Matheson to John Abel Smith March 25, 1846: 
The gradual improvement which we were counting upon here in the market for 
manufacturers has had a considerable check lately by the disclosure mode at Shanghai 
that instead of the goods going into consumption. they were going into the Pawnbrokers' 
shops, or in other words. that the principal purchases of them from foreigners. finding 
that he could not resell them for cash. placed them at enormous interest, and when the 
selling day arrived at their New Year. he was of course unable to meet his 
engagements. The difficulties have been measured as regarding foreigners by the 
experience of the Consul and his adjustments in devising measures to meet the 
emergency. It is understood. however. that the Chinese government will compel the 
Bankers who have been the main cause of the evils. to assist the tea and silk dealers. 
till their produce which has gone to England chiefly under advance can be sold and 
aCcounted for. 
China is now participating in the same scarcity of money that has been prevailing in 
India and Europe and it is chiefly distributed to the drain by her own Government of 21 
million dollars worth of Sycee during the last three years. The wont of this Bullion for the 
usual remittance to India and the simultaneous scarcity there precluding any advantage 
from the transmission of English paper to that market must compel us to resort to the 
export of dollars. which being a foreign currency we have not the means of readily 
replacing, and thus our trade will be even more fettered than at present. If these 
antiCipations are realized. it would be worth the attention of capitalists either to ship 
Spanish dollars to Europe or to influence remittances from South America by way of 
China and Specie .... 
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Market Knowledge 
• C4/1 William Jardine to I.H. Gladstone, March 29,1830: 
You ask me to give my opinion of the consequence of throwing open the trade between 
England and China, a measure which I expect to see only partially resorted to at 
present. Should the trade be thrown open, it will still be carried on by Europeans, or 
rather English capital. Howqua is old and cautious, too much disposed to quiet and 
retirement, to advance his very large capital in distant speculations. Mowqua had very 
large landed property, but not enough of ready cash to carry on the Company's trade 
allotted to him, without borrowing from Europeans ... Tengqua, who conducts the 
bUSiness of Powkequa's Hong is too timid to embark on any uncertain speculation, and 
however since he took charge of the Hong, confined himself almost entirely to the Co-
hong's business. Chunequa is neither solvent nor is the Hong broken up. I have this 
forenoon been requested by the creditors to draw up a chop or petition against his 
Hong, the Viceroy having been under a promise to bring the head of the Hong, Lord 
Melville back ever since September last, but has hitherto failed in doing so. Old 
Kingqua is still poor and in debt, though his credit is good. Falqua has neither money 
nor character. Gowqua had money but knows nothing of business beyond supplying 
teas for the company, who generally pay him cash and burthen him with as little import 
cargo as possible. 
So much for the Old Hongs. We have now four or five new Hongs ... Some money, 
some character, or without money and without character ... broken down opium brokers. 
If the trade is thrown open and we or any House or individual known here can purchase 
a certain quantity of black or green tea annually, there will be no difficulty in procuring 
them and the importance or sway of the party will be propitious to the extent of the 
trade they carry or always supposing them to be honest, reasonable, just and honorable 
in all their mercantile transactions. 
C4/1 William Jardine to Magniac, Esq., November 10,1830: 
By this conveyance, you will of course expect a copy of the accounts that should have 
been sent to you last season and I feel very much annoyed at being again compelled to 
disappoint your expectations, but the truth is this, after having gone through the whole of 
the opium accounts of last season, we found that Mr. Ullman had so mixed up the soled 
but uncleared drug of the previous season with It that It became necessary to examine 
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minutely the operations of that also, which has not been satisfactorily accomplished. 
Mr. Matheson has however made great progress in this tedious examination, and by 
one of the later ships of the season (we will send you) a statement that may be relied 
on. 
In the meanwhile, I may safely say Mr.Ullman's balance of about $78,000 will be more 
than doubled by adding to it the profit arising from the opium account. 
You may possibly recollect my repeatedly observing to you that I was satisfied Mr. 
Ullman's books were sufficiently correct for practical purposes but never balanced with 
nicety. 
• Coast Letter Book, Hongkong to A.G. Dallas, Sh June 4,1852: 
• 
"You will please bear in mind that money in China has been scarce for some time back, 
and as we are dependent upon the Woosung station for a considerable portion of our 
supplies, it would be most inconvenient were we entirely deprived of these.· 
The government-controlled Bengal monopoly provided regular reports and irregular 
memoranda on crops and possible yields in the Benares and Behar agencies, but 
Jardine depended upon Jeejeebhoy and others for its knowledge of the Malwa crop and 
Bombay market trends to prepare instructions for commanders on the coast. 
Unbound Correspondence in Letter Box, 1848: 
"(1) What is the present amount of manufactured opium on hand in the country (I.e., 
Rajputana and the Native States)? Reply: 2000 chests of old drug 1846/47 and about 
9000 to 10,000 of new 1847/48 now coming in, (2) Whether there is a prospect of 
extensive failure to the crop now sowing? Reply: the want of water will doubtless 
occasion a considerable reduction but the rates being so high It may be expected, and 
is, that every means will be taken, such as sinking fresh wells, to procure water. So 
suspicious, however, are those who make advances that they are waiting until the crop 
is high to see what water remains for the advancing stage of the poppy before they lend 
money. The crop cannot exceed 9000 or 10,000 chests, though ordinarily 12.000. If 
there are high prices just before the rains they will adulterate to 12.000 but this opium 
won't come in before November. The rule is .. .if prices are high. they adulterate, If low, 
store their drug. 
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• Unbound Correspondence, Calcutta, November 11, 1850: 
• 
"Memo of Opium Cultivation, Behar Opium Agency, 11 November 1850: For five days 
rain fell incessantly, which not only has retarded the sowings but has damaged them 
considerably and will necessitate the resowing of a large quantity of land. On the whole 
it will make the crop a late one which is objectionable, a late crop of poppy never being 
so plentiful as an early one." 
C9/1 Donald Matheson to John Abel Smith May 25, 1846: 
Trade with China is now completely overdone, and each successive mail seems 
destined to transmit slightly worse accounts than its predecessor from either side, 
aggravated, it seems to me by an imaginary good in the shape of a prospective 
reduction of the tea duties. The benefit of which when they do arrive may after all be 
greatly overestimated. The export of green teas for the past eleven months amounts to 
upwards of eleven million pounds, an unusually heavy supply. Fortunately, the increase 
has taken place chiefly during the last two months, and as the vessels sail out of 
season, they will make long and irregular passages, thus extending the Imports into 
Great Britain over a greater space of time. I trust the moderate quantity shipped by 
ourselves may be moved off at about ... rates, which is the best we cen hope for in these 
times. 
The scarcity of money which I alluded to in a former letter continues both here and in 
India and the non receipt in the latter country of the usual supplies from China appears 
to be severely felt as shown in the Exchanges. We learn that considerable purchases 
were made of Bills in China at 200 Rs for $10011 hope the sales of tea and silk will 
enable you to send to Jardine Skinner & Co. a considerable amount of Company's bills 
on our account. 
We have just been favored by the Government here with an extract from Mr. 
Gladstone's dispatches sealing the fate of Hong Kong. Increasing dissatisfaction has 
for some time prevailed especially among the small houses, at the gradual decline of the 
little trade that existed owing to the ruinous policy pursued by the local government and 
now that the policy has been most unconditionally approved of by the new Secretary for 
the Colonies, all hope is at an end. It is the sincere conviction of those who have the 
best means of judging that this island under the fostering care of a good government 
might have prospered, and to an extent which under present adverse circumstances 
might appear incredible, but the opportunity is even now gone. The island of Chusan Is 
to be given up immediately, but the right of entrance Into Canton, although ceded to us 
in writing, is denied or abandoned by us in fact. 
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Coast Letter Book Hongkong to Coast, Feb 5,1843, March 11,1844, April 1844: 
"We are sending cotton staple to the north. There is no demand here (Hongkong-
Canton) but demand is reported at Arnoy (Feb. 1843) ... Raw cotton is very dull (March 
1844) ... Nothing doing in cotton. Jeejeebhoy and Company advise that 1400 are being 
sent forward with other shipments to follow, and the article is as usual unmovable (April 
1844)." 
Coast Letter Book Hongkong to A.G. Dallas, Sept. 15, 1845: 
"It will be impossible to get cash for cotton this year (1845) and we shall have to load, 
bye and bye, about 4000 tons of tea. We must realize on $700,000 of Jeejeebhoy 
cotton.": 
Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, with whom the firm conducted jOint-account business, 
complained in 1846 that Jardine had not lowered its commission charges on raw cotton 
or opium in accord with those of many smaller dealers, particularly the Parsees who 
speculated in small amounts at Hong Kong or Canton. The firm replied that big 
operations required more capital. 
PLB, Hongkong to India to Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy, August 18, 1846: 
"In former times when we had an establishment at Canton only, these commission 
charges were not considered high. Now we are compelled to keep branches at Canton, 
Macao, Shanghai and Amoy besides our coast stations, Involving a very heavy outlay of 
capital and large annual disbursements." 
Coast Letter Book, Hongkong to Commanders, May 29, 1851: 
The almost simultaneous arrival of (four) vessels from the fifth and sixth Calcutta sales 
has caused, for the moment, a panic among the dealers and prices which had 
previously been well supported at our last quotations have given way .... After a time, 
however, the market will probably rally somewhat, but, for the present you will continue 
to take full share of sales at current rates." 
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Insurance 
• C4/1 James Matheson to Charles Thomas, Singapore February 9, 1832: 
I regret it is not in our power to comply with your wish for being appointed Agent for the 
9th Canton Insurance Company, the present office being under the management of 
Dent & Co. On the 1st January next, it will be succeeded by the 10th Insurance 
Company under our management, and we shall then probably be able to avail ourselves 
of your services. But in place of receiving premiums in produce, which must be 
attended with great trouble and risk of loss, I would suggest as a preferable 
arrangement their being paid in good bills on China, London, Calcutta or Bombay, at the 
same rate of Exchange as the policy. Great care will be requisite in accepting only good 
risks and in rejecting all those of a secondary class, including small coasters and traders 
among the Malays or Eastern isles. 
Time policies unless where the voyage is very particularly speCified and unobjectionable 
should also be avoided. In short it is not for the sale of the premiums to be realized that 
we would contemplate having an agent at Singapore. Is chief use will be to protect the 
interests of the office in regulating transshipments to England. But for this motive, we 
should feel no desire to extend our 
C4/2 James Matheson to Hugh Matheson February 25, 1832: 
In the course of the ensuing summer, it will devolve upon us to establish the 10th 
Canton Insurance Company. I am happy to say that Mr. Jardine is quite as much 
disposed to befriend you on the occasion, as I am myself, If he does not even go 
beyond me. It seems essential to the pian that your proposed partnership with Lyall 
should be carried into effect or some other of equal respectability. As you will still be a 
young house, it will be desirable to make a provision that the premiums, when they 
accumulate to a certain sum, shall be placed in the hands of some party of stronger 
credit than yourselves, the Union Bank for instance and in this case what interest will be 
bank allow? 
Hitherto the Calcutta agents have acted on their own responsibility without any 
committee such as the Calcutta offices have, but should you be appointed, I should 
think it would add to the respectability of the concern to appoint a Committee consisting 
of the most influential parties who might be disposed to take an interest In supporting It. 
Out of the 60 shares of which the office consists, Palmer & Co. had formerly 18 for 
distribution among their influential friends and 6 for themselves. Were you to be 
appointed, four 
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shares would of course satisfy you, which would leave a greater number for distribution. 
The point to be ascertained therefore is how you could command an adequate portion of 
business, or create an interest among your friends, having the distribution of the above 
number of shares --- say 18 for yourselves and friends. At present we make no 
promises, but it would facilitate a decision when the point comes to be ultimately 
resolved upon, were you to turn the matter in your mind and let us know your opinion on 
the points I have adverted to. You will do well to avoid giving out that I have written to 
you on the subject --- but there will be no harm in enquiring of your friends whether in 
the event of your succeeding, they would be disposed to support you. 
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PlB James Kewswick, Sh. - HK, to W. Keswick, January 17,1879: 
"Alii can say at the moment is that if the scheme be carried through at all we shall have 
the business for I do not anticipate that the Chinese will go to any other firm." 
Unbound Correspondence, Hongkong, from J. Bell-Irving, Feb. 4, 1870: 
"Our best information holds that China Cotton cannot be spun into yarn which will make 
gray shirtings, and that the highest count of yarn into which it can be spun is No. 20." 
PClB, HK, G. Brown to Platt Bros. & Co., Oldham, November 14,1878: 
"We write regarding the subject of supplying the Chinese with the plant of Machinery 
requisite for the establishment here of a Manufactory by which Native Cotton can be 
worked up into gray shirtings. This undertaking has so far advanced that certain 
influential Chinese have now come forward and are seeking the necessary permission 
from the Native Officials to form themselves into a Company for the purpose of carrying 
out the scheme ... we may be called upon at an early data to definitely state the terms 
upon which we will undertake to supply the plant of Machinery ... Telegraph to us the total 
cost in Sterling including Freight & Insurance to Shanghai...(The plant must be capable 
of turning out 270,000 pieces of Grey Shirtings per annum.) On receipt of your telegram 
we shall be in a better position to treat decidedly with the promoters ... send by mail a 
memo of the probable Wages you would have to arrange for when engaging the 
following Skilled hands, viz 1 Chief Superintendent, 1 Engineer, 1 Supt. for carding and 
spinning machinery, 1 Supt. for the weaving machinery, 1 Mechanic to erect and set up 
the Plant & Machinery ready for us. All for three years .... This letter we forward open 
through our london friends Messrs. Matheson & Co." "The Shanghai Cotton Spinning & 
Weaving Company· failed to attract support, although Jardine continued to pursue it and 
related projects, such as a government-sponsored mill. 
PClB, F.B. Johnson to W. Keswick, March 12, 1880: 
"It is evident that the Mill, if started, will mainly have to compete with Native 
manufacturing industry and this is just what Li and Shen, its patrons, do not want to do." 
C39/1 Private letter Book - Sh J.J. Keswick September 4,1880, Nagasaki: 
(Impact on financial reporting of cost of coal per ton) I do not overlook the fact but for a 
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time working accounts were rendered which we supposed to show the cost of coal, but 
..... in conjunction with the cost statements, I do not think the figures in the working 
accounts could be considered strictly accurate as various payments seem to be 
imported into the account which are not - properly speaking - in any way connected with 
the working of the time. 
It has been a matter of much concern to the Nahahara and to their agents to find that 
the clause of the agreement with the Gotos which provides that the 80 percent of the 
value of coal advanced by him as not immediately applied as provided for viz. to the 
payment of wages at the mine ... 
In November 1882, Jardine with a group of foreign merchants organized another joint-
stock cotton mill company. The firm did not know what their legal rights to build 
factories in China were. 
PLB, William Paterson, Sh-HK to W. Keswick, Dec. 29,1882: 
"Do not calculate too assuredly upon the protection to be given us by the Diplomatic 
Body at Peking. The rights of foreigners in respect to such enterprises are not in any 
way clearly set forth in the Treaties. I mean if the Chinese insist upon placing their own 
construction upon the wording of the treaties and appeal to their rights under the usual 
principles of International Law I do not feel sure that the contention of foreigners to enjoy 
special privileges in the settlements which are denied to natives, unless expressly 
granted in the treaties, would be sustained by our own government, considering the 
present drift of its policy. 
Johnson felt that the wisest course would be to continue to establish jOint-stock 
enterprises with Chinese investors for those needs like cotton manufacture and silk 
reeling which appeared likely to render good profits because of changes in domestic 
and foreign demand. To do this it was important to secure the participation of Chinese 
merchants and well-connected to the bureaucracy, but preferred not to risk their money 
in government supervised projects. 
Unbound Correspondence, HK-Sh F.B, Johnson to W. Paterson, Jan. 20, 1883: 
"I would recommend that the interests be tacitly allowed to grow until they become too 
extensive to be interfered with without inviting claims for compensation if disturbed." 
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An abortive scheme typical of the kind the company was willing to consider because they 
wanted above all else to make a cotton mill was a plan for a mill in Shanghai in cooperation 
with a Bombay yarn merchant. 
• 
• 
PLB. Sh. Hk to J. Macgregor. July 22. 1889: 
"if he can get up sufficient capital I shall endeavor to get a company formed entirely 
Chinese. with a separate agreement appointing Jardine. Matheson & Company as 
managers for a small percentage on gross. say 2%." 
PLB Sh HK to J. Keswick. June 2.1894: 
"If it succeeds we will order more machinery at once to build a Mill on our property 
behind the Ningpo Wharf. Shanghai...we could get the whole of the capital from the 
Chinese Piece Goods dealers in Shanghai...the dealer would not put a tael in any mill 
where the official element appears. The time has come to exercise our rights." 
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Appendix B: 
Jardine, Matheson Acquisitions 
And Investments, 1970-1996 
XXIV 
Kind of Comean~ 
Name of Company 
Count!1 of OE!eration {and countrl of registration or Incore:orat ion} PrlnciE!al e:foduct or actlvilies SIC Code 
Subsidiary Singapore Promet Singapore Pte Ltd. Steel products manufacturing 3533 
Subsidiary United Kmgdom Bradley British Overseas Ltd. Confirming agents 509915142 
Subsidiary Singapore Jardine International Insurance Brokers Pte. Insurance braking 6411 
Subsidiary Philippines Jardine Davies Inc Holding and management 6719 
Pnncipal Subsidiary & 
Associated Companies 
Hong Kong Associated Engineers Ltd. Englneenng 8711 
Subsidiary Philippines Allied Guarantee Insurance Company, Inc. Insurance 6411 
Subsidiary Philippines Hawaiian.Phihppine Company Sugar milling 2061 
Subsidiary Philippines Sherwin-Williams Philippines Inc. Industnal machinery 5084 
Subsidiary Singapore Gregory Singapore (Pte.) Ltd. Diamond trading 5094 
Subsidiary PhilipPines Air Con Inc. Alr--conditioncr and television 3589 
manufacturing 
Subsidiary United Kingdom ASA Aeroservlces Ltd Air chartoring agents 4522 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Jardine Shipping Agencies Pte Ltdb Freight forwarding 4731 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Air Express Ltd Freight forwarding 4731 
SubSidiary United Kingdom Air Express Travel Ltd Travel agents 4724 
Subsidiary Singapore Parrish Pte Ltd MedtcaJ & scientific supplies 3841 
Subsidiary PhilipPines Edward J Nell & Co. Machinery distributors 5084 
SubsKfiary Australia 86 Berry Streel Pty Ltd Property 6512 
SubSidiary Australia A. Hoffman (Insurance) Pty Ltd . Insurance braking 6411 
Associates Fiji A .S. Farebrother Co .. Ltd. 
Associates PhiliPPines Acme Plywood & Veneer Co .. Inc. Wood products 2435 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Agana Life Ltd. Ship operallng 4499 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Air Express Lid Freight forwarding 4731 
ASSOCiates Kenya Air Freight Kenya Ltd. Freight forwarding 4731 
Subsidiary United Kingdom All ShipPing Agencies Ltd Freight forwarding 4731 
SubSidiary PhiliPPines Aircon Inc. Air-conditioner and television 3585 
manufacturing 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Alfred Dunhill (Far East) Ltd Mar1<ellng 5099 
ASSOCiates Japan Alfred Dunhlll (Far East) Ltd. (Hong Kong) Dunhill mktg 5194 
SubSidiary Rhodesia Allen Wack & Shepherd (Pili) Ltd. Shipping and manne msuranco 4731 
Subsidiary Philippines Allied Guarantee Insurance Co Ltd Insurance 6411 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Allied Food Industries (Far East) Ltd Food services 9999 
AsSOCiates Singapore Alhed Food Industries (Far East) Ltd (Hong Kong) Food services 9999 
Subsidiary Philippines Alhed Guarantee Insurance Company. Inc. Insurance 6411 
Associates Hong Kong Almarino Navigation Ltd Ship owning 4499 
Subsidiary Lesotho Amalgamated Hotels (Lesotho) (Pty) Ltd HOlels and casinos 7011 
Associates Republic of South Africa Amalgamated Leisure (Pty) Ltd Outdoor equipment 3949 
Subsidiary Lesotho Amalgana ted HOlels (Lesotho) (Pty) Ltd Holels and caSinOS 7011 
Subsidiary Austra lia Ambatta Pty Lid. Proper1y 6512 
PrinCipal SubSidiary & 
Associated Companies 
England Anderson & Co Stockbroking 6211 
Associates Malaysia Antah Avlau Sdn Bhd 
Associates Malaysia Antah Char1ered Insurance Brokers Insurance broking 6411 
Associates Malaysia Antah Holding Sdn Bhd Holding 6719 
Associates Malaysia Antah Jardine EqUipment Sdn Bhd Offshore servico equipment 9999 
AsSOCiates Malaysia Anlah Jardine Flaming Sdn Bhd Morchent banking 6211 
ASSOCiates MalaYSia Antah Jardine Offshore Sdn Offshore Services 7389 
ASsociates Malaysia Antah Jardine Shipping Agencies Shipping servtc •• 4731 
Associates Malaysia Antah Offshore Sdn Bhd Offshore petroleum 1382 
ASsociates Malaysia Antah Oliloois Sdn Bhd Offshore Supplios 5084 
ASSOCiates Malaysia Antah Schindler (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd Lift englneerrng 3534 
Associates Singapore Arrow International Loglsllc Inc . (USA) 0,1 Industry supplies 5084 
Subsidiary Singapore Arrow tnternallonal Supply (Pte) Ltd Oi/lndustry suppllos and sorvlclng 5084 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Arvin (Hong Kong) Ltd. Electronics manufacturers 3679 
Subsidiary United Kingdom ASA Aeroservices Ltd Air chartering ogonts 4522 
Associates Liberia Asia No 1 Bulk Carners Freight Forwarding 4731 
Associates Hong Kong Asiadats Computer Sorvlce Bureau 9999 
Principal SUbSidiary & 
ASsociated Companies 
Hong Kong Associated Dairies International Ltd Dairy products 2024 
ASsociates Hong Kong ASSOCiated Engineers Ltd Engineering 1611 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Associates Engineers Ltd Engineering 1611 
Subsidiary Fill Associates PacifIC Bakeries Ltd Bakery products manufacturing 2053 
PrinCIpal Operating 
Companies and 
Investments 
Australia Astre Investments Pte Ltd Motor distribution 5012 
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Kind ot Comean~ 
Name of Company 
Count~ of 0l!eratlon 'and count!}: of registration or Incor(:!oratlon! Prlncieal E!roduct or acllvltles SIC Cod. 
Subsidiary USA Atlas ElectriC Company Inc ElectriC and eloctronlcs 5063 
Associates Australia Australian Dauy Farm Ltd. Franklin's stores. finance & investment 6211 
Associates Thailand Bangkok Investment Co Ltd Investments 6289 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Bangour Enterprises Ltd. Property trading 6512 
SubsKliary liberia Bangour ShiPPing Inc Ship oWning 4499 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Bangour Shipping Inc. (Liberia) Ship owning 4499 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Balh Shipping Co. Ltd Ship ownmg 4499 
Associates Hong Kong Biwater Treatment {Hong Kong} Waler Treatment 4941 
ASSOCiates Philippines Bago-Medellin Milling Co . Inc. Sugar Milling 2061 
Associates Hong Kong Boland Housing Ltd Property development 6512 
SubSidiary United Kingdom Bradley British Overseas Ltd Confirming agents 5099/5142 
Principal Subsidiary & 
Associated Companies 
Hong Kong Brink HKS Ltd. International movement or valuables 7381 
SubSidiaries Hong Kong British S'eel (Asia) Ltd. Trading 5051 
Subsidiary Australia Brookeades Pty Ltd. ScientifiC equipment manufacturing and 3841 
marketing 
Associates Malaysia Bumlmedic Sdn Bhd Medical supplies 9999 
Subsidiary Hong Kong CAC Ltd. Toy exports 5092 
Principal Subsidiary & 
Associated Companies 
Hong Kong CaledOnian Far East Airways Ltd Ground handling sefV1ces 9999 
Associates Liberia Candid Tankers Corp. 011 shipment 4412 
Associates Singaporc Carboline South East Asia Pte LId Wholesaling 5198 
Subsidiary Republic of South Africa Cash Security Associallon (Pty) Ltd Security services 7382 
PrinCipal SubSidiary & Hong Kong Causeway Hotel LId. Hotel ownership 7011 
Associated Companies 
Principal Operating 
Companies and 
Malaysia CCl Group Properties Sdn Bhd Investment & development properties 6552 
Investments 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Cemac (H K.) Ltd Cement 3241 
ASSOCiates United Kingdom Central Basinghallinvestments Ltd Property developmen, 6512 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Central London Inland Clearance Customs clearing 4731 
AsSOCiates Hong Kong Central Reglstralion Hong Kong Share registrars 6289 
Associates Hong Kong Central Registration Hong Kong Inc. Share registrars 6289 
Associates Hong Kong Central Reglstrallon Hong Kong Ltd Registrars of Public Companies 6289 
PrinCipal Opera ling 
Companies and 
Thailand Chaophaya Development Corporation Ltd . Shopping complex 1542 
InveSlments 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Charies HewlU (Insurance Brokers) LId. Insurance braking 6411 
Subsidiary Malaysia Chee & Co. Sdn Bhd Dental supplies 5047 
Subsidiary Singapore Chee Kin Dental EqUipmen' (S) Pte Ltd Dental supplies 5047 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Cheshire Shipping Co Ltd Ship owning 4499 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Cheshire Shipping Company Ltd Ship owning 4499 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Chi Wo Properties Ltd Propertlos Investmonts. management & 6531 
development 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Chinese International Underwriters Ltd Insurance broklng 6411 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Chubb (Hong Kong) Lid Security oqUipment 1799 
Prlnclpal Operating China/Hong KongfTalwan Chubb China Holdings Lid Security equipment 1799 
Companies and 
Investments 
Principal Operating 
Companies and 
France Cke Insurance braking 6411 
Inveslments 
AsSOCiates Hong Kong Citation Carriers Inc. (Liberia) ShIp oWning 4499 
ASSOCiates Liberia Citation Carriers. Inc Ship owning 4499 
AsSOCiates Hong Kong City Hotels Ltd Hotels 701 t 
Principal SUbSidiary & 
ASSOCiated Companies 
Bntish Virgin Islands Clare Investment and Trusteo Holding 6719 
ASsociates Republic of South Africa Classic luggage Co. (Pty) ltd Leathor goods 316t 
Principal Operating 
Companies and MalaYSia 
Cold Storage (Malaysia) Bhd Retailing & manufactUring 5149 
Investments 
Subsidiary Fiji Cold Siorage Ltd RefrlQeratod storago 5411 
Pnncipal OperatIng Singapore Cold Storage Singapore (1983) Pta Ltd Supennarkats. pharmaclcs & 5411 
Companies and convenience stores 
Investments 
PrinCipal Operating 
Companies and 
Japan Colliers Halilax Assoclales Property investment & servlcos 6798 
investmonts 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Colliers Jardine (Hong Kong) Ltd Property seMces 6798 
Prlnclpal Operating 
Companies and 
Australia Colliers Jardine Holdings (Australia) Ltd Property SCrYIces 6798 
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Kind or Com~an~ 
Name of Company 
Country or Operation (and country or registration or Incorporation) Principal product ar actlvltle. SIC Codo 
Investments 
Principal Operating ASia PaCific Colliers Jardine Holdings Lid Property services 6798 
Companies & Investments 
Subsidiary Singapore Colhers Jardine, Goo & Tan Pte Ltd Property servlcos 6798 
AsSOQates Republic or South Afnca Colorent (Pty) Lid TV Rental 7359 
Associates MalaYSia Commercial UnIOn Assurance (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd Insurance braking 6411 
AsSOCiates Panama Campania Progress Five S A Ship owning 4499 
Subsidiary Panama Campania Progress Holdings SA 011 service vessel owners 6719 
Principal SubSidiary & Jersey Compendium Trusl Co. Inc. Trust services 6733 
Associated Compantes 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Concept 2000 (Hong Kong) Lid Toy and youth electroniCS 3944 
Subsidiary Netherlands Antilles Concept 2000 N V Toy and youlh electrOniCS 5092 
Subsidiary USA Concept 2000 N V (Netherlands Antilles) Toys and outh electronlbx onlx 5092 
youth 
ASSOCiates Bermuda Connaught Investors Ltd Investment 6712 
ASSOCIates Australia Consolidated Cargo Services (N S W ) Pty Ltd Transportation services 4783 
Subsidiary Eire Consolidated Insurance Brokers Ltd Insurance broklng 6411 
ASSOCiates RepubliC of Soulh Africa Conlalner Bases (Pty) Lid Container sales 5088 
Associates Hong Kong Container RefurbIShing Ltd Container reconditiOning 4783 
AsSOCiates MalaYSia Conventence Shopping Sdn Bhd Convenience slore 5411 
AsSOCiates Hong Kong Crolhall Hospital Services Lid Hospital saMallon 7349 
Associates United Kingdom Culchurch Properties Lid . Property development 6512 
Assoaales Hong Kong Curlew Nalll9allon lid Ship oWning 4499 
Principal Opera ling MalaYSia Cycle & Carnage Blntang Bhd Motor dlstnbutlon 371 1 
Companies and 
Investments 
Principal Operating Singapore Cycle & Carnage Industnes (1986) Pte Lid Malar distribution 5013 
Companies and 
Investments 
SUbsidiary Hong Kong Cyona Ltd Investment holdmg 6719 
Principal SubSidiary & Bermuda Dairy Farm Intematlonal Holdings Holdmg operating through Subsldlanes 6719 
Associated Companies in rood products. supermarkots and drug 
stores 
PrinCIPal Operating 
Companies and 
Hong Kong Dairy Farm Management Services Ltd Management 5411 
Investments 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Dallas Gems & Minerals Company Ltd Precious and semi-preCIous stones 5094 
PrinCIPal SubSidiary & Hong Kong Dantas Holding Ltd Furniture retailing 5712 
ASSOCiated Companies 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Dantas Holdings Ltd Furniture retailing 5712 
SubSidiary RepubUc of South Arnca Oalnows Industries (Pty) Ltd 
Subsidiary USA Davies Brokerage. Inc Insurance 6411 
Subsidiary USA Oav~s BUilding Malerials. Inc Construction 1542 
SubSidiary USA Davies Euromotors Lid MotardlSI 5012 
SubSidiary USA Davies Insurance Agencees, Inc Insurance 6411 
Subsidiary USA Davies Marine Agencies, Inc Shipping sorvlces 4731 
Subsidiary USA DaVies PaCific Center Inc Convenuon mgrnl 7389 
Subsidiary USA DaVies TirO Co o. Inc Automotive suppfios 5531 
Subsidiary Australia Deacon and Howes Pty Ltd Refuse disposal 4953 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Denhart Shipping Lid. Ship owntng 4499 
Prlnclpal Operating Japan DFI SeIYu Ltd Supermarkets 5411 
Companies and 
Investments 
AsSOCiates Netherlands Antilles Dlamond Dragon Dnlhng Finance N V Finance 6211 
Associates Netherlands Antilles Diamond Dragon Dniling N V Drillstllp owning 1311 
Assooates Hong Kong D,award Steel Works Ltd Stool fabncatlon 3559 
Associates Hong Kong Dominion Far East Line (Hong Kong) Ltd Shipping serYIces 4731 
Associates Australia Domlmon Far East Une Ply ltd Shipping serviCes 4731 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Dorset ShipPing Ltd Ship owntng 4499 
Subsidiary Rapubllc of South Africa Douglas Green of Paa~ (Ptyl Ltd Liquor wholesalers 5 t82 
Subsidiary Namibia Dougtas Green of Paa~ (SWA) (Pty) Ltd Liquor wholesa lers 5t82 
SUbSidiary Australia Duklnson Pty Lid Proper1y 6512 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Dumfries ShipPing Co Ltd Ship owning 4499 
ASSOCiates Philippines Dynamanne Corporation 4731 
Subsidiary MalaySia E.I Pamsh Sdn Bhd Medical & SCientific supplies 3841 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong East POint Hotels ltd Hotels 7011 
AsSOCIates Hong Kong East POint Management Ltd Hotel management 8742 
Associates Hong Kong East Poinl Reinsurance Management Company of Reinsurance 6331 
Hong Kong Ltd 
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Kind of Coml!an~ 
Name ot Company 
Count!): of 0l!!,atlon 'and count~ of registration or Incore£:rationJ Prlncil!al E!roduct or acUvltl •• SIC Cod. 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Eastern Secunues Co lid Investment 6726 
Subsidiary Singapore EI Parnsh (Singapore) Pte lid Medical and sClontific suppllos 3841 
Associates libena Elegance Carners. Inc Ship OWning 4499 
Associates Hong Kong Elegance Camers. Inc. (Llbena) Shlpownmg 4499 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Empire Finance Co LId Finance company 6211 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Empire FInance Company. Ltd Investment holding 6719 
Associates Philippines Etemlt Corp Asbestos cement 3292 
AssocJates Hong Kong Eupo-Air (Holdings) LId Holdings 6719 
ASSOClaies Umled Kingdom Eupo-Air Travel ServICe Ltd T ransportatton 4512 
ASSOCiates Malaysia Euro Medlcallndustnes Sdn Bhd Medical supplies 3841 
Associates Japan Ewo Deve~pment Lid Roal eslata 6552 
Associates Japan Ewoland Co .. Ltd Real estale 6552 
ASSOCiates Macau Excelsklr ~. Hotels E Investlmentos Llmltada The Excelsior Hotel Macau 7011 
PrinCipal Operahng 
Companies and 
Hong Kong ExcelSior HOlel (BVI) LId Holel ownership 7011 
Investments 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Falcon Holdings Co . Lid Ship OWning 4499 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Fardel & Company Ltd Trading 5137 
Associates Thailand Fedders (Thailand) Ltd Air conditiOning 5075 
ASsociates Thailand Fedders Markellng SerVlC8s Lid Air conditioning 5075 
SubSidiary Republic of South Afnca Fidelity Guards (Pty) LId. Security 7382 
Associates Fill FIJI Insurance Company ltd Insurance 6411 
Assodates Hong Kong Fiji Insurance Company LId (FIJI) Insurance 6411 
Assoaates Singapore Fltzpalnck's Food Supplies (Far East) Ltd Food and property 6512/5411 
Associates Singapore Fitzpatrick's LId Suponnarkots 5411 
Principal Operating Hong Kong Floet Trans InternaHonal Co .• Ltd Shippong services 4731 
Compames and 
Investments 
Subsidiary Australia Fleetmor Customs Services Pty Ltd Customs agents 4731 
Associates Australia Fleetways (Holdings) Lid Holding 6719 
ASsociates Australia Fleetways Finance Ltd Financial SOMces 6211 
Subsidiary Auslralla Fleatxpress Pty Ltd Transport 4731 
Subsidiary Austraha Fleetllpress Securoly and Watching Servoce Pty Secunty sorvuces 7382 
Ltd 
ASSociates Australia Flinders Shipping Company Ltd Shipping seMces 4731 
Subsidiary USA Frank R MacNeill & Son Inc Managing general agenl 8741 
Pronclpal Operating 
Companies & Investments 
Australia Frankllns Ltd Supermarkets 5411 
Associates Australia Franklins LId Supermarkets 5411 
Associatos Australia Franklins Self-Serve Ply Ltd Supermarkets 8742 
AsSOCiates Liberia Fratemlty Carners. Inc Shlpowl1lng 4499 
Associates Hong Kong Fraternity Carriers, Inc. (liberia) Ship owning 4499 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Freight Express Intemational Ltd Frelghl lotwardlng 4731 
PMclpal Subsidiary & 
AsSOCiated Compames 
Hong Kong Freighl-Trans Intemallonal Co Ltd ShipPing services 4731 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Fu Tung Holdings Ltd Motor vehicle & Ir8nspon eqUipment 6719 
agonCies 
Subsidiary Fiji Gammon (FIJI) Ltd ConslruClton 1611 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd Conslructlon 1611 
SubSidiary Singapore Gammon (Hong Kong) Pte Ltd Construction 1611 
Subsidiary Malaysia Gammon (Hong Kong) Sdn Bhd Conslructlon 1611 
AsSOCiates Hong Kong Gammon BUilding ConstructIon Lid ConstructIOn 1611 
Principal SubSidiary & Hong Kong Gammon Construction Ltd Construction 1811 
ASSOCiated Companies 
SUbsidiary Hong Kong Gammon Properties Ltd Property dovotopmonl & manogomol1t 6512 
AsSOCiates Hong Kong Gateway Terminals Lid T ormlnal SOMces 4731 
AsSOCiates Liberia Gem Carriers, Inc. Ship owning 449 
ASSOCIalos Panama Grand Pollux Inc Ship owning 4499 
ASsociates Panama Grand Regulus Inc Ship owning 4499 
Assoclalos Hong Kong Greatway Terminals Ltd Terminal SOMces 4731 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Gregory Holdings Lid DIAmonds 5094 
Subsidiary Ropubllc of South Africa Grosvenor Car Hire Ltd Carhlr. 7515 
Principal Operating 
Companies and 
Singapore Guardian SEA Pte Lid Pharmaclos 5122 
Investments 
AsSociates Hong Kong GUinness Stout (H.K ) Ltd GUlnness mkg 5181 
SubSidiary United Kingdom H G. Parkinson & Co Ltd Insumnco broklng 6411 
Associates Australia Hallmark DeSign Pty Ltd 2512 
XXVJlI 
Kind Of Comean~ 
Name of Company 
Count!): of 0l!!ratlon land coun~ of registration or Incofe!!rationl Prlncll!al e:roduct or activit Ie. SIC Cod. 
Subsidiary United Arab Emirates Harbour Engineers Ltd Dredge owners and contractors 4783 
SubsIdiary Llbena Harmony Carners. Inc. ShIp ownIng 4499 
SubsidIary Hong Kong Harmony Carners. Inc. (LIberia) Shlpownlng 4499 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Harry Wicklng & Co Ltd TradIng 5131 
SubsidIary USA Hawaii Pizza HUI. Inc. Fast foods 5812 
Subsidiary USA Hawaiian Fluid Power Corp Water treatment 4942 
SubsIdIary USA Hawaiian Irrigation Co .. Lid Waler troatment 4941 
Principal Subsidiary & 
Assoclaled Companies 
USA Hawaiian Pizza Hul, Inc Restaurants 5812 
SubSIdiary Philippines Hawaiian-PhilipPine Co Sugar milling 2061 
Principal Subsidiary & 
Associated Companies 
PhiliPPines HawaIIan-PhilippIne Co Sugar milling 2061 
Subsidiary Repubhc of South Afnca Heavy Transpon and Plan I Hire (PlY) Ltd Ptant hire 7359 
Associates Hong Kong Heller Factoring (Hong Kong) Ltd Export faclonng 6153 
ASSOCIates MalaYSIa Henry Oestgns Associates (Malaysia) Setn Bhd Interior design 7389 
SubsidIary USA Hila Iron Works, Inc Sugar harvesling mfg 3556 
Associates Hong Kong HKL (Prlnce 's BUIlding) LId Property Invostment 651g 
Associates RepublIC of South Afnca Hluhluwe Holiday Inn HOlols 7011 
Associates Republic of Soulh Afnca Hluhluwe MOlors (Ply) Ltd. HOlols 7011 
SubSIdiary Hong Kong Hoi Kong Container Services Co .. Ltd Container services 4731 
Subsidiary Lesolho Holiday Inn (Lesolho) (P ty) LId Hotols and casinos 7011 
Subsidiary Transkei Holiday Inn fTranskel) (Ply) Lid Hololiar 7011 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Afnca Holiday Inn Properties Ltd HOlols and property 7011 
Subsidiary Republic of South Alnca Holiday Inns LId HOlels 7011 
Subsidiary Botswana Holiday Inns International (Ply) Lid Holels and casinos 7011 
Associates Repubhc of South Afnca Holiday Inns Kwazutu Ltd HOlels 7011 
Subsidiary Republic of South Afnca Holiday Inns Limited HOlets 7011 
Subsidiary Republic of South Afnca Hohday Trail LId Tou"sm 4725 
Subsidiary RepublIC of South Africa Holiday Trail (Ply) LId Tounsm 4725 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Hong Kong & China Property Co LId . ROB I estate 6512 
Assodates Hong Kong Hong Kong Air Cargo Terrnlnals Ltd Temunels 4731 
Associales Hong Kong Hong Kong Air T errnlnal Services Ltd Airport servicos 4581 
ASsocialos Hong Kong Hong Kong Convenience Stores Ltd Convenience sloros 5411 
Associales Hong Kong Hong Kong Convenllon Cenlre LId Mgml SOMces 8741 
SubSIdiary Hong Kong Hong Kong French ElectronIcs Company LId EleClrOntc component manufactunng 3679 
SubSIdiary Hong Kong Hong Kong Securities Ltd Socurlty sorvices 7382 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Hong Kong Secunty Lid Socurity services 7382 
Associatos Hong Kong Hong Kong Telephone Co LId TelecommunteattOn sorvtCos 4813 
Assoaatos Hong Kong Hongkong Air Terminal SeMces Ltd Traffic hand'ng faalllle, at Hong Kong 4581 
Alrpon 
Associatos Hong Kong Hon9kong Electnc HoldIngs Ltd Gonoralion & supply of electnclly 4911 
AsSOCIales Hong Kong Hongkong Land (CommerCial Cenlres) LId Property InvDstment 9999 
As,oclale. Nelherlands Anlilles Hongkong Land (Hawaii) N.V Property holding 6719 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Hongkong Land (S H ) Ltd Property Invoslment 9280 
Associales Austraha Hongkong Land Australia LId Property holding 9999 
PrinCipal Operallng Hong Kong Hongkong Land China Holdings LId Property ilweslmont 9999 
Companies and 
Invostments 
Principal Oporahng Hong Kong Hongkong Land Group Ltd Managoment 8732 
Companies and 
Investments 
PrlnCipat Operallng 
Companlos and 
Bennuda Hongkong Land Hotdlngs Holding 6719 
Investments 
ASlOClalos Hong Kon9 Hongkong Land HoldIngs Ltd Hok1lng oporallng through 5ubSKiIonos 6~19 
In proporty development & Investmont 
I aSlf'Ig & menagomenV· 
PnnClpal Opomting 
Companies and 
Bnllsh Virgin Islands Hongkong Land Inlemational HOldings Holdlllg 5719 
Investments 
PrinCIpal Oporallng Asia Hongkong Land Inlemallo,,"1 Holding, LId Proporty and Infmslrucluro Invostment 8798 
Companies and 
Invoslmcnls 
Associates Bermuda Hongkon9 Land tnlemational Lid Financial .orvlces 9999 
Principal Oporallng 
Companies and 
Hong Kong Hongkong Land Lid Managomont g 99 
Investmonts 
SUbsidiary USA Honokaa Sugar Co Sugar MIlling 2061 
Subslchary USA Honolulu Mongago Co Inc Invostment 6162 
AsSOCiates United KIngdom Howe Malhoson & Co , LId Invostmont 6726 
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Kind of ComE:an:t 
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Count~ of 0E:eratlon (and count~ of registration or Incoreoratlonl Prl ncl~.l l!roducl or activities SIC Code 
Associates United Kingdom Howe Matheson Tankers Ltd Olf shore 441 2 
Associates Hong Kong Hsln Fu Ltd Mfg . whotesale 9999 
Principal Subsidiary & 
Associated Companies 
Hong Kong Hui Kong Container Services Company Ltd Container services 4783 
Associates Hong Keng Humphreys Estate & Finance Company Ltd Residential property 6531 
ASSOCiates Singapore Hung Chue Pedder Martin Pte Ltd Securities 6726 
Associates Liberia Hussar Shlppmg Inc. Freight forwardtng 4731 
Principal Operating United Kingdom Hyde Park Hotel Ltd Hotel ownership 7011 
Companies and 
Investments 
Associstes Phltlppines IIIlgsn Coconut Industnes, Inc. Candy 2064 
Associates Liberia Incandesce Carners, Inc. Ship owning 4499 
Assoclales Hong Kong incandesce Carners, Inc. (Liberia) Ship OWning 4499 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Industrial Freighl Ltd. Freight forwarding 4731 
Subsidiary USA Industrial Manufacturing Group ('75) Inc Machine Tools 3541 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Industnai Waste Disposals Lid Waste disposal services 7349 
SubSidiary USA Insurance Braking Group JIB Holdings Inc. Insurance broking 6411 
Subsidiary USA Inter Island EqUipment. Inc. Tourism 4724 
Associates Philippines Intercontinental Gannent Manufaclunng Co. Clothing Mfg 2389 
Subsidiary Zimbabwe Intematlonal Holiday Inns (Pvt) Ltd Hotels 7011 
SubSidiary Rhodesia tntemallonal Holiday Inns (RhodeSia) (Pvt) Ltd Hotels 7011 
Associates New Zealand tntemationallnsurance Holdings Ltd Insurance braking 6411 
Subsidiary Hong Kong International Telecommunications Equipment Lid Electronic eqUipment 3661 
SubSidiary Singapore Interseas Shipping (Pte) Ltd Vessel managing 4783 
ASSOCiates Australia tsherwood & Dreyfus Holdings Ltd Beverage bottling 2086 
SUbsidiary Fiji Island Bottlers of Fiji Ltd SoU drink manufacturing 2086 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Ivory land Co. Ltd Property holding 6719 
Associates Bermuda J.F.M. Drillships Drillshlp owning 1311 
Principal Operating Umted States 
Companies and 
J.I.B. Hotdings Inc Hotdlng 6719 
Investments 
Subsidiary Helland J M.I.B. Holdings BV. Holding & Investment 6719 
Associates Singapore Jack Enen & Associates (HK) Ltd (Hong Kong) 011 industry supplies 5084 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Jack Enen & ASSOCiates (Hong Kong) Ltd 0,1 Industry supplies 5084 
ASSOCiates Singapore Jack Enen & AssOClates Pte Ltd 011 Industry supplies & S.MCing 5084 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Jardlnduslries Entertainment's Lid Distribution of tolovislon films 7841 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardlnduslnes Ltd Holding and managoment 6719 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Jardine Drlllships Ltd. Dnllshlp Investment 1311 
Subsidiary Thailand Jardine Matheson & Co (SEA) Ltd • Bangkok Englneenng 1611 
Branch 
SubSidiary Thailand Jardine Shipping Agencies Ltd . (Hong Kong) · Customs closrtlnce and agenls 4731 
Bangkok Branch 
Subsidiary Canada Jardine & Rotfe Ltd Retail broklng 6411 
Subsidiary UK Jardine (Lloyd 's) UnderWriting Agents) Ltd Lloyd's names agents 6411 
Subsidiary USA Jardine Air Cargo Air Irelght 451 3 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Air Cargo (International) Ltd Holding & management 6719 
Subsidiary UK Jardine Air Cargo (UK) Ltd Alrfr.'ght 4581 
Subsidiary USA Jardine Air Cargo (US) Ltd AlrfrelQht 4581 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Airport Services Ltd Ground handhng sOrvlces 4231 
Subsidiary Panama Jardine Asian Holdings tnc Invest mont holding 6719 
Principal Subsidlery & Australis Jardino Australia Insuranco Brokers Holdings Ply Retail braking 6411 
Associated Companies Ltd 
Principal Operallng Auslralia Jardino Auslrallan Insurance Brokers Ply lid RUlal! broklng 6411 
Companies & Investments 
Subsidiary Australia Jardine Australlsn Insumnce Brokors (Holdings) Insuranco broklng 6411 
Pty Ltd . 
SubSidiary Australia Janllne Australian MatO< Hotdlngs Pty Ltd Motor dlstrlbutton 5012 
Associates Hong Kong Jardine Barclays Ltd 
AsSOCiates Australia Jardine Bowen & L1p",an Pty Ltd 
PnnClpal Oporating United States Jardine California Motors Ltd Mator dlstrlbullon 5012 
Companies & Investments 
SubSidiary UK Jardine Cargo International (UK) lid AIr frolght 4731 
Subsldtary Netherlands Jardine Cargo Intematlonal Holdings B V Air freight 473 t 
SubSidiary USA Jardine Cargo International. (US) Inc. Airfreight 4731 
AssocialQs Hong Kong Jardine CMG Life Holdings Ltd Holdlng!+ 6719 
Subsidiary Unitod Kingdom Jardine d 'Ambrumenlllnternetional Ltd Insumnc8 broklng 641 t 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Danby Ltd Medlcat supplies 5122 
Subsidiary Philippines Jardine Davies Inc. Holding and managemont 5149 
XXX 
Kind of Comf!an:i 
Name of Company 
Count!}: of Oeeration ,and countrl of registration or Incoreoratlon~ Prlneieal eroduct or activities SIC Cod. 
5<Jbsldlary PhihpPlnes Jardine Davies insurance Brokers Inc Insuranco braking 6411 
5<Jbsldlary Australia Jardine Development Pty Ltd. Property and dry cleamng 6552 
Subsidiary USA Jardine Emelt & Chandler Inc Relall brakIng 6411 
SubsIdiary USA Jardine Energy Services Inc 011 explora tion 1382 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Englneertng Intemaltonal Ltd Engineering and aViation sales 1611 
Subsidiary Singapore Jardine Englneenng International Pie Ltd Engmeenng and B\ljalion 1611 
Subsidiary Singapore Jardine Equipment Servicing Ptc Ltd Crane and winch trading 1389 
Principal Subsidiary & 
Associated Companies 
USA Jardine Ernet! & Chandler Inc Relall broking 6411 
AssOCiates Hong Kong Jardine Feamley and Egers Syndlcale Offshore services 9999 
Associates Singapore JardIne Feamley ONshore Broklng (Pie) LId Offshore services 9999 
Associates Singapore Jardine Feamley Offshore Management (Pte) ltd Off shore services 9999 
Associates Hong Kong Jardine Feamley Offshore Operations Ltd Flnancaal services 6211 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Finance Services Ltd Financial services 6211 
SubSidiary Australia Jardlno FinanCial Services ltd Finance 6211 
Subsidiary Australia JardIne Filloy Ply LId. Property 5812 
ASSOCiates Jardine Fleming & Co .. lid Investment 6022 
Associates Austra lis Jardine Fleming (Auslral .. ) Pty LId . Investment management 6022 
AsSOCiates Japan Jardine FlemIng (Far Easl) LId. (Hong Kong) Merchanl banking 6211 
Assoctates Hong Kong Jardine Fleming (Securities) Lld_ Merchanl banking 6211 
SubsidIary SIngapore JardIne Fleming (Singapore) Plo LId. Merchant banking 6211 
Associates Singapore Jardine Fleming (Soulh EaSI ASIa) Pie LId Merchant banking 6211 
Principal Operating Hong Kong Jardine Fleming Bank LId Fully licensed bank 6022 
CompaOles and 
Investments 
Associates Bermuda Jardine Fleming Group LId . Holding company!+ 6719 
Associates Hong Kong Jardlno Fleming Holdings lid Merchanl banking 6036 
Associates Japan JardIne Fleming Inveslmenl Advisers (Japen) LId Investment managoment 6022 
Principal SubsidIary & 
Associated Companies 
Hong Kong Jardine Fleming Investment Management Ltd Investment management 6726 
Pnnclpal OperatIng Japan Jardine Fleming Investment Trust and AdVISOry Investment advisory 6726 
Companies and Company LId 
Investments 
Associates Hong Kong Jardine Fleming Secu,,"es LId Merchanl banking 6211 
PrinCipal Operallng Australia JardIne FlemlngOrd Minnell Ply LId Securities broklng rosoarch & corporal8 6726 
Companies and finance 
Investments 
Subsidiaries Taiwan Jardine Food ServIces (Taiwan) Co .. LId Restaurants 5812 
Associates West Germany Jardine Gill Gunlermann Zuckerhandels G m .g H 9999 
Subsidiary UK Jardine GlanviI! (Services) LId Management consuUancy 641 1 
Subsidiary UK JardIne Glanvlli (UK) LId. Insumnce broklng 6411 
Subsidiary UK JardIne Glanvlli (UnderwritIng AgenCies) LId Underwriting agents 6411 
SubSidiary Australia Jardine Glanvlllinsurance Brokers Pty Ltd Insurance broklng 6411 
SUbsidiary UK Jardine Glanvill LId Insuronce braking 6411 
SubSidiaries USA Jardine Hawaii Malar Holdings. LId Motor dlstnbullon 5012 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Industnos Inc. HoldIng and managemenl 6719 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Induslnos LId Holding & management 6719 
SubSidiaries England Jardine Insurance Broker Lid Rolall braking 6411 
SubsidIary Hong Kong Jardine Insurance Brokers ASia Ltd Relall braking 6411 
Subsidiary USA Jardine Insurance Brokers Holdings Inc . Holding 6719 
Subsidiary USA Jardine Insurance Brokers Inc, Insurence braking 641 1 
Pnncipal SubSIdiary & 
Associated Companies 
England Jardine Insurance Brokers Inlernational Lid Whol.solo brakIng 6411 
Subsldlanes USA Jardino Insurance Brokers Los Angoles ROlail broklng 6411 
Principal Subsidiary & England Jardine Insuranco Brokors Ltd Relall braking 6411 
AsSOCiated Companies 
Subsidiaries USA Jardine Insurance Brokers New York Inc. Rotoil braking 6411 
SubSidiary Australia Jardine Insurance Brokers Ply LId Insuranco broklng 6411 
SubSidIaries USA Jardine Insurance Brokers San FranCISCo Inc. Retoll broklng 6411 
Subsidiary USA Jardine Insumnce Brokers, Inc Insurance broklng 6411 
Subsidiary England JardIne Insurance Braking Group Ltd Holding 6719 
SUbsidiary Panama Jardine Insurance Holdings Inc Holding company 6719 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Insurance Services Ltd Insumnco consultancy services 6411 
SUbSidiary Hong Kong Jardine Insurance Underwrlllng Managemenl LId Insumnce lmdefWf'lIlng mAllogemonl 6399 
servlcos 
SUbsidiary Bermuda Jardine Inlemahonal Malar Holdings LId Holding. opereUng Ihrough subsldlanos 67 19 
In motor dlstrlbutionl+ 
Principal OpereUng Hong Kong Jardine International Molars Management LId Man gemanl 9999 Companies and 
XXXI 
Namo or Company 
Kind of Com~an~ Count~ of 0E!eratlon (and country of registration or Incorporation) Principal product or BCl lvlties SIC Cod. 
Investments 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine International Petroleum lid Holding and managoment 6719 
Subsidiary Singapore Jardine Internahonal Petroleum Management Pie Management of all Interosls 8741 
Ltd 
Subsidiary UK Jardine Investment Management Ltd Investment management 6022 
Associates Netherlands Antilles Jardine land & Manne N V. Manne engineering and conStruction 4789 
P"ncipal Subsidiary & Bermuda Jardine Life Assurance Ltd Lire Insurance Hong Kong 6311 
Associated Companies 
Principal Subsidiary & England Jardine L1oyd's Underwriting Agents Ltd lIoyds names agenls 6411 
Associated Companies 
Principal Subsidiary & Hong Kong Jardine loglca ltd. Computer software 7379 
Associated Companies 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Jar<lIne Loglca Systems Ltd Computor software 7379 
Principal Operating Taiwan Jardine Machinery Taiwan Ltd. Construction oqulpment 5082 
Companies and 
Investments 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardme Markellng Services Ltd . Marketing and management 5999 
Subsidiary MalaYSia Jardine Matheson Holdings (MalaYSia) Sdn Bhd Investment and managemenl 6022 
Subsidiary Australia Jardine Matheson & Co. (Australia) Pty Ltd Holding company for Group Australian 6719 
Interests 
Subsidiary Korea Jardine Matheson & Co (O"enl) Ltd (Hong Kong) Representative office 9999 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Matheson & Co. (South East ASia) Ltd. Holding and management 6719 
Subsidiary Australia Jardine Matheson (Australia) Ltd Holding & management 6719 
Subsidiary Brunei Jardine Matheson (B) Ltd tnvestment holding 6719 
SubSidiary Bermuda Jardine Malheson (Bermuda) Ltd Investment and finance 6719 
Subsidiary Canada Jardine Malheson (Canada) Ltd. Holding 4731 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Matheson (China) Ltd Marketing 5999 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Matheson (Finance) ltd . Finance 9999 
Associates Panama Jardine Matheson (ME) Inc. Investment and teprosentauve 9999 
Subsidiary Malaysia Jardine Matheson (MalaYSia) Sdn Bhd Investment and management 9999 
SubSidiary Iran Jardine Matheson (ME) tnc. (Panama) - Tehran Representative oHlco 9999 
Branch 
SubSidiary Monaco Jardine Matheson (Monaco) Sdn Bhd Ship management 4783 
Subsidiary USA Jardine Matheson (North America). Inc Management 9999 
SubSidiary Singapore Jardine Matheson (Singapore) Ltd Holding & trading 6719 
AsSOCiates Thailand Jardine Matheson (Thailand) Lid Holdings & management 6719 
Subsidiary Australia Jardine Matheson Austraha 1980 Ltd Holdings & management 6719 
Subsidiary Australia Jardine Matheson Australia Ltd Holding and management 6719 
Subsidiary Australia Jardine Matheson Dlst"butors Lid. Trading 5199 
SubSidiary Malaysia Jardine Matheson Estates Sdn Bhd Investment and managomont 6719 
SubSidiary Nethertands Jardine Matheson Europe B.V. Hok1lng. finance and Investment 6719 
SubSidiary Australia Jardine Matheson Finance (Aust ) Ltd Finance 9999 
Principal Subskhary & Hong Kong Jardine Matheson Finance Ltd. Finance 9999 
Associated Companies 
Principal Subsidiary & Singapore Jardine Matheson Holdings HOldings & managomont 6719 
Associated Companies 
Subsidiary Malaysia Jardine Matheson Holdings (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd Investment & managomont 6719 
SubSidiary Singapore Jardine Matheson Holdin9s (SEA) Ltd Holding end managemont 6719 
SubSidiary Singapore Jardine Matheson Holdings (Singapore) Ltd Investment holding and management 6719 
SubSidiary USA Jardine Matheson Inc. Hotdlng company lor Group USA 6719 
Interests 
Subsidiary Australia Jardine Matheson Industries Ltd Hotdlng company 67 19 
SubSidiary United Kingdom Jardine Matheson Insurance Brokers Insurance broklng 6411 
Subsidiary Australia Jardine Matheson Insurance Brokers (Aust ) Ply Holding company 67 19 
Ltd 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Matheson Insurance Brokers (H K) Ltd Insurance Oroklng 6411 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Matheson Insurance Brokors (Hong Kong) Insurance braking 6411 
Ltd 
SubSidiary Singapore Jardine Matheson insurance Brokers (Pie) Ltd lnsuranco braking 6411 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Jardine Malheson Insurance Brokors (UK) Holding company 6719 
Holdings Ltd 
SubSidiary United Kingdom Jardine Matheson Insurance Brokers (UK) Ltd Insuranco braking 64 tl 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Matheson Insurance Brokers internatlonat Insumnce broklng 6411 
Ltd. 
Subsidiary Singapore Jardine Malheson Insurance Brokers Pta Ltd Insurance broklng 6411 
Subsidiary Netherlands Antilles Jardine Mathason International N V Holding. finance & Invostmonl 67t9 
Subsidiary Netherlands Antilles Jardine Malheson International N V (100%) Finance. holding company 67 19 
Pnncipal SubSidiary & Bermuda Jardine Malheson Inlernatlonal Services Ltd Finance. holding company 6719 
Associated Companies 
XXXII 
Kind of ComEan:t 
Name of Company 
Count!): of 0l!oratlon 'and count~ of registration or Ineore!:!ratlonl Prlneil!al I!roduct or activities SIC Cod. 
Subsid13ry Smgapore Jardine Malheson Investmenls (South East ASia) Investment holding & managoment 67 t9 
Ltd 
Principal Subsidiary & Japan Jardine Matheson K K. Marketing 5999 
AssOCIated Companies 
Subsidiary Untted Kingdom Jardine Matheson life and Pension Brokers lid Insurance broklng 64tl 
Subsldianes Bermuda Jardine Matheson lid Managemenl 6719 
Subsidiary Austraha Jardine Matheson Properties lid Property management 6719 
Subsidiary Austraha Jardtne Malheson Properties Pty lid Property management 67 t9 
SubSidiary MalaYSia Jardine Matheson Properties Sdn Bhd Investmont and managoment 9999 
Subsidiary Singapore Jardine Matheson RegIOnal Holdings (SEA) Pte Investment holding and management 67 19 
Ltd 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Matheson Services lid Marketing & management 5999 
Pnnclpal Operating 
CompaOles and 
Southeast ASia Jardine Matheson South East ASia Pte Ltd Management services 9999 
Investments 
Principal Subsidiary & Brillsh Virgin Islands Jardine Matheson Trust Corporation Trust servlcos/Bermuda 6733 
Associated Companies 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Jardine Matheson Underwriting Agencies Ltd Insurance underwnting agents 641 1 
PrinCipal SubSidiary & Austraha Jardine Matheson Victoria lid Restaurants 5812 
Associated Companies 
SubSidiary PhilipPines Jardine Nell CorporatIOn Industnal eqUipmont marketing 3255 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Jardine Offshore (H .K ) LId Offshore service vessels ownorshlp 9999 
SubSidiary Singapore Jardine Offshore (Holdings) Pte LId Managemont & serviCing of 011 9999 
equipment 
SubSidiary Panama Jardine Offshore Contractors Inc Offshore contracting 9999 
SubSidiary Panama Jardine Offshore Inc, Vessel owners 9999 
Subsidiary Singapore Jardine Offshore Promo! Pte Ltd Englneenng, shotblasltng and ship- 1611 
bUilding 
SubSidiary Singapore Jardine Offshore Promet (Holdings) Pte LId tnvoSlmont holding and management 6719 
Subsidiary Panama Jardine Offshore Promet S A Holding company 6719 
Subsidiary Singapore Jardine Offshore Pte LIe Management and servICing of ott 9999 
equipment 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Offshore Vessels (H K.) LId Offshore service vessels operation 7389 
SubSidiary Singapore Jardine Odfield Supplies & Service s Pte LId 011 tnduslry suppltes and seMclng 7389 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardtne Oilfield Supplies & Services (Hong Kong) Olltndustry supplies 5094 
LId 
SubSidiary British Virgin Islands Jardine Pacific Finance LId . Investment & finance 9999 
SUbSidiary Bermuda Jardine PaCific Holdings LId Holdlng/+ 6719 
SubSidiaries Benmuda Jardine PaCific ltd Management 8742 
Associates MalaYSia Jardine Parnsh (MalaYSia) Sdn Bhd Medlcsl and saontiflC supplies 3841 
Subsidiary Stngapore Jardine Parrish (Singapore) Pte LId Medical and sClonlific supplies 3841 
SubSidiary Singapore Jardine Petroleum Management Pte Ltd Managemont of oillnlerosls 8741 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Jardine Properties (Holdings) LId Property hoIdtng 6799 
Subsidiary Republic of South Africa Jardine Rennie Insurance Brokors (Pty) Ltd Insurance 6411 
Assoaates Australia Jardine Rentacolor Ply LId TV Rental 7359 
SubSidiary Canada Jardine Rolfe LId Relall braking 641 I 
Assodates Malaysia Jardine Sandllands (MalaYSia) Sdn Bhd Importer, export~r, manufacturers' 7389 
ropresent811vc 
SubSidiary Singapore Jardine Sandllands (Singapore) Pie LId Importer. oxporter. manufacturers' 7389 
ropresentatlvo 
Principal Subsidiary & British Virgin Islands Jardine Schindler (Far East) Holdings Inc Holding & managemenl 6719 
Assoclaled Companies 
Subsidiary Panama Jardine Schindler (Fer East) Holdings S A Hotdtng ond manage mont 6712 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Schindler (Far East) Holdings S A Holding nnd management 6719 
(Panama) 
Subsidiary Jersey Jardine Schindler (Pacific) C.I LId Lift ongtnoonng 3534 
Principal Operating Hong Kong/Southeast Jardine Schlndter Holdings LId LUt In5taliailOO & mSlnlcnonco 6794 
Companies and ASIa 
Investments 
Subsidiary Netherlands Jardine Schindler Pacllic B V Ult In5t81101l0n & m81ntenanc 6194 
Principal Subsidiary & Jersey Jardine Schindler PaCific C I LId LIcenSing 9999 
Associated Companies 
ASSOdates Hong Kong Jardine Secuncor LId Security sorvlcos 7381 
Associates Jardine SecunlteS Ltd invostment 67 19 
AsSOCIates Thailand Jardine Services (Thailand) Ltd Shtpplng sarvtees 4731 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Ship Managemenl LId Ship management 4499 
Assoclatos Thailand Jardine Shipping (Thailand) LId Ship management 9999 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Jardine Shipping Agencies (Hong Kong) LId Shipping agonl5 4499 
Subsidiary Singapore Jardine Shipping Agencies Prlvat. LId Shipping agency ropresontation 4731 
Subsidiary Libena Jardine ShipPing LId Holding & managemonl 6719 
XXXIII 
Kind of Comean~ 
Name of Company 
Count!}, of O~ratlon ,and count~ olregistration or Incor2oratlon~ Prlncl~.1 ~roduci or activities SIC Codo 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardlno ShiPPing Ltd (Lobena) Holding & management 6719 
Subsidiary Bermuda Jardine Strategic Holdmg Holdlng!+ 6719 
Pnnclpal Subsidiary & 
Associated Companies 
Bermuda Jardine Sirategic Holdings Ltd. Investment 6719 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Technical Products Ltd Markollng and management 8742 
Subsidiary UK Jardine Thompson Graham & Co Ltd Reinsurance broklng 6411 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Jardino Thompson Graham Ltd Insurance & rein surance broklng 641 t 
Subsidiary Australia Jardone Thompson Graham Pty Ltd Insurance braking 641 I 
Pnncipal Operating 
Companies and 
Hong Kong Jardine Trans Alr·condltlonlng AIr·condlhoning 5075 
Investments 
Associates Hong Kong Jardine UOT Ltd liquor distribution 5182 
Subsidiary Slngapore/MalayslafThal1 Jardine Waugh Ltd Tmdlng 5099 
and 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Wicking ltd Garment manulactunng 2389 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Jardine Wines & SPiritS International Lid Markoling 5182 
Pnnclpal Subsidiary & 
ASSOCiated Companies 
Japan Jardine Wines & Splnls KK liquor dlstnbutlon 5 182 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine Wines & Sptrits Ltd Marketing 5182 
ASSOCiates Malaysia Jardine Wines & Spinls Sdn Bhd Marketing 5182 
Principal Subsidiary & 
Associated Companies 
Hong Kong Jardle Wmes & Spints International Bhd Marketing 5 182 
AsSOCiates NewZoaland Jardine Wrightson Lid Insurance broklng 6411 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Jardine. Gill & Duffus (Holdings) Ltd Holdings & managemenl 6719 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Jardine. Gill & Duffus (Hong Kong) Ltd 6221 
ASSOCiates Australia Jardine. Gill & Durrus (PaCific) Ltd (Fill) 6221 
ASSOCiates United Kingdom Jardine. Gill & Duffus (UK) Ltd 622 t 
Associates United States Jardine, Gill & Duffus Inc 6221 
Pnnclpal SubSidiary & Hong Kong Jardine. Malheson & Co Ltd Holdong & trading 6719 
Associated Companies 
SubSidiary Japan Jardine. Matheson & Co. (Japan) Ltd Tmdlng 5099 
Subsidiary Japan Jardine. Matheson & Co . (Japan) Lid (Hong Tmdlng and shipPing agents 5099/473 t 
Kong) 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine. Matheson & Co • (Onent) Ltd Marketing 5099 
SubSidiary Indonesia Jardine. Matheson & Co .. Ltd Ropresontallve office 9999 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine. Matheson & Co .. Ltd - Taipei Branch Tradong & shipPing agents 5099/4731 
Subsidiary Indonesia Jardine. Matheson & Co .• Ltd. (Hong Kong) Representative office 9999 
Subsidiary Fiji Jardine. Matheson & Company (FiJI) Ltd Holding nnd management 67t9 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Jardine. Malheson & Company (Onenl) Ltd RepresontatlVo offlco 9999 
SubSidiary South Korea Jardine. Matheson & Company (Onenl) Ltd (Hong Hotels and casinos 7011 
Kong) 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Jardine. Matheson and Co .• (Onent) Ltd Markellng 5099 
SubsKhary Hong Kong Jardine. Matheson and Company (Japan) Ltd Tradong & shipping agents 5099/473 1 
ASSOCIates PhilipPines Jardlne·Manlia Finance. Inc Investment 67t2 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Jardines Properties (Hotdlngs) Ltd Property hotdlng 6719 
SubSidiary Australia Jarwon Pty Ltd Property 6512 
Subsidiary USA JG Special Risk Insurance Brokers Insurance broklng 64 11 
Subsidiaries England JIB Group Pic Holding. opemtlng through subsldlRNos 6719 
In Insumnce broklng 
SubSidiary USA JIB Holdings Inc. Insurance broklng 641 t 
Subsidiary UK JIB International Services Lid Managemont 6719 
Principal Operating Bntlsh Virgin Islands JMH Investments Lid HoldIng 6719 
Companies and 
Investments 
Principal Operating Hong Kong JMH Treasury Ltd T roasliry sorvtces 9999 
Companies and 
Invostments 
Subsidiary Holland JMIB Holdings B.V Hokhng & Invoslmg 6719 
Subsidiary Netherlands Antilles JMIB Holdings N V Holding 6719 
Pnndpal SubSidiary & Netherlands JMIB Holdings S V Holding 6719 
Associated Companies 
Subsidiary liberia JMIB International Managemont Ltd Monagomont 9999 
Subsidiary Hong Kong JMIB Internationol Management lid (Llbona) Insurance broklng 641 t 
Subsidiary United Kingdom JMIB Managemont Ltd Holding & management 67 19 
Associates Malaysia JMS (M) Sdn Bhd Holdlg & Monng.ment 6719 
Subsidiary USA John 0 Sayor & Co Inc Rolnsumnce broklng 6411 
Subsidiary Republic of South Africa John T Rennie Son & Co Lid (Unltod Kingdom) 9999 
Subsidiary Unite d Kingdom John T Rennie Son & Co Lid Shipping sorvlces 4731 
Subsidiary Republic of South Afnca Jordan & Co Ltd 3143 
XXXIV 
Kind 0' Comeanx 
Name of Company 
Count~ of O~eratlon (and counl~ of registration or Incor~ratlon~ Princle;al eroduct or actlvltle. SIC Code 
Principal Operating Hong Kong/China JTA China Import Ltd Air~condlllo",ng 5075 
Companies and 
Investments 
SubsIdIary Rhodesia JW Jagger /I Co. (RhodesIa) Sel' SeIVlce Cash and carry wholesalo 5122 
Wholesalers (Pvt) Ltd 
Assoclales Japan KK Halo'ax 8742 
Associates Japan K K Halifax Associates 8742 
PrincIpal Operating 
Companies and 
Japan K K Slem Zushl Motor distribution 5012 
Investments 
Principal Operating 
Companies and 
United Slates Kahala Holel Associates Limited Partnership Hotel ownership 7011 
Investments 
Associates Australia Kale. MachIning Works Pty Ltd Machine Tools 3541 
SUbSIdiary Australia Karoo Developments Ply Lid Property 6512 
Associates Umted Stales Kawaihae T enTunals, Inc. Cargo 'orward,ng 4731 
SubSIdIary South A'nca Keens Group Company (Pty) Ltd Electncal eqUipment dlstnbuhon 5065 
SubSIdiary Singapore Khinco (Singapore) Pie Ltd Steel products manufactunng 3312 
Subsidiary MalaYSia Khlnco Sdn Bhd Steel products manufactunng 3312 
Pnnclpal SubSIdIary & Hong Kong KroU ASSOCIates ASIa Ltd Corporate intelligence 8742 
ASSOCiated Companies 
SubSIdiary MalaYSia Kuala Reman Rubber Estates Ltd (UK) Rubber estates 762 
Subsidiary USA Kukaiau Ranch Co .. lid Sugar plantation 762 
SubsidIary Australia Kurralta Pty Ltd Property 6512 
PnnClpal Subsidiary & England Kwtk Save Group Pic Supermarkets. freezer centers hquor & 5411 
ASSOCIated Compames convenience stores 
SubsidIary UK Lancaster Group Holdings lid Retail motor dlstnbutlon 5511 
Principal Substdlary & 
Associated Compames 
England Lancaster Pic Motor distribution 6719 
SubsidIary USA Laupahoehoe Sugar Company Sugar MIlling 2061 
AsSOCiates UK LCI Finance Ltd Investment holding 6719 
Assoclales Malaysoa Leo Burnett Sdn Bhd AdvertIsing 73 t 1 
Assoclales Hong Kong Llan'aes Investments Ltd Property mvestmont 6798 
AsSOCiates Phlhppines Lincoln Phlhppine lI'e Insurance Company. Inc Life Insurance 6311 
Principal Subsidiary & PhilIppines Lincoln Phllippmes Ure Insurance Co Inc. lifo Insurance 6311 
Assoclaled CompanIes 
Subsidiary liberia lisburne Shipping Ltd Ship owning 4499 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Lisburne Shlppong Ltd (Llbena) ShIp owning 4499 
Subskfiaries Bermuda Lockhart Insurance Company Ltd Group insuranco 6371 
Subsidiary Austraha Loftus Moran John Dyson Ltd Hotel suppllos 5023 
SubsidIary Australia Loftus Moran John Dyson Pty Ltd Holel supplloS 5023 
Subsidiary Australia Loftus Moran Ltd Hotol supplies 5023 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Lombard Alliance Insurance Company Insurance 6411 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Lombard Alliance Insurance Company Ltd Insurance 6411 
ASSOCiates UK Lombard Continental Insurance pic Non·ltfe Insurance 6331 
SUbSidiary UK Lombard Ellzabathan Insurance pic Insurance 6411 
PrincIpal SubSIdiary & 
Associated Companies 
Hong Kong Lombard Goneral Insurance Ltd Non-life insurance 6331 
AsSOCiates Panama Lombard Group Inc Insumnce holding 6719 
Subsldlnry Hong Kong Lombard Insurance Co .. Lid Insul'llnce 64 11 
Subsidiary Australia Lombard Insurance Company (Australia) Ltd Insurance 64 11 
SubSidiary UnIted KIngdom Lombard Insurance Company (UK) Ltd Insuranco 64t1 
SUbSidiary Hong Kong Lombard Insumnce Company Ltd Insumnco 6719 
ASSOCiates Panama Lombard Insl.Jfance Group Inc Insurance holding 6719 
Assoclales Panama Lombard Insurance Holdings Inc Insurance holding 6719 
Pnnclpal SubSidiary & BelTTluda Lombard lire Assurance Ltd Lole insurance/Hong Kong 8311 
ASSOC1atod Companies 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Lombard Securoties Ltd Securltl 622t 
ASSociates Hong Kong Loxhall ShIppIng Ltd ShlpplnA servlCos 4731 
Associates Llbena Lustre Carriers Inc. Ship owning 4499 
Subsidiary Australia Luya Julous Ltd Transport 473t 
Substdlsry PhilipPines Macleod Intemahcmallnc TransportallOn 473 t 
Assoclales Japan MacMIllan JardIne (Japan) Ltd Forost products 503 1 
Associates Malaysia MacMillan Jardine (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd Forost products 503 t 
Associates Japan MacMillan JardIne Ltd Forest product. malkolong 5031 
Subsidiary Republic 0' South A'rica MacRall Holdings (Ply) Ltd Holdings 67 t9 
Subsidiary Liberoa Majesllc Carriers Ltd Ship owmng 4499 
Subsidiary Llbena Majestic Carrlors. Inc. Ship owning 4499 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Majestic Carriers. Inc (Libaroa) Shlpownlng 44g9 
XXXV 
Kind of Comean~ 
Name of Company 
Count!Y of 0eeratlon land count~ of reslstratlon or Incor,eoraUon! Prlncl,eal ,eroduct or activities SIC Cod. 
Associates Republic of Soulh Africa Makro (Ply) LId ManfuaclUnng 5141 
Principal Operating 
Companies and 
Singapore Malayan Credit LId . Inveslment & development proporlios 7359 
Investments 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Manchu Gems LId Jewolry manufactunng 3911 
Associates Hong Kong Mandarin International Hotels ltd Hotel managemont 7011 
Principal Operating 
Companies and 
Hong Kong Mandarin Orienlal Hotel Group International lid . Management 8742 
Investments 
Principal Operating Hong Kong Mandann Orienlal HOlel Group LId. Management 8742 
Companies and 
Investments 
Principal Subsidiary & Bermuda Mandarin Oriental Hotels Ltd. Holding & managemenl 6719 
Associated Companies 
Prlnopal Subsidiary & Bermuda Mandarin Onantat International Ltd Holding operating Ihrough subsldianes 6719 
Associated Companies in hotel management & ownorship 
Principal Subsidiary & Hong Kong 
Associated Companies 
Mandann Oriental, Hong Kong LId . Hotol ownership 7011 
Associates Hong Kong Mandarin Publishers LId Magazine Publishing 2731 
Associates Philippines Manila Mandarin Hotel Inc. Mandarin HOlel, Manila 7011 
Associates Philippines Manila Mandarin Inc. Holdong 6719 
Associates Hong Kong Manland Investment Company. Ltd Investment 9999 
Subsldianes Hong Kong Mannings Real lid . Drugslores 5912 
Principal Operaling Hong Kong Mannings Retail LId Drugstores 59 12 
Companies & Investments 
Associates Singapore Marina Bay Holel Pie LId . Hotel ownership 7011 
Subsidiary Singapore Manne Coatings Pie Ltd Sleel coaling 3479 
Subsidiary New Zealand Marlowe Agencias LId Toy wholesaling 5092 
Subsidiary Australia Marshall's MOlors (NSW) Ply Lid Molor distribution 5012 
Subsidiary New Zealand Martin 's Toys & Hobbies LId Toy relailing 5945 
SubSidiary Uniled Kingdom Malheson & Co" LId Holding company for Group United 6719 
Kingdom ,ntereslS 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Malheson (Chartenng) Lid Ship chartering 4783 
Proncipal Subsidiary & Hong Kong Matheson Securities lid . Financial consultants 6221 
Assoclaled Companies 
PrinCipal Operating 
Companies and 
Channel Islands Malheson Bank (Jersey) Ltd Banking 6021 
Investments 
Principal Subsidiary & England Malheson Bank Lid Banking services 6029 
Assadaled Companoes 
Assadales Kenya Malheson Baumann lid 6221 
Associates India Malheson Bosanquel & Co. lid Tea 5199 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Malheson Chanering (Hong Kong) LId Ship charlerong 4783 
Subsidiary Uniled Kingdom Malheson Express LId Freighl forwarding 473 1 
Subsidiary Bermuda Matheson Financial Holdings (Bermuda) LId Holding 6719 
Subsidiary England Malheson Financial Holdings lid Inveslmenl holding 6719 
Pronclpal SubSidiary & 
Associated Companies 
Hong Kong Malheson Financial Planning (EAST) lid Financial & lax planning consultanls 6289 
Subsidiary Uniled Kingdom Malheson Freight Services ltd Frelghl lorwardlng 4731 
Subsidiary Unlled Kingdom Matheson Investment Ltd, Investment holdIng 6719 
Pronclpal Subsidiary & England Matheson Investment Management Ltd Investment management 6289 
Associated Companies 
Subskilary UK Malheson Molor Holdings Ltd Holding (reloll molar dlslribullon) 6719 
Subsidiary UK Matheson Petroleum Co. Ltd 011 explorallon 1311 
Subsidiaries Cayman Islands Matheson PFC Holdings Ltd Financial sorvtco$l1' 8742 
Pnnclpal SubSidiary & 
Associated Companies 
Hong Kong Malheson PFC Lid Financlol consultants 8732 
Subsidiary UK Matheson Properties Co LId Property Inveslmonl 65 12 
Pronclpal Operating 
Companies and 
Channel Islands Malheson Securotoes (Channel Islands) Lid StockbrOking 6 159 
Investments 
PrinCipal Subsid iary & 
ASSOCiated Companies 
England Malheson Securoties Lid Siockbroking 6 159 
Subsidiary Unlled Kingdom Malheson Shipping Services Ltd Ship managemonl. chortorlng ond 4783 
agonls 
Subsidiary Jersoy Malheson Trusl Co (Jersey) LId Trust services 6733 
SUbsidiary UK Malheson Trusl Co LId Banking services 6029 
PrinclpalOpernling Channel Islands Malheson Trusl Company (Jersoy) LId T ruSI sorvices 6733 
Companies and 
Investments 
SubSidiary UK Malhesons Inveslmenls Lid Invoslmonl holding 6719 
Pronclpal SubSidiary & USA Maui Gold, Inc. Consumer continully 391 I 11 ........ 1_ . ......... - ____ 1 __ 
XXXVI 
Kind of Com~an~ 
Name of Company 
Country of Operation (and country of registration or Incorporation) Principal product or activities SIC Cod. 
ASSOCiated Companies 
AsSOCiates Hong Kong MaXim's Caterers lid Restaurants 5812 
Associates Hong Kong May Tower Development Lid Real estate 6552 
Associates United Kingdom Mercator Chartering Lid. Shlppng services 4731 
Subsidiary Australia MGB Propenles Pty Lid, Propeny 6512 
Associates Micronesia Micronesia Industrial Corporation Copra coconut and coconut by-products 2099 
Subsidiary Transkel Mzamba Development (Pty) Lid , Hotelier 7011 
Subsidiary Transkei Mzamba Propenies (Ply) lid Property 6512 
Subsidiary Republic of South Africa Natal Erection & Crane Hire (Pty) lid, Crane & Winch rental 1389 
Subsidiary England Neighborhood Stores (Holdings) lid Holding 6719 
PrinCipal Subsidiary & England Neighborhood Stores pte Convenience stores 5411 
ASSOCiated Companies 
Principal Operating Hong Kong/China Nestle Dairy Farm Holding. S,A Dairy products manufactunng 2024 
Companies and 
InvDstments 
Associates Japan Nlhon Rentacolor K K. TV rental 7359 
Associates Hong Kong Notfolk Shipping Company Ltd, Shipping ser'Jices 4731 
Subsidiary Australia Northpoint Properties Ply Ltd Property 6512 
Subsidiary Australia Northside Gardens Investmenl Ply Ltd PropMy 6512 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Oriental World Trading Company Ltd . Toy exporting 5092 
Pnncipal Subsidiary & 
ASSOCiated Companies 
England Orma & Co Ltd Siockbroking 2281 
Associates Hong Kong Otto Wollf·Aulomolive Ltd Motordist 5012 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Oxford Shipping Company Ltd . Ship owning 4499 
SubSidiary Republic of South Africa P&I Assoclales (Ple)Ltd 9999 
Subsidiary Canada P,H. Foods Ltd Restaurants 5153 
Associates Indonesia P .J. Jaya Mandarin Agung Hotel developmenl 7011 
ASSOCiates IndoneSia P,T, Jakana Land Property 6512 
Associates IndoneSia P,T. Jaya Mandarin Agung Hotel devolopment 5148 
Principal Operating Indonesia PT. Sekman Wisata Hotel ownership 7011 
Companies and 
Investments 
Pnncipal Operating IndoneSia PT, Tunas Ridean Motor dlstnbutlon 5012 
Companies and 
Investments 
Associates liberia Pacific Bulk Transport Inc, Freight forwarding 4731 
Principal Operating Hong Kong Pacific Finance (Hong Kong) Ltd Installment nnance 6163 
Companies and 
Investments 
SubSidiary USA Pacific Machinery. Inc. Machine tools 3541 
Associates Singapore Pacol Pie Ltd 5199 
ASSOCiates Malaysta Pacol Sdn Bhd 5199 
Associates Philippines Pagadanan Timber Products Inc Tlmbor 2431 
Subsidiary Fiji Pearce & Company Ltd Trading 5199 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Pedder Deposil Brokers lid Deposit & Exchan90 Brokers 6163 
Subsidiary The Netherlands Pedder Europe B,V Holding and monagomont 6719 
Subsidiary Panama Pedder Holdings S A, Holding, finance and Investment 6719 
Associates Hong Kong Pedder Martm Ltd . Money broklng 6163 
Subsidiary liberia Pedder Shipping Inc. Ship owning 4783 
Associates Hong Kong Pedder Ventures Lid InvOSlfnont 6719 
Associates Hong Kong Pembros Investments Ltd Investment 6719 
Associates Hong Kong Pensions & Personnel Services Ltd Managomonl 8742 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Permacas( (Hong Kong) Ltd Jowelry manufacturing 3911 
Assoclales MalaYSia Parnes Jardine AViatIon Sales Sdn Bhd Air tmnspon services 4731 
Associates Hong Kong Personal Financial Consultants Ltd Investment consultants 7299 
Subsidiary Canada PH Foods Ltd Rostaurants 5812 
Subsidiary Philippines Philippine Machine Tool Company, Inc Machine loois 354 1 
Associafes Fiji Phofographor Oistnbulors Kodak dlslnblltor 5043 
SubSidiary United Kingdom Pickford Dawson & Holland Ltd 
Subsidiary Guam Pizza Hut of Guam. Inc. Fast foodS 5012 
Associates MalaYSia Plantation Agencies Sdn Bhd Planlatlon mgml 8742 
SubSidiary W Germany Pracht Air Services GmbH Freighl forwarding 4731 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Prachl International Freight Sorvice Ltd Freight lorwardlng 4131 
ASSOCIates Malaysia Preclma Sdn Bhd Transponollon sorvlcos 3679 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Preston Shipping Co Ltd Ship owning 4499 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Promet Contractors Offshoro contracting 7389 
Subsidiary Singapore Promet Englnoenng Pte Ltd Marine onglneerlng contractors 8711 
Subsidiary Singapore Promet Pie Ltd Shipbuilding end onglnoorlng 7363 
XXXVII 
Kind of ComE!an~ 
Name of Company 
Count~ of O~erat ron {and count~ of registration or IncorE!0ra tlon! Prlncleal eroduct or activities SIC Codo 
SubsIdiary Singapore Promel ShIpbuilders Pie Lid Sleel fabricalion 7363 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Promel ShIppIng InveslmenlS Lid . HoldIng company 67 19 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Afnca Prolea Renl·A·Bakk,e Holdings (Ply) Lid Car rentals 7534 
Subsidiary New Zealand Provincal Finance Ltd Holding and management 6719 
Subsidiary Republic of South Afnca RCH Finance Co (Pty) Lid. Finance and Investmenl 6163 
Associates Singapore Redland Jardine Induslrial ServIces (Singapore) Stoel fabncalton 33 12 
Pie Lid. 
Associates Hong Kong Redland Jardine Induslnal Services LId Sleel fabrocatlon 3312 
Associates Ubena Regence Carriers. Inc. ShIp owning 4499 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Regency Electronics Toy and radio exporls 5092 
Pronclpal Operallng Hong Kong/Soulheasl Reliance Environmental ServICes Co. LId Contract cleaning 7349 
Companies and Asia 
Investments 
Associates Hong Kong Reliance Services Company LId Air condilioning 5075 
Associates Soulh Afroca Renhil PropertIes Ltd. Holding (property & hOlels) 6719 
Subsidiary Rhodesoa Rennie Ballen & Russell (Pvt) Lid ShipPing and manne insuranco 4731 
Subsidiary Zimbabwe Rennie Gnnaker Zimbabwe Ltd . Holding 6159 
Assoclales MalaWI Rennoe Press (Malawi) Ltd. Cleanng. shipping & alrfrelghl agonts 4731 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Africa Rennies Air freighl (Ply) Ltd . Frelghl foowardlng 4731 
Subsidiary Republoc of Soulh Africa Rennies Air Holdongs (Ply) Lid HoldIng 6719 
Subsidiary Republoc of Soulh Africa Rennles Bulk Terminals (Pty) Ltd Frelghl foowardlng 4731 
Subsidiary RepubliC of South Africa Rennies Confirming & Finance (Pty) Lid Confirming 6163 
ASSOCIates MalaWI Rennles Consolidaled (Blanlyre) Ltd Travel and shipping servIces 4731 
ASSOCiates Republoc of Soulh Africa Rennles Consolidated (Bloemfontein) (Ply) Lid Shipping services and manne Insurance 4731 
SubsidIary Mozambique Rennles ConsolIdated (LM) Lda ShipPing seMces and manna Insurance 4731 
Associales Namibia Rennles Consolidaled (SWA) (Ply) Lid. ShippIng agenls 4731 
Subsidiary Rhodesia Renmes ConsoHdated Holdings (Rhodesia) LId Cash and carry. IrallOl and fre'ght 4731 
Subsidiary Zimbabwe Renmes Consolidated Holdings (Zimbabwe Holding 6719 
Rhodesia) Lid 
Subsidiary Republic of South Africa Rennles Consolidaled Holdings Ltd Holdings 6719 
Subsidiary Republoc of South Afroca Rennies Conlainer & WarehOUSIng Servlces (Ply) Cont81nenzatlon 4783 
Ltd. 
Subsidiary Republic of South Africa Rennles Express Delivery (Ply) Lid Express Delivery 4513 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Afroca Rennies Heavy Hautage (Pty) Ltd 4789 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Africa Rennies Hotel & Liquor HoldIngs (Ply) Lid Holding 6719 
SubSidIary Republoc of South Africa Rennies Inlemational Alrfrelghl (Ply) Lid Airfreight 4513 
SubSidiary RepublIC of South Africa Rennies Liquor Holdmgs Ltd Holding 6719 
Subsidiary Republoc of Soulh Afroca Rennles Luggage HoldIngs (Ply) Ltd HoldIng 671g 
SUbSidiary Republic of Soulh Africa Rennies Management Services (Ply) LId Mgmt Sorvlces 8742 
Subsidiary Republic of South Afnca Rennles Manufacturing Holdings Lid Holding 6719 
Subsidiary RepubUc of South Afnca Rennies Murrary & Co (Ply) Lid 
SubSidiary Republic of South Africa Rennlas Projocts (Pty) LId C,V,' Eng. Projects 8711 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Africa Rennles Property HoldIngs (Pty) Ltd Holding (Iradlng) 67 19 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Africa Rennoes Securlly Travel & Transporl (pty) Lid Holding (trading) 6719 
Subsidiary Republic of South Arrlca Rennles Shipping & Transporl HoldIngs Lid Holding (tradIng) 6719 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Afroca Rennies Shipping HoldIngs (Ply) Lid Holding (Iradlng) 6719 
SubSIdIary Zimbabwe Rennles Trading (Pty) Lid Holding (tradIng) 6719 
SubSidiary South Africa Rennoes Trading Lid . Holding (Iradlng) 6719 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Africa Rennies Travel & Tourism (ply) Lid Travel and lourism 4725/4724 
SubSidiary Republic of Soulh Afroca Rennies Travel Servfces (Pty) Ltd Travel and tourism 472514724 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Africa Renl·A·Bakk,e Holdings (Ply) Lid Car rontal 7534 
ASsociales United Slates Rentacolor Toloy,ston lontal 9999 
Assoclales Brazil Rentacolor do Brasil Telovlsao Lido Television rontal 9999 
ASSociates Rentacolor Intemalional Ltd Tolovislon renlal. 9999 
Associates Hong Kong Renlacolor Ltd. 67 19 
Assoclatos New Zealand Rentacolor New Zealand Lid Tolevision ronWI 9999 
Assoclatos Nlgena Rentacolor N~erj8 Ltd T e!evtslon ronlal 9999 
Assoclntes Philippines Rentacotor Philippines Inc Tolevislon ronlol 9999 
ASsociales Singapore Renlacolor Pnvate Ltd Telovislon ronlol 9999 
Associates Singapore Rentac~or Pte Ltd Tolftvislon rental 9999 
ASSOCiates Australia Renlacolor Ply Ltd Telolll510n ronlol 9999 
Assoclales Mexico Renlacolor S.A. do C.V Telovision ronlol 9999 
AsSOCiates Malaysia Rentacolor Sdn Bhd Tolovislon ronl91 9999 
AsSOclales Hong Kong Repco AUlomollve Englneorlng (HK) Ltd Englneenng 8711 
SUbSidiary Hong Kong Repedol Lid. Repolr and dellvory sorvlces 7549 
AsSOCiates Philippines Republic Cement Corporation Comonl mfg 3241 
XXXV III 
Kind of Coml!an~ 
Name of Company 
Count!}: of 0ecration ,and count~ of registration or Incoreoratlon) Prlncleal eroduct or activities SIC Cod. 
Subsidiary Unlled Kingdom Reunion Properties Company lid Propeny 6512 
SubSidiary Republic of Soulh Afnca Revelalion Producls (Ply) Lid. Garmonl Mfg, 2389 
Associates South Afnca Roben Enlhoven & Co. (Ply) Lid . Insurance brotong 6411 
Subsidiary liberia Rory Shipping Corporallon Ship oWning 4499 
Associates Republic of South Africa SA Car90 Depols (Ply) Ltd, Containerization 4783 
Subsidiary Republic of Soulh Africa SA OvMand Tours (Ply) Lid Tounsm 4724 
Associates Philippines San Carlos Milling Co .. Inc. Sugarmdllng 2061 
Subsidiary Malaysia Sandolands Butlery & Co" Lid (Uniled Kingdom) Mart<ellng, dlslnbuhon, shipping agency 4731 
and insurance 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Schindler Llfes (Hong Kong) Lid Elevator sales and Installallon 3534 
SubSidiary Singapore Schindler Uti (S) Pie Lid Elevator sales and Inslallallon 3534 
Subsidiary Singapore Schindler LItis Elevalor salos and Inslallatlon 3534 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Schindler litis (Hong Kong) Lid Uti salos & Inslallation 3534 
Subsidiary Malaysia Schindler litis (M) Sdn Bdn Elevator sales and inslallatlon 3534 
Subsidiary MalaYSia Schindler litis (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd Uft sales & installation 3534 
Subsidiary Singapore Schindler litis (Singapore) Pie Lid Uft sales & Inslallatlon 3534 
Associates Hong Kong Seaborne EqUipmenl Lid 3799 
Associates Hong Kong Securair Ltd. Airport security services 7382 
Principal Subsidiary & Bermuda 
Associated Companies 
Secure Lid. Group Insuranco 6371 
Associates MalaYSia Secuncor (Malaya) Sdn Bhd Airpon secunty services 7382 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Shackman Ltd . Walch parts manufaclUnng 3873 
Subsidiary PhiliPPines Sherwin-Williams, Philippines, Inc, Industnal machinery 3599 
Subsidiary Singapore Sholblasllng Engineering Services (Pie) Lid. Sholblasllng 1389 
Subsidiary Singapore Sholblasling Pie Lid Shotblasting sorvlces 1389 
Associates Thailand Slam Holel Syndicale Lid, The Orlenlal HOlel 7011 
SubSidiary Taiwan Silo Engineenng Corporatton EnglOoenng 8711 
Subsidiary Spain Simago, SA Variely Sioros 5999 
Associates Singapore Singapora Land Lid, Property OMung and developing 6512 
Subsidiary Singapore Singapore Sleel Pie Lid , Steel foundry 3325 
Subsidiary Hong Kong SinUS Enlerprlses Lid Property owning and developing 6512 
SubSidiary Republic of Soulh Africa Skyflile Luggage Co (Ply) Lid Insurance 6411 
ASSociates France Societe Interconlinentalo d'As5ufances pour Ie Relail broklng 6411 
Commerce ell'lnduslrle S A 
Subsidiary Fill Soqulu Plantatton Ltd Relailing wholosallng and Inveslmenl 5198 
Assoclales South Afnca Soulh African Conlalner Depols (Pty) Lid Conlalner handling 4731 
ASSOCiates Soulh Africa Soulh African Siavedores Lid Stevedoring & marine servlcos 4783 
SubSidiary Australia South AuSlralian Insurance Holdmgs Ltd Insurance 6411 
Principal Opera ling China Soulhern Slar MOlor Company Motor dlstrlbullon 5012 
Companies & investments 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Sovereign Bracelets Lid Jewelry 3961 
Subsidiary FiJI Spar holdings Lid, Sot! dnnks end cold slorago 4222 
ASSoclBtes Republic of South Africa Spencer Hey Sponswear (Ply) Lid Sportwoar Mfg 2389 
SubSidiary Swaziland SI. Vincenllnvesmlnos Lid , Inveslmenl holding company 6719 
ASSOCiates libena Slarlight Carnors. Inc. Ship owning 4499 
AsSOCiates Fiji Siinson A H,1. Lid, Relailing Rnd wholesalo 5094 
Subsidiary New Zealand Slinson Pearce (N,Z,) Lid Holding and managomonl 5092 
Subsidiary FiJI Slinson Pearce Ltd. Relaillng and wholosallng 5094 
SubSidiary Fiji Slinsons Inveslmenls Lid RelRWlng and wholosallng 5198 
ASSOCiates Australia Slrawbeny Hill Developmenl Lid Reat 6stale 6531 
Subsidiary USA Siubenberg Company, Lid 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Success Secunlles Lid investment and finance 6211 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Sulherland propenles Lid Propeny 6512 
Subsidiary SwaZiland Swazlspo Holdings Lid Hotels and casinos 6719 
ASSOCIates Hong Kong Swire SiriUS Lid Propony dovelopment 6512 
Subsidiary Hong Kong S\\iss Plating Corpora lion Lid Eleclronlc ptating 2796 
PnnClpal Operahng 
Companies and Hong Kong 
Syslem-Pro Compulers Lid Compuler retailing 7372 
Investments 
Subsidiary Unlled Kingdom T . G Terminals Lid Frolghl forwarding 4731 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong T ,I.S. Lid 6411 
Principal Opera ling 
Companies and 
Hong Kong T .J, Engineering Sorvlces lid Nr condllJOnlng saNtees 7623 
InvOstmonts 
Assoclales Australia T P Clark & Chapman (Reinsurence) Ply Lid 6411 
ASSOCiates Australia T.P, Clark & Chapman Ply Lid 6719 
~r~~c~~~I; ?~r:tl~_~. ___ ._ Taiwan TP.HCo , Lld Reslauranls 5812 
XXX IX 
Kind of Coml!an~ 
Name of Company 
Country of Operation (and country of registration or incorporation) Principal product or actlvltlus SIC Code 
Companies & Investments 
Subsidiary USA T aCQ Aloha, Inc. Fasl foods 5812 
Associates Taiwan Taiwan Consolidalion Company Ltd 4412 
Associates Hong Kong Telemac (Hong Kong) lid Texttles 2299 
Associates Hong Kong The Daily Farm Company Lid. Supermarkets 5411 
Associates Hong Kong The Dairy Farm Ice & Cold Storage Company lid . Dairy farming, cold slorage, ice 2024 
manufacturing, catenng and 
supermarkets 
Subsidiary PhilipPines The Edward J Nell Co. Machinery distributors 5084 
Subsidiary United Kingdom The Elizabelh Manne & Genemllnsurance Insurance 6411 
Company Lid 
Principal Subsidiary & 
Associated Companies 
Hong Kong The Excelsior Hong Kong Ltd. Hotel ownership 701 1 
Associates Hong Kong The Excelsior Helel (Heng Kong) lid. Hotel operator 701 1 
Subsidiary Australia The Fleel Forge Pty Lid Engineering 87 11 
Subsidiary Hong Kong The Hong Kong Fire Insurance Company lid. Insurance 64 tl 
Associates Hong Kong The Hong Kong Land Company. Lid Propony holding & operating through 65 12 
subsldlsnes In property Investments. 
loa Sing & management 
Associates Hong Kong The Hoogkong Fire Insumnce Company Lid Non-life insurance 6331 
Associates Hong Kong The Hongkong Land Company. Ltd Property Investment management & 6512 
development 
Associates Hong Kong The Hongkong Land Property Company Ltd Property investment & managoment 6512 
Subsidiary Republrc of Soulh Afnca The Independenl Brewers Corp Llmlled 2082 
Subsidiary Hong Kong The Indo-China Sleam Navigation Co .• Ltd Ship owning 4499 
Subsidiary Hong Kong The Indo-China Steam Navigation Company Shipowning and management 4499 
(Hongkong) Ltd 
Subsidiary Hong Kong The Jardine Engineering Corporation lid Englneenng 1611 
Associates Australia The Land Company Ply Lid . Investment holding 6719 
Subsidiary Unrled Kingdom The Maltese Cross Insurance Company. Ltd Insurance 6411 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong The Mandarin Orienlal Holel Company Ltd . HOlellnvestment & management 7011 
Principal SubSIdiary & 
ASSOCiated Companies 
Hong Kong The Optical Shop Lid Optical products retailing 8742 
Associates Thailand The Onental Hotel (Thailand) Ltd Hotel ownership 7011 
Principal Operating 
Companies and 
Thailand The Onental Hotel (Thailand) pel Hotel ownership 70 11 
Investments 
Principal Opera ling 
Companies and 
Thailand The Oriental Hotel (Thailand) PCL Holel ownership 701 I 
Investments 
SubSidiary USA Thea Davies Euromotors ltd Motor dlslnbu\lon 5012 
Subsidiary Canada Theo Davies Holdings Canada Ltd Restaurants 5812 
SubSidiary USA Theo. H. DaVies & Co . Lid. Holding 6719 
SubSidiary USA TheoOavios Bluebell , Inc 011 & gas oxplorauoo 1382 
Subsidiary USA TheoDavles Euromolors. Lid 011 & gas explorallon 1382 
Subsidiary USA TheoDavles Exploration. Inc 011 & gas e)(ploratlon 1382 
Subsidiary USA TheoDavles Marine Agencies. Inc. ShipPIng agonls 4731 
Subsidiary USA TheoDavlas Properties propeny developmenl 65 12 
Subsidiary USA ThaoDavles Propenles. Inc. Property development 6512 
Subsidiary USA TheoDavies Ventures. tnc. 011 refining 291 1 
Subsidiary USA TheoDavlos-Altamont, Inc. 011 & gas oxploratlon 1382 
Subsidiary USA TheoDavies-Willlston. Inc. 011 & gas oxplorallon 1382 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Thistle Equlpmenl Sales (HK) Ltd Industnal and marine equlpmenl 3559 
Associates USA Thlslle Inc. Sefsmlc dala loaslng 8713 
Subsidiary Uniled Kingdom Thistle Insurance Co ltd Insurance Motor 641115012 
IMotor 
Subsidiary Singapore Thistle Investment Pte lid Inveslmenl holding 6719 
ASsadales South Africa Thomas Cook Rennies Travel (Ply) Lid Tr8vol 4724 
Associates Malaysls Thomas Cook Sdn Bhd 4724 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Thompson. Graham & Company Ltd Insumneo and rolnsurance broklng 6411 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Tofl Bros. Expon Co .. LImited Holding company 67 1g 
Subsidiary Australia Toft Bros. Industnes Lid SugAr harvesting oqulpmonl 3559 
manufocturlng 
SubSidiary Brazil Toft Equipamentos Agricolas Lid. Sugar harv sting equlprnent 3559 
manufacturing 
AsSOCiates Hong Kong Tomafin Ltd. 
Assoclales Fiji Tourist Enlerprisos (FIJI) Lid TOUrism 4724 
Principal Operating Uniled Kingdom and Trafalgar House pic Holding. operating through subsldlnnoB 701 I 
Companies & Investments Worldwide In construction & ongln erlng. proporty. 
passengor shippIng & hOlols 
XL 
Kind of Coml!an~ 
Name of Company 
Count~ of 0 l!!ratlon (and countrr, of registration or I ncore:oration~ Prlneleal eroduel or Delivlli •• SIC Code 
Associates Malaysia Trans-Meridian Moving System Sdn Bhn Transport services 4731 
Associates Libena Transport and Trading Company Inc Holding company operating through 67 19 
affiliates In general contracllng, trading 
& transportation 
Associates lIbena Transporting and Trading Company Inc. Holding company operatmg through 6719 
affiliates in general contractmg. trading 
& transportation 
Associates Middle Easl Transporting and Trading Company Inc . (liberia) Holding company operating through 6719 
affiliates in general contracting. trading 
and transportation 
Associates UK Translee Inlernallonal Freighl Serw:es Lid Frelghl fOlWardmg 4731 
Subsidiary Zambia Turnbull Gibson & Co. Insurance 6411 
SubSidiary Untted Kingdom Turnbull Gibson & Co (Insurance Brokers) Ltd Insurance broking 6411 
SubSidiary Zambia Turnbull Gibson & Co. (Zambia) lid . Insurance 6411 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Turnbull Gibson & Co. Ltd. Freight fOfW8rding 4731 
Subsidiary Hong Kong Turnbull Gibson (Far Easl) lid. Insurance braking 6411 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Turnbull Gibson (UndelWnling AgenCies) Ltd Insurance underwriting 6411 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Turnbull Gibson Travel Ltd Travel agents 4724 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Turnbull Matheson & Co Lid. Insurance braking 6411 
Associates Singapore UIE-Promel Pte Ltd Steel fabrication 3312 
Principal Opera ling 
Companies and 
Singaporo UMF Pte Ltd Finance 62 11 
Investments 
Assoc~tes Hong Kong Uniled Freighlways Ltd Freight forwarding 4731 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Untted Merchants Finance Ltd Hire purchase finance 6022 
Associates Malaysia Uniled Orient Leasing Company Sdn Bhd Equlpmenlleaslng 6022 
Associates Malaysia United Orient Leasing Sdn Bhn Container loasing 4783 
Associates Taiwan United Terminals Ltd Container terminals 441 2 
Subsidiary United Kingdom Vatrader Ltd. Freight forwarding 4731 
AsSOCiates Hong Kong Vermillion Land Co Ltd Property development 6512 
AsSOCiates Liberia Viking Carriers, Inc. Ship owning 4499 
ASSOCiates Hong Kong Wah Ming Eleelrics Ltd Electronics 3677 
Associates India Wallwood Plantalions & Agency Lid . Tea 762 
Principal Subsidiary & Hong Kong Walerhouse of Hong Kong Lid. Waler lours 4724 
AsSOCiated Companies 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Walertours of Hong Kong lid Walenour opemhng 4724 
SubSidiary Australia Walhen Curnow & Cocks (HoldIngs) Pty Ltd Customs agents 4783 
Subsidiary Australia Wathen Jardine Air Cargo Ltd AirfrOighl 4731 
Subsidiary Panama Wealden Shipping S.A Holding & Inveslmenl 67 19 
Associales Liberia Wealth Carriers. Inc. Ship owning 4499 
Principal Operating Hong Kong Wellcom Company Lid Supermarkets 5411 
Companies & Investments 
Principal Subsidiary & Hong Kong Wellcome Co. Lid Supermarkets 5411 
Associated Companies 
Subsidiary Taiwan Wellcome Taiwan Company lid SupallTl8rkets 5411 
Subsidiary Auslraha Weslralian Aviahon (Services) Ply Lid Aircraft solos, him and sorvlCtng 4522 
Subsidiary Bermuda Whetslone Company Ltd. Investment and finance 6211 
Associates Hong Kong Wh,lehead & Poole (Hong Kong) Lid 9999 
Subsidiary Transkel Wild Coasl Holiday Inn (Ply) Lid HOlel & casino 7011 
Subsidiary Transkei Wild Coasl Properties (Ply) LId HOlel & casino 70 11 
SubSidiary Australia Willis & Sons LId. Watch and Jewelry dealing 5094 
Subsidiary Republic of South Afnca Wlhnd Holdings Lid 6719 
Subsidiary New Zealand Woolworth. (New Zealand) Ltd Supermarkets 54 11 
Subsidiary Uniled Kingdom Ynll Lid Property 6512 
Associates Hong Kong Young Fashions Lid . Garmenl mfg 2389 
Subsidiary Australia ZF Austral,. Ply Lid Holding company 50 13 
Subsidiary Hong Kong ZF Engineering Lid Cor park owning nnd onglneonng salos 7521 
Subsidiary Hong Kong ZF Garages Lid Engineering service. 7538 
PrinCipal Operallng Hong Kong Zung Fu Company Molar dlstribullon 551 1 
Companies and 
Investments 
SubSidiary Hong Kong Zung Fu Company LId. Transport and englnecling equlpmonl. 37 11 
specialists 
Principal Operallng Macau Zung Fu Motors (Macau) Ltd . Motor dlSlrlbulion 551 1 
Companies and 
Investments 
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